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Begin New Search Topic Deterrence Political Geography China

11. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:
Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

12. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

13. “Production Is Deterrence”: Investing in Precision-Guided Weapons to Meet Peer Challengers

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report explores whether the fiscal year (FY) 2024 U.S. defense budget request for key conventional precision-guided munitions (PGMs) aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) by prioritizing weapons needed for the “pacing challenge” China poses and dealing with the “acute threat” from Russia, while taking risk in lower priority areas. The FY24 presidential budget request builds on the shift that began in FY23 to support the NDS: increasing buys of key long-range and antiship missiles to prepare for a fight in the Pacific, starting to fill the cruise missile defense gap, bolstering production of the land-attack weapons needed in Europe, and test-running multiyear procurement and large lot procurement for key munitions to strengthen the defense industrial base. In the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budgeting process, ships, aircraft, and vehicles tend to be prioritized, leaving missiles and munitions with inadequate funding. Moreover, the Pentagon does not take a holistic approach to procuring key conventional PGMs, making it difficult to assess the joint portfolio. If the United States is going to effectively compete with China and Russia, that needs to change. To deter and—if deterrence fails—defeat China, the DoD needs large stockpiles of standoff missiles, maritime strike weapons, and layered air and missile defenses. The authors conclude that after years of underinvestment, the DoD is buying more long-range and medium-range missiles, which would be essential in a China war fight. While historically the Pentagon has overinvested in bombs and missiles to attack targets on the land and neglected antiship weapons, the FY24 budget saw a notable uptick in air-launched antiship weapons. For the past decade, the DoD has consistently invested in air defenses, but its purchases have focused on expensive ballistic missile defense interceptors, while neglecting cruise missile defenses. The FY24 budget reverses this trend. Additionally, the DoD is investing in PGMs to arm Ukraine and replenish American and allied stores of weapons that are needed to counter Russia. Except for surface-to-air missiles, the weapons for Ukraine are relatively short-range land-attack PGMs that U.S. forces do not need in the Indo-Pacific. A large portion of the funding for these weapons is coming from Ukraine supplemental appropriations, not the base defense budget. Supplemental appropriations are also resourcing significant investments in U.S. production lines, but the DoD has made only moderate progress rebuilding American stockpiles of the PGMs given to Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Budget, Weapons, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

14. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction

Author:
Andrew Metrick
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. The Cold War Computer Arms Race

Author:
Bryan Leese
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The Cold War computer arms race illustrates the military’s role in strategic competition. The Soviets bought and stole, versus creating computer technology themselves. A U.S.-led coalition integrated economic, diplomatic, and information mechanisms, embargoing computer technology to disadvantage the Soviets. President Ronald W. Reagan’s offset strategy integrated military power, openly demonstrating computer-infused weapons lethality that jeopardized Soviet quantitative military advantage. President Reagan’s use of the computer arms race shows a way to conduct and integrate a strategic competition campaign of deterrence that includes coercive diplomacy with diplomatic efforts that can deter China and Russia while encouraging them to reverse harmful foreign and domestic policies.
Topic:
Cold War, Science and Technology, Deterrence, Espionage, Embargo, Coercion, Competition, and Computers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

16. The role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis

Author:
Gregory Weaver
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The potential for a conflict over Taiwan is increasing due to China’s nuclear and conventional military buildup and the threat of two simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, which would severely stress the ability of US and allied conventional forces to win in both theaters. Nuclear weapons will cast a long shadow over a Taiwan conflict and could play multiple roles in the deterrence and warfighting strategies and operations of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A conflict over Taiwan has a number of attributes that will shape those roles. Those attributes make the potential for limited nuclear escalation real and uncontrolled nuclear escalation possible. In order to prevent war and escalation in war, US policymakers and military planners must take the role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict seriously. The United States should communicate four focused deterrent messages to China and reassure its allies and partners that it can deter Chinese nuclear use. The United States should reevaluate its theater nuclear capability requirements for a Taiwan conflict and carefully analyze options to defeat a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan with limited nuclear strikes if necessary. Finally, the United States must credibly address the potential for collaborative or opportunistic aggression by China and Russia in an environment in which both are peer nuclear adversaries. This requires determining what the US strategy should be to address the two-peer threat, optimizing US and allied conventional forces to address it, and reshaping US nuclear capabilities if necessary. The United States needs to know now whether it is going to require a nuclear force that is larger, or different, or both, because changing the current modernization program requires immediate action to address the threats in time.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

17. Making Collective Deterrence and Defense Work in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
David Santoro and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific security architecture is undergoing fundamental transformation to address rising challenges, most notably those posed by an increasingly confident, assertive, and capable China. Pacific Forum has started a multi-year unofficial dialogue with experts and officials from the United States and key allies and partners to share views of this evolving regional security environment and identify common interests and concerns as well as areas of divergence. The inaugural Pacific Forum Defense and Deterrence Dialogue, which included participants from the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, took place in Tokyo on February 2-3, 2023. It was run at the Track 2 level, although diplomatic officials and military officers from each country also attended as observers. Pacific Forum’s goal is to identify ways to shape this evolution to ensure that it meets U.S. national security needs, particularly integrated deterrence of, and defense against, regional adversaries—with China as the foremost concern. Responses to these changes have taken several forms. Bilateral alliances are being modernized. Other security relationships are being strengthened, such as those between Japan and Australia and Japan and the United Kingdom. There is also talk of new coordination among Five Eyes and other partners. In other cases, new initiatives have been launched, such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States “enhanced trilateral security partnership” (AUKUS) or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Recent developments, such as the election of conservative Yoon Yuk-soul as president in South Korea, are hopeful signs of the revitalization of currently moribund defense and security arrangements, notably U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. There is also reportedly talk of renewed interest in the Trilateral Security Dialogue that includes the United States, Australia, and Japan. All these initiatives are designed to better compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defend against adversaries determined to rewrite the regional order in ways that align with their interests. While the notion of an Asian equivalent to NATO is out of sync with regional needs (and there is broad recognition of that fact among key allies), current momentum could herald the emergence of an Indo-Pacific defense community reminiscent of the one created by trans-Atlantic nations after the Second World War. That community was forged to defend against the Soviet Union. Today, the nascent group in the Indo-Pacific is focused on China, although it is not the only threat. Understanding how regional governments see and rank those diverse threats is a critical step in ensuring that the new arrangements are most effective. One thing is certain: the current situation—in which there is no coordination mechanism among the existing and emerging arrangements—is not tenable in view of the mounting China challenge. To succeed, this process must be nurtured. The United States must better understand the forces at play and the views driving national action, and it must work to ensure that those changes are effective to counter China and other challenges. Work is needed to understand how all these pieces fit together in a coherent regional deterrence and defense architecture, particularly to deal with strategic conflict. This is not easy. The above- mentioned initiatives and relationships are new and evolving. It is difficult to appreciate each on its own, much less the overlap between them, and their convergences and divergences. Plus, in some cases, governments are also focused on other ways to deter. DTRA’s chief concern is the warfighter, who must be prepared to address a range of threats that extends from “strategic” military problems (including those related to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and other domains) to gray zone issues, but some regional initiatives also address other issues, notably climate change, vaccine diplomacy, and emerging technologies. It is critical that the United States understand how allies and partners see this menu of items and their goals and priorities, even as the focus of our proposed effort is strengthening regional deterrence and defense. Plainly, a cumulative, comparative assessment is critical because effective deterrence and defense demand a comprehensive analysis and there needs to be shared understanding of how these mechanisms can be coordinated to ensure that needs are met and that participating governments maximize and make the most efficient contributions. From a U.S. perspective, building a collective deterrence and defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific is urgent and the only realistic way to compete effectively against China. As a landmark report from the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney has found, “a strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.”1 Failure to build an effective Indo-Pacific deterrence and defense architecture would shift the regional balance of forces to the detriment of the United States as it addresses the China challenge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

18. China Maritime Report No. 33: China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, and Strategic Implications

Author:
David C. Logan
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Maritime, Deterrence, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

19. EU-Pacific Talks: Taiwan and security dimension – lessons learned, Indo-Pacific containment

Author:
Adam Horry
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
During the first debate of the third edition of the EU-Pacific Talks, organised by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, participants engaged in a lively debate covering various aspects of Taiwan's status. They discussed the economic, military and value drivers behind Taiwan's importance, addressing concerns about China's approach and lessons from other global conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. Read what our guests debated in this report by Adam Horry.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Deterrence, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

20. Multidomain Deterrence and Strategic Stability in China

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China and Asia