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61. Network effects: Europe’s digital sovereignty in the Mediterranean

Author:
Matteo Colombo, Federico Solfrini, and Arturo Varvelli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Undersea internet cables are critical infrastructure as important as gas and oil pipelines, and are becoming a focus of growing geopolitical competition. Throughout the EU’s wider neighbourhood, geopolitics influences states’ decisions about who is allowed to build internet infrastructure and where they can do so. China and the US differ in their approaches, but both are racing ahead of the EU in their influence over internet infrastructure and the states that depend on it. The EU has the ambition and potential to become a sovereign digital power, but it lacks an all-encompassing strategy for the sector, in which individual governments are still the key players. The EU should set industry standards, help European telecommunications companies win business abroad, and protect internet infrastructure against hostile powers.
Topic:
Infrastructure, European Union, Geopolitics, Internet, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Mediterranean

62. Decade of patience: How China became a power in the Western Balkans

Author:
Vladimir Shopov
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China has become the most prominent third actor in the Western Balkans. The country’s activities are spread unevenly across the region, but they follow a common approach. This approach is marked by China’s wide-ranging efforts to establish itself in key economic areas and to gradually position itself as an indispensable actor. China is slowly transforming its interactions with Western Balkans countries in sectors such as culture, media, and politics into long-term and institutionalised relationships. As European and US ambivalence towards the Western Balkans persists, the region will be in increasing danger of falling into an endless spiral of competition between various foreign actors. Western policymakers should address the widening developmental gap between the region and the EU through initiatives such as targeted investment plans in energy and infrastructure, sectoral integration frameworks, and the frontloading of EU law in the accession process.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and United States of America

63. Unfinished Connectivity in the Bay of Bengal

Author:
Amit Bhandari, Sagnik Chakraborty, Naren Punjabi, and Gitanjoli Dasgupta
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
The Bay of Bengal is a bridge between the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and with a population of 1.4 billion, an increasingly important economic zone in its own right. India has been slow to build regional connectivity. The space has been filled by China's Belt and Road Initiative projects, which have not always been beneficial for host countries. The region may be better off pursuing digital connectivity by enabling tech startups – areas of India’s strength. This research uses maps to explore the potential for energy, transport, and financial connectivity across the Bay of Bengal.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Regional Integration, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Transportation
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Indian Ocean, Indo-Pacific, and Bay of Bengal

64. Regaining the Digital Advantage: A Demand-Focused Strategy for US Microelectronics Competitiveness

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Microprocessors are a critical element of US national infrastructure and manage the country’s energy grids, transportation systems, and telecommunications networks. Without a reliable supply of computer chips and microelectronic components, most US economic and societal activity would grind to a halt. The semiconductor manufacturing process is largely concentrated in East Asia, where manufacturers could be subjected to pressure or coercion by the People’s Republic of China. The semiconductor supply chain, and its inherent resilience and security, could be strengthened by US government investment to bring more steps of the microelectronics production and assembly process onto US shores. To guide government policies, this study proposes a four-factor framework measured from the perspective of the US microelectronics customers and industry. These factors include: resilience of continued microelectronics supplies to the US market; assurance that US microelectronics reflect their intended design and are free of security vulnerabilities; the ability of the US microelectronics industry to meet current microelectronics demand, which shapes the ecosystem; and the value added from US firms, which supports future demand.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

65. Directions of Innovation Policy: Contrasting Views of China and the US

Author:
Anna Jaguaribe and Kamila Aben Athar
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
At the 24th China Analysis Group Meeting, experts analyzed the contrasting views of innovation policies in China and in the United States. The 14th five-year plan continues most of the economic efforts that characterized the last decade while also challenging some certain well-established elements. Internet development is still the dominant focus, but we can also observe the shift towards a service-based economy and high investment in infrastructure. According to the participants, one of the most relevant differences between the US and China is the way non-state actors are connected to the national government. American innovation efforts heavily feature research groups and private corporations having an active role, while in China the government puts up barriers that distort the market and influence it more directly. The tension between the two countries is stronger than ever and the new Biden administration brings a new set of uncertainties to the table, but at the same time, both China and the US are heavily dependent on each other economically. China’s efforts to expand its influence worldwide by negotiating with multiple countries will most likely exacerbate the conflict and talks regarding a decoupling, which currently seems unlikable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Markets, Infrastructure, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

