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321. Missile Defence and European Security

Author:
François Heisbourg, Klaus Becher, Alexander Pikayev, and Ivo H. Daalder
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
European NATO countries have been spectators to the debate about defending the US against ballistic missile attacks. While there have been national differences in Europe's reactions to the national missile defence (NMD) programme, it is obvious that most Europeans don't like it. The French seem somewhat more convinced than others that missile defence is inherently foolish and unworkable. Some British experts seem to insist more than others that any programme that might undermine NATO's nuclear deterrence and strategic unity should be avoided. And perhaps Germans, more than others, worry about perceived dangers to the ABM and other arms control treaties, and generally about relations with Russia. Most Europeans at present believe that US defence against long-range ballistic missiles is a slap in the face for Russia, a dangerous provocation for China and an inadequate response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Germany

322. Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Publication Date:
01-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) held its annual Pacific symposium on “Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China” at the National Defense University in Washington on March 7 and 8, 2000. This event brought together representatives of the policy community and academe from Australia, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. It focused on how perceptions of China influence defense and foreign policies in key nations of the Asia- Pacific region, how the likely course of developments in China might affect the future policies of countries in the region, and how such changes might impact on their security relations with the United States.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and International Law
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, India, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand

323. China: Making the Case for Realistic Engagement

Author:
Michael E. Marti
Publication Date:
09-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Chinese aspirations to become a great power in the 21st century have numerous regional implications. Beijing claims to seek a peaceful international climate so as to concentrate on domestic development. Yet under the rubric of a New Security Concept (NSC), China also is pursuing a long-term strategy to alter radically regional power relationships that have contributed to prosperity and relative stability in East Asia over the past 50 years.
Topic:
Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Beijing, and East Asia

324. Regional Conflicts with Strategic Consequences

Author:
M. Elaine Bunn, Richard D. Sokolsky, and David E. Mosher
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The strategic environment facing the United States has changed radically in the past decade. The United States needs to reexamine traditional ways of planning for the use of military force in conflicts that threaten vital interests and that could escalate to the highest levels of violence. Several characteristics define the new environment: Changed relationships between the major powers. The bipolar world of the Cold War has yielded to U.S. preeminence in virtually every facet of power, while Russia has become a second-tier power. China now has the seventh largest economy in the world and is modernizing both its conventional and nuclear forces—though it is unlikely to replace the former Soviet Union as the second pole in a reconfigured bipolar world. The rise of regional powers, such as Iraq and Iran. These aspiring regional hegemons are unhappy with a status quo that is preserved by American military power. The end of bipolarity has brought this antagonism to the fore. During the Cold War, regional conflicts played out within the context of the broader ideological and strategic conflict between the two superpowers, which also tamped down pressures for escalation and proliferation for fear that conflict would spiral out of control. That all ended with the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet empire made it impossible for Russia to continue supporting its allies abroad, who were forced to become responsible for their own security. The possibility that smaller rogue states might try to keep the United States out of a regional conflict. By credibly threatening that the fight could escalate and even involve homeland attacks on the United States or its partners, a regional pariah might hope to prevent the United States from committing forces to the conflict or hinder it from building coalitions with European and regional allies. Failing that, a regional adversary could seek to delay and disrupt U.S. deployments to the theater and hamper operations. Finally, the leadership of a rogue state may be able to preserve its regime even in defeat if it could strike the American homeland or American allies. In short, regional powers are developing the capability to conduct strategic warfare against the United States. The importance these countries place on asymmetric warfare probably has been encouraged by the American distaste for wartime casualties and worries about self-deterrence.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and China

325. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

326. The Place of the Defense Industry in National Systems of Innovation

Author:
Kenneth Flamm, Ann Markusen, Judith Reppy, John Lovering, Claude Serfati, Andrew D. James, Eugene Cobble, Judith Sedaitis, Corinna-Barbara Francis, Dov Dvir, Asher Tishler, and Etel Solingen
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
Abstract:
A review of current and forthcoming developments in the European defense industry (which here means mainly Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) would lead, I believe, to some fairly clear conclusions. The relationship between sectoral and national (including regional) economic development is changing profoundly. This is above all because the defense industry currently represents a major and extremely significant instance of globalization. However, this is not the kind of globalization described in many summaries.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, and Industrial Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Middle East, and France

