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11. Iron ore futures: possible paths for Australia’s biggest trade with China

Author:
David Uren
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The iron ore market is wrong-footing forecasters again, as it has throughout the last 20 years. Nobody expected the iron ore price to surpass US$200 a tonne as it did in May and no one predicted it would then plunge to less than US$100 as it has this week. This report argues that Australia’s troubled relationship with China will be influenced by which path the iron ore market takes over the medium term. China’s authorities are determined to reduce their dependence on Australian iron ore, both by seeking alternative supplies and by capping their steel production. However, China has been trying and failing to curb its steel production for the past five years, with many local governments ignoring central orders. In just the first six months of this year, 18 new blast furnaces capable of producing as much steel as Germany’s entire output were approved. Although China will never be able to rid itself entirely of the need for Australian supplies, this report warns that if an iron ore glut emerges, whether by Chinese government design or because of an economic downturn, the commodity may join the list of other Australian exports subject to Chinese coercion. The report also highlights that the effort to reduce its dependence on Australia will come at considerable cost to China. Australia is by far the cheapest and closest source of high-quality iron ore for China’s mills.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Natural Resources, Mining, and Trade
Political Geography:
China and Asia

12. Trojan Dragons? Normalizing China’s Presence in the Arctic

Author:
Bryan J. R. Millard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Many Arctic narratives cast suspicion on China, based on concern that the Asian power will seek to undermine the sovereignty of Arctic states and co-opt regional governance mechanisms to facilitate access to resources and new sea routes to fuel and connect its growing global empire. This paper focuses on China’s Arctic maritime capabilities to analyze and infer possible Arctic interests of this self-declared “near-Arctic” state. Do Chinese state officials mean what they say about the Arctic, or are they using the cover of polar scientific research and thinly veiled language in an attempt to normalize their presence and advantageously position themselves? Assuming that acceptance of China’s presence – or at least apathy to it – serves as a necessary precondition to access and exploit Arctic resources, the authors deduce how Chinese scientific research reflects and fits with the country’s regional interests and its global commercial, resource extraction, and power projection goals. After producing a timeline of key inflection points in Chinese academic and official discourse, the authors analyze the activities of Chinese icebreaker Xue Long and the 11 Chinese national Arctic research expeditions (CHINARE). They conclude that China has successfully used its scientific community as an instrument to normalize its presence in the region for skittish Arctic nations. This is consistent with China’s “near-Arctic state” narrative, thus laying the foundation for the broader strategic goal of accessing the region and exploiting its resources.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Maritime, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Arctic

13. China’s Objectives in Afghanistan in the Geo-Strategic Dynamics

Author:
Saima Parveen and Syed Akhtar Ali Shah
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Afghanistan is important to China not only for curbing religious extremism to prevent its further spread into and beyond Xinjiang, but also for serving its economic interests and making the region safe for the One Belt One Road Initiative now briefly called Belt Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese current engagement in Afghanistan is mainly based on resource exploitation and infrastructure development. With its fast-growing economy, political stability at home and increasingly successful foreign policy, China is in a good position to create the image of projecting stability in this troubled region. Indeed, geo-strategically, China is now in a position to play a decisive role in regional affairs. It has become a solid, stabilizing influence with the power to materially impact the region. This research is conducted through sequential mixed method design with three major phases namely, an initial data gathering stage, a questionnaire survey, and a qualitative data gathering phase. The study concludes that Afghanistan is significant for China because of investment in economic projects and for the success of China Pakistan Economic Corridor and BRI. And next important to it is to counter terrorism for the safeguard of Xinjiang
Topic:
Terrorism, Natural Resources, Political stability, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, South Asia, Asia, and Xinjiang

14. Getting to 30-60: How China’s Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges

Author:
Edmund Downie
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
In September 2020, China announced its intentions to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. The neutrality goal in particular was a breakthrough for global climate ambitions: a net-zero target from the world’s largest emitter, responsible for around one-quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The two new goals—referred to in Chinese policy discourse as the “30-60” goals—are not China’s first public targets on GHG reduction. They are, however, the centerpieces of a new Chinese climate policy in which GHG cuts are a standalone goal rather than an ancillary benefit of more immediate priorities like energy efficiency and industrial upgrading. Prior approaches had required little engagement from firms in carbon management. Indeed, none of the largest Chinese firms in the coal power, cement, and steel sectors had publicized quantitative targets for reducing or controlling carbon emissions before the government announced the 30-60 goals. They faced little pressure to do so; authorities pressed firms in climate-adjacent areas like reducing air pollution rather than carbon management. The 30-60 announcement appears to mark a break from this era, forcing firms to adjust accordingly. This report, part of the China Energy and Climate Program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, assesses how China’s high-emitting industries have responded to the 30-60 targets and the accompanying elevation of climate within national policy priorities. It focuses on corporate and sectoral emissions reduction targets through June 2021 among 30 major firms in three of China’s largest sources of direct emissions: coal power generation, cement, and steel.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Coal, Industry, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15. Green Giants? China’s National Oil Companies Prepare for the Energy Transition

