Number of results to display per page
Search Results
162. Connectivity in Eurasia: Geopolitical Chances for the EU
- Author:
- Jacopo Maria Pepe
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- As the coronavirus pandemic fuels technological and geopolitical competition among the great powers, Europe’s relations with China and Russia are facing new challenges and risks. Still, the reconfiguration of power in Eurasia also brings unexpected opportunities for European actors in the area of connectivity. To seize them, the EU needs to reconcile its aspiration to be a globally accepted “normative-regulatory” power with both its limited financial means and its more assertive attitude to geopolitics.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia
163. Stand by Me! The Sino-Russian Normative Partnership in Action
- Author:
- Alice Ekman, Sinikukka Saari, and Stanislav Secrieru
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- It has become commonplace to describe the relationship between China and Russia as ‘a marriage of convenience’,1 in particular in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, this popular metaphor hides very different – even contradictory – interpretations of the nature and future of the relationship. Perhaps depending on one’s take on arranged marriages, the deepening relationship between these two states is seen as ‘stable and successful’2 and ‘durable’,3 or on the contrary, as a ‘mere’ convenient arrangement doomed to be a temporary solution.4 It seems that fuzzy and often misunderstood marriage allegories bring more confusion than clarity to understanding and explaining complex relations between states. Shared norms and worldview would certainly indicate a steady and long-term arrangement whatever the marriage metaphor used. The Sino-Russian partnership is dense and multidimensional, and it is rooted in shared norms. International norms – the standard of expected state behaviour – reflect the underlying values of the global system, and underpin international cooperation in the political, economic and security-related fields.Sino-Russian normative cooperation aims at redefining and re-interpreting existing international norms in a way that reflects their shared principles, worldviews and threat perceptions – ‘like-mindedness’ as Chinese official communication refers to it.5 Both China and Russia share a conviction that today's international order is unfairly dominated by the US and the West, and that the current international norms and their interpretation reflect Western values that should not be considered universal. They are both convinced that these need to be changed, and that the time is ripe for this. For Beijing and Moscow, a post-Western era of global governance looms on the horizon. This shared reading of the present and predilection for such a future global order has been translated into dynamically evolving normative cooperation between the partners at multilateral level. Two other important and shared convictions are, first, that neither party represents a threat to the other regime’s survival (and even has an interest in supporting the other regime) and, second, that the West would like to see the regime in both China and Russia challenged (and under the right circumstances is ready to contribute to this). The shared worldview and threat perception help to smooth out the differences between the two countries: when their interpretations differ, they show mutual self-restraint and acquiesce rather than go against each other in the name of national interest. This Brief examines the normative dimension of Sino-Russian cooperation – i.e. how the two countries advance their understanding of international rules and norms together in the international arena. It studies how the two countries advance their understanding of appropriate state behaviour internationally in three areas: human rights, non-intervention and cyber-governance. All three issues are united by a common thread – states’ sovereignty – a robust version of which both vigorously defend. As a result, in these three areas, their cooperation is particularly strong and proactive.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Norms
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia
164. Sovereignty Over Supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while engaging with the world
- Author:
- Daniel Fiott and Vassilis Theodosopoulos
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Fears about the EU’s trade, resource and technology dependences have only grown since the outbreak of the pandemic, even though US-China trade disputes and the rolling out of 5G have played a significant role, too. Some analysts have pointed to the beginning of a ‘decoupling’ of certain supply chains away from China, and, while evidence suggests that some ‘reshoring’ has taken place since at least 2011, there are debates about whether the production of certain technologies should be relocated back to Europe after decades of de-industrialisation. Decoupling and/or reshoring are a reaction to geopolitically risky dependences, with the fear being that certain products, technologies or raw materials will be unavailable during times of crisis or that a reliance on third-party supplies will limit political freedom. In the digital age – where data dominates – there are also concerns that dependences may lead among other things to espionage or a curtailment of personal rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that decoupling is unfeasible, save perhaps for in very specific critical technology domains, the threat perception surrounding critical supplies has given rise to a different vocabulary and EU communiques and strategies are today replete with references to ‘technological sovereignty’, ‘open strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’. Yet, in conjunction with this rhetoric has come a raft of new policy initiatives. In February 2020, the European Commission released a bundle of strategies on data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the digital future, which stressed the importance of reducing technological dependences in strategic areas. This is why the Commission is to invest €8 billion in supercomputing and help leverage €20 billion per year for AI. In March, a new ‘Industrial Strategy for Europe’ was published that stated that critical raw materials are ‘crucial for markets such as e-mobility, batteries, renewable energies, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, defence and digital applications’. It will be much harder for the EU to develop supercomputers and batteries without secure supplies of raw materials. To this end, on 3 September a ‘Commission Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials’ was released along with an updated List of Critical Raw Materials and a foresight study looking at strategic technologies and dependent sectors over the 2030-2050 horizon. This bundle of initiatives has made the case for the EU to diversify resource supplies, especially in an era of digitalisation that demands increasing amounts of strategic resources found outside of the Union’s territory.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Geopolitics, Supply, and Supply Chains
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
165. Remolding China’s ‘Empty’ Belt and Road Initiative: An Opportunity for the EU
- Author:
- Jasper Roctus
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been subject to ample scrutiny since its inception in 2013. Practical results could be said to be severely lacking in contrast to the project’s ambitious plans. Chinese engagement abroad has irrefutably intensified since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, but whether this can be classified as the fruits of BRI remains unclear. China, in fact, is developing BRI on the go. That gives the EU an opportunity to engage with BRI and remold it into a more desirable form. Because China increasingly sees Europe as BRI’s “final destination”, the EU has a lot more leverage than it commonly assumes.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, European Union, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
166. Climate superpowers: How the EU and China can compete and cooperate for a green future
- Author:
- Janka Oertel, Jennifer Tollmann, and Byford Tsang
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The broad notion of ‘partnership’ no longer reflects the true complexity of the EU’s interactions with China in tackling the most important global challenge. Instead, as climate action becomes more material to economic interests, Europe and China will both compete and cooperate with each other, against the backdrop of an overarching systemic rivalry. To successfully manage this new reality, the EU and its member states will have to clearly define benchmarks and red lines for credible climate action, to set the framework for cooperation. At the same time, they will need to invest in future competitiveness, especially in the green technology needed to compete for markets, standards, and influence in a low-carbon world.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Climate Change, European Union, and Interstate Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe
167. Biden’s World? Views from the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union
- Author:
- Alexey Gromyko and Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the annual joint seminars that since a few years the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations organise in Moscow and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that is more than ever necessary in a world of increasing tensions between the great powers. We continue our collaboration through this joint publication, therefore, for which we have invited prominent scholars from Russia and the European Union as well as China and the United States to share their analysis of the impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections on international politics.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
168. Technology Strategies in China and the United States, and the Challenges for European Companies
- Author:
- Laurence Nardon
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- As international relations are increasingly reorganized around the US-China rivalry, the tensions between these two great powers are shaping a growing number of sectors, and the exchange of sensitive technologies in particular. This is a critical issue for European companies today. Indeed, European companies, as manufacturers, importers and exporters, risk finding themselves at the heart of the deepening technological competition opposing the United States and China (Éric-André Martin). The United States has a long history of using multiple regulatory instruments in managing the export of dual-use technologies, in particular towards China. Even beyond the Trump administration’s aggressive positions, these regulations are expanding and increasingly strict, hinting at a potential protectionist technological warfare (Pierre Girard). Despite China’s progress in innovation (5G, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things), and an expansion of measures meant to protect intellectual property rights both for domestic and foreign firms, Beijing’s predatory industrial practices and the weight of the Chinese Communist Party on the economy and society clearly live on (John Seaman). French and European companies are thus hindered both by the prohibition of re-exporting American technologies and products enacted by Washington and by Beijing’s predatory practices. How much leeway do European companies have? What role should the European Union (EU) play in the face of such challenges? Since 2016, new propositions to reform the EU export-control regime regulating dual-use items are being intensely debated (Sofia Bournou). The three chapters of this report examine the norms currently in place in the United States, China, and Europe, and delve more deeply into specific case studies: the battle between the Trump administration and Huawei (Marion Welles), the problems facing European companies in China (Laurence Nardon and Mathilde Velliet), and the case of the communications satellites (Jean-François Bureau). The conclusion of this report draws up a list – of great interest for decision-makers – of the infrastructures and technologies that will be critical for European strategic autonomy in the years to come (André Loesekrug-Pietri).
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Internet, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
169. Latin America and the New Global Order
- Author:
- Antonella Mori
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- Amid the coronavirus pandemic, global geopolitical relations are being shaken to their roots, and Latin America is no different. The region is experiencing new transformations in political, economic, and societal terms. In turn, all these rapid changes are having an impact on how Latin American countries shape their own foreign policies, and on how they adapt to the challenges of an increasingly multipolar world. How are the US, China, and the EU competing in terms of political alliances and economic projection on the Latin American region? And how are some of the main Latin American countries (namely Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela) contributing to shape these new regional dynamics?
- Topic:
- Politics, European Union, Economy, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, and Multipolarity
- Political Geography:
- China, Brazil, Latin America, Venezuela, Mexico, and United States of America
170. The Berlin Pulse 2020/21 (full issue)
- Author:
- Gro Harlem Brundtland, Paolo Gentiloni, Peter Altmaier, and H.R. McMaster
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Körber-Stiftung
- Abstract:
- In last year’s edition, we called 2020 an ‘eventful year’ with Germany’s presidency of the European Council and the US presidential election. But no one would have thought that a pandemic might be added to the list of major events affecting German foreign policy and political priorities around the globe. One year – and a COVID-19 special edition of The Berlin Pulse in between – later, international policy-making is slowly adjusting to the new level of uncertainty the pandemic brought into our lives. Despite these uncertain times, German public opinion on involvement or restraint in international crises remains solid as a rock: 44 percent of respondents say that Germany should get more strongly involved while 49 percent still prefer restraint. Since Körber-Stiftung posed this question for the first time in 2014, the public’s perspective has barely changed. In spite of this continuity, the present issue is also full of surprises and novelties. The idea of The Berlin Pulse is to identify potential gaps between German public opinion and expectations of international policy-makers. In 2020, another gap becomes an eye-catcher – the one between German and US public perceptions of the transatlantic partnership. A wide majority of US respondents considers Germany as a partner when tackling issues, such as protecting human rights and democracy (75 percent) or the environment (76 percent). By contrast, German respondents hardly reciprocate this feeling. With the US presidential election just behind us, an increasing US-Chinese rivalry in which Europe risks becoming – as Pauline Neville-Jones puts it – ‘the pig in the middle’ and crises beyond COVID-19 on the horizon, the present issue dedicates one chapter to each of these three developments to which German foreign policy needs to respond.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Public Opinion, European Union, Multilateralism, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and WTO
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, India, Germany, Syria, and United States of America