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41. Winter 2019 issue of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:
Ruben Safrastyan
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:
ARMENIA IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT SAREN ABGARYAN BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE AND THE INCREASING RELEVANCE OF ARMENIA-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY ...................... 4 MANE BABAJANYAN TACKLING ARMENIAN-GEORGIAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET AGE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES .............. 21 ANNA KARAPETYAN THE NEW DYNAMICS ՕF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNAL PROCESSES IN ARMENIA IN 2018 .......................................................................................................... 47 RESOURCE COMPETITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARAM ABAJYAN THE ROLE OF GULF REGION’S ENERGY SUPPLIERS IN CHINA’S ENERGY SECURITY AT THE TURN OF THE 21ST CENTURY ............. 62 SHOGHIK TADEVOSYAN HYDRO-HEGEMONY IN ACTION: THE PROBLEM OF WATER IN THE ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT ................................................. 82 WORKSHOP DEDICATED TO CONTEMPORARY EURASIA ............ 106
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, Water, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Energy Sector
Political Geography:
China, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Asia, Palestine, Armenia, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

42. Iran Nuclear Deal Procurement Channel Update: Is it being bypassed?

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The procurement channel set up under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, appears to be considering fewer proposals than expected and is altogether unused by a traditionally illicit conduit to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and non-nuclear programs, namely China. The procurement channel was designed to regulate Iran’s imports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods for nuclear or non-nuclear use. Given that Iran’s non-nuclear industries have often imported nuclear dual-use goods, this finding raises the question of whether the procurement channel, and its associated Procurement Working Group (PWG), is simply not being used, but illicit, nuclear dual-use supplies are still going to Iran. Although no evidence has emerged of banned sales going from the United States, Europe, or Japan, which have often been targets of Iranian illicit procurement networks, there is concern that banned sales could be going from parts of Asia. In particular, Chinese entities may be continuing to make sales of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran without using the channel. The United States and its allies should augment efforts to detect and intercept the flow of any strategic goods from China to Iran and from other potentially illicit supplier countries to Iran. China needs to reach out to suppliers or distributors of dual-use goods operating on its territory and ensure that they are informed about China’s export control laws and PWG requirements governing the sale of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran’s industries, whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

43. Canada’s Progressive Trade Agenda and a Free Trade Agreement with China: Are They Incompatible?

Author:
Hugh Stephens
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The “non-market” clause in the just-concluded update of NAFTA, now known as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would appear to limit Canada’s options in terms of negotiating a free trade agreement with China at the present time (given the de facto U.S. veto over a Canada-China agreement that it provides), yet Prime Minister Trudeau has already reaffirmed Canada’s intention to pursue closer economic ties with China despite this apparent limitation. If negotiations proceed, negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with China will be very different from negotiating one with a country that shares Canada’s Western values. However, a trade agreement with China makes good economic sense, and while there are some unique obstacles to reaching such an agreement owing to differing views of progressive trade, these are not insurmountable. In fact, Canada can use the same models in negotiating with China that it has used with Western countries. Such an approach combines trade goals with respecting Chinese cultural and political differences, particularly those that fall into the category of progressivism. This category includes labour rights, Indigenous and gender issues, and governance. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government has been focused on progressive elements in trade deals, while China has made it clear it is not interested in including them in any such pact. Concluding an agreement would mean that China and Canada must both recognize the political requirements and dynamics on the opposite side of the negotiating table, while seeking common ground diplomatically. Side agreements such as those that exist in the original NAFTA and in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) are one way to work with the two countries’ differences. Many of the provisions in a side agreement are not binding and thus not subject to the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism or trade sanctions. Instead, they are more aspirational and sometimes lay out a process for civil society groups to raise issues and help the thinking on those issues evolve, rather than simply holding the parties accountable for breaches. Canada is rightly concerned about Chinese stances on human rights, labour, environmental and gender issues. However, instead of including these issues in the main document on trade, they can be dealt with as shared interests between the two countries. Establishing separate but parallel mechanisms to deal with these issues would be a practical way to make progress. Focusing on micro, small and medium-sized businesses as one Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) did, could be another successful approach. Women own many of these businesses in developing countries, so such a focus would make a substantial contribution to their welfare. None of this means Canada should kowtow to China or look the other way on important values and issues. Side agreements and special focuses have formed parts of agreements with other countries that already share Canada’s Western values. This type of give-and-take is present even when Canada negotiates with countries that are not polar opposites. No country’s interests are exactly the same as those of any other and it’s unrealistic to expect unanimity on every issue. Language and firm commitments on progressive issues are still evolving in many of Canada’s free trade agreements, including the USMCA. It would be unreasonable to hope that everything can be achieved in an agreement with China on the first go-around. Rather, viewing a trade agreement with China as a work-in-progress means controversial elements can be brought into the negotiations and language used that reflects the understanding that these issues are evolving. It will require creative thinking, flexibility and joint commitment to find a solution, but—assuming that the USMCA does not rule out Canada-China negotiations toward a trade agreement— it should be possible to find sufficient common ground without having to resort to obfuscation and “creative ambiguity”.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, NAFTA, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America

44. The Strategic Importance of Antartica for China and India Under Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism

Author:
Monica Heinzaelmann and Leonardo Faria de Mattos
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The Antarctic Treaty was signed during the Cold War and intended to preserve the continent and transform it into a conflict free territory, prioritizing scientific cooperation. Despite having quadrupled the number of its signatories, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) faces nowadays the uncertainties of the new international order. Starting out from John Mearsheimer’s realistic perspective, this paper aims to analyze, the strategic importance of Antarctica and the interests that China and India have on the continent, as well as speculate on how their rise on the international scenario can impact the future of the Antarctic Treaty System.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Antartica

45. Japan in the Driver’s Seat? Reshaping the Regional Trade Order without the United States

Author:
T. J. Pempel
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
On January 28, 2018 representatives from eleven countries, following the strong leadership of Japan, agreed to a modified version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This new pact —renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP), or TPP-11—was formally signed in Chile on March 8. The treaty will take effect once ratified by at least six member countries. Japan is planning to push the treaty through the Diet within 2018 and anticipating that it will come into force sometime in 2019. The agreement represented a major recovery by the eleven countries following initial expectations that TPP was dead after the election of Donald Trump. Trump, as an early follow through on his xenophobic and unilateral campaign promises, signed an executive order pulling the United States out of the TPP within one hundred hours of his inauguration. With that stroke of his pen, Trump wiped out 10 years of work on the so-called “Pacific” route to regional trade integration, anchored on the U.S. market. It also defied multiple analyses demonstrating the strong economic benefits that TPP would provide for the United States. Turmoil immediately prevailed among the remaining eleven signatories. Japanese prime minister Abe, for example, only weeks after Trump’s election announced, “TPP is meaningless without the U.S.” Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong argued, “if the TPP does not go ahead, it would be a great loss for the rest of the member economies.” The National Interest was typical in its skepticism about both the survival of TPP and the long-term implications for the Asia-Pacific. In an article entitled “TPP is Dead; Now What?” it observed: “The United States’ withdrawal not only throws away the potential for a trade agreement but may cause countries that expended significant political capital for the TPP to retreat from free trade for the foreseeable future.” That China will be the primary beneficiary of Trump’s withdrawal was a widespread conclusion.5 In fact, as the signing of the CPTPP indicated, all eleven countries were prepared to recommit themselves to the deal and to continue to advance the goals of a liberal trading order in the region.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

46. Is the Belt and Road Initiative a Chinese-style Regionalism?

Author:
Tu Xinquan
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the last two decades, bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been considered a primary force to advance the world trading system because the Doha Development Agenda of the WTO has stagnated since its launch in 2001. The continuous expansion of the European Union and the American-led NAFTA and TPP as well as bilateral FTAs between the United States and EU and their partners best exemplified this phenomenon. However, such an approach is facing serious challenges from rising anti-globalization sentiment originating in the EU and United States in recent years. In June 2016, the United Kingdom decided to exit the EU as a result of a referendum. This is the first time a EU member chose to leave. On January 23, 2017, at the start of his presidency, Donald Trump signed as his first executive order the withdrawal from TPP, which his predecessor spent years concluding with 11 partners. These two consecutive dramatic actions of the previous and current world leaders shocked the globe. Next to the WTO, regionalism is seen as the second-best choice in promoting globalization. Now, two regional initiatives led by developed countries are facing a serious backlash. The world is concerned that this means the end and a reversal of globalization. Since its WTO accession in 2001, China has also been actively negotiating FTAs with its neighbors as well as some remote partners such as Iceland and New Zealand. While its WTO accession package was praised for its ambition and courage, it is difficult to defend Chinese FTAs as comparable to those of developed countries in terms of market access and institutional changes. One explanation for that is China has made very high-level multilateral commitments. Another one is China is not in such a comfortable strategic and economic position as the United States in negotiating FTAs with either developed or developing countries. The former want to obtain more market access concessions and institutional reforms from China, while the latter are afraid to expose their domestic industries to China’s overwhelming competitiveness in manufacturing. In addition, the Chinese government seems more confident in its own institutions and unwilling to change them due to outside pressure, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. President Xi Jinping proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during his state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in September and October 2013, which soon was made a top national priority and even included in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Nadege Rolland labels this China’s Grand Strategy1 and the organizing foreign policy concept in the Xi Jinping era.2 One key feature of BRI in comparison with RTAs is that BRI focuses more on improving physical connectivity rather than reducing institutional barriers. The logic of physical connectivity is undoubtedly powerful, especially for developing countries with poor infrastructure. The impact of more and better international links on the regional landscape could be huge, not only by boosting trade and commerce but also by easing flows of energy and other resources, stimulating technological innovation, influencing culture and politics, and shaping strategic choices. Given the fact that RTAs are facing serious difficulties, the BRI looks like an attractive and feasible alternative to promote regional economic integration and globalization. However, there are also plenty of uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding the BRI, particularly due to China’s centrality as well as its direction of economic and strategic development. Hence, this chapter explores BRI characteristics in promoting regional economic integration and whether it could become an alternative approach to regionalism and globalization for China as well as the world.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Policy, Trade, and Integration
Political Geography:
China and Asia

47. China and Canada eye more mutually beneficial trade deal

Author:
Dong Yan and Bai Jie
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
A clause in the US-Mexico-Canada trade pact, widely known as a "poison pill" aimed at China, will not stop Canada from continuing to negotiate a free trade agreement with China, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said at an event at the National University of Singapore on Thursday. This suggests the US will find it extremely difficult to administer its "poison pill", because it has gone too far in using bullying tactics against other countries－in this case, China.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America

48. Keeping China’s WTO Commitments Clear

Author:
Su Qingyi
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
In terms of fulfillment of WTO (World Trade Organization) commitments, all members of the organization should be treated equally. First of all, China’s WTO accession commitments, which were made when the country was admitted to the organization in 2001, were recorded in three documents, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China to the WTO and two reports from the working party on the accession of China to the WTO. The two reports specified China’s promises to open up its services market. And the protocol defined the country’s other promises outside the realm of the services market. Second, after years of China’s accession to the WTO, WTO members should be very clear of China’s compliance with its WTO commitments. For questions as to whether China has opened up in compliance with its commitments, whether it met targets on the time table and whether reforms have been carried out in some areas, the results should be clear. Third, since 2006, WTO has been performing a trade policy review on China every two years. Every WTO member can supervise China’s fulfillment of its WTO commitments within the WTO framework. If any have complaints about China, the two sides can solve the problem within the WTO review mechanism. In fact, the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism can be employed to force China to make readjustments.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, World Trade Organization, Economy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

49. The Reality of Updating China’s Nationally-determined Contributions:Effects of Long-term Economic Growth and Global Carbon Emissions Budget

Author:
Ang Zhao
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
In June 2015, prior to the COP21 talks in Paris, China committed to peak its carbon emissions around 2030. For many, China’s commitment was an aggressive move to combat climate change, demonstrating its leadership in the global climate engagement. Yet, more critical voices questioned whether China’s commitment adequately considered global average temperature increase target of 2 degrees Celsius within this century. As the upcoming COP24 talks in Katowice, Poland draw closer, participating countries delegations may focus on the main negotiation objective, an implementation plan of the Paris Agreement. However, in this conference there will be plenty of discussion on how big economies, like China, set Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) targets, not only according to their own economic and technological capacities but also based on the precondition of meeting the global carbon emission goal suggested by the Paris Agreement. The following piece will investigate economic factors behind China’s predicted carbon emissions (including GDP, urbanization, and energy consumption), as well as global predicated carbon emissions in 2030 and 2050 to discuss whether China can promise to peak much earlier and begin decreasing its total carbon emissions around 2025.
Topic:
Climate Change, Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Economic Growth, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

50. Is the Belt and Road Initiative a Chinese-style Regionalism?

Author:
Tu Xinquan
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the last two decades, bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been considered a primary force to advance the world trading system because the Doha Development Agenda of the WTO has stagnated since its launch in 2001. The continuous expansion of the European Union and the American-led NAFTA and TPP as well as bilateral FTAs between the United States and EU and their partners best exemplified this phenomenon. However, such an approach is facing serious challenges from rising anti-globalization sentiment originating in the EU and United States in recent years. In June 2016, the United Kingdom decided to exit the EU as a result of a referendum. This is the first time a EU member chose to leave. On January 23, 2017, at the start of his presidency, Donald Trump signed as his first executive order the withdrawal from TPP, which his predecessor spent years concluding with 11 partners. These two consecutive dramatic actions of the previous and current world leaders shocked the globe. Next to the WTO, regionalism is seen as the second-best choice in promoting globalization. Now, two regional initiatives led by developed countries are facing a serious backlash. The world is concerned that this means the end and a reversal of globalization. Since its WTO accession in 2001, China has also been actively negotiating FTAs with its neighbors as well as some remote partners such as Iceland and New Zealand. While its WTO accession package was praised for its ambition and courage, it is difficult to defend Chinese FTAs as comparable to those of developed countries in terms of market access and institutional changes. One explanation for that is China has made very high-level multilateral commitments. Another one is China is not in such a comfortable strategic and economic position as the United States in negotiating FTAs with either developed or developing countries. The former want to obtain more market access concessions and institutional reforms from China, while the latter are afraid to expose their domestic industries to China’s overwhelming competitiveness in manufacturing. In addition, the Chinese government seems more confident in its own institutions and unwilling to change them due to outside pressure, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. President Xi Jinping proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during his state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in September and October 2013, which soon was made a top national priority and even included in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Nadege Rolland labels this China’s Grand Strategy1 and the organizing foreign policy concept in the Xi Jinping era.2 One key feature of BRI in comparison with RTAs is that BRI focuses more on improving physical connectivity rather than reducing institutional barriers. The logic of physical connectivity is undoubtedly powerful, especially for developing countries with poor infrastructure. The impact of more and better international links on the regional landscape could be huge, not only by boosting trade and commerce but also by easing flows of energy and other resources, stimulating technological innovation, influencing culture and politics, and shaping strategic choices. Given the fact that RTAs are facing serious difficulties, the BRI looks like an attractive and feasible alternative to promote regional economic integration and globalization. However, there are also plenty of uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding the BRI, particularly due to China’s centrality as well as its direction of economic and strategic development. Hence, this chapter explores BRI characteristics in promoting regional economic integration and whether it could become an alternative approach to regionalism and globalization for China as well as the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:
China and Asia