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21. Getting Surplus Countries to Adjust

Author:
John Williamson
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The world has witnessed two distinct attempts to build a multilateral mechanism to discipline surplus countries that declined to adjust their surpluses, and several proposals are currently on the table to do the same. On the two previous occasions the major surplus country of the day defeated attempts to create such a mechanism, and today China (not to mention Japan or Germany) exhibits no enthusiasm for the idea. Despite the importance of the issue, there has been remarkably little discussion of these proposals.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, International Monetary Fund, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Germany

22. Renminbi Rules: The Conditional Imminence of the Reserve Currency Transition

Author:
Arvind Subramanian
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis and the ongoing rapid changes in the world economy, the fate of the dollar as the premier international reserve currency is under scrutiny. This paper attempts to answer whether the Chinese renminbi will eclipse the dollar, what will be the timing of, and the prerequisites for this transition, and which of the two countries controls the outcome. The key finding, based on analyzing the last 110 years, is that the size of an economy—measured not just in terms of GDP but also trade and the strength of the external financial position—is the key fundamental correlate of reserve currency status. Further, the conventional view that sterling persisted well beyond the strength of the UK economy is overstated. Although the United States overtook the United Kingdom in terms of GDP in the 1870s, it became dominant in a broader sense encompassing trade and finance only at the end of World War I. And since the dollar overtook sterling in the mid-1920s, the lag between currency dominance and economic dominance was about 10 years rather than the 60-plus years traditionally believed. Applying these findings to the current context suggests that the renminbi could become the premier reserve currency by the end of this decade, or early next decade. But China needs to fulfill a number of conditions—making the reniminbi convertible and opening up its financial system to create deep and liquid markets—to realize renminbi preeminence. China seems to be moving steadily in that direction, and renminbi convertibility will proceed apace not least because it offers China's policymakers a political exit out of its mercantilist growth strategy. The United States cannot in any serious way prevent China from moving in that direction.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
United States and China

23. The Year to Date

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The array of postbubble stresses and uncertainties identified in the January 2010 Economic Outlook (“The Year Ahead”) promised that the new year would see plenty of volatility in markets. That is exactly what is playing out as we move through the first quarter. As risks accumulate, it may be that 2010 is shaping up as a mirror image of 2009, reversing last year's down-then-up pattern with an up-then-down pattern this year.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, and Europe

24. Do Chinese Really Save Too Much? Aspects from Total Factor Productivity Growth in China since 1952

Author:
Qiong Zhang and Chong-En Bai
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
China's economic growth over the past three decades is unprecedented. Although this growth is commonly attributed to a high domestic savings rate among “thrifty” Chinese, savings alone cannot promote economic growth unless productivity has continuously grown for such a long period. This article uses a one-sector, neoclassical growth model to calibrate the economy to Chinese data since 1952 and finds that measuring changes in total factor productivity between 1952 and 2005 can well capture the secular movements in the Chinese savings rate. Far from supporting the widespread belief that China's savings rate is too high, this article argues that even thrifty Chinese “under-saved” for most of the years during this period; furthermore, the fiscal reforms of 1983 and 1985 further suppressed saving behavior, especially China's economic growth over the past three decades is unprecedented. Although this growth is commonly attributed to a high domestic savings rate among “thrifty” Chinese, savings alone cannot promote economic growth unless productivity has continuously grown for such a long period. This article uses a one-sector, neoclassical growth model to calibrate the economy to Chinese data since 1952 and finds that measuring changes in total factor productivity between 1952 and 2005 can well capture the secular movements in the Chinese savings rate. Far from supporting the widespread belief that China's savings rate is too high, this article argues that even thrifty Chinese “under-saved” for most of the years during this period; furthermore, the fiscal reforms of 1983 and 1985 further suppressed saving behavior, especially when initially implemented. In presenting such findings, this article at least partly solves the so-called “Chinese savings puzzle.”
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
China

25. Renminbi Undervaluation, China's Surplus, and the US Trade Deficit

Author:
William R. Cline
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
On June 21, 2010, in the run-up to the G-20 meeting in Toronto, China announced that it would shift to a more flexible exchange rate policy. From mid-June to July 30 the yuan rose 0.8 percent against the dollar. In contrast, the currency had remained fixed (at about 6.83 yuan to the dollar) from September 2008 to early June 2010. Pressure not only from the United States and the European Union but also from Russia, Brazil, and India as well as the IMF seems likely to have played a role in China's decision, although concerns about domestic inflation may also have been a factor.
Topic:
Economics and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
United States and China

26. New PPP-Based Estimates of Renminbi Undervaluation and Policy Implications

Author:
Arvind Subramanian
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Is there reason to add to the proliferating set of estimates on the extent of renminbi undervaluation (see among others, Bergsten 2010; Cline and Williamson 2008 and 2010; Goldstein and Lardy 2008 and 2009; Frankel 2008; Reisen 2009; and Lee et al. 2008)? Yes, not least because these new estimates: (1) suggest that purchasing power parity (PPP)-based approaches to measuring renminbi undervaluation suggest that China's currency is undervalued by about 30 percent against the dollar and not the 12 percent recently reported (Bajaj 2010); and (2) are closer to and consistent with alternative approaches to estimating renminbi undervaluation.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Exchange, International Political Economy, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
China

27. The G20 Meetings: No Common Framework, No Consensus

Author:
Michael Pettis
Publication Date:
05-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Participants in the recently completed G20 meeting in London agreed on a number of measures, some substantial and some merely symbolic, but they sidestepped the real issues dividing the major economic powers and, in so doing, failed to address the root causes of the global trade and investment imbalances. This was almost inevitable. China, Europe, and the United States have incompatible conceptual frameworks for understanding the causes of the global financial crisis; furthermore, their conflicting domestic political constraints make agreement on solutions hard to reach. Europeans believe that the root cause of the crisis was excessively deregulated financial systems, and they are skeptical about U.S. and Chinese calls for fiscal expansion, worrying that excessive spending would prolong the imbalances and make the ultimate adjustment more difficult. China also believes that the roots of the crisis lie within the structure of the global financial system, although Beijing insists that it was mainly the reserve status of the U.S. dollar that permitted imbalances to develop to unsustainable levels. China is particularly vulnerable to trade protection and seeks to maintain open markets for its continued export of domestic overcapacity. Like the United States, it is pushing for more aggressive, globally coordinated fiscal expansion. However, because of rigidities in its financial system and development model, its fiscal response to the crisis may exacerbate the difficult global adjustment and may, ironically, increase the chances of trade friction. In a time of contracting demand, the United States controls two-thirds of the most valuable resource in the world: net demand. Consequently, it is U.S. policies that will determine the pace and direction of the global recovery, along with the institutional framework that will govern trade and investment relationships for decades to come. The crisis puts the United States more firmly at the center of the emerging world order than ever. So far, the United States has not understood the need to consider the global outcomes of its recovery policies. Until the major powers can reach consensus about the roots of the imbalance and cooperate on policies to promote recovery, it is likely that the world economy will get worse before it gets better. The United States will drive the recovery process, but in order to do so effectively it will need to recognize its position of strength and negotiate the appropriate agreements with other major powers, especially China, on the pace and nature of the adjustment.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, and London

28. Understanding Special Drawing Rights

Author:
John Williamson
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
A once-familiar but long-neglected acronym has reappeared in newspapers in recent weeks. We have read that the G-20 meeting in London endorsed a proposal that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should create $250 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). We have been told that one problem with this proposal is that most of the SDR allocation would accrue to countries that are unlikely to use them, and some readers may have seen proposed ways around this difficulty. We have read that the governor of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, has proposed that the SDR should gradually displace the dollar at the center of the international monetary system and that surplus countries should be able to convert their dollar holdings into SDR-denominated assets. No one can doubt that the SDR is back.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
United States and China

29. Inflation Scare: Crazy but Real

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The recent steps by the Federal Reserve to preempt deflation have—ironically and unexpectedly— prompted a surge in inflation fears both inside the United States and abroad, especially in China. Specifically, the Fed's measures to go beyond the stimulus inherent in a zero percent federal funds rate by purchasing Treasury and mortgage securities has conjured visions—especially in the eyes of major buyers of Treasury securities, China foremost— of massive money printing to underwrite trillions of dollars of additional government borrowing at low interest rates. As markets have shown, if that were the Fed's intention—which it decidedly is not—the effort would fail because excessive money printing—creating a money supply larger than the quantity of money demanded— would push up interest rates as inflation expectations rose.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
United States and China

30. Three Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
More than two years have passed since the U.S. housing bubble burst. That event ushered in a financial crisis that was not only intense but also stunning. So stunning in fact, that in August of last year, just a month before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the global economy was close to a crisis worthy of comparison with the Great Depression, yet neither the markets nor the Federal Reserve had much of an inkling of what was to come. The Standard and Poor's (S) 500 Index had come down to about 1,300 from its October 2007 high of 1,576. Positive growth had just been reported for the U.S. economy during the second quarter of 2008 at an annual rate of 2.8 percent (later revised down to 1.5 percent). Almost one percentage point of that growth came from U.S. consumption, and government spending also contributed. The wave of relief after the Bear Stearns scare in March 2008 had provided a nice boost to the economy and to markets. That boost was further enhanced by the substantial contribution to growth from net exports (2.9 percentage points) thanks to what was, then, continuing strength in the global economy, especially in China, which had reported blistering 10.1 percent year-over-year growth in the second quarter of 2008. These and other positive components more than offset a drag from inventories and residential investment. In short, the real economy had not shown much evidence of damage emanating from the chaos that was churning in the financial sector.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States and China