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11. Security Review: Russia-Ukraine Confrontation

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili, Zurab Batiashvili, Nika Petriashvili, and Giorgi Surmava
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
After the occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the epicenter of hostilities shifted to eastern Ukraine, specifically to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Russian-speaking population was not loyal to Kyiv even before that but the events in Crimea and the Russian assistance invigorated the local separatists who, along with adventurers backed by the regular Russian troops, managed to gain control over parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The fighting turned out to be quite bloody and long lasting. There were large casualties on both sides, including civilians. Coupled with a high-profile incident of the downing of a passenger plane, it caused a wide international reverberation and world interest in resolving the conflict. The efforts of the leading OSCE countries had led to a certain agreement and the cessation of intense hostilities by September 2014. A quadripartite agreement (Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine) was achieved on the separation of the parties and a ceasefire. The line of contact was divided into sectors and precincts where a group of OSCE military observers began to monitor the “silence” regime. Since then, the intensity and scale of the hostilities have been significantly reduced. However, every now and then the situation would worsen which was followed by a new agreement on a ceasefire and the establishment of a “silence” regime. It should be noted that since March 2021, the number of incidents has increased dramatically. At the same time, regular Russian troops began to gather along Ukraine's eastern borders and Crimea.
Topic:
International Relations, National Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, Separatism, and Annexation
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea

12. On the New National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On June 2, 2021, the new National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation was approved. It is a guiding document for Russia's security policy planning process; however, as a public document, it also has a significant political implication as it is saturated with political messages reflecting Russia's position on various important issues. Russia's new National Security Strategy is the fifth such document. The first document, which was approved as early as in 1997 by then President of Russia, B. Yeltsin, was called the Concept of National Security. At the beginning of 2000, the decree on the amendments to this document was signed by V. Putin who, at the time, was only the acting president of the Russian Federation. Afterwards, at a meeting of the Russian State Council in September 2008, then President, D. Medvedev, declared the need to develop a new strategy. It should be noted that this session was officially dedicated to the "conflict in South Ossetia." As a result, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, which was supposed to be active up until 2020, was approved in May 2009; however, this strategy did not last as far as 2020 - in late 2015, it was replaced by a new national security strategy developed by Russia after the annexation of Crimea and the armed aggression in eastern Ukraine. These events created a whole new reality which also strained relations between Russia and the West, eventually reflected in the strict tone towards the West in the 2015 National Security Strategy. As for the National Security Strategy, it was developed in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Law on Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation adopted in 2014. According to this law, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation must be adjusted every six years. A new National Security Strategy was developed and approved on July 2, 2021, precisely in line with the requirement of this six-year period of the law.
Topic:
International Relations, National Security, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Georgia, Crimea, and Russian Federation

