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11. State of Democracy in Central Europe after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Lucia Husenicova
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The central question of this article is why Russian military aggression in Ukraine has failed to strengthen support for democracy and cooperation with partners in some Central European countries. In addition, the article examines the link between military conflict in the immediate neighbourhood and the crisis of democracy. Based on a review of the extensive literature on the crisis of democracy, the article integrates findings from several opinion polls conducted in Central European countries. Looking primarily at the Visegrad countries, clear patterns emerge in responses and attitudes towards Russia. We can see the influence of the political discourse in these countries, the narratives used by political elites and, more recently, war fatigue and economic consequences. The article argues that a military conflict in the vicinity of democratic countries exacerbates the crisis of democracy. The information warfare that is part of this conflict and the susceptibility of the political elite to the dissemination of enemy propaganda undermines trust in democratic institutions and democracy.
Topic:
Democracy, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Aggression
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Central Europe

12. Illiberal Populism as a Polarizing Factor of Regional Cooperation in Central Europe

Author:
Ladislav Cabada
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Central European identity and regionality are very traditional and deeply rooted discourses. Over the past 35 years, a number of regional cooperation formats have emerged, among which the Visegrad Group has acquired a special position. This weakly institutionalised and thematically selective regional organisation has nevertheless established itself in the last 15 years as one of the visible actors of socalled populist regionalism. The (partial) transformation of the V4 towards populist foreign policy, national conservatism and Euroscepticism is the subject of our analysis. Using the concepts of populist regionalism and illiberal populism, it focuses on the formation of a monolithic discourse of the V4 as a group opposed to the international liberal order and the "Brussels agenda" in terms of values and public policies. We also examine the negative implications of this populist appropriation of the V4 for the region's position within the EU.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Populism, Polarization, Russia-Ukraine War, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Europe and Central Europe

13. Socio-economic consequences for Central Europe related to the mass migration of Ukrainian citizens after Russia’s full-scale invasion

Author:
Łukasz Jureńczyk and Svitlana Soroka
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused displacement on a scale not seen since the Second World War. More than 6.5 million refugees from Ukraine have been registered worldwide (as of 16 May 2024), and more than 4.2 million Ukrainians have received temporary protection in the EU. Most of them found shelter in Poland and Germany. These countries have received an influx of migrants that corresponds to the logic of their demographic development. Ukrainians are almost an ideal demographic resource for Central Europe. In August 2023, only one person in three wanted to return to Ukraine. If the Ukrainian refugees are properly adapted, they will provide additional development impulses to the countries where they reside.
Topic:
Migration, Refugees, Labor Market, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe

14. The End of a Partnership and Cooperation. How Sino-Russian partnership ruined perception of China in Central Europe

Author:
Šárka Waisová
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Since the first decade of the 21st century, pro-China attitudes have gradually become the political mainstream in Central Europe. Today, however, the relationship between Central European countries and Beijing is different. While Beijing remains an important partner for Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have turned away from cooperation with China, and Slovakia's enthusiasm for China has cooled somewhat. This article examines why the Czech Republic and Poland, but not Slovakia and Hungary, have stopped building and maintaining their relations with China. It uses contrafactual analysis to find an answer. The article concludes that what caused the change and ruined the relations between Czechia and Poland on the one hand and China on the other hand was China's building of relations with Russia. In contrast, Hungary and Fico's Slovakia, which have repeatedly refused to recognise the Russian invasion of Ukraine and have maintained relations with Moscow, continue to have good relations with China
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Central Europe, and Slovakia

15. Securitization of Cooperation: The Three Seas Initiative in the shadow of the Russian-Ukrainian war

Author:
Łukasz Lewkowicz
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is a relatively new format of regional cooperation in Central Europe. The main objective of 3SI activities is the development of energy, transport and digital infrastructure in the region. Following the outbreak of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2014, the security dimension of 3SI activities has become more important. The last 3SI Summit was held in Vilnius in April 2024. The aim of this article is primarily to analyse the military dimension of the Three Seas Initiative's activities after the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022. The text presents the military potential of the 3SI countries and the diversified approach of the member states to the Russian-Ukrainian war. It also analyses the Lithuanian 3SI perspective, the decisions of the Vilnius Summit and the prospects for 3SI military cooperation. Due to the relatively new nature of the research topic, the analysis focuses primarily on recently published specialist texts.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Securitization, Russia-Ukraine War, and Three Seas Initiative (3SI)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Central Europe

16. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

17. Examining Changes in Regional Cooperation in Central Europe from a Polish Perspective

Author:
Tomasz Żornaczuk
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Visegrad Group (V4), until recently the most active and multidimensional cooperation platform in Central Europe, does not serve currently to strengthen the voice of the region on the most essential issues concerning its security. This is because Hungary’s stance on Russia’s attack on Ukraine is different than that of its partners. That is why Poland is tightening relations with the other Visegrad countries—Czechia and Slovakia. At the same time, Poland is also intensifying cooperation with the Baltic states, which has its source in joint actions on security and eastern affairs in the years preceding the war.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia

18. The Europeanisation of the Energy Transition in Central and Eastern EU Countries: An Uphill Battle that Can Be Won

Author:
Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the brutal decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, is a game changer for the Central and Eastern Europe region which was still heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supply. There are still a few oil, gas, and nuclear fuel supplies, but the sharp decline, and search for alternatives, lead to a shift in paradigm: deploying low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency is now a matter of national security and economic security. Hence, following the 2022 energy crisis, the understanding that the European Union’s (EU) energy security of supply means an acceleration in phasing out fossil fuels and deploying clean energies has become the newest European acquis in energy policy, increasing the importance of the Green Deal at EU, national and local levels. The risk that a carbon wall would be erected within Europe between the West and the Central and Eastern European Member States (CEECs) is no more valid. The concept of Europeanization is at the core of the analysis of the energy transition in the CEECs. The progress on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction observed in these Member States (MS) can be considered as a success of the Europeanization process in this region, as its timing coincides with the implementation of the 2020 agenda for climate and energy, to the establishment of which these countries were part of. Moreover, the Clean Energy Package and the Green Deal seem to have been successful in putting in place a mechanism of cognitive framing pertaining to the Europeanization toolbox, by setting a framework for all Europeans to move in the same direction, of a cleaner and healthier way of living, independently of their starting point. Given the status quo in the ten CEECs, the new ambitious objectives regarding transport decarbonization will translate into important transformation costs for the region, which in turn could increase the risk of renegotiation attempts, as the circular Europeanization theory predicts. The acknowledgment at the EU level that the transition must be just to succeed is one instance of bottom-up Europeanization, where the challenges brought forward by specific Member States shaped the European energy transition agenda and discourse. Large financial support for this end was a first condition for CEECs to support the climate neutrality agenda. The second condition is that CEECs plan to replace their coal fleet at least partially with nuclear power, be they reactor capacity expansions, lifetime extensions, large new reactors, or small modular reactors (SMRs). The third condition has been securing a role for the use of natural gas for the transition, which in 2022 turned out to be a costly choice. With the crisis, CEECs have all taken on board the necessity to boost renewables as a tool to rapidly decrease dependence on imported fossil fuels, to meet the 2030 targets, prepare for the progressive phase-out of free emission allowances while awaiting the new nuclear generation capacities due from 2035 onwards. This strategy is also supported by public opinion, while it remains to be seen how public acceptance of SMRs will be. This gives the CEE region a strong joint interest to push for the inclusion of nuclear energy in EU legislations, alongside France. On gas, countries have switched to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and diversified their pipeline supplies, and where possible, try to boost the domestic supply of natural gas and soon, biomethane. Although being relatively far from alternative gas entry points means that for some CEECs Russia remains, to a certain extent, a necessity, this cannot be used as an excuse for undermining EU unity and should push towards harder EU-level reflections on energy solidarity on which some progress was done during the 2022 energy crisis. It remains to be seen if a new line of fragmentation will not appear between Germany and Austria on the one hand and the CEEs on the other: following the Nord Stream betrayal and denial by Germany of Polish energy security concerns for example, CEECs are concerned about the extraterritorial outreach of Germany’s nuclear phase-out policies, and of Austria’s continued systemic opposition to nuclear. This plays in the hand of the United States, which is the ultimate gatekeeper to pressure Germany and secure the energy technology choices of CEECs through the export of US technologies. Of note is also the shared concern now over the dependence on Russian nuclear fuels and equipment, and efforts to reduce this. A last source of possible tensions comes from some new gas infrastructure investments which can strengthen resilience but risk locking in gas much longer than the EU trajectory allows for. Beyond nuclear energy, however, the interest in accelerating the deployment of renewables, and the concern over a just transition, the note shows that there is little in common between the CEECs which have all their specificities. Last but not least, this note argues that a new risk of fragmentation may emerge, related to the localization of innovation and the volume of state aids and subsidies to industries. While some CEECs appear to be a frontrunner in the deployment of battery cell gigafactories, their financial and budgetary capacities are much more limited compared to Western MSs, and their ability to develop comprehensive, coherent climate plans, and to mobilize EU tools and funding, is also limited. Without an EU Sovereignty Fund, the region will find it hard to keep pace with EU’s objectives in the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act due to limited fiscal space to be leveraged for state aid purposes, despite more favorable conditions.
Topic:
European Union, Renewable Energy, Fossil Fuels, Transition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

19. Trade and Investment Cooperation between South Korea and the Visegrad Group

Author:
Grzegorz Mazur
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The Visegrad group (V4) is a political alliance of four countries of Central Europe - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, reaching its roots to the beginning of the 1990s, when the countries started reforming their political and economic systems from centrally planned to democratic free market economies. The coalition - consisting of countries with similar historical experience, transformation challenges and level of socio-economic development - aimed at regional co-operation and mutual support on their strategic goal of full membership in the European Union (EU). The V4 countries are currently full members of the EU (since 2004) with dynamic and competitive economies. The four countries form a market of over 60 million consumers with a share of ca. 7.7% of the EU’s GDP (Table 1). Over last three decades V4 countries have experienced high economic growth, closing a development gap with highly developed countries of the EU. Their economies have opened up to the global trading system, changing directions (mostly towards other EU countries) and expanding volumes of their international trade. Liberalizing economies have become attractive destinations for FDIs due to their central location at the continent, well-educated society as well as restructuration and privatization of many economic sectors (Mazur, 2009). Joining the European Union in 2004, V4 countries became part of the European Single Market leading to various consequences for economic policy and business conditions. While membership in the EU brought new economic opportunities and enhanced the countries’ business attractiveness, it has also had relevant consequences for their trade co-operation with third countries. The V4 states adopted all rights and commitments from the EU’s Common Trade Policy and have since been developing their trade and economic co-operation with third countries, including the Republic of Korea, commonly with other EU partners and exclusively at the EU level.
Topic:
Economics, Investment, Trade, Visegrad Group, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Central Europe

20. Celebrating István Deák, Panel III: István and East Central European History

Author:
The Harriman Institute
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Columbia University’s Department of History, the Botstiber Institute for Austrian-American Studies, and the Harriman Institute present a conference in honor of István Deák (1926-2023).
Topic:
History, Conference, and István Deák
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe