Search

Begin New Search Political Geography China Publication Year within 25 Years

1981. The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50 Still a Grand Bargain?

Author:
George R. Packard
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
On January 19, 1960, Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter signed a historic treaty. It committed the United States to help defend Japan if Japan came under attack, and it provided bases and ports for U.S. armed forces in Japan. The agreement has endured through half a century of dramatic changes in world politics -- the Vietnam War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea, the rise of China -- and in spite of fierce trade disputes, exchanges of insults, and deep cultural and historical differences between the United States and Japan. This treaty has lasted longer than any other alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Given its obvious success in keeping Japan safe and the United States strong in East Asia, one might conclude that the agreement has a bright future. And one would be wrong. The landslide electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) last August, after nearly 54 years of uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party, has raised new questions in Japan about whether the treaty's benefits still outweigh its costs. LABOR PAINS Back in 1952, when an earlier security treaty (which provided the basis for the 1960 treaty) entered into force, both sides thought it was a grand bargain. Japan would recover its independence, gain security at a low cost from the most powerful nation in the region, and win access to the U.S. market for its products. Without the need to build a large military force, Japan would be able to devote itself to economic recovery. The United States, for its part, could project power into the western Pacific, and having troops and bases in Japan made credible both its treaty commitments to defend South Korea and Taiwan and its policy of containment of the Soviet Union and communist China.
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, South Korea, and Vietnam

1982. Second Strike: Is the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Outmoded

Author:
Jan Lodal
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Keir Lieber and Daryl Press ("The Nukes We Need," November/December 2009) argue that to deter the growing number of nuclear-armed states against which it might have to fight a conventional war, the United States should develop a new generation of accurate low-yield nuclear weapons. They contend that "the least bad option in the face of explicit nuclear threats or after a limited nuclear strike may be a counterforce attack to prevent further nuclear use." It is true that for the United States to maintain nuclear deterrence, the president must have credible options to respond to nuclear threats or attacks. Lieber and Press rightly assert that the capability to destroy enemy cities with high-yield weapons is not enough. But their argument for new counterforce capabilities attacks a straw man. The United States already has the flexibility to carry out low-yield counterforce attacks, and there are no plans to eliminate this. The B-61 nuclear bomb has a variable yield that can be set quite low and is highly accurate, especially when carried by the stealth B-2 bomber. Cruise missiles with low-yield warheads have similar capabilities. Even long-range ballistic missiles can be targeted to minimize collateral damage. Lieber and Press go beyond urging low-yield counterforce capabilities and propose a bizarre and dangerous nuclear strategy for the United States: to develop the capacity for attacks against a threatening enemy that would prevent the enemy from launching any subsequent nuclear attacks. These disarming strikes would be launched even if the enemy had attacked an isolated military target, such as a carrier battle group at sea. Astoundingly, the authors also propose preemptive nuclear attacks against "explicit nuclear threats." The states against which such attacks might be used include Iran, North Korea, other new nuclear powers, and even China.
Political Geography:
United States and China

1983. Happy News: Censorship, Nationalism, and Language Ideology in China

Author:
Susan D. Blum
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
This article examines aspects of China's language ideology regarding the exposure or concealment of negative news and the promotion of positive news, focusing especially on the 2008 riots in Tibet and the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Censorship may have many appearances and rationales; in this case the permission to criticize or expose depends on the speaker's identity and the anticipated consequences of the revelation. Strong preference, supported by nationalistic identification and policy, favors the promulgation of “happy news” and seeks to suppress and repress any contrary messages. The intersection of nationalism and a concern for a unified, uplifting message result in what is arguably some of the world's most intense censorship.
Topic:
Communism, Human Rights, and Mass Media
Political Geography:
China, Beijing, and Asia

1984. The Sustainability of China's Recovery from the Global Recession

Author:
Nicholas R. Lardy
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
China's policy response to the global financial and economic crisis was early, large, and well-designed. Although Chinese financial institutions had little exposure to the toxic financial assets that brought down many large Western investment banks and other financial firms, China's leadership recognized that its dependence on exports meant that it was acutely vulnerable to a global recession. Thus they did not subscribe to the view sometimes described as “decoupling,” the idea that Asian countries could passively weather the financial storm that originated in the United States and other advanced industrial economies. They understood that absent a vigorous policy response China inevitably would suffer from the backwash of a sharp economic slowdown in its largest export markets—the United States and Europe.
Topic:
Economics and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, and Asia

1985. New PPP-Based Estimates of Renminbi Undervaluation and Policy Implications

Author:
Arvind Subramanian
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Is there reason to add to the proliferating set of estimates on the extent of renminbi undervaluation (see among others, Bergsten 2010; Cline and Williamson 2008 and 2010; Goldstein and Lardy 2008 and 2009; Frankel 2008; Reisen 2009; and Lee et al. 2008)? Yes, not least because these new estimates: (1) suggest that purchasing power parity (PPP)-based approaches to measuring renminbi undervaluation suggest that China's currency is undervalued by about 30 percent against the dollar and not the 12 percent recently reported (Bajaj 2010); and (2) are closer to and consistent with alternative approaches to estimating renminbi undervaluation.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Exchange, International Political Economy, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
China

1986. The Year Ahead

Author:
John H. Makin
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
We can expect 2010 to be a volatile year. This likelihood is underscored by looking back at 2008 and 2009. Two thousand eight was a highly volatile year leading up to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September, which was followed by the risk of a total systemic meltdown. That sharp and obvious risk spike prompted massive policy responses that were simply the largest that central banks, with rate cuts and liquidity provision, and governments, with tax cuts and spending increases, could manage. The result—beginning in March 2009—was a linear rise in the prices of risky assets, the result of massive relief once the slip into a global depression had been averted and the acute phase of the crisis in the financial sector had passed.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, and Europe

1987. Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific

Author:
Elsina Wainwright
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The Asia Pacific has experienced thirty years without interstate conflict, but a number of long-running, low-level internal conflicts continue in Southeast Asia, and several South Pacific states have recent experience of instability. Tensions also remain at the inter-state level, and shifting power dynamics between the US, China, and other Asian states have the potential to foster regional instability. In addition, a raft of transnational threats, such as resource scarcity and climate change, are creating new uncertainty.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Political Violence, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
United States, China, Australia/Pacific, and Southeast Asia

1988. Developing Countries – even China – Cannot Rescue the World Economy

Author:
Manmohan Agarwal
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Many analysts believe that developed countries will recover very slowly from the global economic crisis. Consequently, they have looked to the emerging economies of the developing world to help stabilize the world economy and generate a stronger recovery. Indeed, when the financial crisis first engulfed the rich countries in 2008 and early 2009, growth in developing economies was not affected as their banks and financial systems faced neither credit problems nor a more serious meltdown. It is true that some foreign investors, particularly institutional investors, withdrew their money from developing countries with large stock exchanges, setting off stock price declines and some currency devaluations. But this did not affect the “real” economy of production and employment. There was a wide belief that many developing economies were “decoupled” from the rich economies and could continue to grow and this growth would buoy the world economy. Even when output declined dramatically in the developed economies, reducing the demand for developing countries' exports, it was expected that growth in the larger emerging economies would not be significantly affected. This has been borne out by subsequent events. Growth in China has been 8-9 percent and in India about 6 percent in the first three quarters of 2009.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
China and India

1989. The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?

Author:
Daniel P. Erikson
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The presidency of Barack Obama ushered in a welcome honeymoon period in US-Latin American relations following eight years of the Bush administration's polarizing policies towards the region. Early optimism has been tempered by the reappearance of tensions in hemispheric relations. They include the rise of Brazil as a regional power, the role of Venezuela and the continued strain in US-Cuban relations. Regional relations are further complicated by China's growing economic presence in Latin America, increased ties with Iran and Russia, different US and Latin reactions to the June 2009 coup in Honduras, and the crisis response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Still, the US has potential to advance a strategy of substantive, issue oriented engagement designed to rekindle the early goodwill that resulted from Obama's election to the White House.
Topic:
International Relations and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Latin America, and Haiti

1990. Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy

Author:
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and foreign policy analysts have debated the type of world order that the United States should strive to create—a hegemonic system, a multilateral institutional system, or a great power concert. Initially, a major issue was whether attempts to maintain U.S. primacy would stimulate counter - balancing from other states. But since the 2003 Iraq War, a new consideration has emerged—how to persuade other states to cooperate with U.S. global governance. States that do not oppose efforts by the United States to maintain stability may nonetheless decline to follow its leadership. This is a matter for concern because although the United States can act alone, it cannot succeed on such issues as controlling terrorism, curbing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rebuilding failed states, or maintaining economic stability without help from other states.
Topic:
Cold War
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Iraq