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1. Securitization of China Pakistan Economic Corridor Amid India China Rivalry

Author:
Muhammad Babar and Muhammad Umar
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI). The project has been considered the guarantor of Pakistan‟s economic development and has the potential to significantly improve the Pakistan gross domestic product and to transform Pakistan economy from import driven to export driven. Since the project has been under various impediments particularly in the domain of security, there have been several attacks on the Chinese personal working on the projects and its installations, majorly prompted by the Indian backed proxies and non-state actors in Pakistan. The Potential threats to the success of CPEC have been enhanced due the growing and intensifying India china rivalry. The securitization of the CPEC from all potential threats is a matter of national interest and ensuring national and economic security. This paper highlights the importance of CPEC for Pakistan‟s economy, potentials threats to the CPEC emanating from the Indian backed-proxies, discuss security measures taken to address these concerns and suggests a strategic path forward for the project securitization.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Non State Actors, Borders, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Exports, Economic Development, Rivalry, Securitization, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

2. Negotiating the India-China Standoff: 2020–2024

Author:
Saheb Singh Chadha
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India and China have been engaged in a standoff at their border in eastern Ladakh since April–May 2020. Over 100,000 troops remain deployed on both sides, and rebuilding political trust will take time.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

3. The Clash at Tawang: Tensions Rise on the China-India Border

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 9, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian army clashed at Yangtse along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in injuries on both sides. Following the incident, the local Indian commander held a flag meeting with his Chinese counterpart on December 11 in order to restore peace. The clash at Tawang marked the first major skirmish between the two armies in the eastern sector since the Galwan Valley clash in the western sector in Eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 (China Brief, July 15, 2020).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

4. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

5. Stabilizing the Border: A Possible Way Ahead in the Post-Galwan Situation

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
An abnormal situation continues to prevail along the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) three years after the Galwan valley incident despite bilateral talks to resolve the matter. Although progress is being made, the force levels on both sides and the close proximity in which they are deployed increase the chances of a deadly mishap or an unintended encounter. Even after a mutually satisfactory resolution is achieved, it may still take several months to build back a broad political understanding at the state-to-state level and reverse the erosion in trust. This paper examines why the existing agreements and measures to preserve peace and tranquility along the LAC were not entirely successful in mitigating the military face-offs between the two sides since 2013, including in the Galwan valley in 2020. It also explores whether the three-stage formula1 that is being talked of is a way of resolving the issue—disengagement, de-escalation, and de-induction2 of forces—especially the de-induction of forces, could practically work given the absence of trust as well as the geographical and climatic conditions in which the two sides operate. The paper concludes that unless political trust exists, the de-induction of forces may not be achievable. India should be ready for a prolonged state of military preparedness by establishing a credible deterrence along the LAC and adequate reserves in the rear to respond to fresh aggression, while simultaneously engaging China to negotiate a modus vivendi in the border areas. Specific options both on negotiating a new balance with China and building deterrence are suggested. The first section of the paper looks at ways in which both sides created the building blocks of border management in the 1990s. The objective is to determine which elements succeeded in achieving peace and tranquility and why this framework has shown stress in more recent times. This section highlights that the border management framework, as originally envisaged, encompassed immediate measures to both stave off unintended conflict and longer-term ways and means to maintain peace and tranquility along the entire border region through mutual force reduction. It explores the possible reasons as to why the longer-term objective of mutual force reduction was not pursued. The paper concludes that peace and tranquility could not be sustainably maintained because the focus was on short-term management of situations to the detriment of long-term measures that would reduce the risks. The second section of the paper looks at how both sides might deal with border stabilization in the post-2020 scenario and, more specifically, whether mutual reduction of forces is still a feasible option. It seeks to draw lessons from the Sino-Russian experience in this regard, which shows that mutual force reduction happens when state-to-state engagement deepens and both sides feel comfortable with the level of trust and their own capacity for deterrence. The paper concludes that political trust is a prerequisite for meaningful mutual de-induction of forces. Presently, such conditions do not exist in the India-China context. This section of the paper also looks at how the growing infrastructure gap between India and China in the border areas since 2000 also makes it difficult for the two countries to replicate the Sino-Russian model. The final section of the paper looks at the options that might be available to India to build back a framework for peace and tranquility along the border areas. It also outlines the actions that India might consider adopting unilaterally as well as in the negotiations with China with the objective of creating the conditions for restoration of peace and tranquility in the border region. It suggests a three-pronged approach of negotiating with China to stabilize the border region, building deterrence on the LAC, and holding adequate reserves in the rear.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Political stability, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and India

6. Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-China Border Dispute

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Frictions along the India-China frontier have heated up following a burst of fighting in 2020, the first in decades. The danger of more will lurk as long as the countries disagree over where the line lies. Both should take steps to manage the mounting risks.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Territorial Disputes, Borders, and Risk
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Himalayas

7. The Taiwan Factor: Why Is China seeking a larger military might?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is also the head of Central Military Commission, told the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held from October 16 to October 22, to speed up efforts to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to transform it into a world-class military. He also underscored the need for winning regional wars.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Borders, Strategic Interests, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

8. Sanctions, SWIFT, and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System

Author:
Barry Eichengreen
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the United States and a coalition of cooperating countries imposed harsh financial sanctions on the Russian government, corporations, and individuals.1 These sanctions bar Russian banks from using SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) to facilitate cross-border payments, prohibit banks from doing most forms of business with Russian entities, and freeze assets held abroad by the Central Bank of Russia in the form of treasury securities and bank deposits. These developments have led Russia, as well as other countries contemplating whether they might find themselves in the same position, to explore alternatives. Such options could include building a substitute for SWIFT to send instructions regarding cross-border interbank transactions; identifying financial counterparties other than Western banks with which to do international business and platforms other than Western clearinghouses through which to make payment; and finding a vehicle other than the dollar for denominating and executing transactions. Specifically, countries are looking to China, which has large internationally active banks, has created its own clearinghouse for cross-border transactions and is embarked on a campaign to encourage broader international use of its currency, the renminbi.2 This note investigates how far China has gone in creating alternatives to SWIFT, Western banks, and the dollar. It explores whether Russia and other countries might be drawn toward this parallel international financial universe and what economic and political implications this has—for the United States, for its geopolitical rivals, and for global economics and politics. China is making strides in fostering cross-border use of the renminbi and building a renminbi-based interbank payments system that can serve as an alternative to SWIFT and Western clearinghouses. However, these remain somewhat limited alternatives—for the moment. The situation could change faster if lent additional impetus by Western sanctions. Thus, countries such as the United States that employ financial sanctions should prepare for the development of alternative financial arrangements in China and possibly elsewhere. This may mean relying more heavily on nonfinancial measures insofar as financial sanctions eventually become less effective.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Finance, Borders, and Banks
Political Geography:
China and Asia

9. The Geopolitics of Human Trafficking and Gendered North Korean Migration

Author:
Eunyoung Christina Choi
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
According to the “White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2021,” human-trafficking targeted at North Korean defectors in China remains a grave issue ? not only are North Korean women sold without their consent, but they are also forced to prostitution at entertainment establishments. In this commentary, Eunyoung Christina Choi, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University, looks into the dire circumstances North Korean women defectors find themselves in during their pursuit to defect. She explains that the international community’s interest in and measures against the human-trafficking of North Korean female defectors have been dominated by geopolitical interests and have in turn exacerbated women’s prospects to safely defect.
Topic:
Women, Borders, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

10. The Long Shadow of the 1962 War and the China-India Border Dispute

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In the war that India and China fought between October 20 and November 20, 1962, India not only suffered a humiliating defeat but also lost a chunk of territory in Aksai Chin in Ladakh in eastern Jammu and Kashmir. Sixty years later, the Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are locked in a standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border, at Ladakh, which began in mid-2020 and continues through the present (Jamestown Foundation, March 1). Both sides’ corps commanders have held sixteen rounds of bilateral talks thus far and have reached agreements on the disengagement of troops from several points of friction and the establishment of several “buffer zones” in these areas (Xinhua, July 28). However, China has refused to return to the April 2020 status quo and the buffer zones have been carved largely out of Indian territory. Sixty years after it lost a large swath of territory in Ladakh, is India ceding ground there again to China?
Topic:
War, History, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia