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2. Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia
- Author:
- Jennifer Hsu, Richard McGregor, and Natasha Kassam
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Lowy Institute for International Policy
- Abstract:
- Australia’s foreign interference debate and the souring of bilateral relations between China and Australia has left many Chinese-Australians and their community organisations caught in a contest for their loyalty. The Chinese Party-state actively reaches out to overseas Chinese communities, in Australia and elsewhere, to promote China’s political interests and economic development, with mixed results. Australia’s efforts to combat this outreach have also had mixed results. A survey of Chinese-Australians found that many believed the new anti-foreign interference laws helped to protect community members from Beijing’s overtures. However, a greater number said attacks on the community in Australia — political, verbal, and sometimes physical — had alienated Chinese-Australians and in some cases made them more receptive to messages critical of Australia. Many Chinese-Australians said they had little or no engagement with Chinese community organisations. The newer organisations in particular, which often have closer economic ties to China, were not considered to be representative of broader community sentiment. The area in which community associations were reported to have the greatest traction was in promoting business opportunities in China.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Foreign Interference, and Community Organizing
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Australia
3. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next
- Author:
- Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
- Topic:
- Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America
4. Cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums
- Author:
- Sarah O'Connor, Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Over the past decade, state actors have taken advantage of the digitisation of election systems, election administration and election campaigns to interfere in foreign elections and referendums. Their activity can be divided into two attack vectors. First, they’ve used various cyber operations, such as denial of service (DoS) attacks and phishing attacks, to disrupt voting infrastructure and target electronic and online voting, including vote tabulation. Second, they’ve used online information operations to exploit the digital presence of election campaigns, politicians, journalists and voters. Together, these two attack vectors (referred to collectively as ‘cyber-enabled foreign interference’ in this report because both are mediated through cyberspace) have been used to seek to influence voters and their turnout at elections, manipulate the information environment and diminish public trust in democratic processes. This research identified 41 elections and seven referendums between January 2010 and October 2020 where cyber-enabled foreign interference was reported, and it finds that there’s been a significant uptick in such activity since 2017. This data collection shows that Russia is the most prolific state actor engaging in online interference, followed by China, whose cyber-enabled foreign interference activity has increased significantly over the past two years. As well as these two dominant actors, Iran and North Korea have also tried to influence foreign elections in 2019 and 2020. All four states have sought to interfere in the 2020 US presidential elections using differing cyber-enabled foreign interference tactics. In many cases, these four actors use a combination of cyber operations and online information operations to reinforce their activities. There’s also often a clear geopolitical link between the interfering state and its target: these actors are targeting states they see as adversaries or useful to their geopolitical interests. Democratic societies are yet to develop clear thresholds for responding to cyber-enabled interference, particularly when it’s combined with other levers of state power or layered with a veil of plausible deniability. Even when they’re able to detect it, often with the help of social media platforms, research institutes and the media, most states are failing to effectively deter such activity. The principles inherent in democratic societies—openness, freedom of speech and the free flow of ideas—have made them particularly vulnerable to online interference.
- Topic:
- Elections, Referendum, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
- Political Geography:
- China, Australia, and Global Focus
5. The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system
- Author:
- Alex Joske
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- What’s the problem? The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is strengthening its influence by co-opting representatives of ethnic minority groups, religious movements, and business, science and political groups. It claims the right to speak on behalf of those groups and uses them to claim legitimacy. These efforts are carried out by the united front system, which is a network of party and state agencies responsible for influencing groups outside the party, particularly those claiming to represent civil society. It manages and expands the United Front, a coalition of entities working towards the party’s goals.1 The CCP’s role in this system’s activities, known as united front work, is often covert or deceptive.2 The united front system’s reach beyond the borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—such as into foreign political parties, diaspora communities and multinational corporations—is an exportation of the CCP’s political system.3 This undermines social cohesion, exacerbates racial tension, influences politics, harms media integrity, facilitates espionage, and increases unsupervised technology transfer. General Secretary Xi Jinping’s reinvigoration of this system underlines the need for stronger responses to CCP influence and technology-transfer operations around the world. However, governments are still struggling to manage it effectively and there is little publicly available analysis of the united front system. This lack of information can cause Western observers to underestimate the significance of the united front system and to reduce its methods into familiar categories. For example, diplomats might see united front work as ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘propaganda’ but fail to appreciate the extent of related covert activities. Security officials may be alert to criminal activity or espionage while underestimating the significance of open activities that facilitate it. Analysts risk overlooking the interrelated facets of CCP influence that combine to make it effective.4 What’s the solution? Governments should disrupt the CCP’s capacity to use united front figures and groups as vehicles for covert influence and technology transfer. They should begin by developing analytical capacity for understanding foreign interference. On that basis, they should issue declaratory policy statements that frame efforts to counter it. Countermeasures should involve law enforcement, legislative reform, deterrence and capacity building across relevant areas of government. Governments should mitigate the divisive effect united front work can have on communities through engagement and careful use of language. Law enforcement, while critically important, shouldn’t be all or even most of the solution. Foreign interference often takes place in a grey area that’s difficult to address through law enforcement actions. Strengthening civil society and media must be a fundamental part of protecting against interference. Policymakers should make measures to raise the transparency of foreign influence a key part of the response
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China, Australia, and Australia/Pacific
6. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems
- Author:
- David Levine
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
- Topic:
- Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America
7. Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries
- Author:
- Matt Schrader
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- “For our friends, we produce fine wine. Jackals, we welcome with shotguns.” – Ambassador Gui Congyou, 2019 This was how a Chinese ambassador warned Sweden of potential consequences after Stockholm decided to honor a Swedish citizen imprisoned in China with a human rights prize. Ambassador Gui Congyou’s turn of phrase has a long history; it is the final line of a famous 1950s propaganda anthem written to eulogize China’s bloody contest with the United States on the Korean Peninsula.2 Gui’s statement would be easy to dismiss as the words of a single ambassador, but his statement is consistent with two patterns in the Chinese Communist Party’s interactions with the outside world.3 The first is China’s growing global assertiveness under Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Prior to Xi’s ascent there were signs that China’s leadership had concluded it was time to put aside Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that China should “hide its brilliance and bide its time.”4 But since Xi came to power in late 2012, party officials have more frequently noted that China is a large, powerful country, and that smaller, less powerful countries oppose its interests at their own risk.5 The second and more enduring theme is the party’s tendency to divide the world into friends and enemies. Inside China, the party’s friends are those who “uphold the leadership of the [Communist Party] and the socialist cause” through support for its policy agenda.6 Outside China, the party’s friends are “foreigners of influence and/or power who assist China’s interests.”7 The party’s enemies are those who publicly question how it chooses to exercise power. The party has operationalized this mindset by developing a sophisticated set of tools and a well-defined body of doctrine to attempt to maintain unchallenged power by “uniting friends” and “isolating enemies.”8 This divide-and-conquer strategy is predicated not only on rewarding friends for their support, but also on coercing the party’s enemies. Within China, coercive tactics include: extralegal detention, limits on public and private speech by individual citizens, control of all forms of media and key sectors of the economy, and cooption of elites by establishing personal and professional costs for opposing the party. This report describes how the party has increasingly employed many of these domestic tools to unite foreign friends and isolate foreign enemies.9 Ambassador Gui’s remarks are but one example in an expanding universe of cases. The threat of losing business in China means that foreign corporations are routinely pressed to censor themselves and their employees to avoid topics the party considers sensitive. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have built and sold the party’s tools of digital authoritarianism in South America, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Chinese diplomats have also tried to rally other countries in support of greater governmental control over the flow of digital information inside national borders. In Southeast Asia, party-state linked actors have sought to covertly alter the outcome of elections throughout Southeast Asia, combining cyberespionage prowess with the financial firepower of the PRC’s enormous policy banks.10 And the party has used the same vision of triumphant ethnic solidarity it pushes on its own population to justify its attempts to threaten, censor, and co-opt the Chinese diaspora. In so doing, the party hopes to influence democratic politicians and politics by controlling the external narrative presented of China.
- Topic:
- Politics, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
8. Covert Foreign Money: Financial Loopholes Exploited by Authoritarians to Fund Political Interference in Democracies
- Author:
- Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- In addition to more widely studied tools like cyberattacks and disinformation, authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have spent more than $300 million interfering in democratic processes more than 100 times spanning 33 countries over the past decade. The frequency of these financial attacks has accelerated aggressively from two or three annually before 2014 to 15 to 30 in each year since 2016. We call this tool of foreign interference “malign finance,” defined as “the funding of foreign political parties, candidates, campaigns, well-connected elites, or politically influential groups, often through non-transparent structures designed to obfuscate ties to a nation state or its proxies.” A typical case involves a regime-connected operative funneling $1 million to a favored political party, although buying influence in a major national election costs more like $3 million to $15 million. Rather than start our analysis by focusing on any given policy area, we review open-source reporting in 16 languages to identify malign finance cases credibly attributed to foreign governments. Finding that approximately 83 percent of the activity was enabled by legal loopholes, we catalogue the resulting caseload into the seven most exploited policy gaps. Broader than just money flowing through straw donors, shell companies, non-profits, and other conduits, malign finance includes a range of support mechanisms innovated by authoritarian regimes to interfere in democracies, from intangible gifts to media assistance. As such, policy strategies to address these vulnerabilities are not limited to campaign finance reforms, but also include greater transparency requirements around media funding, corporate ownership, campaign contacts with foreign powers, and other issues. In addition to identifying loopholes, our case study informs the scope of our recommended policy solutions, which are meant close off channels for foreign financial interference without infringing upon the speech rights of domestic political spenders or jeopardizing bipartisan support. Each of our recommendations balances these trade-offs differently based on empirical, legal, political, and administrative considerations vetted in consultation with more than 90 current and former executive branch officials, Congressional staffers from both parties, constitutional law scholars, and civil society experts. This report is organized around each of the seven U.S. legal loopholes that need to be closed, starting with the most urgent priorities, plus an eighth chapter on the need for stronger governmental coordination.
- Topic:
- Authoritarianism, Democracy, Finance, Foreign Interference, and Dark Money
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
9. A Stronger Mediterranean Partnership: Why More Than Gas is at Stake
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 08-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus must encourage the US to assert a higher military and diplomatic profile as a counterweight to Turkish pressures, Russian and Iranian ambitions, and Chinese inroads.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Asia, North America, Egypt, Cyprus, and United States of America
10. Can a Chinese-Iranian Deal be Averted?
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Chinese investment in Iran would help Tehran withstand US economic pressures, and exacerbate the Western crisis with Iran
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Investment, Economic Diplomacy, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America