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61. Taiwan Flashpoint: What Australia Can Do to Stop the Coming Taiwan Crisis

Author:
Brendan Taylor
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australian diplomacy could ease rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, if Australian policymakers rediscovered an appetite for involvement in the flashpoint. Tensions between Taiwan and China are rising, driven in part by an increasingly assertive government in Beijing, growing Taiwanese estrangement from the Chinese mainland, and deteriorating US–China relations. If key regional governments fail to help de-escalate tensions, the consequences are likely to be serious. Rather than continue the debate about Australia’s position on its ANZUS obligations should the United States invoke the treaty in a Taiwan conflict, Australia should work with other regional powers to advocate for more robust risk avoidance and crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Multilateralism, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

62. The Peace-Building Process in the South China Sea: Challenges and Future Prospects for a Maritime Regime

Author:
Kamila Stasiak
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The aim of this article is to examine two treaties which are often presented by scholars as potential models for a maritime regime in the South China Sea, namely the Svalbard Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty System. The work concludes that even though both of the treaties have resolved equally complex territorial disputes, their importance as a role model for the SCS is limited due to the unique political condition in the Asia-Pacific. However, the solutions within the sphere of environmental protection and the structure of decision-making institutions developed by the abovementioned treaties present a valuable lesson and a potential example for the countries involved in the South China Sea dispute to emulate. The article argues that cooperation within environmental protection and fisheries management, as a low-profile endeavour, is easier to be put into practice than the joint development of highly contested hydrocarbon resources of the SCS. Furthermore, it can potentially lay foundation for the future high profile collaboration. The paper also presents a model of a maritime regime for the South China Sea.
Topic:
Environment, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, Maritime, and Peace
Political Geography:
China and South China Sea

63. Russia’s Arctic Policy

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia views the Arctic as a contested area with the U.S. and a place of competition with China. It regards any loss of its dominant position as the most important challenge in the Arctic region. To counteract it, Russia develops energy, military, and logistics infrastructure in the region. Although the role of transport in the Arctic, along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), is limited for now, the increased Russian military presence in the region is already a challenge for the security of NATO countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

64. Beijing Piles More Pressure on Taiwan after a Historic Victory by Tsai Ing-Wen

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
How will Beijing react to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s resounding re-election victory on January 11, when she garnered a historic 8 million votes, or 57.13 percent of the electorate? So far, Beijing’s response to this triumph by the candidate of the theoretically pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been relatively non-belligerent. The spokesman of the cabinet-level Taiwan Affairs Office said a few hours after the polls that Beijing would “insist on the basic objective of ‘peaceful unification and one country, two systems’,” even though he also indicated that Beijing would not tolerate “any form of ‘Taiwan independence’.” Another post-election commentary by the official Xinhua News Agency said that “the mainland firmly holds the initiative in bilateral relations.” In an article in the usually hawkish Global Times, Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin said Chinese society was “prepared for war with Taiwan independence,” but that it was not yet ready for “immediate warfare” (Xinhua, January 12; Phoenix TV News, January 12; Global Times, January 11; South China Morning Post, January 11). Observers of Taiwan Strait dynamics have noted that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, the highest-ranking decision-maker on Taiwan issues, was bitterly unhappy about the margin of Tsai’s victory; and that the commander-in-chief will likely order a series of measures to boost “war preparation,” squeeze Taiwan’s diplomatic space, suppress Taiwan’s economy, and nurture the so-called “fifth column” in Taiwan society (Chinatimes.com, January 12; HK01.com, January 11). The fifth column is a reference to Taiwanese politicians and businesspeople who, while professing to defend their island against Communist aggression, are proposing more communication and even “pro-unification talks” with Beijing as a result of their dependence (financial or otherwise) on the CCP.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

65. Beijing’s Appointment of Xia Baolong Signals a Harder Line on Hong Kong

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Beijing has signaled a much tougher policy toward the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) with the announcement on February 13 that Xia Baolong (夏宝龙), the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), would take up a concurrent appointment as Director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO). In the official pecking order of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a CPPCC vice-chairman is reckoned as a “state leader”—and therefore, this move portends the raising of the status of the HKMAO and the overall importance of Hong Kong affairs in national policy. Also significant is the fact that from 2002 to 2007, when Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping was party secretary of the coastal Zhejiang Province, Xia was deputy party secretary. The fact that Xia, who began his career in the Tianjian municipality, is an important Xi protégé is well-known among China analysts (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], February 14; HK01.com, February 13). The HKMAO is usually headed by a ministerial-level official. Zhang Xiaoming (张晓明), a veteran of the HKMAO whom Xia replaced, is a ministerial-level cadre. After being demoted, Zhang remains the Executive Vice-Director of the HKMAO with the title of minister. However, it seems clear that his job will be to execute policies as directed by Xia—and above Xia, Xi Jinping. With the appointment of a key associate as head of the HKMAO, Xi also indirectly takes over the position of the highest arbiter of Hong Kong and Macau affairs. This is despite the fact that according to division of labor, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) member in charge of Hong Kong—the Head of the Central Coordination Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs (CCGHKMA)—is PBSC member and Vice-Premier Han Zheng (韩正). In the past few years, Han has focused on infrastructure programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Greater Bay Area Project, leaving Hong Kong-related political issues to Xi as the “lifelong core” of the party (BBC Chinese Service, February 13; ITN.com [Taipei], December 3, 2019; PRC State Council, March 1, 2019).
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

66. Military Activity and Political Signaling in the Taiwan Strait in Early 2020

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 16, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force aircraft conducted a set of unusual nighttime sorties over the sea to the southwest of Taiwan. At least one KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEWC) aircraft and an undisclosed number of J-11 FLANKER-L jet fighters participated in the mission, and at one point crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which prompted a scramble by Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) F-16 fighters in response (Focus Taiwan, March 17; Taipei Times, March 18). Although the nature of the mission was unusual—this marked the first time that PLA aircraft flew in the vicinity of Taiwan at night—the incident was otherwise consistent with a pattern of increasingly provocative naval and military aviation operations conducted in the vicinity of Taiwan by PLA units in the first quarter of 2020. This uptick in tactical military activity has been accompanied by more assertive rhetoric from People’s Republic of China (PRC) media outlets and spokespersons since the landslide reelection of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) on January 11 (China Brief, January 17). These military operations (see further discussion below) have also taken place as PRC officials and citizens have scrambled to cope with the social, economic, and political impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic that first manifested in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in December (Jamestown, ongoing). This suggests that senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials wish to project the message that the crisis has not inhibited the PLA’s capabilities to defeat Taiwan “separatism”—and may further wish to use such operations to assert an image of strength in the face of the internal crisis produced by the pandemic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

67. Rethinking Taiwan policy: History, politics, ideology

Author:
Mark Harrison
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The issue of Taiwan has long been one of the most intractable and multilayered in regional political, defence, foreign affairs, trade and security policy. Taiwan is claimed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as part of its territory, and, under its official title of the Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan is limited by Beijing to a marginal position in the international system. Political relations between Taipei and Beijing are fractious, but the Taiwan Strait is at the same time a critical link in global supply chains, carrying hundreds of billions of dollars of cross-strait trade in goods and services and investments every year. Hanging over this political and economic relationship is the constant threat of military action from Beijing. Taiwan policy in Australia and internationally is structured around the ‘resolution’ of the Taiwan issue, either through a negotiated settlement or through large-scale military action by the PRC. Australia should reassess its understanding of the Taiwan issue so as to identify alternative scenarios and calibrate its responses accordingly.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Territorial Disputes, History, and Ideology
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

68. Resource Sharing and Joint Development in the South China Sea: Exploring Avenues of Cooperation

Author:
Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The Philippines and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development, demonstrating their willingness to explore joint development as a pathway to collaboration, notwithstanding their territorial disputes. Recent commentaries on joint development are mostly framed on legal challenges, South China Sea (SCS) rows, geopolitics, and state-centric security issues. However, there have been no extensive discussions on the potential contributions from non-state stakeholders that can make joint development agreements environmentally sound, sustainable, and less political. These stakeholders are the oil companies, fishermen and coastal communities. In this regard, this NTS Insight explores potential roles of these stakeholders in promoting joint initiatives to share and develop resources in the SCS. It argues that the engagement and participation of non-state stakeholders in resource sharing and joint management must be pursued to address key non-traditional security challenges in the SCS. It also examines mechanisms to integrate marine environmental protection and sustainable fishing management into joint development agreements.
Topic:
Security, Development, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, Southeast Asia, and South China Sea

69. China’s Territorial Claim at South China Sea: A Strategic Competition with USA and its Implications

Author:
Kanwal Hayat and Rehana Saeed Hashmi
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
China claims South China Sea as its sovereign domain where it possesses the right to intervene militarily and economically. However, USA considers South China Sea as a common global passage where rule of law and freedom of navigation should prevail.These diverging viewpoints coexist in a wobbly peace environment where both US and China want their own version of international law to be applied and have occasionally resorted to minor armed conflicts over this issue. Every state claiming authority over South China Sea is willing to use coercion in order to get what they want, however, the extent of how far they are willing to go is not clear. This is resulting in a show of gunboat diplomacy involving maritime force of influential states that strives to manipulate the policy makers of the relevant nations (Costlow, 2012). The paper will focus on the situation in the South China Sea. South China Sea is not only claimed by China but various other Asian nations. Does this territorial strife possess the power to turn the region into a war zone? Being one of the most active trade routes in the world having complicated geography and the diverging regional and international interests makes it very sensitive area. China being the emerging economic giant gives competition to the USA in many spheres. Although America has no territorial claim in the South China Sea, it has strategic and economic interests. Where China wants a complete hegemonic control of the area, USA wants to find a way where free unchecked trade could be the future for all.Accompanied with numerous other South Asian nations claiming various portions of the region, a constant tension exists in the region.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Oceans

70. Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea

Author:
Ketian Zhang
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—“killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Military Affairs, and Maritime
Political Geography:
China, Beijing, and South China