66. Advancing a Liberal Digital Order in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, and Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and other regional democracies risk losing ground in the competition to shape Asia’s digital future. China is making rapid inroads in developing the region’s 5G infrastructure and is playing an increasingly expansive role in the broader digital ecosystems of Indo-Pacific countries. Beijing’s position at the center of Asia’s developing digital order poses a series of challenges to the interests of America and its democratic allies and partners—ranging from the potential compromise of critical networks to the development of new technology standards that favor Chinese companies and undermine civil liberties. Policymakers are scrambling to ascertain how to compete effectively with China in the digital space, when Chinese companies and technology are already interwoven into the digital landscape. These Chinese companies are obligated to assist China on national security, intelligence, and cyber security issues, raising the prospect that they could be employed to carry out espionage or sabotage in the service of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) geopolitical goals. In the case of 5G telecommunication network development, the United States will need to expand its campaign to promote additional trusted vendors who can supply safe, reliable, and cost-effective alternatives to Chinese offerings. Shaping the 5G ecosystem now will set the stage for how the broader U.S.-China technology competition will play out over the next decade. Undersea fiber-optic cables represent another area of technology infrastructure that is being contested between China and the United States. With nearly 95 percent of intercontinental internet data flowing through these undersea cables, it is imperative that they be treated and protected like other critical technologies and infrastructure. Washington must recognize that many issues in digital development remain ambiguous, and it must craft policies that account for the field’s complexity. For example, some countries will seek to maintain a relatively liberal political environment while embracing Chinese technology for economic development purposes. Others will seek out alternatives to Chinese suppliers as a means of maintaining their own security and independence but might still employ those technologies in illiberal ways in order to suppress dissent and maintain political control at home. Moreover, the fast-moving nature of innovation in digital technologies means that technological development will often outpace the creation of liberal political, legal, and regulatory regimes—even in the United States. The development of democratic norms and best practices to combat disinformation, restrict surveillance technologies, and give individuals the right to control their own data is still in a nascent stage. In other words, much of what constitutes a liberal digital order is still being defined. The challenges to ensuring a future liberal digital order are immense; to meet them, the United States must develop a multifaceted approach that prioritizes coordination with democratic allies and partners. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, or the Quad, will play a key role in ensuring protection of emerging and critical technologies through its newly formed working group, announced following the first-ever leaders-level Quad summit in mid-March. Working closely with other technologically advanced Indo-Pacific allies and partners such as South Korea and Taiwan on digital development initiatives will also be important. The degree to which the United States can work with democratic allies and partners to pool resources and capabilities, while also setting mutually agreed standards and guidelines for use of digital technologies, will determine whether those technologies are harnessed in a way that advances free and open societies or contributes to strengthening autocratic regimes.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

67. How Duterte Strong-Armed Chinese Dam-Builders But Weakened Philippine Institutions

Author:
Alvin Almendrala Camba
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese construction contracts and development finance have increased massively in recent years. According to many experts, these projects are largely transplants designed to offshore and export Chinese technology, labor, and policy designs to host countries. However, these views have little regard for important nuances of place, time, and politics, ignoring the degree to which host countries—such as local elites, members of civil society, and norms—shape project design, implementation, and results on the ground. Under the regime of President Rodrigo Duterte, political elites in the Philippines have pressed Chinese firms to adapt to some of their demands for political expediency on key infrastructure projects. This pattern is evident from the Kaliwa Dam and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project—both of which have made substantial progress during Duterte’s rule. In particular, Manila has bypassed local social and environmental regulations and has paved the way for Chinese dam builders to break ground on projects quickly so as to strengthen the Duterte government’s political standing. Around the world, Chinese firms have been highly attentive to the will of local political elites, limiting or sometimes completely avoiding relationships with opposition elites and ties to civil society members. Philippine politics is turbulent. Projects supported by the Duterte regime today might not have the same traction under his successor. So while these Chinese concessions have earned favor with Duterte and his allies, such tactics may prove unsustainable over the long term and could easily spur future resentment against China among local communities marginalized by this decisionmaking. In sum, it is Filipinos, not Chinese actors, who mostly have set the agenda on these major infrastructure projects, except on a few specific contractual terms.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Rodrigo Duterte, and Construction
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

68. What Railway Deals Taught Chinese and Brazilians in the Amazon

Author:
Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Maiara Folly, and Maurício Santoro
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Chinese investments in Brazil have expanded and diversified considerably, especially ones involving infrastructure. Chinese investors have also diversified geographically. Increasingly, major Brazilian infrastructure projects are being planned or implemented with Chinese backing in environmentally sensitive regions such as the Amazon rain forest and the Cerrado, a large savanna region in Central-West Brazil. Chinese actors have become directly involved in such projects against a backdrop of sharpening debates about sustainability and other consequences of large-scale infrastructure projects. This is especially true in protected areas such as land populated by Indigenous groups and conservation units. A notable example is the Ferrogrão project, a major railway line designed to cross sections of the Amazon and Cerrado to deliver goods to Brazilian ports. This paper examines the diverse ways that Brazilian and Chinese actors have learned from each other as they negotiate the terms of these deals. It also explores how these learning processes have been conditioned by intense domestic political debates over these projects in Brazil. Official documents and secondary sources reveal that, rather than a set Chinese way of doing business or a stock Brazilian response, such projects entail dynamic institutional learning. Such learning is shaped not only by the particulars of the Ferrogrão project but also by Chinese actors’ broader engagement with Brazilian infrastructure projects over the past ten years.
Topic:
Environment, Infrastructure, Investment, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, South America, and Amazon Basin

69. How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid

Author:
Juliana González Jáuregui
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s modernization strategy integrates both domestic and foreign policy, especially through two complementary prongs—the so-called Going Global strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This push to internationalize China’s development strategy has ushered in a new era in Beijing’s relationships with countries and regions around the world. In Latin America, these policies have triggered a dynamic pattern of interactions between China and the region’s political economy. Being rich in fuels, energy, foodstuffs, and basic products, countries in Latin America have emerged as significant suppliers for China, but they also have become important destinations for Chinese-made industrial products, and, subsequently, Chinese investment and lending. For Latin American countries, China’s rise as an influential investor, lender, trader, and builder has created an array of new challenges and opportunities. While Beijing has harnessed its engagement in Latin America to support its own development, countries in the region have sought to direct some of China’s economic and financial resources to promote their own strategic sectors. Argentina illustrates this dynamic well, particularly in the energy sector. Argentinian government officials and business leaders have attracted Chinese investment and finance into renewables and other types of energy to promote Buenos Aires’s goals of taking a hybrid path to an energy transition. For its part, China has seized this opportunity to advance its own development goals and to participate in Argentina’s energy transition strategy. Though Argentina has not yet formally joined the BRI, Argentinian officials have reported publicly that Buenos Aires has already decided to endorse the initiative and is waiting for the right moment to do so.1 Argentina has been weighing the pros and cons of signing on to the BRI. On the one hand, signing on could enhance the presence of Chinese actors in the Argentinian renewables sector, as China seeks to intertwine its engagement in Latin America with the deployment of the Green BRI, the dimensions of the initiative that are framed in terms of environmental sustainability. More broadly, joining the BRI could attract new Chinese investment and finance in alternative energy and electricity transmission infrastructure, further contributing to Argentina’s goals for an energy transition. On the other hand, Argentina faces the challenge of designing and implementing a long-term national energy plan that complements its role in the BRI. This means devising an energy plan that, among broader objectives, seeks to help Argentina harness Chinese know-how on renewables and develop innovation and technological capacities of its own. In the meantime, Argentina’s lack of committed engagement with the BRI to date has not impeded the expansion of Chinese overseas investment and financing for renewables and other types of energy projects in the country. In a clear sign of political agency, the diplomatic outreach of key Argentinian national and provincial government officials, as well as corporate players’ push for local associations, has been central in the quest to increase Chinese engagement in Argentina’s solar and wind power sectors and in other alternative energy projects. These interactions have allowed Argentinian policymakers to help shape an adaptive partnership to strengthen the alignment between Chinese investments and Argentinian development objectives. Admittedly, this engagement has at times encountered resistance due to environmental and social risks in certain localities. Even so, these concerns are part of the learning process and set a tone for future cooperation on energy projects. Renewables and alternative energy will continue to be a magnet for global investment as countries around the world strive to address climate change. Thus, local tensions are pushing both Argentinian and Chinese actors to learn from the problematic impacts of some projects and do more to address local communities’ concerns jointly. Successful responses to such concerns would further enhance the basis of Argentina and China’s energy-focused adaptative partnership.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Economy, Business, Investment, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

70. The Clash of Japan’s FOIP and China’s BRI?

Author:
Daisuke Akimoto
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Since the late 2010s, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” has been becoming increasingly significant in the international political arena. In August 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed a policy of “Free and Open Indo- Pacific” (FOIP) as Japan’s new diplomatic vision at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) VI held in Kenya. The FOIP strategy was supported by the Donald Trump administration followed by the renaming of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. However, China has viewed the FOIP as a containment strategy against the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The FOIP vision is unclear for general observers, and it might cause a security dilemma with the Chinese BRI. Is it possible for the FOIP vision to coexist with China’s BRI, or are these two strategic visions destined to clash with each other? In an attempt to answer these questions, the article aims to provide multiple perspectives of the FOIP concept by applying international relations (IR) theory. This article warns that the FOIP and the BRI are likely to bring about diplomatic tension that could be escalated into a military skirmish over the territorial dispute. In order to avoid the possible military clash, it finally seeks to explore possible future pathways of the peaceful coexistence of the two visions in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia