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21. Securing Energy Supply and Maritime Interests: Seeking Convergence

Author:
Frank Umbach
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
As ASEAN’s energy demand is likely to increase by almost two-thirds in the period up to 2040, the regional oil and gas resources in the offshore zones of the ASEAN member states will become even more important for enhancing the energy supply security of both the individual member states as well as for ASEAN as a whole. Accordingly, access to and political as well as physical control and security of these offshore energy resources will receive even more governmental attention. In context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as well as South China Sea policies and its energy dimensions, they can fuel already existing maritime competition and conflicts in the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the interconnecting sea lanes and regional choke points. This paper analyses the question to what extent are energy security concepts and challenges are interlinked with maritime policies, particularly in regard to the unresolved overlapping claims in the South China Sea and the perceived intensifying naval competition in the Indian Ocean. It also highlights the strategic implications of ASEAN's rising energy demand and growing exploitation of its offshore maritime energy resources for future regional cooperation, enhanced competition and potential strategic rivalries as well as conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Oil, Gas, Maritime, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

22. The New Southbound Policy Deepening Taiwan’s Regional Integration

Author:
Bonnie Glaser, Scott Kennedy, and Matthew Funaiole
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In a concerted effort to expand Taiwan’s presence across the Indo-Pacific, President Tsai Ing-wen has introduced the New Southbound Policy (NSP) to strengthen Taipei’s relationships with the 10 countries of ASEAN, six states in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan), Australia, and New Zealand. The policy is designed to leverage Taiwan’s cultural, educational, technological, agricultural, and economic assets to deepen its regional integration. This report tracks the ongoing implementation of the NSP and assesses what has been achieved since Tsai was elected in January 2016. The Guidelines for the New Southbound Policy issued by the Tsai administration detail that the policy is designed to (1) forge a “sense of economy community” by fostering links between Taiwan and the 18 NSP target countries; and (2) establish mechanisms for wide-ranging negotiations and dialogues, and to “form a consensus for cooperation” with NSP target countries. In the short and medium term, the Guidelines identify four goals: (1) use national will, policy incentives, and business opportunities to spur and expand “two-way” exchanges with NSP target countries; (2) encourage industry to adopt “a New Southbound strategy” in their planning; (3) cultivate more people with the skills needed to support the NSP; and (4) expand multilateral and bilateral negotiations and dialogues to enhance economic cooperation and resolve disputes and disagreements.1 The NSP follows from similarly named policies initiated under Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, which were aimed at diversifying Taiwan’s outbound investment away from Mainland China and into Southeast Asia. Since these prior efforts had only a limited impact, skeptics often mischaracterize the NSP as the latest iteration of a failed policy. Such naysayers fail to appreciate, however, that Tsai’s approach is both more strategic and more comprehensive than those of her predecessors. While diversifying and reinvigorating Taiwan’s economy remain fundamental to the NSP, the policy also outlines mechanisms for more effectively integrating Taiwan into the region through cultivating interpersonal connections. Moreover, the NSP is being implemented at a time of slowing growth and rising wages in Mainland China, while investment opportunities are booming in Southeast Asia and South Asia. The core economic goals of the NSP include institutional initiatives, such as updating and expanding economic agreements with targeted countries. At the same time, Taiwan is seeking to encourage small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to explore opportunities overseas. Taipei has also identified avenues for improving bilateral ties by engaging with the general publics of NSP target countries, as well as with government officials and business executives. As such, Taiwan has invested heavily in expanding cultural and educational exchanges to help promote a deeper under- standing of South and Southeast Asian cultures, languages, and business practices among the people of Taiwan. These “people-centered” exchanges serve to realize Taipei’s twin goals of strengthening Taiwan’s integration with the region and facilitating its economic diversification. It is too early to determine whether the NSP will ultimately achieve its ambitious goals, and it may take years before the Tsai government’s investment will start paying dividends. Furthermore, the NSP should be carefully examined by both the countries targeted by Tsai and partners further afield—including the United States. Many of these countries have a vested interest in bolstering the mechanisms available for Taiwan to contribute to the peaceful development of Asia. These countries may find that the goals of the NSP overlap with their own objectives in the region, and therefore may be eager to lend additional support to the endeavor. Selected Policy Recommendations for the United States The United States has a profound interest in the success of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. Taiwan has been a long-standing partner of the United States. Its democracy and free society are a beacon of liberal values in the region, while its economic development model has been admired and studied for decades by nations in Asia and beyond. To date, the United States does not appear to have given much thought or expended much effort to support the NSP within Asia. We suggest the United States consider actively supporting the NSP. We recommend the following specific actions: The assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs should coordinate with his/ her counterpart in the South and Central Asia division to create an internal working group to consider how the U.S. government can support the NSP. The U.S. government should engage Japan, Australia, and India, the other members of the “quad,” in support of the NSP. The U.S. government should continue to support Taiwan’s inclusion and active participation in international and regional initiatives where statehood is not required. U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly those with programs in NSP target countries, should consider partnerships with NGOs in Taiwan to integrate their work where appropriate in support of the NSP. The Commerce Department’s U.S. Commercial Service should engage with American industry associations and companies, and explore potential avenues of collaboration be- tween American and Taiwan industry in NSP target countries. The United States should consider bilateral (U.S.-Taiwan) cultural initiatives that may be brought to third countries in Asia. The United States should include Taiwan youth in relevant regional programs and networks.
Topic:
Agriculture, Education, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Culture, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan

23. Incident Prevention and Mitigation In The Asia Pacific Littorals: Framing, Expanding, and Adding to Cues

Author:
Graham Ong-Webb, Collin Koh, and Bernard Miranda
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper explores the possibility of South China Sea claimants and regional countries playing an active role in developing measures to prevent untoward incidents involving government (including naval and maritime law enforcement) and non-government vessels while political negotiations take place with respect to the proposed Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China. It argues that such a comprehensive incident prevention and mitigation plan must be multidimensional and multilevel in its approach, cascading from the political, strategic, operational, to tactical levels. This study breaks down into three main sections. The first examines the framing of the existing Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) and its expansion as well as any new prevention and mitigation initiatives. The center of gravity and theory of success for CUES must be at operational and tactical levels, this paper highlights, while also proposing that CUES should be expanded to include sub- surface and aerial- based actions as other potential triggers for unplanned encounters and unintended escalations at sea. The end-state calls for a comprehensive CUES in light of the multidimensional nature of the SCS maritime landscape. The second section of this paper assesses the prospects for an expanded CUES, focusing on maritime law enforcement and irregular forces. It examines the viability of expanding this mechanism through what this paper terms as “Phased” and “Blanket” Approaches, which is dependent on the regional political climate. The third, final section raises two proposals at the strategic level, and six proposals pegged at the operational and tactical levels of planning and activity to build on and enhance the existing slate of such mechanisms as CUES to promote navigational safety and risk reduction in regional waters.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Maritime, Conflict, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, South China, and Brunei

24. The Impact of Chinese National Identity on Sino-ASEAN Relations

Author:
Danielle Cohen
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
China and ASEAN possess tremendous opportunities for economic cooperation, but also face significant security challenges, particularly regarding the South China Sea. In both domains, China’s national identity has greatly influenced the trajectory of the bilateral relationship. China’s ASEAN policy is characterized by a desire to recreate the Sinocentric structures of the tributary system, a belief in the historical legitimacy of China’s maritime and territorial claims, a vision of China as a global economic powerhouse, and a sense that China has already “peacefully risen” and can more actively assert itself to reap the rewards.
Topic:
Trade, Economic Cooperation, ASEAN, and Identity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

25. China's engagement with Regionalization in South and Southeast Asia: A comparative perspective

Author:
Vasiliki Papatheologou, Rizwan Naseer, and Musarat Amin
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
China’s involvement in Asian regionalization is a main axis of its foreign policy and a part of China’s multilateral strategy which aims at increasing its regional role in Asia and multilateralism in global arena. The engagement with the regional institutions such as SAARC and ASEAN on the one hand facilitate China’s role as an effective player in the peripheral politics and on the other hand, maximizes PRC’s strategic interest for further regional integration. The article seeks to analyze the main elements of China’s engagement with two Asian regional organizations, (SAARC and ASEAN). The comparative analysis over China’s behavioral policies towards SAARC and ASEAN leads to the estimation that China has the potential for leadership in Southeast Asia while in South Asia its “voice” is still inaudible. The article argues that China’s engagement with SAARC compared to ASEAN is limited due to the games of balance of power in the region of South Asia deriving from the internal contradictions among the members (India-Pak relations), the low level of regionalization in South Asia as well as due to the increased role of other great and regional powers in the region of South Asia such as USA and India.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, Engagement, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia

26. CHINA SPOOKING ALLIES WITH THE SEE-SAW BETWEEN SOFT AND HARD POWER

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Chinese leaders spend considerable time and energy in assuring the international community that they have no reason to be afraid of China’s “peaceful rise” and rapid emergence as one of the most important economic and diplomatic players on the international stage. Many countries, however, equate China’s growing economic might with greater political influence and are less accepting of the benign image that Beijing now wants to portray to the world. Although China’s current policy may appear at first impression to be a rather soft variety of imperialism, it is still perceived by many as “hard” imperialism. There are now mounting signs that other countries, especially China’s neighbors, are not totally convinced of Beijing’s proclaimed benevolent intent. Those countries are presently taking measures to protect themselves in case China’s “soft” imperialism eventually turns out to be more aggressive or of the “hard power” variety.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, Cambodia, Australia, and Myanmar