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661. Going Too Far: Bush's Pledge to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Ted Galen Carpenter
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
When he pledged to do whatever was necessary—even use U.S. military forces—to help Taiwan defend itself, President George W. Bush seemingly replaced Washington's long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” with a policy of strategic clarity. Although the president and his advisers subsequently retreated from his initial rhetorical stance, both China and Taiwan are likely to believe that Bush's original statement accurately reflects U.S. policy. That creates an extremely dangerous situation for the United States.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, China, Washington, Taiwan, and Asia

662. HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue

Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
It is projected that, at current rates, more than 100 million people worldwide will have been infected with HIV by 2005. Where the epidemic has hit hardest, Sub-Saharan Africa, experts believe AIDS will eventually kill one in four adults. Seven countries already have adult prevalence rates above 20 per cent of the population.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Security, and Human Welfare
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, and Southeast Asia

663. Missile Defence and European Security

Author:
François Heisbourg, Klaus Becher, Alexander Pikayev, and Ivo H. Daalder
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
European NATO countries have been spectators to the debate about defending the US against ballistic missile attacks. While there have been national differences in Europe's reactions to the national missile defence (NMD) programme, it is obvious that most Europeans don't like it. The French seem somewhat more convinced than others that missile defence is inherently foolish and unworkable. Some British experts seem to insist more than others that any programme that might undermine NATO's nuclear deterrence and strategic unity should be avoided. And perhaps Germans, more than others, worry about perceived dangers to the ABM and other arms control treaties, and generally about relations with Russia. Most Europeans at present believe that US defence against long-range ballistic missiles is a slap in the face for Russia, a dangerous provocation for China and an inadequate response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Germany

664. Fishing in Troubled Waters: Putin's Caspian Policy (Event Summary)

Author:
Doug Blum and Carol Saivetz
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Carol Saivetz and Doug Blum spoke about Russia's policies toward the Caspian under President Putin at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs on May 2, 2001 in an event sponsored by the Caspian Studies Program. Carol Saivetz, Research Associate at the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard and Executive Director of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, noted a trend toward more coherence in Russia's foreign policy, although she said it is occurring despite a split within the foreign policy establishment. Doug Blum, who spoke second, focused on the bilateral relationships between Russia and other Caspian Basin countries, and on those countries' responses to Russian policy, singling out Kazakhstan's relations with Russia as the most cooperative. Melissa Carr, Caspian Studies Program Director, chaired the event. Carol Saivetz opened by arguing that President Putin has being working to correct the foreign policy "freelancing" rampant in the late Yeltsin years, bringing more coherence to Russian foreign policy in general. However, at the same time, she said, the Putin Administration seems to be split into two different camps. Moscow analysts, when describing this trend to Saivetz, used the terms "integrationists" and "isolationists." The "integrationists" are those interested in reforming the Russian economy and linking it to the outside world (through WTO membership, for example) and who welcome globalization. The "isolationists" are in Saivetz's opinion the "derzhavniks," those who long for Russia's superpower status and for increasing Russia's power in the CIS. Putin has decided, Saivetz argued, that the Caspian is one of Russia's vital interests and therefore a region to concentrate on. Shortly after he was elected President, a Security Council meeting took place in which the two items on the agenda were the new military doctrine and Caspian issues. After this meeting, Putin declared that Russia must be "competitive" in the region and to this end he created a new department for Caspian policy, appointing Viktor Kalyuzhny as Caspian envoy. The Russian President also talked about the need to balance state interests with the interests of the oil companies. Following that statement (and probably with Kremlin backing), Yukos, LUKoil and Gazprom joined in a new consortium called the Caspian Oil Company to start developing reserves in the Russian sector. Next Saivetz discussed Putin's January trip to Azerbaijan and the agreements that emerged from his meetings with Aliyev. There was compromise on the division of the Caspian Sea, and in parallel the signing of an oil deal between LUKoil and SOCAR during the visit. On the other hand, at that time Russia was still trying to block the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (since then they have withdrawn overt opposition but continued to waver), and could not find agreement with Azerbaijan about Nagorno-Karabagh. Saivetz also briefly discussed Khatami's trip to Moscow, which ended up being about arms deals and not the Caspian, precisely because of the lack of agreement on a legal regime. The final resolution of the Caspian demarcation remains one of the key issues in the region, she noted. Saivetz made several broader conclusions: 1) Putin has made the Caspian a priority; 2) Putin's policy blends economic and geopolitical calculations; he has shifted the emphasis in foreign policy from macro ties (state-to-state relations) to a combination of macro and micro (i.e. trade and economic) ties. 3) There is a notable militarization of Russian pressures on other littoral states, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia; many analysts explain Russia's intention to keep the waters of the Caspian common as a way to ensure Moscow the right to project its naval power. 4) Increased attention to the Caspian reflects a larger Russian policy towards what Russians have called the "Near Abroad," and particularly the Caucasus (Chechnya, Georgia, Armenia). Returning to the idea of integrationists and isolationists, Saivetz remarked that there is a debate in the U.S. about which of these two tendencies is driving Russian policy. It seems that Putin has not made a choice: the Russian government is pressuring Georgia and Azerbaijan at the same time as Viktor Kalyuzhny has backed off from opposing BTC. It seems that Russia's ideal model for pipeline development is reflected in the CPC: outside investment went into a pipeline that traverses Russian territory (where Russia gets transit fees). This pipeline reflects a policy that is simultaneously both integrationist (bringing in Western investment) and isolationist (forcing North-South routes). Doug Blum began by registering his agreement with Saivetz's presentation. He structured his talk by focusing on Russia's bilateral relationships with Caspian littoral states one by one, in "declining order of [Russia's] success": Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Georgia. He pointed out that Russia's place is extremely important in all the significant issue areas that concern the Caspian countries. "This is not simply a matter of Russia being effectively able to exert leverage on these countries," he remarked, "there are shared and overlapping interests." Russia is an important transit route for Central Asian goods, and these countries also share an interest in combating terror, drugs, crime, and "Islamic fundamentalism." Russia has the logistical and military resources to help in these areas, and is unparalleled by all other countries in the region. Russia's successes in Kazakhstan include the achievement of increased energy transit through Russian territory with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line and also with added volumes from on the Aktau-Samara route. Also, Russia and Kazakhstan have concluded formal accords on trade and the possible implementation of a Eurasian Economic Union. In security, there is cooperation on an air defense system. Also, Russia has retained access to the Baikonur Space Facility. In sum, Russia has succeeded in fulfilling its goals in Kazakhstan, but this is largely due to overlapping interests. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is and has for the past decade been interested in balancing its orientation between Russia, China, and the West. This balancing act has resulted in strains with Russia, for example over the possible Kazakh commitment to BTC. Kazakhstan also disagrees with Russia about the ownership of some offshore oil islands, and about Russia's naval presence in the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan, according to Blum, presents a "much more complex picture of balancing and bandwagoning," being limited to some extent by Nagorno-Karabagh and, relatedly, the U.S. Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which limits direct government assistance from the U.S. to Azerbaijan. He noted that Azerbaijan of necessity has been searching for a modus vivendi with Russia, a pursuit that has been made easier given the new Russian flexibility towards Azerbaijan under Putin. Azerbaijan and Russia have started to form agreements on trade and investment, and also humanitarian relief and treatment of migrants. The two countries are cooperating on combating terrorism, organized crime, and drug smuggling. Also, Azerbaijan is increasing imports of Russian gas as a trade-off for exporting more oil through Novorossiisk. Total trade between Azerbaijan and Russia remains low, however. Azerbaijan is trying to attract Western investment and balance against Russia through membership in groups such as GUUAM. Blum emphasized that both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are attempting to accommodate to geopolitical reality. In addition, he pointed out that both countries are "very sensitive and very angry about repeated Western, and especially American, criticisms of human rights and the lack of political progress"; and this motivates compromise with Russia. Iran's relationship with Russia involves both conflict and cooperation. There is disagreement over Russia's naval presence in the Caspian and about the ownership of the Sea. On the other hand, there is significant military cooperation. Turkmenistan's relationship with Russia is "quite strained," according to Blum, especially over the Caspian legal regime, where Turkmenistan has sided with Iran. Turkmenistan has, however, negotiated a favorable deal for gas transit through the ITERA system. However, on the whole Turkmenistan remains "a very isolated and extraordinary backwards, removed country." Blum termed Georgia's relationship with Russia "extremely strained." Russian policymakers see it in zero-sum terms, especially over energy transit issues (what goes through Georgia is a Russian loss) and over the pending loss of military bases in the region. Georgia has shown some willingness to form a working relationship with Russia, but still the Shevardnadze regime is understandably very reluctant (given how the Russian security apparatus relates to him, as a wishful target for assassination). Blum closed by reiterating that the cornerstone of current Russian policy is international integration. Russia is pushing a north-south route that would bring trade from Iran and India up through Russia's Caspian port of Astrakhan then up the Volga. The Caspian States also want to enter into the international economy, with the help of multiple trading routes, north south and also the east west.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

665. Rough Waters in the South China Sea: Navigation Issues and Confidence-Building Measures

Author:
Ji Guoxing
Publication Date:
08-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
In the wake of a collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter off the coast of Hainan in April 2001, verbal skirmishing between the United States and China revealed sharply different conceptions of jurisdictional and navigational principles. These differences persist and will likely be the cause of future conflicts; they have already caused strife among countries ringing the South China Sea. Central to these conflicts are the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) that extend 200 nm into the sea from coastal nations' baselines. Created by the UN Law of the Sea Convention, these zones attempt to accommodate coastal states' interest in controlling offshore resources and maritime powers' interests in maintaining freedom of navigation. But ambiguities in the Convention's language combined with coastal states' proliferating EEZ claims have created a tinderbox. The situation will remain volatile as long as the focus remains on jurisdictional disputes. But confidence-building efforts aimed more narrowly on practical navigation issues and managing “incidents at sea” offer a starting point for first bilateral and then multilateral agreements. In the wake of a collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter off the coast of Hainan in April 2001, verbal skirmishing between the United States and China revealed sharply different conceptions of jurisdictional and navigational principles. These differences persist and will likely be the cause of future conflicts; they have already caused strife among countries ringing the South China Sea. Central to these conflicts are the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) that extend 200 nm into the sea from coastal nations' baselines. Created by the UN Law of the Sea Convention, these zones attempt to accommodate coastal states' interest in controlling offshore resources and maritime powers' interests in maintaining freedom of navigation. But ambiguities in the Convention's language combined with coastal states' proliferating EEZ claims have created a tinderbox. The situation will remain volatile as long as the focus remains on jurisdictional disputes. But confidence-building efforts aimed more narrowly on practical navigation issues and managing “incidents at sea” offer a starting point for first bilateral and then multilateral agreements.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, and International Law
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, and China

666. Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Publication Date:
01-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) held its annual Pacific symposium on “Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China” at the National Defense University in Washington on March 7 and 8, 2000. This event brought together representatives of the policy community and academe from Australia, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. It focused on how perceptions of China influence defense and foreign policies in key nations of the Asia- Pacific region, how the likely course of developments in China might affect the future policies of countries in the region, and how such changes might impact on their security relations with the United States.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and International Law
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, India, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand

667. Regional Conflicts with Strategic Consequences

Author:
M. Elaine Bunn, Richard D. Sokolsky, and David E. Mosher
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The strategic environment facing the United States has changed radically in the past decade. The United States needs to reexamine traditional ways of planning for the use of military force in conflicts that threaten vital interests and that could escalate to the highest levels of violence. Several characteristics define the new environment: Changed relationships between the major powers. The bipolar world of the Cold War has yielded to U.S. preeminence in virtually every facet of power, while Russia has become a second-tier power. China now has the seventh largest economy in the world and is modernizing both its conventional and nuclear forces—though it is unlikely to replace the former Soviet Union as the second pole in a reconfigured bipolar world. The rise of regional powers, such as Iraq and Iran. These aspiring regional hegemons are unhappy with a status quo that is preserved by American military power. The end of bipolarity has brought this antagonism to the fore. During the Cold War, regional conflicts played out within the context of the broader ideological and strategic conflict between the two superpowers, which also tamped down pressures for escalation and proliferation for fear that conflict would spiral out of control. That all ended with the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet empire made it impossible for Russia to continue supporting its allies abroad, who were forced to become responsible for their own security. The possibility that smaller rogue states might try to keep the United States out of a regional conflict. By credibly threatening that the fight could escalate and even involve homeland attacks on the United States or its partners, a regional pariah might hope to prevent the United States from committing forces to the conflict or hinder it from building coalitions with European and regional allies. Failing that, a regional adversary could seek to delay and disrupt U.S. deployments to the theater and hamper operations. Finally, the leadership of a rogue state may be able to preserve its regime even in defeat if it could strike the American homeland or American allies. In short, regional powers are developing the capability to conduct strategic warfare against the United States. The importance these countries place on asymmetric warfare probably has been encouraged by the American distaste for wartime casualties and worries about self-deterrence.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and China

668. China And US Foreign Policy In The Asia-Pacific: Living With American Dominance

Author:
Mike Smith and Nicholas Khoo
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
Since the end of the Second World War, US foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific has been characterized by the assertion of American dominance. To this end, policy-makers in Washington have adopted a varied policy towards China. From 1950 to 1972, the US pursued a containment policy designed to thwart the revolutionary goals of Maoist foreign policy. Beginning with Nixon's rapprochement with Beijing in 1972, US policy was dramatically altered to meet the overriding goal of deterring the Soviet threat. The US and China actively cooperated to contain Soviet and Vietnamese influence in Northeast and Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War, preceded shortly before by the Tiananmen massacre, saw another shift in the US position, whereby China was no longer looked upon with favour in Washington. Acting on his presidential campaign promises not to repeat George Bush Senior's policy of 'coddling dictators'in Beijing, President Clinton initially enacted a policy that explicitly linked China's human rights record to the renewal of most favoured- nation trade status with the US. When this linkage failed, a striking policy reversal occurred as the Clinton administration adopted an unrestrained engagement policy in which it eventually underplayed Sino-US differences in the spheres of trade, human rights, and strategic-military ties.
Topic:
Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, America, Washington, Beijing, and Asia

669. Special Report: Rising India and U.S. Policy Options in Asia

Author:
Mandavi Mehta and Teresita C. Schaffer
Publication Date:
12-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The South Asia program has recently concluded a year-long study entitled “Rising India and U.S. Policy Options in Asia” with a final conference that was held on October 15, 2001. The “Rising India” project seeks to analyze aspects of the U.S.-Indian relationship, examine the effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic tools in the context of different growth trends in India, and put U.S. policy toward India within a broader Asian context. This summary reflects the project study, amplified by presentations made at the conference.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, China, South Asia, and Asia

670. India's Turbulent Northeast

Author:
Mandavi Mehta
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
India's northeastern corner and the neighboring countries embody some of the major demographic and environmental time bombs in the subcontinent. Instability in this region, which both India and China regard as strategically important, could provoke a disruptive Indian response or a serious deterioration in India-China relations, with a significant impact on the broader politics of the region. The last month brought two reminders of how volatile this area is: the murder of the King of Nepal and most of his family, and the violent protests in Manipur following India's extension of its ceasefire with the primary Naga insurgent group. This paper provides a thumbnail sketch of the players and the places involved in India's “northeast problems.”
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, India, and Nepal