Author:
Erica Downs
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
On September 22, 2020, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, made a surprise announcement about China’s climate ambitions during remarks to the United Nations General Assembly. He stated that China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), aims to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Xi also said that China’s GHG emissions would peak before 2030, a slight revision to China’s pledge under the Paris Climate Agreement to peak emissions around 2030. China’s new climate targets spurred the country’s three major national oil companies (NOCs)—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—to strengthen their climate ambitions. PetroChina (the flagship subsidiary of CNPC), which had already set a goal of achieving near-zero emissions by 2050, intends to peak its carbon emissions by 2025. Sinopec Corp. (the flagship subsidiary of Sinopec Group) also aims to peak its carbon emissions by 2025 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. CNOOC Ltd. (the flagship subsidiary of CNOOC) plans to reduce its GHG emissions by 16 percent between 2020 and 2025 and aims to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. This report, part of the China Energy and Climate Program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, provides a baseline for understanding how China’s NOCs are responding to climate change. It examines the activities the three companies identified as part of their emerging energy transition strategies before Xi unveiled the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality targets, and why they didn’t do more. The report then assesses the implications of China’s new climate ambitions for its NOCs and lays out their preparations to date for supporting Xi’s 2030 and 2060 pledges.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
China and Asia

16. Military Build-up in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea: How Relevant Are the Disputes with China?

Author:
Bruno Hendler and Andre Luiz Cancado Motta
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contexto Internacional
Institution:
Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:
The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the regions with the most dynamic and intense military activity in the world. This is largely due to commercial and political interests linked to the region, which is crucial for global maritime trade and rich in natural resources. China is the most interested party in the SCS, claiming 90% of its entire area, a portion referred to by Beijing as the “nine-dash line.” The present article seeks to analyse both quantitatively and qualitatively the influence of China on the military spending of four Southeast (SE) Asian countries that are also interested in the SCS: Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. For quantitative analysis, we used the data for military expenditure, armaments acquisition, the frequency and type of incidents involving national navies and/or civilians. For qualitative analysis, we retrieved information from hemerographic sources and official documents from the United States, China, SE Asian countries, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the World Bank (WB).
Topic:
Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Maritime, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

17. China’s National Carbon Market: Paradox and Potential

Author:
Cecilia Springer
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
China announced it would launch a national carbon market in 2017, yet this policy is taking years to come into effect. What will it take for a carbon market to work in command-and-control China? This policy brief explores an understudied challenge—emissions accounting—and identifies potential opportunities that have arisen in the first phase of China’s national carbon market.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

18. China’s Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements—and Why We Should Care

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
According to geologists, rare earths are not rare, but they are precious. The answer to what appears to be a riddle lies in accessibility. Comprising 17 elements that are used extensively in both consumer electronics and national defense equipment, rare earth elements (REEs) were first discovered and put into use in the United States. However, production gradually shifted to China, where lower labor costs, less concern for environmental impacts, and generous state subsidies enabled the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to account for 97 percent of global production. In 1997, Magniquench, then-America’s leading rare earths company, was sold to an investment consortium headed by Archibald Cox, Jr., son of the same-named Watergate prosecutor, with two Chinese state-owned metals firms, San Huan New Materials and China National Nonferrous Metals Import and Export Company. The chairman of San Huan, son-in-law of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, became chairman of the company. Magniquench was shut down in the United States, moved to China, and reopened in 2003, where it fit in well with Deng’s Super 863 Program to acquire cutting-edge technologies for military applications, including “exotic materials.” This left Molycorp as the last remaining major rare earths producer in the United States until its collapse in 2015.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, Exports, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China and Asia

19. The Impact of COVID-19 on Vulnerable Mineral Supply Chains

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report will concentrate on select examples of the growing US vulnerability to global competitors due to shortages of key mineral resources in our domestic supply base. Dependence on China for raw materials and competition with its manufacturing firms is also a key focus. Shortages do not always indicate a problem because our close allies in mineral-rich countries like Australia and Canada can mitigate gaps in domestic supply. However, China’s growing control over many basic materials, and its history of using that control as leverage for its own economic and political goals, makes this a cause of concern for the continued strength of the US manufacturing economy.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, COVID-19, and Minerals
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Australia, North America, and United States of America

20. Reform Is in the Pipelines: PipeChina and the Restructuring of China’s Natural Gas Market

Author:
Erica Downs and Sheng Yan
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Beijing launched the most ambitious reform of China’s oil and natural gas industry in more than two decades with the establishment of the China Oil & Gas Piping Network Corporation (PipeChina) last December. The company is being developed from midstream assets—pipelines, liquified natural gas (LNG) import terminals, and storage facilities—and personnel transferred from China’s national oil companies (NOCs). Beijing expects that its goals of increasing China’s domestic and imported natural gas supplies and consumption will be more effectively advanced by having China’s midstream infrastructure owned and operated by a single company that provides fair and open access to its pipelines, LNG import terminals, and storage facilities instead of by three NOCs reluctant to grant third-party access to infrastructure.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Gas, and LNG
Political Geography:
China and Asia