Search

Begin New Search Political Geography China Publication Year within 1 Year

21. Ronnie C. Chan: The Past, Present, and Future of U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Ronnie C. Chan and Lien-Hang Nguyen
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
December 2, 2024 — Ronnie C. Chan, Honorary Chair of Hang Lung Properties and Chair Emeritus of the Asia Society, speaks with Lien-Hang Nguyen, Director of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University, about the implications of the 2024 U.S. presidential election for the future of U.S.-China relations and global stability. Columbia University Interim President Katrina Armstrong and University Professor Jeffrey Sachs contribute introductory remarks.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Political stability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

22. From Trade to Supply Chain Investments: China’s Three Roles in the Solar Surge of the Gulf Region

Author:
Qi Wang
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
This paper examines China’s evolving role in the solar energy surge of the Gulf region, with a focus on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It identifies three approaches through which China has progressively deepened its participation: (1) large-scale export of solar products, (2) investment and construction of solar power projects, and (3) offshore investment in local solar manufacturing bases in the Gulf. These approaches reflect not only China’s response to ambitious green energy commitments and rising solar demand in the Gulf, but also the strategic efforts of China’s solar industry to address domestic overcapacity under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative and mitigate growing trade protectionism. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for China and the Gulf countries to strengthen solar cooperation, tackle trade barriers, and ensure a balanced, transparent, and sustainable energy transition.
Topic:
Investment, Trade, Solar Power, Supply Chains, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

23. China Decoupling Beyond the United States: Comparing Germany, Japan, and India

Author:
Joshua Sullivan and Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Key U.S. partners are moving toward less technological integration with China. But their specific paths diverge significantly based on domestic circumstances and varied relationships with Beijing.
Topic:
International Relations, Science and Technology, Economy, Regional Integration, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, Germany, and United States of America

24. Impacts of the Artificial Intelligence on International Relations: Towards a Global Algorithms Governance

Author:
Vicente Garrido Rebolledo
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article examines the transformative impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on international relations (IR) and global governance. It begins by presenting a conceptual framework that situates AI within the theoretical and practical dimensions of IR, and explores how AI influences global power dynamics, alters state behaviour, and reshapes institutional frameworks. The study highlights the ethical and regulatory challenges of AI governance, focusing first on the efforts of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU). Later, the article discusses the "AI technology race" between the United States and China and their regulations. Finally, the article highlights the need for ethical and responsible AI development to foster global cooperation and address the challenges and opportunities that this technology presents in contemporary international relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Science and Technology, United Nations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, and Council of Europe
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

25. A vision from China on Artificial Intelligence. Implications for Soft Power in Global Cultural Exchange

Author:
Sonia Valle, Yi Wang, and Deng Lian
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article examines China's vision of AI, its efforts to use it as a tool to promote its soft power, and the implications this has for digital diplomacy and global cultural exchange. As key findings, we highlight that through AI-powered platforms and digital diplomacy, China can adjust global narratives on sensitive issues such as human rights, economic development, and its role in global trade. China's AI expansion on the world stage serves not only as a tool for economic growth, but also as a strategic tool for enhancing its soft power. By offering technological solutions to global challenges and fostering meaningful partnerships, China is enhancing its global image as a responsible, innovative and forwardlooking actor in the international community.
Topic:
Foreign Exchange, Global South, Soft Power, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Diplomacy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

26. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

28. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Brazil

Author:
Ruby Scanlon and Bill Drexel
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the CNAS Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The second case study focuses on Brazil. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team spent a week in the country interviewing local policymakers, journalists, technology firms, civil society, and academics, along with U.S. diplomats, development experts, and companies. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Brazil’s digital ecosystem.
Topic:
National Security, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

29. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

30. Kangaroo Concerns About Swiming Dragon Ambitions

Author:
Saira Aquil and Waheed Ur Rehman
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
China has accelerated its naval modernization in recent years. There are multiple factors behind this modernization drive. The rise of China in many ways is impacting political, economic, and security dynamics around the world but particularly in Asia-Pacific (Indo-Pacific). Australia is one of the country in this region which is not an exception in this regard. This study looks for implications of China’s naval modernization on Australia. The study makes an important contribution to the literature because this part of the world has not been looked into while analyzing Chinese naval modernization. Data is collected through primary and secondary sources. Besides reviewing the existing literature data is collected through key informant interviews and policy documents of China and Australia. Australian threat perception is evaluated by analyzing Australian Defense White Papers, speeches of Australian leaders and analysis of the country’s security analysts. The study finds that challenges posed by other nations in the region is prompting China to modernize its navy. This in turn enhances security concerns in Australia which is always wary of securing its territorial integrity, economic interests, and global liberal world order which has contributed to its development and security. Australia, in response to these developments, has embarked on the path of modernizing its own forces. It has bolstered its alliances with the US and other partners.
Topic:
Security, Navy, Modernization, Strategic Interests, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia