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171. China and the EU in the Western Balkans: A zero-sum game?

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Frans-Paul van der Putten
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael Report explores whether and how China’s approach to the six non-European Union (EU) countries of the Western Balkans (the WB6) relates to EU interests. It focuses in particular on the question of whether China’s influence affects the behaviour of the WB6 governments in ways that run counter to the EU’s objectives in the region. China engages with the Western Balkans primarily as a financier of infrastructure and a source of direct investment. This is in line with China’s main strategic objective for the Western Balkans – that is, to develop the Land–Sea Express Corridor, a component of its Belt and Road Initiative, aimed at improving China–EU connectivity. This report proposes a number of actions based on recognising the developmental needs of countries in the Western Balkans, and accepting that China’s economic involvement is inevitable and potentially beneficial for such developmental needs. In particular, the EU should maximise accession conditionality as a tool to influence the conditions under which China is involved in the region.
Topic:
Infrastructure, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Development, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Balkans

172. Coming out and breaking out: The US, Iran and Europe go nuclear

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
On the eve of the US elections, the nuclear deal (JCPOA) stands on the edge of the precipice. The US strategy of ‘maximum pressure’ has not (yet) achieved its implicit objective of 'regime change' but tanked Iran’s economy, caused its government to dig in and increased regional instability. The geopolitical consequences of US sanctions, EU prevarication and Iran’s deep presence throughout the Middle East have been equally profound. At the global level, they include nudging Iran towards China/Russia, the US alienating its European ‘partners’ and encouraging them to develop greater strategic autonomy. At the regional level, US sanctions risk creating an alternative economic regional order, ensuring Yemen remains a protracted war and making a regional security initiative more necessary, but less likely. It is not yet too late to turn the tide. The focus should now be on reducing regional tensions and especially the stress that sanctions have put on Iran’s population and government. Radical action looks more inviting when one stands against the wall, but the Middle East does not need more conflict than it already has. To do so, the EU should first support Iran with a large-scale Covid-19 humanitarian economy recovery package. As such measures are already sanctions-exempt, they will create few new tensions. An economic initiative should follow that grants preferential access to the EU’s internal market for industrial and agricultural goods from the entire Middle East (for Iran via an upgraded INSTEX). Such interventions will not resolve existing security dilemmas but can show there is an alternative to confrontation.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Elections, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Yemen, and United States of America

173. A Search for Independence in President Duterte’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Denise Layla P. Miram
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Duterte administraƟon’s move toward favoring non‐tradiƟonal partners above other equally valuable— and perhaps more beneficial—trade and development partners, such as the United States and the European Union, has significantly changed the direcƟon of the country’s foreign policy and impacted its naƟonal security. While the government maintains that it is pursuing an “independent foreign policy”, many experts have criƟcized the administraƟon’s supposed strategy for its lack of clarity and posiƟon. In the absence of clear guidelines and a well‐defined vision, the administraƟon has merely pivoted away from one superpower, its treaty ally in the US, to global superpowers China and Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Trade, and Rodrigo Duterte
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Philippines, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

174. The Implications of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor for Pakistan–European Union Relations

Author:
Agnieszka Nitza-Makowska
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) holds the potential to transform Pakistan along with its turbulent regional environment. In the short run, the multiple networks of infrastructure that the project provides will eventually improve Pakistan–European Union (EU) trade. Moreover, while the CPEC is unlikely to bring an immediate strategic shift in the bilateral dialogue, which is particularly lacking in political dynamics, its long-run promises can help to foster such dynamics. The project, if successful, can help Pakistan to establish a peaceful domestic environment and subsequently promote the country’s fresh image to reverse its soft power losses in Europe and beyond. This paper investigates contemporary Pakistan–EU relations, which have so far attracted little attention from international relations scholars. It presents the bilateral dynamics in the context of the CPEC, which is an unprecedented investment by China in Pakistan. The paper concludes by shedding light on the differences between China’s and the EU’s strategies vis-à-vis Pakistan. Despite the fact that the study focuses on one particular South Asian state, it can serve as a case study for the comparative analysis of China’s and the EU’s presence in third countries, especially those that, like Pakistan, have joined the Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, European Union, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, Europe, South Asia, and Asia

175. Disinformation from China and Russia during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka and Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has become another opportunity for China and Russia to conduct disinformation campaigns. Activities include overt and covert propaganda directed at the EU, NATO and the United States. Both countries are seeking to strengthen their international position, primarily in relations with the EU and the United States. The disinformation activities of Russia and China also result from the desire to disrupt European cooperation, which is a challenge for Poland.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, COVID-19, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Poland, and United States of America

176. Consequences of Hong Kong’s National Security Law

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The National Security Law, imposed on Hong Kong by China on 30 June, has reduced protests against China’s policy. The scale of the restrictions, including those potentially affecting foreigners, and China’s supervision over the implementation of the law have already worsened the living conditions of Hong Kong residents and functioning of foreign companies. China’s actions caused an international reaction, mainly from the UK, the U.S. and the EU. Concerned about the safety of its citizens, the EU recommends that Member States suspend their extradition agreements with Hong Kong.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Law, European Union, and Freedom
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, Hong Kong, and United States of America

177. The Most Important Challenges in China’s Foreign Policy after the First Phase of the Pandemic

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China’s rivalry with the U.S. is intensifying. New American sanctions threaten, among others, Huawei’s global position. As a result of China’s aggressive foreign policy, relations with the EU and Australia have worsened, and the border conflict with India has intensified. To counter these failures and re-build their image, the Chinese authorities are trying to shift the responsibility for the problems to the U.S., strengthening anti-Western rhetoric, and presenting the world with new multilateral initiatives, such as one related to data security. With China’s foreign policy being idealogised, any successful cooperation with the EU on climate matters is unrealistic.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Borders, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, Asia, and Australia

178. 5G Security: The New Energy Security

Author:
Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

179. Strategic autonomy for European choices: The key to Europe's shaping power

Author:
Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Multi-level competition is on the rise in the international system and the standoff between the US and China risks becoming a defining feature of international affairs. However, the future is not predestined: the European Union (EU) will play a major role in the development of the international order, whether through its absence or its engagement. This Discussion Paper follows recent European Policy Centre publications and debates dedicated to revamping Europe’s approach to an increasingly challenging international context, which have delivered recommendations to: equip Europe with the tools to govern interdependence and mitigate confrontation; take a strong stance in defence of Europe while not endorsing a zero-sum interpretation of global affairs; turn the EU into a global shaping power by pursuing a ‘rules-first’ strategy; and frame Europe’s strategic autonomy in comprehensive terms, including the economic, technological and security and defence dimensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Affairs, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

180. China’s Export Success: Due to Unfair Practices or Fair Competition?

Author:
Rolf Langhammer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Compared with previous ratings, China’s trade policy today is more positively acknowledged. Yet, China can still be criticised in particular because of its non-transparent subsidy policy, the privileged role of state-owned enterprises, the heavy hand of the state in general, the sluggish enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the prevalence of non-tariff barriers. Yet, it cannot be ignored that Chinese entrepreneurship mentality is highly developed outside state interference in world markets. Especially, in the digital economy, high motivation and a large pool of human skills act as drivers of innovations, so far mainly process innovations. The trade war with the US hurts China and is responded by China with asymmetrical retaliation. The more Chinese exports to the US in total are affected, the more costs will have to be borne by US consumers as options to shift to alternative suppliers become weaker. What President Trump would see as a “good” deal for the US is unclear. It can be thus presumed that the trade war will continue into 2020 and that it is in fact a tech war. The EU is affected as EU companies produce in China for the US market and in the US for the Chinese market. While it might gain from trade diversion effects in the short run, the negative effects on investment due to uncertainty weigh more heavily. The EU is tempted to negotiate a free trade agreement with China but rightly refuses to start negotiations before China is prepared to conclude an agreement on investment. The EU should not see China and the US on equidistance. Workable relations with the US are much more important. To conclude, China’s trade policy has improved relative to Western standards but still warrants further steps towards much less state influence. Yet, its global competiveness especially in the state-of-the-art digital economy is high and is owed to a strong entrepreneurial mentality.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Asia, Exports, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America