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1. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

2. The geopolitics of water: how the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

Author:
Neely Haby
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations. To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.
Topic:
Water, Geopolitics, Rivers, Competition, Regional Security, and Brahmaputra River
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

3. A Subdued Environment and Missed Opportunities

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Chinese diplomacy toward the Korean Peninsula in late 2023 sputtered forward, driven more by a calendar of bilateral anniversaries with North Korea and multilateral gatherings involving South Korea than any sense of strategic purpose. Both relationships seemed preoccupied with off-stage developments such as the September summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin and the momentum of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations, rather than any inherent dynamism of their own. Still, regular Sino-North Korean bilateral exchanges ahead of the 75th anniversary of the bilateral relationship and Sino-South Korean bilateral economic dialogues provide opportunities to overcome resistance and sustain progress in the face of deepening major power rivalries. Senior-level dialogues between China and North Korea occurred on North Korea’s 75th founding anniversary in September, with the visit of Chinese Vice Premier Liu Guozhong to Pyongyang, a visit that occurred against the backdrop of the second US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group meeting, North Korea’s first successful indigenous satellite launch, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho’s visit to Beijing. Meanwhile, ministerial and working-level economic dialogues on issues such as supply-chain stability, export controls, and trade facilitation continued between China and South Korea, punctuated by a notable bilateral exchange between Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo in late September on the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou. But these exchanges did not generate the traction necessary for South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to have substantive bilateral meetings with President Xi on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in San Francisco in November. Bilateral and trilateral foreign ministerial meetings in Busan between South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and counterparts Wang Yi and Kamikawa Yoko—the first in four years—failed to generate sufficient momentum to set a date for the resumption of China-Japan-South Korea summitry. Instead, the resumption of China-South Korea or China-Japan-South Korea summitry will depend on developments in 2024.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, and North Korea

4. Taiwan and China—Steady As She Goes

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As 2024 dawned, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated in his New Year Address that Taiwan must unify with China. In her New Year Address, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, with the election of her successor only 14 days away, repeated her offer to meet China on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and without preconditions, echoing themes dating back to her first inaugural address in 2016. On Jan. 14, Tsai’s chosen successor, Vice President Lai Ching-te, won an unprecedented third successive term for the Democratic Progressive Party, promising to uphold the independence of the Republic of China, but the party lost its majority in the legislature. A month later, two Chinese fishermen operating illegally near Kinmen Island died when their boat capsized as they were pursued by the Taiwan Coast Guard. Five days later, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel boarded and inspected a Taiwanese tour boat near Kinmen. Tensions grew but they did not boil over. On Jan. 30, China unilaterally moved its M503 civil aviation flight route closer to the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Premier Li Qiang included the obligatory call for Taiwan reunification in his Work Report to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC). Some analysts found that and other NPC references to Taiwan more strident than in recent years, but any change in tone was subtle. In apparent retaliation for Lai’s electoral victory, China persuaded Nauru to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China even as Taiwan continued to strengthen unofficial relations with larger powers. These Taiwan efforts were supported by US President Biden, who used a trilateral meeting with Japan and the Philippines to call for cross-Strait stability. Taiwan’s continuing negotiation with the US of a 21st Century Trade Initiative and TSMC’s decision to expand new facilities under construction in Arizona exemplified Taiwan’s continuing diversification of economic linkages away from China. President-elect Lai will be inaugurated on May 20; his inaugural speech and China’s response could portend the future course of cross-Strait relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Regional Security, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

5. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation

Author:
James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

6. Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan

Author:
Michael D. Swaine and James Park
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A full–blown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility. Suspicion, threat inflation, zero–sum framing, and worst–casing are increasingly dominant factors in U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan, driven by preconceived ideas of the other’s intentions based on history and ideology, and domestic pressures in each country to prioritize military deterrence and even aggression. Amidst this emerging threat of direct conflict, numerous scholars, experts, and military strategists have focused on how to discourage China from invading Taiwan through military force alone — warfighting perspectives that typically share glaring and mutually reinforcing faults that, if overlooked, may only help to pave the path toward conflict. Analysts’ emphasis on military deterrence tends to obscure the utmost importance of political reassurances to avert conflict, particularly the United States reaffirming and recommitting to its original understanding of the One China Policy; this fixation on the military dimension feeds into the destabilization of the Taiwan issue, brought about by heightened suspicions of the other side’s intentions. Policymakers and pundits, in turn, tend to underestimate the possibility of inadvertent escalation, driven by an environment of distrust, pressure in Washington and Beijing to appear tough on the other, and a lack of comprehensive crisis management mechanisms. By examining the common analytical blindspots regarding a conflict over Taiwan, this report sheds new light on how the political and social dynamics fueling mutual hostility between Beijing and Washington could play a much more decisive role in a future crisis over Taiwan, rather than factors that earn far more attention, such as calculations about military capability and resolve. Averting a destructive crisis will require the United States and China to build off recent diplomatic progress to restore a deeper mutual understanding concerning Taiwan through policies and actions including: Mutual recognition of the interactive nature of the growing crisis over Taiwan, to which Beijing, Washington, and Taipei contribute. A clearer, more credible U.S. commitment to its successful, long–standing stance on Taiwan: the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity. Continued U.S. rejection of both unilateral Taiwan independence and any unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. A credible Chinese affirmation of its continued commitment to peaceful unification without any specific deadline. The development of a broad–based crisis communication mechanism that includes both military and civilian dialogue.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, Joe Biden, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

7. Rapprochement Despite Strategic Divergence: The Significance of the 2024 Japan-China-South Korea Summit

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
After four and a half years of interruption, Japan, China, and South Korea finally held their trilateral summit. Initiated in 2008 and planned to be held annually, the summit has promoted three-way economic, trade, and cross-sectoral cooperation. Over the years, historical grievances, territorial disputes, and strategic divergencies between the three neighbours often derailed mutual engagement, thus disrupting the trilateral framework. In 2024, the timing was ripe for the leaders to meet again. The 9th summit has succeeded in restoring communication among Japan, China, and the ROK and in softening somewhat the rough edges of the trilateral framework. This approach reflects the shared understanding in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul that common challenges and goals, including ageing societies and enhanced connectivity of supply chains, require joint responses. As the other regional players in the wider Indo-Pacific, especially the smaller Southeast Asian nations, navigate an increasingly unpredictable strategic environment driven by major power rivalries, the restoration of dialogue among the three Northeast Asian heavyweights sends a positive signal to the whole region. The summit did not lead to major breakthroughs on sensitive matters. Future cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea will likely remain limited to the economic and non-traditional security domains, not crossing over to the more sensitive geopolitical, territorial, and national security issues. At the same time, taking into consideration the continuing divisions over security issues, the strategic significance of restored high-level dialogue among three highly interdependent economies and key geopolitical players in the Indo-Pacific region should not be underestimated.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

8. Countering Coercion: Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Nilanthi Samaranayake
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has been engaging in gray zone activity—coercive behavior that is aimed at changing the status quo but that is below a threshold that would prompt a military response—particularly against the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), and these actions are raising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.1 Washington must closely monitor the situation and take steps to help protect the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations from PRC intimidation and territorial encroachment. China makes ambiguous claims to 90 percent of the 1.3 million square miles of the South China Sea, including waters within the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Projecting power and dominating the South China Sea, with its critical resources and central role in global trade—around $3 trillion worth of commerce transits the seaways annually—is a top national security and foreign policy goal for China.2 PRC maritime bullying is not new, but it has intensified in the past few years, especially against the Philippines. Beijing aims to convince Manila to give up its claim to Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater reef located in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. The Philippines makes its claim to the shoal by housing a small contingent of marines aboard a World War II–era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, that was intentionally grounded there in 1999.3 Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea threaten to involve the United States, which has been a treaty ally of the Philippines for over 70 years. Despite the risk that tensions could further escalate, Washington continues to stand firmly behind Manila as it employs asymmetric tactics to push back against Chinese behavior.4 PRC maritime activities and goals in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the time being, are focused on protecting China’s economic interests (80 percent of its energy imports flow through the Indian Ocean), gathering intelligence, and projecting power, not on asserting maritime claims.5 However, China’s unrelenting aggression in the SCS has raised concern that Beijing will soon begin to demonstrate similar behavior in the IOR. Over the past 15 to 20 years, China has expanded from sporadic to regular presence in the Indian Ocean through its naval ships, research vessels, and fishing fleets, as well as a military base. The United States and its allies and partners must not be complacent about PRC actions in the Indian Ocean Region, especially China’s submarine port visits and docking of dual-use ships such as in Sri Lanka and, more recently, Maldives. Due to the high stakes involved, the United States and its allies and partners must balance the need to deter China with the need to avoid military escalation when responding to PRC gray zone acts. When there are violations of international law and norms or when the lives of official personnel or civilians are threatened, Washington and its allies must respond.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Gray Zone, Coercion, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

9. Southeast Asia Is the Soft Underbelly of American Power in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is not just the swing sub-region in the Indo-Pacific but also the soft underbelly of the region—the area most susceptible to Chinese coercion, influence, and expansion. Except for Vietnam, Southeast Asian states have strong fence-sitting tendencies and are reluctant to properly balance and counter Beijing due to their proximity to China, smaller size, limited capabilities, and economic integration with and reliance on China. They are also constantly fearful that the US and its allies will abandon and leave them to fend for themselves against a hostile China. This means that while one can identify pockets of creative and proactive thinking in this sub-region, the prevailing inclinations of the region’s countries are to never back a side before the result is obvious, do the minimum when it comes to burden sharing, and receive maximum economic and security benefits for minimum risk, price, and commitment. In short, they are often inclined toward free riding. It is easy for the US and its allies to become frustrated with Southeast Asian states that give the impression they are seeking various forms of “strategic welfare.” The more constructive approach is to understand their domestic and external vulnerabilities and work within these.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

10. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East