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1. Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China

Author:
Lynette Ong and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
How do states coerce citizens into compliance while simultaneously minimizing backlash? In Outsourcing Repression, Lynette Ong examines how the Chinese state engages nonstate actors, from violent street gangsters to nonviolent grassroots brokers, to coerce and mobilize the masses to pursue its ambitious urbanization project. She draws on ethnographic research conducted annually from 2011 to 2019--the years from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, a unique and original event dataset, and a collection of government regulations in a study of everyday land grabs and housing demolition in China. Theorizing a counterintuitive form of repression that reduces resistance and backlash, Ong invites the reader to reimagine the new ground state power credibly occupies. Everyday state power is quotidian power acquired through society by penetrating nonstate territories and mobilizing the masses within. After the book’s publication, Lynette has extended the arguments to explain the success, failure, and implications of China’s Zero-Covid Policy in the Journal of Democracy, Foreign Affairs and the Economist etc. Outsourcing Repression has won the American Sociology Association’s Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship in Political Sociology, and the Human Rights Best Book Awards from the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Association, and the International Studies Association.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Governance, State, Coercion, Zero-COVID, and State Power
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2. Countering Coercion: Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Nilanthi Samaranayake
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has been engaging in gray zone activity—coercive behavior that is aimed at changing the status quo but that is below a threshold that would prompt a military response—particularly against the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), and these actions are raising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.1 Washington must closely monitor the situation and take steps to help protect the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations from PRC intimidation and territorial encroachment. China makes ambiguous claims to 90 percent of the 1.3 million square miles of the South China Sea, including waters within the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Projecting power and dominating the South China Sea, with its critical resources and central role in global trade—around $3 trillion worth of commerce transits the seaways annually—is a top national security and foreign policy goal for China.2 PRC maritime bullying is not new, but it has intensified in the past few years, especially against the Philippines. Beijing aims to convince Manila to give up its claim to Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater reef located in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. The Philippines makes its claim to the shoal by housing a small contingent of marines aboard a World War II–era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, that was intentionally grounded there in 1999.3 Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea threaten to involve the United States, which has been a treaty ally of the Philippines for over 70 years. Despite the risk that tensions could further escalate, Washington continues to stand firmly behind Manila as it employs asymmetric tactics to push back against Chinese behavior.4 PRC maritime activities and goals in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the time being, are focused on protecting China’s economic interests (80 percent of its energy imports flow through the Indian Ocean), gathering intelligence, and projecting power, not on asserting maritime claims.5 However, China’s unrelenting aggression in the SCS has raised concern that Beijing will soon begin to demonstrate similar behavior in the IOR. Over the past 15 to 20 years, China has expanded from sporadic to regular presence in the Indian Ocean through its naval ships, research vessels, and fishing fleets, as well as a military base. The United States and its allies and partners must not be complacent about PRC actions in the Indian Ocean Region, especially China’s submarine port visits and docking of dual-use ships such as in Sri Lanka and, more recently, Maldives. Due to the high stakes involved, the United States and its allies and partners must balance the need to deter China with the need to avoid military escalation when responding to PRC gray zone acts. When there are violations of international law and norms or when the lives of official personnel or civilians are threatened, Washington and its allies must respond.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Gray Zone, Coercion, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

3. Countering China’s coercive diplomacy: Prioritising economic security, sovereignty and the rules-based order

Author:
Fergus Hunter, Daria Impiombato, Yvonne Lau, Adam Triggs, Albert Zhang, and Urmika Deb
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly using a range of economic and non-economic tools to punish, influence and deter foreign governments in its foreign relations. Coercive actions have become a key part of the PRC’s toolkit as it takes a more assertive position in international disputes and seeks to reshape the global order in its favour. This research finds that the PRC’s use of coercive tactics is now sitting at levels well above those seen a decade ago, or even five years ago. The year 2020 marked a peak, and the use of trade restrictions and state-issued threats have become favoured methods. The tactics have been used in disputes over governments’ decisions on human rights, national security and diplomatic relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Economic Security, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

5. The Cold War Computer Arms Race

Author:
Bryan Leese
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The Cold War computer arms race illustrates the military’s role in strategic competition. The Soviets bought and stole, versus creating computer technology themselves. A U.S.-led coalition integrated economic, diplomatic, and information mechanisms, embargoing computer technology to disadvantage the Soviets. President Ronald W. Reagan’s offset strategy integrated military power, openly demonstrating computer-infused weapons lethality that jeopardized Soviet quantitative military advantage. President Reagan’s use of the computer arms race shows a way to conduct and integrate a strategic competition campaign of deterrence that includes coercive diplomacy with diplomatic efforts that can deter China and Russia while encouraging them to reverse harmful foreign and domestic policies.
Topic:
Cold War, Science and Technology, Deterrence, Espionage, Embargo, Coercion, Competition, and Computers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

6. Investigating China’s economic coercion: The reach and role of Chinese corporate entities

Author:
William Piekos
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s economic statecraft has expanded in line with Beijing’s vision for an international environment that is more conducive to its interests. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are willing to use every means at their disposal to achieve this goal, bringing the full force of the party-state to bear in support of Xi’s objectives abroad and against perceived enemies of the Chinese government. Economic statecraft—the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals—has been a consistent feature of Xi’s dealings with CCP competitors and adversaries. Intensifying US-China strategic competition and Beijing’s increasingly overt attempts to assert its preferences only further emphasize the importance of confronting China’s use of economic coercion and influence and understanding the reach of Chinese companies. The deliberate use of economic ties to achieve geopolitical objectives is underpinned by corporate entities that facilitate trade, investment, and financial flows.1 Beijing’s preference for plausible deniability and nontransparency in theory makes corporate entities an attractive mechanism through which to signal its displeasure and to achieve strategic goals. Understanding the reach and role of such entities is, therefore, key to identifying where Beijing might be best positioned to advance its economic statecraft. To that end, this report explores avenues through which researchers can investigate these issues, considers industries that could be vulnerable to future coercion and influence, and offers policy recommendations to counter China’s economic statecraft.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Global Markets, Economy, Trade, Norms, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

7. Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The danger of armed confrontation over Taiwan is growing, raising the spectre of a direct conflict between China and the U.S. that would have severe global repercussions. Managing this risk will require the parties to rebuild trust by shoring up decades-old understandings.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Territorial Disputes, Risk, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Taiwan Strait

8. Chinese coercion, Australian resilience

Author:
Richard McGregor
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australians have grown in confidence about the country’s ability to withstand economic coercion from China since the imposition of punitive trade measures in 2020. Beijing suspended high-level political exchanges and imposed a range of informal sanctions and trade blockages against Australia in the wake of a series of escalating disputes, culminating in Canberra’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of Covid-19 in April that year. Two years on, it is prudent to plan on the basis that it is still early days in China’s use of trade measure against Australia. Canberra and Beijing resumed ministerial-level dialogue after the election of the Albanese Labor government in May 2022. But given the long-term structural divide between the United States and China, and Australia’s position as a strong US ally, Australian governments of all persuasions should assume that China’s trade policies against Australia will remain largely in place. Beijing may tactically retreat now and again to fill shortfalls or if it wants for political reasons to present itself as a conciliatory partner. But a solution to the fundamental bilateral political tensions driving trade disruptions is not on the horizon. The sectors in which bilateral trade with China have continued to prosper are not those in which Australian producers are dependent on China but rather where the two countries are interdependent. Australia cannot find alternative markets to match China for commodities such as iron ore, liquefied natural gas, and wool. Nor can China wean itself off a substantial reliance on Australia as a supplier. For this reason, the core elements of bilateral trade will remain reasonably resilient for some years. However, absent a huge change in the structure of the Australian economy and its export profile, the longer-term picture for exports to China looks worse. As China’s economy grows and its structure changes and becomes less resource intensive, Australia will likely get a decreasing share of a growing pie. Over time, the cost of trade bans and other punitive measures will likely mount as Chinese investment in Australia diminishes and the cost of diversifying from the region’s largest economy grows. Australia has maintained its reputation as a reliable supplier of commodities throughout the downturn in bilateral relations with China. It is imperative that it continue to do so — both to benefit the Australian economy and to maintain leverage of its own. Control over critical commodities carries considerable strategic value, as the role of gas and oil in the Ukraine war has shown.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Commodities, Trade, Resilience, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China and Australia

9. Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Game Theory, Coercion, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

10. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark