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121. China’s Use of U.S. Satellite Communications Technology in the South China Sea

Author:
Zachary Haver
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In recent years, the maritime law enforcement (MLE) forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have dominated the contested waters of the South China Sea (AMTI, December 4, 2020). While the exponential growth and increasing assertiveness of the China Coast Guard (CCG) have captured headlines, the evolving role of technology in China’s MLE operations has received less attention. New communications infrastructure and monitoring systems, for example, help Chinese MLE forces monitor and control contested maritime space in the South China Sea (CMSI, January 2021). These investments align with China’s broader pursuit of information superiority in the South China Sea, which involves building up electronic intelligence, counter-stealth radar, and other capabilities (JHU APL, July 2020).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Armed Forces, and Satellite
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

122. Tracking the Digital Component of the BRI in Central Asia, Part One: Exporting “Safe Cities” to Uzbekistan

Author:
Sergey Sukhankin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Following the 2013 announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at a speech given by People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping during visit to Kazakhstan, Central Asia has been a key regional priority and an indispensable element for the success of the BRI as a whole (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 7, 2013). Over the years, the BRI—nebulously defined from the start—has come to be associated with a variety of policy and investment programs. A previous series of articles has covered security-related developments associated with the BRI aimed at maintaining stability and protecting economic investments across the region (China Brief July 15; October 19; August 12).China has also begun to expand its export of digital infrastructure and surveillance technology under the umbrella of the BRI. The digitalization strategy—ostensibly aimed at promoting the international integration of technology with infrastructure and finance as well as spreading digital innovation abroad—is often referred to as the Digital Silk Road (DSR, 数字丝绸之路, shuzi sichou zhi lu). The high-level emphasis on promoting the DSR has only grown under the COVID-19 pandemic (CGTN, June 10, 2020). Across Central Asia, the DSR has been primarily represented by efforts to export China’s Smart/Safe City programs, which allow governments to collect, store, process and analyze vast amounts of personal information. The promotion of the so-called “informatization” of society (信息化, xinxi hua) and data commodification are yet more driving forces behind China’s DSR ambitions in Central Asia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Surveillance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, Asia, and Uzbekistan

123. Buying Silence: The Price of Internet Censorship in China

Author:
Ryan Fedasiuk
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On Monday, November 12, 2018, the recently-appointed director of China’s Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CAC) Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文) summoned senior executives from WeChat and Sina Weibo for a “discussion” (Central CAC, November 16, 2018). While there is no transcript of the meeting available to the public, one thing is certain: It did not go well. For months, Zhuang had been telegraphing his discontent with the state of censorship in China—and specifically, the role that social media giants had played in undermining it (New America, September 24, 2018). His official statement about the meeting, which was uploaded to the CAC’s website a few days later, accused China’s largest internet companies of “breeding chaos in the media” and “endangering social stability and the interests of the masses.” Under his watch, he vowed that the Central CAC would “strictly investigate and deal with the enterprises that lack responsibility and have serious problems” (Central CAC, November 20, 2018). Rarely do Party officials offer such scathing public admonitions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, Surveillance, and Censorship
Political Geography:
China and Asia

124. Stemming the Flow: The United States Needs a Strategy to Address China’s Strategic Exportation of Digital Authoritarianism

Author:
Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Many of China’s technology companies perfect their products in the domestic market by facilitating the party-state’s oppression and data control, and subsequently seek to export the technology to fledgling authoritarian states or nations with fragile democracies. This is part of Beijing’s strategy to enhance its digital instruments of national power, normalize illiberal uses of technology, and equip foreign governments with the tools to replicate aspects of the CCP’s authoritarian governance model. If Washington wants to blunt this strategy, the US government needs to implement a comprehensive strategy of its own to address this.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Law, Authoritarianism, Grand Strategy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

125. China's Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Ambitions: The First-mover Advantage

Author:
Alice Ekman
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
China was initially cautious in the development and application of blockchain technology. Among the technology’s best-known attributes are the relative anonymity and immutability of the information, as every blockchain transaction has a digital record and signature that can be identified, validated, stored and shared. This technology could therefore become a double-edged sword for the Communist Party of China (CPC), as it goes against the government’s efforts to censor content it considers sensitive and, in more general terms, efforts to assert its cyber-sovereignty. However, after at first observing the emergence of blockchain technology with concern, China’s central government has increasingly seen it as an opportunity, as has been the case with most emerging technologies. Since the launch of the 13th five-year plan in 2016 and the release of the first White Paper on Blockchain Technology and Application Development by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology the same year, the CPC has increasingly considered that blockchain could become an economic, political and geopolitical asset for the country, if ‘guided’ well. China has continued to shape its positioning on and conceptualisation of blockchain technology on a regular basis over the last 5 years: the China Blockchain Industry White Paper (1) was published in 2018, another White Paper entitled Blockchain Technology Application in Judicial Evidence Storage was published in 2019 (2) and the 14th five-year plan (2021–2025), released in March 2021, also refers to blockchain and cryptocurrency (see timeline diagram on page 7) (3). China’s unique approach to blockchain is conditioned precisely by this paradox, stemming from the decentralised nature of the technology and the highly centralised nature of the Chinese political system. While blockchain technology is essentially decentralised, regulations in China have aimed to guarantee state control over its development and application. As part of this dual policy, which is analysed in the first part of the Brief, the Chinese government has launched its own digital currency – the digital yuan. At the same time, it dislikes bitcoin, which relies on a truly decentralised type of blockchain. Although blockchain is best known for being the technology behind cryptocurrency, the Chinese government’s approach towards blockchain is very comprehensive, going far beyond cryptocurrencies. It promotes application of the technology in a variety of fields, ranging from energy conservation to urban management and law enforcement, and has strong ambitions to become the world leader in the field. In October 2019, China’s President Xi Jinping, speaking at a study session for members of the Politburo, declared that he wanted the country to be a ‘rule-maker’ on blockchain, suggesting that this technology will increasingly become a key arena in the country’s race against the United States for technological supremacy (4). Blockchain has become a fast-growing sector in China over the last two years. But is China likely to succeed in the global promotion of an alternative form of blockchain? This Brief answers this question by analysing the development of different applications at national level, before and during the Covid-19 pandemic, but also the emergence of international cooperation on blockchain and cryptocurrency.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cryptocurrencies, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
China and Asia

126. Geo-tech politics: Why technology shapes European power

Author:
Ulrike Franke and José I. Torreblanca
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
New technologies are a major redistributor of power among states and a significant force shaping international relations. The European Union has for too long seen technology primarily through an economic lens, disregarding its implications for its partnerships and for its own geopolitical influence. If the EU wants to be more than a mediator between the two real technological powers, the United States and China, it will need to change its mindset. For the EU and its partners, the vulnerabilities created by battles over technology divide into two types: new dependencies and openness to foreign interference. The EU and its member states need deeper engagement with the geopolitical implications and geopolitical power elements of technology. This engagement has an external element of reaching out to partners and an internal element of ensuring close cooperation between the EU and its member states.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

127. The evolution of US strategic priorities

Author:
Carl Bildt
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance reflects an evolution in US strategic thinking and policy priorities. The document shows how the administration intends to shift away from America Alone and towards America and its Allies. But the optimism and confidence the US expressed in 2015 has been replaced by deep concern over a range of strategic trends. The US will now prioritise strategic competition with China, a new approach to trade, the rise of technology, the defence of democracy, the urgent climate and health crises, and efforts to avoid ‘forever wars’ in the Middle East.
Topic:
Climate Change, Health, Science and Technology, Democracy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

128. How 2400 Pages of Tech Industrial Policy will change Transatlantic Relations

Author:
Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The currently 2400-page long ‘US Innovation and Competition Act’ making its way through Congress is about one thing only: China. But it also signals a much broader shift in American geoeconomic strategy towards tech industrial policy which matters just as much for Europe. To avoid major rifts, tech industrial diplomacy will need to become a staple of transatlantic affairs.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Transatlantic Relations, Industry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

129. Unfinished Connectivity in the Bay of Bengal

Author:
Amit Bhandari, Sagnik Chakraborty, Naren Punjabi, and Gitanjoli Dasgupta
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
The Bay of Bengal is a bridge between the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and with a population of 1.4 billion, an increasingly important economic zone in its own right. India has been slow to build regional connectivity. The space has been filled by China's Belt and Road Initiative projects, which have not always been beneficial for host countries. The region may be better off pursuing digital connectivity by enabling tech startups – areas of India’s strength. This research uses maps to explore the potential for energy, transport, and financial connectivity across the Bay of Bengal.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Regional Integration, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Transportation
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Indian Ocean, Indo-Pacific, and Bay of Bengal

130. Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation

Author:
Gateway House
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Over the last decade and a half, Israel and the U.S. have become India’s top arms suppliers, and a robust defence partnership is underway. Beyond pure defence trade, Israeli and U.S. defence companies have participated in the ‘Make in India’ initiative, focusing on technology transfers and the co-development and co-production of technologies. This is the moment for India to capitalise on these two critical, bilateral defence partners, and particularly the start-up innovation hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. How can India insert itself into the U.S.-Israel defence technology cooperation corridor, and participate in the development of emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence in defence? What benefit will the U.S. and Israel gain from a partnership with India? This paper studies the U.S.-Israel defence technology corridor, and suggests potential collaborations for India. It will necessitate the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru coming together to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. Bringing a like-minded, tech-savvy democracy like India into the arc of the U.S.-Israel partnership will offer a trinity of benefits: a robust and tested edge in emerging technologies to the three militaries over their adversaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce their access to the Indian market. The greatest benefit will be for India, which has been set back by lengthy defence acquisition procedures, and will do better with a modern defence base at home. India will have to overcome the geopolitical hurdles of its defence relationship with Russia, and of Israel’s reported defence ties with China and Pakistan, to build a sturdy trilateral cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Israel, and United States of America