327. NATO's Past, NATO's Future

Author:
John Lewis Gaddis
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization stands at a crossroads. Critical choices lie ahead that will determine its future. I begin my paper this way because it is customary to begin pronouncements on NATO with this kind of statement. Indeed papers and speeches on NATO have been beginning this way through the half-century of the alliance's existence - and yet NATO never quite reaches whatever crisis the speaker or writer has in mind. NATO seems to have a life of its own, which is remarkably detached from the shocks and surprises that dominate most of history, certainly Cold War history. And NATO's members, both actual and aspiring, seem bent on keeping it that way. So what is a crossroad anyway in historical terms? Most of my colleagues, I think, would say that it's a turning point: a moment at which it becomes clear that the status quo can no longer sustain itself, at which decisions have to be made about new courses of action, at which the results of those decisions shape what happens for years to come. The Cold War was full of such moments: the Korean War, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech, the Hungarian and Suez crises, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six Day War, the Tet offensive, Nixon's trip to China, the invasion of Afghanistan, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War itself. What strikes me as a historian, though, is how little impact these turning points had on NATO's history - even General deGaulle, who tried to turn himself personally into a turning point. The structure and purposes of the alliance today are not greatly different from what they were when NATO was founded. Which is to say that NATO's history, compared to that of most other Cold War institutions, is uneventful, bland, and even (let us be frank) a little dull. That very uneventfulness, though, is turning out to be one of the more significant aspects of Cold War history. It surprised the historians, who have been able to cite no other example of a multi-national alliance that has had the robustness, the durability, the continuity, some might say the apparent immortality, of this one. It has also surprised the international relations theorists, for it is a fundamental principle of their discipline that alliances form when nations balance against threats. It follows, then, that as threats dissipate, alliances should also - and yet this one shows no signs of doing so. An instrument of statecraft, which is what an alliance normally is, has in this instance come to be regarded as a fundamental interest of statecraft. That requires explanation, which is what I should like to attempt here.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, Soviet Union, Germany, and Berlin

328. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China

Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is embarked on an ambitious, long-term military modernization effort to develop capabilities to fight and win short-duration, high- intensity conflicts along its periphery. China's defense modernization is broad reaching, encompassing the transformation of virtually all aspects of the military establishment, to include weapon systems, operational doctrine, institution building, and personnel reforms. China values military power to defend economic interests, secure territorial claims, and build political influence commensurate with its status as a regional power with global aspirations. In recent years, the PLA has accelerated reform and modernization in response to the central leadership's concerns that developments across the Taiwan Strait could put at risk Beijing's objectives for Taiwan unification.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Taiwan, and Beijing

329. "One China" and Relations Across the Taiwan Strait

Author:
James J. Przystup, Ronald N. Montaperto, and Gerald W. Faber
Publication Date:
09-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Relations across the Taiwan Strait have reached an apparent impasse. Both China and Taiwan have, in a sense, painted themselves into corners. Yet, aware of the considerable costs that will inevitably be incurred by new and higher levels of tension or conflict, both President Jiang Zemin of China and Chen Shui-bian, the newly elected President of Taiwan, share a vital interest in finding a face-saving way out of their respective dilemmas without compromising their longer term objectives. In the process, each is being influenced and constrained by a number of factors related to politics, economics, and broad strategic interests. Overall, these factors will provide incentives to seek a reduction of tensions, at least in the short term. At the same time, years of mutual mistrust and the stark and growing differences between their respective political and social cultures will continue to affect the prospects for a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues separating China and Taiwan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Government
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Taiwan

330. Old Wine in New Bottles: The Pentagon's East Asia Security Strategy Report

Author:
Doug Bandow
Publication Date:
05-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
To contain Soviet-led communism and, secondarily, to prevent a militarily resurgent Japan, Washington established a network of alliances, bases, and deployments throughout East Asia after World War II. By the 1990s the Soviet Union had imploded, China had become a reasonably restrained international player, and other communist states had lost their ideological edge. At the same time, the noncommunist nations had leaped ahead economically. Despite such momentous developments, however, U.S. policy remains fundamentally the same.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Washington, Israel, and Soviet Union