13. Annexation of Crimea from the Perspective of Offensive Realism | Ofansif Realizm Bağlamında Kırım’ın İlhakı

Author:
Oğuzhan Çakır and Ayça Eminoğlu
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
The main purpose of this study is to understand what motives the Russian Federation, a regional power, uses military force against its neighbor, Ukraine, and annexes Crimea. As a result of the literature review conducted for this purpose, this approach of Russia was generally interpreted from two different theoretical perspectives. Some of the critics evaluated Russia's attitude during the crisis process under the name of defensive realism, while the other group, on the contrary, evaluated Russia's attitude under the name of offensive realism. The work is addressed in the context of these two theories, with a deductive approach. The great powers do not refrain from using hard power when it comes to their security. The answer has been searched to the arguments that the Revisionist movement that Russia displayed in this crisis was caused by international developments rather than domestic political developments and that there is no sanctioning power against the great powers that have become a chronic problem of international law. When the relevant study concluded, and the previous crisis experiences of Russia taking in the consideration, it is observed that Russia has similar characteristic features in this crisis as well. It has been concluded that Russia has not been able to get rid of the sense of the siege it experienced during the Cold War and has pursued aggressive policies when it feels such a threat in its nearby geography. On the other hand, what happened in Crimea has clearly shown that the great powers do not refrain from using force and ignoring international law when it comes to their benefits and security. | Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, bölgesel bir güç olan Rusya Federasyonu’nun, komşusu olan Ukrayna’ya karşı hangi saiklerle askeri güç kullandığı ve Kırım’ı ilhak ettiğidir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda yapılan literatür çalışması sonucunda, Rusya’nın bu yaklaşımı genel olarak iki farklı teorik perspektiften yorumlanmıştır. Düşünürlerin bir kısmı Rusya’nın kriz sürecindeki tutumunu defansif realizm bağlamında değerlendirmekteyken diğer grup ise tam aksine Rusya’nın tutumunu ofansif realizm bağlamında ele almışladır. Çalışma, bu iki teori bağlamında, tümdengelimci bir yaklaşımla ele alınmıştır. Büyük güçler, güvenlikleri söz konusu olduğunda sert güç kullanmaktan kaçınmamaktadırlar. Rusya’nın bu krizde sergilemiş olduğu revizyonist hareketin, iç politik gelişmelerden ziyade uluslararası gelişmelerden kaynaklandığı ve uluslararası hukukun kronik sorunu haline gelen büyük güçlere karşı bir yaptırım gücünün olmadığı argümanlarına cevap aranmıştır. İlgili çalışma sonuçlandığında, Rusya’nın geçmişte yaşadığı krizler de ele alındığında, bu krizle benzer karakteristik özelliklere sahip olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Rusya’nın, Soğuk Savaş dönemi yaşadığı kuşatılma algısından kurtulamadığı ve yakın coğrafyasında bu şekilde bir tehdit hissettiği zaman saldırgan politikalar izlediği sonucu varılmıştır. Öte yandan Kırım’da yaşananlar, büyük güçlerin kendi menfaatleri ve güvenlikleri söz konusu olduğunda güç kullanmaktan ve uluslararası hukuku hiçe saymaktan kaçınmadıklarının açıkça göstermiştir.
Topic:
International Law, Territorial Disputes, Realism, and Annexation
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea

14. Baku’s Success in Using Turkish Drones Raises Question: Could Ukraine Use Them Against Russia in Crimea?

Author:
Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Azerbaijani military’s use of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), purchased from Turkey, played such a prominent role in Baku’s victory over Armenian forces during the Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 9, 2020) that defense analysts around the world are now focusing on how their countries may utilize similar unmanned systems and how they could respond if such drones are used against them (Regnum, accessed December 16; Ecfr.eu., November 24; see EDM, November 9). Notably, Azerbaijan employed its Bayraktars to identify and attack Armenian forces as well as to provide a real-time picture of the battlefield that was useful for both strategic planning and propaganda (see EDM, October 15). Now, Vadim Nozdrya, who heads the Ukrainian arms trade state committee Ukrspetseksport, has announced that Kyiv is prepared to purchase from Turkey 48 of these battle-tested UAVs (Milliyet), December 4). That news is undoubtedly prompting analysts in Moscow to consider how Ukraine could eventually use such drones to threaten Russian control of occupied Crimea or Donbas and what Moscow needs to do in response.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Weapons, Drones, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey, Eastern Europe, Azerbaijan, Crimea, and Mediterranean

15. The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny

Author:
Adrian Popa and Cristian Barna
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Russia’s recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. While the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski’s ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

16. Water Shortages in Occupied Crimea

Author:
Daniel Szeligowski
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Water shortages in occupied Crimea are of a long-term character since its local resources are insufficient to meet its needs. In the short term, the Russian authorities will attempt to resolve the water deficit on an ad hoc basis while stepping up pressure on Ukraine to unblock the North Crimean Canal. A forced takeover of the canal by the Russian military should be considered a last resort, given that the cost of such an operation for Russia would significantly exceed the possible benefit.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Territorial Disputes, Water, and Occupation
Political Geography:
Russia and Crimea

17. Russians Want Crimea; Prefer Luhansk and Donetsk Independent

Author:
Stepan Goncharov and Denis Volkov
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine remains unresolved and—after five years—it does not appear to be reaching a resolution any time soon. The ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine between the Ukrainian government and rebel forces supported by Moscow not only degrades the relationship between Kiev and Moscow but also contributes to the deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. [1] This particular regional conflict has become an important destabilizing factor for international security. Findings from a new binational survey, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center, show that a plurality of Russians believe these eastern areas of Ukraine should be independent states.[2] And a majority of Russians continue to say that Russia’s annexation of Crimea has brought the country more good than harm.
Topic:
International Relations, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Crimea

18. The Baltic Sea Region after the Ukraine Crisis and Trump: A Russian perspective

Author:
Alexander Sergunin
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
This DIIS Report identifies Russian national interests in the BSR (Baltic Sea Region) and discusses whether there are continuities and changes in these interests in the post-Crimea era. The Russian discourse on the BSR is explored, including Russian foreign policy schools and official foreign policy and national security doctrines. Different aspects of Moscow’s BSR strategy - political, economic, sub-regional, environmental and military - are examined. The chances for Russia’s participation in the BSR multilateral cooperative framework are assessed. This DIIS Report authored by Alexander Sergunin, professor at St. Petersburg State University, is an outgrowth of a defence and security project on 'The Baltic Sea Region after Crimea and Trump' with Sergunin and Hans Mouritzen, senior researcher at DIIS, as participants (see also DIIS Working Paper 2019:1).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Crimea, and Baltic Sea

19. What Next for Russia’s Front-Line States?

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, alarmed not only Western-leaning states in Central Europe and the Baltic but also Moscow’s traditional allies. These events signaled that Moscow is now willing and capable of using direct military force against perceived strategic threats in its self-proclaimed region of vested interests. With the exception of Ukraine and the Baltic States, this Letort Paper examines how Russia’s front-line states have adjusted their foreign policy posture since 2014. Belarus, Moldova, the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus calculate the benefits and risks in their relationship with Moscow and either make concessions or strengthen their defenses accordingly to avoid triggering a Russian reaction. This Letort Paper provides a range of policy recommendations intended to maximize the opportunities of a new alignment with the West for these states while minimizing the risk of Russia, using again, those capabilities it has demonstrated in Ukraine and Syria.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Crimea

20. Volodymyr Zelensky’s Sweeping Victories: Is Ukraine’s Turn Toward the West Definite?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
For more than half a decade Ukraine has been one of epicenters on the map of geopolitical crises in the world and consequently drawn a lot of international attention worldwide. Ever since it gained its independence form the crumbling Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine was a of the country also changed. Ukraine has been dominated by Russia as the Russian Empire penetrated deep toward the Black Sea in the 17th century, and the position of inferiority towards Moscow was also the case in the USSR. The first upheaval dubbed the Orange Revolution sort of buffer zone between the West and East, between the United States and European allies on the one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other. With the change of political elites and their political preferences, the orientation in 2004, brought to power Viktor Yushchenko, who tried to conduct reforms and bring Ukraine closer to the West, but the effect of his Presidency were ephemeral. President Viktor Yanukovych turned Ukraine’s sight towards Russia again, but also kept the process of EU association alive before suddenly deciding not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU just days before the planned signing ceremony on 29th November 2013. This Yanukovych’s abrupt turn from EU in favor of stronger ties with Russia triggered the wave of massive public demonstrations which later become known as the Euromaidan and subsequently the Ukrainian revolution in February 2014. The Euromaidan Revolution toppled Yanukovych and the new pro-Western government was formed. Russia soon reacted to the change of tide in Ukraine by annexing the Crimean peninsula in March and soon the armed conflict between the pro- Western government in Kiev and Russia backed rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts broke out. Ever since the spring of 2014, Ukraine has been engulfed in a brutal conflict in the east of the country that is hampering its efforts to reform and get closer to the EU. Nonetheless, Ukrainian leadership is under the new President Volodymir Zelensky is striving to forge stronger links with the West and the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea