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Begin New Search Topic 5G Political Geography China

1. Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States

Author:
Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the course of 2018-20, development of Fifth Generation (5G) communication networks has been increasingly influenced by the considerations of national security and geopolitics. The largest provider of 5G equipment, the Chinese mobile telecom giant Huawei, has come under fire from the U.S., Czechia, Poland, and other nations in recent years for attempted espionage, theft of intellectual property and other nefarious activities; in the past month, UK decided to ban Huawei technology from its networks. All this comes into sharp focus as the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Beijing reaches new heights. However, China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners and has worked to establish its economic, political, and cultural influence in various Member States. The EU and NATO have both released standards for member states must use when gauging the security of potential 5G networks. Yet, the EU in particular has not enacted a blanket ban or sweeping restrictions on the Chinese 5G equipment providers, leaving the tradeoffs between national security, technological progress and cost-efficiency to individual states. Although the Baltic states are well-versed in dealing with cybersecurity challenges, their road to 5G development is going to be complex. Whole-of-society awareness, political diligence, technical competence, regional cooperation, and resilience to Beijing’s influence operations are needed in forging a clear path to 5G that is aligned with their key geopolitical interest—maintaining their close strategic alliance with the United States. This brief aims to explore the geopolitical factors at play in determining the Baltic states’ 5G policy and regulations, with a particular focus on the EU, U.S., and China’s influence. It also provides a short of overview of the state of current 5G networks and regulations in the Baltic states while identifying challenges that the region will face in the coming years.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Resilience, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States

2. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia

Author:
Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States

3. China in Europe and Transatlantic Security

Author:
Andrew A. Michta
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Andrew A. Michta argues that the governments of Central and Eastern European countries will need to weigh the benefit to them of continued economic engagement with China, especially in the area of 5G.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economy, Transatlantic Relations, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Weaponizing the 5G Value Chain

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
US national security experts worry the United States is falling behind China in the competition for 5G mobile communication dominance. While US companies led establishment of today’s 4G networks, they are not the frontrunners in setting 5G standards, building 5G equipment, or deploying 5G infrastructure. The lead in 5G implementation belongs instead to China’s Huawei, which exploited a combination of regulatory protection, government subsidies, and capable technology to rapidly gain one-third of the global 5G market.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Digital Entanglement; Lessons Learned from China’s Growing Digital Footprint in South Korea

Author:
Kristine Lee, Martijn Rasser, Joshua Fitt, and Coby Goldberg
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The South Korean experience is an illustrative case study of digital entanglement with China. This paper focuses on South Korea’s 5G networks for the purposes of scoping, but the spotlight on telecommunications networks offers just one window into a broader trend of technology and economic interdependencies between Seoul and Beijing. In particular, the paper’s focus on 5G illuminates four central observations that could also apply to other technology areas: (1) the U.S.-China strategic competition has wedged South Korea between its most important ally and its largest trading partner; (2) geopolitical risk assessments are not top of mind in South Korea’s technology policymaking calculations; (3) the country’s political leadership largely defers to private industry on the use of Chinese equipment; and (4) South Korean privacy regulations remain relatively fluid and are evolving both to meet domestic pressures and to generate new market opportunities. These trends are evident in the history of South Korea’s economic entanglement with China and the risk of coercion carried with it. Ongoing entanglement with digital infrastructure—and 5G networks in particular—increases the potential for and reach of adverse economic statecraft by Beijing and will make it more difficult and costly to unravel.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Bilateral Relations, COVID-19, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

6. Open Future: The Way Forward on 5G

Author:
Martijn Rasser and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Communication networks are the central nervous system of the 21st century economy. The fifth generation of wireless—5G—will be essential to and inseparable from all we do. In many ways, we are already there. What for most was an abstract concept became all too real during the COVID-19 crisis. The coronavirus pandemic has underscored the critical importance of communication networks: They are integral to our daily lives and our ability to function economically and as a society. Shutdowns of offices, schools, and stores have meant turning to apps to work, learn, and buy. Frontline medical workers and vaccine researchers have consulted colleagues via teleconference to get the latest insight and advice on combating the virus. Being connected means resilience, coping, surviving. Getting 5G right is all the more urgent. Next-generation 5G networks will enable telemedicine, self-driving cars, and a proliferation of Internet of Things devices to fuel the future digital economy. Secure, reliable 5G networks will be essential elements of national infrastructure. Policymakers in Australia, Japan, and Vietnam understood this early on and took decisive action to secure their 5G networks. U.S. officials, slower out of the gates, are now the loudest voice on the risks of having equipment from untrusted vendors in 5G networks. The spotlight is brightest on the risks that Huawei poses to national security, including the threat of espionage or disruption. Given the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to exercise control over Huawei, there is justifiable concern over data integrity on networks that deploy Huawei equipment. More serious is the potential to use 5G equipment as a vector to cripple critical infrastructure. Such risk is not only about communications—5G will be the backbone of controls needed for power grids, water supplies, and transportation infrastructure. Despite this, the United States has had only limited success convincing its allies to join it in banning Huawei. The United States has the opportunity to regain momentum by taking a fresh approach to 5G in the aftermath of the pandemic. In addition to the broader appreciation for the criticality of reliable communication networks, Beijing’s coronavirus cover-up and clunky attempts at soft power have hardened public opinion toward China around the world. The economic fallout of the pandemic will likely slow 5G deployments globally, curtailing the urgency with which many operators approached the issue. At the same time, the first commercial projects centered on technological alternatives to the predominant 5G approach are being deployed. This confluence of events presents the United States and like-minded countries an opening to promote an alternative approach that could lead to a paradigm shift in the industry: wireless infrastructure built on a modular architecture with open interfaces. A modular architecture allows an operator to choose multiple vendors for a range of offerings, rather than being locked in with a single large integrated vendor. Open interfaces—the ability of equipment from any vendor to work with that of another—make that possible. Such a shift means upending the industry status quo that is dominated by four telecommunications equipment providers: China’s Huawei, Finland’s Nokia, Sweden’s Ericsson, and South Korea’s Samsung. Whereas other proposed responses to the Huawei dilemma and the problematic current state of competition in the telecommunications industry fiddle at the margins, switching to an industry centered on open interfaces would change the game altogether. A restructured industry based on open interfaces would directly address the prevailing concerns over untrusted vendors such as Huawei and the broader inefficiencies of the industry. There are distinct advantages to be gained in security and interoperability, supply chain resiliency, probable cost savings, and the opportunity to stimulate much-needed competition in the sector. Taken together, these advantages do much to blunt Beijing’s industrial policies that have enabled Huawei’s predatory anti-competitive practices.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, COVID-19, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. China, 5G, and Dominance of the Global “Infosphere”

Author:
WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Modern consumer society has rapidly evolved from domination by “things” to domination by information. Once upon a time, for example, a car was an object for personal transportation in which anything more than basic information about speed and fuel level came from and through the driver. Now, the automobile itself provides and processes information with which drivers interact at a much richer level. Back-up cameras, blind spot and lane drift warning lights, hands-free wireless telephony, and GPS have transformed the driving experience fundamentally, even ahead of the truly revolutionary era of self-driving cars. A large and growing fraction of the world’s day-to-day life of individuals, objects, and institutions will be indelibly stored with an electronic “footprint.” The intelligence value of this information from a national security perspective exclusively accessed through a modern communications system dominated by China – 5G – is immense and profoundly threatening. The new dominance of information is simultaneously bewildering and promising. Moreover, as rapid as the pace of development has been over the past decade, it will soon quicken—with broad implications for almost every aspect of human life. An important aspect of this shift has been the convergence of rapidly developing and mutually reinforcing technologies into an infosphere that will incorporate almost all information-based communications and data services in the global information infrastructure. Not coincidentally, an integrated infosphere meets aspirations held by the People’s Republic of China to dominate and control the global information infrastructure. Beijing’s investments in 5G reflect an understanding that this technology is the gateway to control the world’s information infrastructure and growing realm of 5G-dependent technologies. A Chinese-dominated infosphere is, in fact, the “digital road” component of its Belt-and-Road-Infrastructure (BRI). While U.S. policymakers have yet to fully grasp the implications of this emerging infosphere, the components below reflect the enabling dimensions that support China’s effort to dominate the global information infrastructure.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Internet, 5G, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
China and Asia