Search

Begin New Search Political Geography China

5251. The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know

Author:
Justin Sommers and Rapporteur
Publication Date:
11-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Asia Society are pleased to present the report of our conference entitled “The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know,” which took place in Washington, D.C., on November 30, 2001. The conference, engaging experts and policymakers both in and out of government, was one phase in a larger joint project of the two organizations that will result in a scholarly volume.
Topic:
Diplomacy and Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States, China, South Asia, Washington, India, and Asia

5252. What Drove Relative Wages in France? Structural Decomposition Analysis in a General Equilibrium Framework, 1970-92

Author:
Sébastien Jean and Olivier Bontout
Publication Date:
09-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
This paper confronts a CGE model to observed evolutions in France, between 1970 and 1992, through a structural decomposition analysis. The choice of the model and the assumption of constant elasticities over time enable the structural change of the economy between two equilibria to be summarised through a set of four types of state variables, reflecting the effect of technical change, changes in factor supplies, shifts in consumption patterns, and international trade. Simulations then allow the contribution of each of these shocks to be assessed. We find that technical change had a strong positive impact on the relative wage of skilled to unskilled workers, while the impact of changes in factor supplies is strongly negative. The effect of international trade is far less important. However, if we take into account a trade-induced effect on productivity, then we find that trade substantially increased wage inequalities.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and France

5253. Missile Defence and European Security

Author:
François Heisbourg, Klaus Becher, Alexander Pikayev, and Ivo H. Daalder
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
European NATO countries have been spectators to the debate about defending the US against ballistic missile attacks. While there have been national differences in Europe's reactions to the national missile defence (NMD) programme, it is obvious that most Europeans don't like it. The French seem somewhat more convinced than others that missile defence is inherently foolish and unworkable. Some British experts seem to insist more than others that any programme that might undermine NATO's nuclear deterrence and strategic unity should be avoided. And perhaps Germans, more than others, worry about perceived dangers to the ABM and other arms control treaties, and generally about relations with Russia. Most Europeans at present believe that US defence against long-range ballistic missiles is a slap in the face for Russia, a dangerous provocation for China and an inadequate response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Germany

5254. Fishing in Troubled Waters: Putin's Caspian Policy (Event Summary)

Author:
Doug Blum and Carol Saivetz
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Carol Saivetz and Doug Blum spoke about Russia's policies toward the Caspian under President Putin at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs on May 2, 2001 in an event sponsored by the Caspian Studies Program. Carol Saivetz, Research Associate at the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard and Executive Director of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, noted a trend toward more coherence in Russia's foreign policy, although she said it is occurring despite a split within the foreign policy establishment. Doug Blum, who spoke second, focused on the bilateral relationships between Russia and other Caspian Basin countries, and on those countries' responses to Russian policy, singling out Kazakhstan's relations with Russia as the most cooperative. Melissa Carr, Caspian Studies Program Director, chaired the event. Carol Saivetz opened by arguing that President Putin has being working to correct the foreign policy "freelancing" rampant in the late Yeltsin years, bringing more coherence to Russian foreign policy in general. However, at the same time, she said, the Putin Administration seems to be split into two different camps. Moscow analysts, when describing this trend to Saivetz, used the terms "integrationists" and "isolationists." The "integrationists" are those interested in reforming the Russian economy and linking it to the outside world (through WTO membership, for example) and who welcome globalization. The "isolationists" are in Saivetz's opinion the "derzhavniks," those who long for Russia's superpower status and for increasing Russia's power in the CIS. Putin has decided, Saivetz argued, that the Caspian is one of Russia's vital interests and therefore a region to concentrate on. Shortly after he was elected President, a Security Council meeting took place in which the two items on the agenda were the new military doctrine and Caspian issues. After this meeting, Putin declared that Russia must be "competitive" in the region and to this end he created a new department for Caspian policy, appointing Viktor Kalyuzhny as Caspian envoy. The Russian President also talked about the need to balance state interests with the interests of the oil companies. Following that statement (and probably with Kremlin backing), Yukos, LUKoil and Gazprom joined in a new consortium called the Caspian Oil Company to start developing reserves in the Russian sector. Next Saivetz discussed Putin's January trip to Azerbaijan and the agreements that emerged from his meetings with Aliyev. There was compromise on the division of the Caspian Sea, and in parallel the signing of an oil deal between LUKoil and SOCAR during the visit. On the other hand, at that time Russia was still trying to block the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (since then they have withdrawn overt opposition but continued to waver), and could not find agreement with Azerbaijan about Nagorno-Karabagh. Saivetz also briefly discussed Khatami's trip to Moscow, which ended up being about arms deals and not the Caspian, precisely because of the lack of agreement on a legal regime. The final resolution of the Caspian demarcation remains one of the key issues in the region, she noted. Saivetz made several broader conclusions: 1) Putin has made the Caspian a priority; 2) Putin's policy blends economic and geopolitical calculations; he has shifted the emphasis in foreign policy from macro ties (state-to-state relations) to a combination of macro and micro (i.e. trade and economic) ties. 3) There is a notable militarization of Russian pressures on other littoral states, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia; many analysts explain Russia's intention to keep the waters of the Caspian common as a way to ensure Moscow the right to project its naval power. 4) Increased attention to the Caspian reflects a larger Russian policy towards what Russians have called the "Near Abroad," and particularly the Caucasus (Chechnya, Georgia, Armenia). Returning to the idea of integrationists and isolationists, Saivetz remarked that there is a debate in the U.S. about which of these two tendencies is driving Russian policy. It seems that Putin has not made a choice: the Russian government is pressuring Georgia and Azerbaijan at the same time as Viktor Kalyuzhny has backed off from opposing BTC. It seems that Russia's ideal model for pipeline development is reflected in the CPC: outside investment went into a pipeline that traverses Russian territory (where Russia gets transit fees). This pipeline reflects a policy that is simultaneously both integrationist (bringing in Western investment) and isolationist (forcing North-South routes). Doug Blum began by registering his agreement with Saivetz's presentation. He structured his talk by focusing on Russia's bilateral relationships with Caspian littoral states one by one, in "declining order of [Russia's] success": Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Georgia. He pointed out that Russia's place is extremely important in all the significant issue areas that concern the Caspian countries. "This is not simply a matter of Russia being effectively able to exert leverage on these countries," he remarked, "there are shared and overlapping interests." Russia is an important transit route for Central Asian goods, and these countries also share an interest in combating terror, drugs, crime, and "Islamic fundamentalism." Russia has the logistical and military resources to help in these areas, and is unparalleled by all other countries in the region. Russia's successes in Kazakhstan include the achievement of increased energy transit through Russian territory with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line and also with added volumes from on the Aktau-Samara route. Also, Russia and Kazakhstan have concluded formal accords on trade and the possible implementation of a Eurasian Economic Union. In security, there is cooperation on an air defense system. Also, Russia has retained access to the Baikonur Space Facility. In sum, Russia has succeeded in fulfilling its goals in Kazakhstan, but this is largely due to overlapping interests. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is and has for the past decade been interested in balancing its orientation between Russia, China, and the West. This balancing act has resulted in strains with Russia, for example over the possible Kazakh commitment to BTC. Kazakhstan also disagrees with Russia about the ownership of some offshore oil islands, and about Russia's naval presence in the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan, according to Blum, presents a "much more complex picture of balancing and bandwagoning," being limited to some extent by Nagorno-Karabagh and, relatedly, the U.S. Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which limits direct government assistance from the U.S. to Azerbaijan. He noted that Azerbaijan of necessity has been searching for a modus vivendi with Russia, a pursuit that has been made easier given the new Russian flexibility towards Azerbaijan under Putin. Azerbaijan and Russia have started to form agreements on trade and investment, and also humanitarian relief and treatment of migrants. The two countries are cooperating on combating terrorism, organized crime, and drug smuggling. Also, Azerbaijan is increasing imports of Russian gas as a trade-off for exporting more oil through Novorossiisk. Total trade between Azerbaijan and Russia remains low, however. Azerbaijan is trying to attract Western investment and balance against Russia through membership in groups such as GUUAM. Blum emphasized that both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are attempting to accommodate to geopolitical reality. In addition, he pointed out that both countries are "very sensitive and very angry about repeated Western, and especially American, criticisms of human rights and the lack of political progress"; and this motivates compromise with Russia. Iran's relationship with Russia involves both conflict and cooperation. There is disagreement over Russia's naval presence in the Caspian and about the ownership of the Sea. On the other hand, there is significant military cooperation. Turkmenistan's relationship with Russia is "quite strained," according to Blum, especially over the Caspian legal regime, where Turkmenistan has sided with Iran. Turkmenistan has, however, negotiated a favorable deal for gas transit through the ITERA system. However, on the whole Turkmenistan remains "a very isolated and extraordinary backwards, removed country." Blum termed Georgia's relationship with Russia "extremely strained." Russian policymakers see it in zero-sum terms, especially over energy transit issues (what goes through Georgia is a Russian loss) and over the pending loss of military bases in the region. Georgia has shown some willingness to form a working relationship with Russia, but still the Shevardnadze regime is understandably very reluctant (given how the Russian security apparatus relates to him, as a wishful target for assassination). Blum closed by reiterating that the cornerstone of current Russian policy is international integration. Russia is pushing a north-south route that would bring trade from Iran and India up through Russia's Caspian port of Astrakhan then up the Volga. The Caspian States also want to enter into the international economy, with the help of multiple trading routes, north south and also the east west.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

5255. At the Crossroads of Post-Communist Modernisation: Russia and China in Comparative Perspective

Author:
Linda Jakobson and Christer Pursiainen
Publication Date:
02-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
“Modernity ends when words like progress, advance, development, emancipation, liberation, growth, accumulation, enlightenment, embetterment, avant-garde, lose their attraction and their function as guides to social action.” By this definition, Russia and China are both still undertaking extensive modernisation – though by very different means. Why have Russia and China chosen such different paths for their post-communist transitions? How do their strategies differ, and how are they interrelated? When – at what junctures - were the crucial choices made?
Topic:
Development, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

5256. Rough Waters in the South China Sea: Navigation Issues and Confidence-Building Measures

Author:
Ji Guoxing
Publication Date:
08-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
In the wake of a collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter off the coast of Hainan in April 2001, verbal skirmishing between the United States and China revealed sharply different conceptions of jurisdictional and navigational principles. These differences persist and will likely be the cause of future conflicts; they have already caused strife among countries ringing the South China Sea. Central to these conflicts are the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) that extend 200 nm into the sea from coastal nations' baselines. Created by the UN Law of the Sea Convention, these zones attempt to accommodate coastal states' interest in controlling offshore resources and maritime powers' interests in maintaining freedom of navigation. But ambiguities in the Convention's language combined with coastal states' proliferating EEZ claims have created a tinderbox. The situation will remain volatile as long as the focus remains on jurisdictional disputes. But confidence-building efforts aimed more narrowly on practical navigation issues and managing “incidents at sea” offer a starting point for first bilateral and then multilateral agreements. In the wake of a collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter off the coast of Hainan in April 2001, verbal skirmishing between the United States and China revealed sharply different conceptions of jurisdictional and navigational principles. These differences persist and will likely be the cause of future conflicts; they have already caused strife among countries ringing the South China Sea. Central to these conflicts are the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) that extend 200 nm into the sea from coastal nations' baselines. Created by the UN Law of the Sea Convention, these zones attempt to accommodate coastal states' interest in controlling offshore resources and maritime powers' interests in maintaining freedom of navigation. But ambiguities in the Convention's language combined with coastal states' proliferating EEZ claims have created a tinderbox. The situation will remain volatile as long as the focus remains on jurisdictional disputes. But confidence-building efforts aimed more narrowly on practical navigation issues and managing “incidents at sea” offer a starting point for first bilateral and then multilateral agreements.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, and International Law
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, and China

5257. Constitutional Causes for Technological Leadership: Why Europe?

Author:
Jurgen G. Backhaus
Publication Date:
08-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Independent Institute
Abstract:
In a paper circulated towards the end of 1997 under the title Why Europe?, Gordon Tullock poses a simple question and provides a tentative, yet provocative answer. The question is why the technological take off took place in Europe and in the 19th century when well into the 18th century other areas of the world, and notably China, looked much better poised for technological and scholarly leadership than Europe. His tentative answer turns on the constitutional composition of the landscape of political entities in Europe. This essay tries to provide some further underpinnings to aspects of Gordon Tullock's preliminary answer.
Topic:
Industrial Policy and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China and Europe

5258. Russia in the International System

Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Russia's Foreign Policy Russian foreign policy in the coming years will be characterized by weakness; frustration--primarily with the United States as the world's preeminent power--over Russia's diminished status; generally cautious international behavior; and a drive to resubjugate, though not reintegrate, the other former Soviet states. The international situation affords Russia time to concentrate on domestic reforms because, for the first time in its history, it does not face significant external threats. But rather than use the breathing space for domestic reforms, Putin is as much--if not more--focused on restoring Russia's self-defined rightful role abroad and seeking to mold the CIS into a counterweight to NATO and the European Union. The Outside World's Views of Russia Russia does not have any genuine allies. Some countries are interested in good relations with Russia, but only as a means to another end. For example, China sees Russia as a counterweight to the United States but values more highly its ties with the United States. Some countries see Russia as a vital arms supplier but resent Russia also selling arms to their rivals (China-India, Iran-Iraq). Pro-Russia business lobbies exist in Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Israel (one-fifth of whose population now consists of Soviet émigres), but they do not single-handedly determine national policies. Europe is the only region that would like to integrate Russia into a security system, but it is divided over national priorities and institutional arrangements as well as put off by some Russian behavior. Most CIS governments do not trust their colossal neighbor, which continues to show an unsettling readiness to intervene in their internal affairs, though they know Russia well and are to a considerable degree comfortable in dealing with it. Turkey has developed an improved dialogue and an unprecedented number of economic ties with Russia during the post-Cold War period, but this more positive pattern of relations has not fully taken root, and Ankara remains suspicious of Moscow's intentions. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow's role in the Middle East has been reduced, but Israel, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq all favor good relations with Russia. Mutual interests also override disagreements in Russian-Iranian relations, but Tehran is wary of Russian behavior, particularly toward Saddam Hussein. India still trusts Russia--a sentiment that is perhaps a residue of the genuine friendship of Cold War days--but clearly not in the same way it once did, and New Delhi fears that weakness will propel Russia into doing things that could drive India further away. In East Asia, the most substantial breakthrough has been the resurrected relationship between Russia and China, one that entails significant longer-term risk for Russia. Other countries in the region value their links with Moscow as a means to balance a more powerful China, or as a useful component of their larger political and economic strategies, but Russia's role in East Asia--as elsewhere--remains constrained by the decline in its political, military, and economic power over the last decade. Russia's Weakness Russia's weakness stems from long-term secular trends and from its domestic structure. In essence, the old nomenklatura and a few newcomers have transformed power into property on the basis of personal networks and created an equilibrium resting on insider dealings. These insiders may jockey for position but have a vested interest in preserving the system. The public does not like the system but is resigned to it and gives priority to the preservation of order. As for the economy, it is divided into a profitable, internationally integrated sector run by oligarchs and a much larger, insulated, low-productivity, old-style paternalistic sector that locks Russia into low growth. No solace will be forthcoming from the international business and energy worlds. They do not expect the poor commercial climate to improve greatly and will not increase investments much beyond current levels until it does. Militarily, Russia will also remain weak. Its nuclear arsenal is of little utility, and Moscow has neither the will nor the means to reform and strengthen its conventional forces. Hope for the Future? The best hope for change in Russia lies with the younger generation. Several participants reported that under-25 Russians have much more in common with their US counterparts, including use of the Internet, than with older Soviet generations. But there was some question over whether the new generation would change the system or adapt to it. Others placed some hope in international institutions, for instance the World Trade Organization, eventually forcing Russia to adapt to the modern world. Dissenting Views Some participants dissented from the overall forecast of depressing continuity. The keynote speaker, James Billington, stated that Russia would not be forever weak and that the current confusion would end in a few years either through the adoption of authoritarian nationalism or federated democracy. One scholar felt the Chechen war was feeding ethnic discord in other areas of the Federation to which Moscow would respond with increased authoritarianism, not necessarily successfully. Finally, a historian observed that the patience of Russians is legendary but not infinite, meaning that we should not be overly deterministic.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Development
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Middle East, and Israel

5259. Second Annual Report

Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
The Commission considerably broadened its activities in its second full year, monitoring religious-freedom violations worldwide and increasing the number of countries it would study in depth. In July, the Commission wrote to the Secretary of State to recommend that Laos, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan be added to the list of “countries of particular concern” as provided for in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). It also recommended that Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, the Milosevic regime in Serbia and the Taliban in Afghanistan remain on the list. In addition, it wrote that India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are serious violators of religious freedom deserving careful State Department monitoring; it also expressed concerns about sectarian violence in Indonesia and Nigeria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Religion
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, China, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Taliban, and Vietnam

5260. Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Publication Date:
01-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) held its annual Pacific symposium on “Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China” at the National Defense University in Washington on March 7 and 8, 2000. This event brought together representatives of the policy community and academe from Australia, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. It focused on how perceptions of China influence defense and foreign policies in key nations of the Asia- Pacific region, how the likely course of developments in China might affect the future policies of countries in the region, and how such changes might impact on their security relations with the United States.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and International Law
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, India, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand