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2372. China-Russia Relations
- Author:
- Yu Bin
- Publication Date:
- 10-2009
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Perhaps more than any time in the past 10 years, the third quarter highlighted both the potential and the problems of this bilateral relationship. On the one hand, the two militaries successfully conducted their joint antiterrorism exercise, Mirnaya Missiya (Peace Mission) 2009, in China's Jilin Province. On the other hand, the closing of Moscow's huge Cherkizovsky market on June 29 uprooted tens of thousands of Chinese citizens doing business in Russia, while $2 billion in goods were confiscated as “illegal” and “contraband.” On the eve of the 60th anniversary of bilateral ties, Moscow and Beijing seemed to be stretching both the cooperative and conflictual limits of their strategic partnership.
- Topic:
- Government
- Political Geography:
- China and Korea
2373. China-Russia Relations Chronology
- Publication Date:
- 10-2009
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Political Geography:
- China and Korea
2374. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia
- Author:
- David C. Kang
- Publication Date:
- 12-2009
- Content Type:
- Book
- Institution:
- Columbia University Press
- Abstract:
- Throughout the past three decades East Asia has seen more peace and stability than at any time since the Opium Wars of 1839-1841. During this period China has rapidly emerged as a major regional power, averaging over nine percent economic growth per year since the introduction of its market reforms in 1978. Foreign businesses have flocked to invest in China, and Chinese exports have begun to flood the world. China is modernizing its military, has joined numerous regional and international institutions, and plays an increasingly visible role in international politics. In response to this growth, other states in East Asia have moved to strengthen their military, economic, and diplomatic relations with China. But why have these countries accommodated rather than balanced China's rise? David C. Kang believes certain preferences and beliefs are responsible for maintaining stability in East Asia. Kang's research shows how East Asian states have grown closer to China, with little evidence that the region is rupturing. Rising powers present opportunities as well as threats, and the economic benefits and military threat China poses for its regional neighbors are both potentially huge; however, East Asian states see substantially more advantage than danger in China's rise, making the region more stable, not less. Furthermore, although East Asian states do not unequivocally welcome China in all areas, they are willing to defer judgment regarding what China wants and what its role in East Asia will become. They believe that a strong China stabilizes East Asia, while a weak China tempts other states to try to control the region. Many scholars downplay the role of ideas and suggest that a rising China will be a destabilizing force in the region, but Kang's provocative argument reveals the flaws in contemporary views of China and the international relations of East Asia and offers a new understanding of the importance of sound U.S. policy in the region.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Trade and Finance, Political Economy, and Power Politics
- Political Geography:
- China and East Asia
- Publication Identifier:
- 9780231141888
- Publication Identifier Type:
- ISBN
2375. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament
- Author:
- Cristina Hansell (ed) and William C. Potter (ed)
- Publication Date:
- 03-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- Today two key nuclear powers, China and Russia, stand at the crossroads of nuclear policy: both Beijing and Moscow are reassessing their nuclear policies and postures. The decisions they make will affect their negotiating positions for years to come; therefore, now is the time to engage both countries in discussions about deep nuclear reductions that could ultimately lead to the elimination of their arsenals. Such actions will contribute to reaching “nuclear zero”—the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons—an idea that was the focus of two recent opinion articles coauthored by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who stressed the necessity of “turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations.”
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- Russia and China
2376. Are Chinese Exports Sensitive to Changes in the Exchange Rate?
- Author:
- Shaghil Ahmed
- Publication Date:
- 12-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
- Abstract:
- This paper builds a model of two types of Chinese exports, those processed and assembled laregely from imported inputs ("processed" exports) and "non- processed" exports. Based on this model, the sensitivity of Chinese exports to exchange rate changes is empirically examined. Unlike previous work, the estimation period includes the net real appreciation of the renminbi that has occurredoverthepastthreeyears. Theresultsshowthatgreaterexchangerate appreciation dampens export growth, both for non-processed and processed ex- ports, with the estimated cumulative price elasticity being substantially greater thanunity. WhenthesourceoftheincreaseintheChineserealexchangerateis appreciations against the currencies of other emerging Asian trading partners, the e§ect on processing exports is positive but insignÖcant, while the e§ect on non-processing exports is signiÖcantly negative. By contrast, when the source of the increase in the Chinese real exchange rate is appreciation against Chinaís advanced-economy trading partners, the e§ects on both types of exports are negative. These results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Counterfactualsimulationsbasedontheestimatedmodelstronglysug- gest that if the trade-weighted real renminbi had appreciated at an annual rate of 10 percent per quarter since mid-2005, Chinese real exports would have been roughly 30 percent lower today. Thus greater exchange rate áexibility could contribute to lowering Chinaís huge trade surplus through restraining growth of exports.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Trade and Finance, Exchange Rate Policy, and Exports
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
2377. China's Transition to a Knowledge Economy (pdf)
- Author:
- Sangaralingam Ramesh
- Publication Date:
- 02-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
- Abstract:
- The Coastal regions of China have benefited more from reform policies associated with China’s research and educational sectors. These reforms were put in place to ensure that the results of knowledge creation activities from universities and research institutes ‘spilled over’ into the entrepreneurial economy. Human Capital is important to any knowledge activity whether creation or transfer. The development of Human Capital is through education .This factor may ultimately be responsible for long term growth by technological innovation .In this context it is necessary to discuss the two dominant schools of thought regarding economic growth before considering other aspects of knowledge spillovers.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Reform, Capitalism, Human Capital, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
2378. Infrastructure, Knowledge Creation and Spillovers and Economic Growth in China
- Author:
- Sangaralingam Ramesh
- Publication Date:
- 03-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
- Abstract:
- The economic prosperity associated with the Coastal regions of China has not ‘trickled’ down to the Western and Central regions sufficiently enough to eliminate the disparities in income between the regions. Indeed, the disparities between China’s Coastal regions and its other regions continue to deepen to the present day. In the Mao period the Central planners held the mistaken belief that investment in the railways and development of heavy industry in the interior parts of China would bring prosperity. In the reform period and beyond, the focus of economic development in China has been to take advantage of China’s low labour costs. In the earlier part of the reform era the focus of economic reforms centred on the development of Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) .In the second phase of reform policies were centred on the High Technology Development Zones [NHTIDZ’s].A characteristic feature of both SEZ’s and NHTIDZ’s is that they represent a concentration of infrastructure within a predefined spatial area. The framework of analysis in this paper is the New Economic Geography [NEG] .The NEG addresses the formation of agglomeration economies accruing to physical linkages in one location. However, the NEG does not address the issue of how agglomeration economies form due to knowledge creation linkages which are location independent. The main facet of this approach is that it will allow for a qualitative analysis of the spatial aspects of the infrastructural and knowledge creation factors affecting China’s economic growth. Previous approaches which have been used to study infrastructure and economic growth in China have been based on Econometric techniques. These approaches use measures such as length of railway, length of roads and telephone density, while in reality the concentration of infrastructure in the SEZ’s and NHTIDZ’s as significantly contributed to China’s post 1978 economic growth.
- Topic:
- Infrastructure, Income Inequality, and Economic growth
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
2379. Muddling along with Missiles
- Author:
- Dongho Jo
- Publication Date:
- 07-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- On April 5, 2009, North Korea carried out a rocket launch. North Korea argued that it was a satellite launch vehicle rather than a warhead-carrying ballistic missile, and portrayed the launch in innocuous and civilian terms, even naming the rocket “Unha,” which means “Galaxy” in Korean, to emphasize its space-oriented function. However, most nations, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, suspect that these words were only a cover for a test of North Korea’s long-range missile technology. In addition, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, followed by several launches of short-range missiles from its east coast. Furthermore, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles on July 2 and additional seven missiles on July 4, despite the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1874 on June 12, condemning North Korea’s hostile activities in the strongest possible terms. Why has North Korea gone ahead with its provocative actions in the face of serious opposition from most of the outside world? To date, analysts have focused on the political aspects of the missile launch. They speculate that its purpose was to push the United States toward bilateral dialogue or to pressure the South Korean government to return to its more positive stance known as the “sunshine policy.” Others argue that the launch was meant to strengthen leadership’s weakening hold inside the country and to ensure its dynastic line of succession. All of these explanations are plausible, and North Korea, of course, may have had multiple goals. But observers seeking to understand the North Korea’s actions are missing one critical component: the economic factor. The North Korean economy was in very poor shape in the 1990s and is still experiencing difficulties. This economic hardship, however, has not only been evident in recent decades but had already begun in the early 1970s, mainly due to lack of capital. Since then, the country’s top economic priority has been to determine how to encourage foreign capital to help the North Korea escape from economic shortages. One alternative pursued since the mid-1990s has been to develop the missile program as an effective means of earning foreign exchange. Understanding the part played by the economic situation in North Korea’s decisions about its missile program is the purpose of this brief article.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
2380. Prospects for Change in the Beijing-Pyongyang Nexus
- Author:
- Sukhee Han
- Publication Date:
- 12-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Having detonated its first nuclear device in October 2006, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Having consistently attempted to dissuade the North from such tests, China has been infuriated by the North’s defiance of Chinese advice and interests. Immediately after the 2009 test, China released a statement almost identical to the one it announced in the wake of the 2006 test. Beijing’s unprecedented wrath and “resolute opposition” to Pyongyang’s unmannerly behavior had been clearly expressed in the 2006 statement. In the 2009 statement, the Chinese government “strongly demands” that Pyongyang abide by its non-nuclearization commitments, “stop actions that may lead to a further deterioration of the situation,” and “return to the track of the Six-Party Talks.” Furthermore, China’s subsequent vote in favor of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which was designed to impose tougher sanctions on the Pyongyang regime than its previous resolution passed in 2006, seemed to indicate that China may implement a strategic shift away from North Korea and may also increase its strategic cooperation with the international community in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Witnessing China’s stern behavior toward the North, some China watchers in Washington and Seoul have argued that North Korea’s second nuclear test, along with a series of other provocations in the first half of 2009, which included a rocket launch and a complete withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, have prompted China to reconsider its long-standing policy of amity toward North Korea. In contrast to its traditional policy, China since the 2009 nuclear test has not hesitated to make it clear in its official statements that North Korea has become a liability than a strategic asset, and that it was not satisfied with North Korea’s arbitrary behavior threatening the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Remarkably open discussions about North Korea have also been permitted in the Chinese academia and media. In the debates, some Chinese analysts have criticized their government for its failure to get tough with North Korea; others have also advocated for Beijing to take a firmer stance toward North Korea. These debates seem to be a departure from the traditional brotherly attitudes many Chinese have shared concerning North Korea, and also serve as convincing reasons for many experts to argue that China may change its policy toward North Korea. At the same time, however, China has made clear that it intends to continue its traditional policy of friendship toward North Korea. U.S. foreign policy circles have frequently commented that the Chinese leadership has become increasingly angry at the Kim Jong-il regime, especially in the wake of the second nuclear test, and that Beijing is willing and able to use its leverage to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. In contrast, however, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to Pyongyang to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of PRC-DPRK(People’s Republic of China-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) diplomatic relations, reassured North Korea of its economic patronage by providing a number of economic measures for expanding China’s economic exchanges with the North. Furthermore, the recent visit of Liang Guanglie, China’s defense minister, to North Korea has also consolidated the Sino–North Korean military alliance. His avowal of “China’s willingness to have closer military contacts with the DPRK” must have provided more confidence for the North Korean leaders in dealing with post–nuclear test reactions. Given this situation, that China’s national interest concerning North Korea has been the maintenance of peace and stability is reconfirmed. On the one hand, in order to keep Pyongyang from further undermining peninsular security, Beijing has resolutely opposed North Korea’s provocations. China’s statements have emphasized its diplomatic pursuit of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and have also underscored that China, as a great power, acknowledges that it shares responsibility for preserving regional order and stability. On the other hand, China still places more importance on the maintenance of the status quo, in the sense of supporting the North Korean regime itself. China has exerted much more effort on behalf of the North’s survival than on behalf of its denuclearization. While China has in principle supported the UN economic sanctions on the North, it has never been sympathetic to the implementation of realistically effective sanctions. In facing Kim Jong-il’s presumed health concerns and subsequent contingencies in the North, however, China has realized that the status quo on the Peninsula cannot always guarantee regional peace and stability. Given that the demise of Kim Jong-il himself is relatively imminent and certainly inevitable, China has to adopt a new approach to North Korea. China’s chief concern is to strengthen its economic and military grip over the North with the intention of keeping the regime afloat and its leadership under China’s control even after Kim Jong-il has passed from the scene.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and North Korea