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221. Finding "Win-Win": China's Arctic Policy and What It Means for Canada

Author:
Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
China is a “Near Arctic State” with national interests in Arctic resources, shipping lanes, and regional governance. That was the message delivered to the world in China’s new Arctic policy (China 2018). The philosophy espoused in the Chinese White Paper is one of cooperation and mutual profit – what the Chinese have dubbed “win-win” polar partnerships. These partnerships have been expanding in recent years. Tens of billions of dollars in Chinese capital has flowed into oil and gas projects in Siberia and the Russian Arctic offshore, new shipping routes are being tested, and state-owned mining companies have acquired rich mineral deposits in Greenland and – to a lesser extent – Canada. These resources, and the sea lanes that connect them, have been labelled the “Polar Silk Road,” a maritime trade and shipping route supported by Chinese infrastructure spending (theoretically) running through the Northwest Passage and other circumpolar channels. China’s increasingly confident posture in the North represents real opportunities – and challenges – for Canada. Managed properly, Chinese money can support the decades old Canadian dream of developing the Northwest Passage as a useable sea route, decreasing shipping costs, supporting development and improving the quality of life for Arctic residents. Managed incorrectly, Chinese activity might leave the Asian power with a degree of de facto control over the Arctic, damaging Canadian sovereignty and imperiling the country’s ability to manage this increasingly important region on Canadian terms. This new White Paper is as clear a signal as can be sent that China is coming into the Arctic with long-term strategic ambitions. Canada should not fear this development, but it must be prepared for it.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and Arctic

222. Energy, Trade and Geopolitics In Asia: The Implications for Canada

Author:
Jeff Kucharski
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada’s growing interest in trade with countries in the Indo-Pacific region corresponds with an ominous growth in geopolitical instability and insecurity in that part of the globe. With Indo-Pacific hunger for oil expected to soar – especially in China, where demand will translate to 80 per cent of imports in 10 years – Canada needs to develop policies to deal with the region’s turbulent realities. The Indo-Pacific comprises countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and includes such unstable and unpredictable players as North Korea and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons and long-simmering border tensions. India is an emerging economic and military rival to China. In the next 20 years, China and India are expected to lead the global demand for gas as coal consumption continues to decline, and Canada has a stake in this prosperous future. Along with territorial squabbles in the region, Canada will have to deal with complex issues such as terrorism, human trafficking, transnational crime, piracy and cyber-crime, as well as the struggle for global dominance between China and the U.S. One key area for potential conflict is China’s recent construction and militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. The Canadian government’s new military strategy, Strong, Secure, Engaged does little more than make a plea for peace and the rule of law in the South China Sea. However, more trade crosses the Pacific Ocean from Canada than crosses the Atlantic. And with Canada signing on to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the region’s troubles will need to be resolved by more than good intentions on paper. Canada must shift more diplomatic, security and military resources to the Indo- Pacific; otherwise, its efforts will be spread too thinly to be effective in the region. Trade, especially through a major route like the Strait of Malacca, could easily be disrupted by any one of a number of disputes, such as a conflict between China and Taiwan or if historic resentments boil over among competing territorial claimants in the region. Thus, Canada needs to step up and reaffirm its security commitments to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a partner in the region. Participating in maritime exercises and Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations would also help to reinforce to countries in the region the importance of abiding by international law. Meanwhile, Canada should set aside for now any intentions to negotiate a free trade agreement with China. China does not share some of Canada’s key trade and security goals and its aggressive behaviour in the South and East China Seas clearly signal that now is not the time to talk about a trade pact. China must demonstrate that it is willing to take a more cooperative approach to resolving trade and security issues in the Indo-Pacific and to support and respect the rule of law in the region. Canada has the potential to become a reliable, stable source of energy for Indo-Pacific countries. There is also an opportunity for provinces such as Alberta to strike their own strategic deals to provide energy resources to countries in that region, in return for trade and investment benefits. However, while investing at home in the necessary infrastructure and export capability to expand its role, Canada must also strive to bring its own unique approach to enhancing regional and energy security in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America

223. Canada’s Refugee Strategy: How It Can Be Improved

Author:
Robert Vineberg
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
When citizens lose faith in their government’s refugee policies, there arises the potential for an anti-immigration backlash, as several European countries have recently discovered. Canada has yet to see that happen, but it has for too long been muddling along with a refugee-processing system that is seriously flawed. Refugees go unprocessed for years, and in the meantime end up living, working and laying down roots. Often that only increases the chances they will end up staying even if they might have otherwise been rejected. It may even lead to increases in questionable refugee claims, as people realize they can work and make money in Canada for years before their case is even heard. The Canadian government has committed to increasing refugee numbers. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has designated Canada as the primary destination for hard-to-settle refugees. The diversity of source countries is increasing, resulting in more refugees who are illiterate in both English and French. More refugees will struggle to adapt to life in Canada. Taken together, it is possible that without fixing the problems in the system, public dissatisfaction could rise as Canadians lose faith that their refugee system is under control, and that could undermine their faith in the entire immigration system. The biggest flaw in the refugee system traces back to the government’s overreaction to the Singh decision. The Supreme Court ordered that all rejected refugees had a right to an in-person appeal, but the federal government went much further and gave every refugee an in-person hearing. That system has left Canada with a backlog, as of last year, of 34,000 cases. In most every other country, initial refugee screenings are conducted by public servants working for the immigration agency, which here would be Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, as opposed to the staff of the Immigration and Refugee Board. Canada could do a much better job at clearing its backlog and better processing refugee claims, particularly in weeding out the bogus claims, by reassigning responsibility for interviewing refugees to the officials at IRCC. The agency also has the advantage of having offices in almost every major city in Canada, while the IRB only hears cases in Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto, with the 2,500 refugee claimants residing in places outside B.C., Quebec and Ontario having to travel long distances for a hearing or having to settle for an inferior two-way video hearing. Also, this would avoid the conflict of interest at the IRB, which is in charge of reviewing appeals of its own decisions. The IRB is better suited to handle appeals of decisions made by IRCC agents who are at arm’s-length from the IRB. In addition, Canada should also ensure it maintains a balance in accepting not strictly refugees who are most at risk, but also an equal number of refugees who will more easily establish themselves in Canada and adapt within one year of landing in Canada. Having a system that not only ensures more efficient, effective processing of refugees, with proper control over who settles here, will not only help Canadians maintain confidence in their refugee and immigration system. It will also ensure that Canada has a system that can respond, when necessary, to global crises when they erupt, and better help those refugees who need protection.
Topic:
Government, United Nations, Immigration, and Refugees
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

224. Canada’s Progressive Trade Agenda and a Free Trade Agreement with China: Are They Incompatible?

Author:
Hugh Stephens
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The “non-market” clause in the just-concluded update of NAFTA, now known as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would appear to limit Canada’s options in terms of negotiating a free trade agreement with China at the present time (given the de facto U.S. veto over a Canada-China agreement that it provides), yet Prime Minister Trudeau has already reaffirmed Canada’s intention to pursue closer economic ties with China despite this apparent limitation. If negotiations proceed, negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with China will be very different from negotiating one with a country that shares Canada’s Western values. However, a trade agreement with China makes good economic sense, and while there are some unique obstacles to reaching such an agreement owing to differing views of progressive trade, these are not insurmountable. In fact, Canada can use the same models in negotiating with China that it has used with Western countries. Such an approach combines trade goals with respecting Chinese cultural and political differences, particularly those that fall into the category of progressivism. This category includes labour rights, Indigenous and gender issues, and governance. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government has been focused on progressive elements in trade deals, while China has made it clear it is not interested in including them in any such pact. Concluding an agreement would mean that China and Canada must both recognize the political requirements and dynamics on the opposite side of the negotiating table, while seeking common ground diplomatically. Side agreements such as those that exist in the original NAFTA and in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) are one way to work with the two countries’ differences. Many of the provisions in a side agreement are not binding and thus not subject to the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism or trade sanctions. Instead, they are more aspirational and sometimes lay out a process for civil society groups to raise issues and help the thinking on those issues evolve, rather than simply holding the parties accountable for breaches. Canada is rightly concerned about Chinese stances on human rights, labour, environmental and gender issues. However, instead of including these issues in the main document on trade, they can be dealt with as shared interests between the two countries. Establishing separate but parallel mechanisms to deal with these issues would be a practical way to make progress. Focusing on micro, small and medium-sized businesses as one Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) did, could be another successful approach. Women own many of these businesses in developing countries, so such a focus would make a substantial contribution to their welfare. None of this means Canada should kowtow to China or look the other way on important values and issues. Side agreements and special focuses have formed parts of agreements with other countries that already share Canada’s Western values. This type of give-and-take is present even when Canada negotiates with countries that are not polar opposites. No country’s interests are exactly the same as those of any other and it’s unrealistic to expect unanimity on every issue. Language and firm commitments on progressive issues are still evolving in many of Canada’s free trade agreements, including the USMCA. It would be unreasonable to hope that everything can be achieved in an agreement with China on the first go-around. Rather, viewing a trade agreement with China as a work-in-progress means controversial elements can be brought into the negotiations and language used that reflects the understanding that these issues are evolving. It will require creative thinking, flexibility and joint commitment to find a solution, but—assuming that the USMCA does not rule out Canada-China negotiations toward a trade agreement— it should be possible to find sufficient common ground without having to resort to obfuscation and “creative ambiguity”.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, NAFTA, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America

225. Subnational Experiences in the Defense Industry Promotion Policies: The Case of Rio Grande Do Sul

Author:
Christiano Cruz Ambrosias
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
This article has as its main objective to present initiatives of the Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul for the promotion of the defense industry of Rio Grande do Sul in recent years. Subnational entities have an important role to play in strengthening the national defense industry and, through the formulation and implementation of well-defined public policies, are able to act as facilitators and catalysts for national initiatives at the local level. This article seeks to bring examples that demonstrate the various public policies that can be implemented by subnational entities in developed countries (Australia, Canada and France) and developing countries (South Africa, India and Mexico), comparing them with what has been done in the Brazilian case.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nationalism, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Canada, India, France, South Africa, Australia, and Mexico

226. China and Canada eye more mutually beneficial trade deal

Author:
Dong Yan and Bai Jie
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
A clause in the US-Mexico-Canada trade pact, widely known as a "poison pill" aimed at China, will not stop Canada from continuing to negotiate a free trade agreement with China, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said at an event at the National University of Singapore on Thursday. This suggests the US will find it extremely difficult to administer its "poison pill", because it has gone too far in using bullying tactics against other countries－in this case, China.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America

227. International Standards and Good Practices in the Governance and Oversight of Security Services

Author:
Nazli Yildirim Schierkolk
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
This collection of best practices analyses international standards and best practices in the governance and oversight of security services. The report consists of four chapters: (1) mandate and functions of security services; (2) executive control of security services, (3) oversight and accountability of security services; (4) transparency of security services. This report was prepared with the financial assistance of the Open Society Georgia Foundation and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF). The report is a component of the Transparency International Georgia (TI Georgia) and Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC) project on ‘Advocacy for the Creation of the Modern System for the Security Sector’ implemented with financial support from the Open Society Foundation (OSF).
Topic:
Security, Governance, Law Enforcement, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Canada, Germany, Belgium, Georgia, and Croatia

228. Mapping the U.S.-Canada Energy Relationship

Author:
Andrew J. Stanley
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
he United States and Canada are each other’s largest energy trading partners as measured by the value of energy commodity trade, which in 2017 stood at U.S.$95 billion. The energy relationship between the two countries extends beyond just the trade of commodities, encompassing a variety of common, though not always identical, economic, security, and environmental priorities. In March 2018, the CSIS Energy and National Security Program undertook a project with the Embassy of Canada in the United States to create a physical map depicting the U.S.-Canada energy trade relationship. The following CSIS brief explains the various aspects of the energy trade relationship using this map, as well as highlights some of the important issues in the development of this partnership moving forward.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Environment, Regional Cooperation, and Trade
Political Geography:
United States, Canada, and North America

229. Melting Arctic: Implications for the Twenty-First Century

Author:
Ziad Al Achkar
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
The Arctic region has not traditionally been the focus of international politics and world economics; however, recently environmental scientists have flooded the news with the effects of global warming in the region concerning the significant melting ice caps, dramatic ecological degradation, and potential irreversible loss of many species. Climate change is manifesting around the world through floods, ecological degradation, and potentially driving violence and conflict; in the Arctic, all these risks are compounded. The nature of the Arctic pole means that what will happen in the region is guaranteed to have an impact elsewhere. While environmentalists have sounded the alarm about the risks to the environment in the region, there is an ever-growing security danger that faces the Arctic. With ice caps melting and retreating to unprecedented levels, the arctic seabed is now open for nations to explore its reported vast amount of natural resources. This article will identify issues that will shape the twenty-first century of the Arctic. The scope of the article is not meant to be exhaustive of the problems and challenges but offer a thematic overview of the problems. There are three broad categories covered in this article. First, an overview of the changing climate, its ecological and environmental impact, and the challenges of operating in the Arctic. Second, an overview of the economics and international law implications that are a result of climate change and of increased activity in the region. Third, the geopolitics of the Arctic region.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, International Law, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America

230. Documents on Canadian Arctic Maritime Sovereignty

Author:
Adam Lajeunesse
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In September 1985, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced to the House of Commons the establishment of straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago, defining those straits and passages within as historic internal waters of Canada and under full national sovereignty.1 “The policy of this government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago” Clark declared, “and to preserve Canada’s sovereignty over land, sea, and ice undiminished and undivided.” (Document 68). This was the first time Canada had delineated its Arctic maritime space, clearly defining in legislation those waters over which it had sovereignty. It was an important clarification, as Canada had claimed and exercised sovereignty for decades without ever stating with precision where that sovereignty began and ended. In the assertion of sovereignty, precision is important. As the American geographer Isaiah Bowman once said, a boundary line “has to be here, not hereabouts.” While this definition was an important clarification it did not fundamentally change the Canadian approach to its Arctic waters. In making this announcement Clark was not staking a claim, rather he was making official what Canada had long assumed and practiced. In so doing, he marked the culmination of decades of political and legal discussions, negotiations, and debate. It was the logical conclusion to a lengthy political and legal evolution, by which Canadian sovereignty came to be defined and asserted in the way that it ultimately was in 1986. This volume is a documentary history, charting the evolution of Canada’s Arctic maritime sovereignty through government memoranda, notes, communiqués, and other primary source material. In so doing, it offers as unfiltered a look as possible at the political thinking, legal analysis, and international discussions that defined Canadian Arctic policy during its formative period. The material included is necessarily limited and selective – drawn from tens of thousands of pages of archival documents on the subject. These documents were included for several reasons: some are important government studies which shaped policy making, some are records of discussions or communications which illuminate important decisions, while others were selected for the context they provide at key moments in Canadian policy making. The period covered in this compendium stretches from 1950 to 1988 and is, in some respects, artificial. Canadian policy makers certainly considered the question of Arctic maritime sovereignty in the years before 1950, but it was never a pressing consideration, nor was any real policy formed. To reproduce material from this period would also be redundant, duplicating as it inevitably would the thorough collection compiled by Janice Cavell in her 2016 Documents on Canadian External Relations volume on Arctic sovereignty and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert’s excellent volume in the DCASS series. This volume has also avoided reproducing material in Whitney lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert’s 2010 book The Canadian Forces a& Arctic Sovereignty, which examines armed forces documents on this subject. This volume ends in 1988, not because the Mulroney government’s declaration of straight baselines – and the Canada-US negotiations which followed – ended discussion on the matter but because, by that point, the internal Canadian debate over the precise nature and extent of Canada’s claim had been settled. Documents 69-74 extend this volume to 1988 to provide some insight into how Canada’s new policy was received both internally and internationally. From a logistical perspective, documentary material on this subject also becomes nearly impossible to secure after this date – even through the Access to Information Act, the vehicle by which the lion’s share of this collection was secured.5 The focus of this volume is on Canadian government material; however, certain key documents from the United States National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD) and the Foreign Relations of the United States6 series have also been included. This American material provides context to Canada’s decision making and offers researchers a glimpse at how crucial Canadian policy initiatives were received by the country’s most important partner – and sometimes opponent – in this field. Ultimately, the purpose of the Documents on Canadian Sovereignty and Security is to facilitate new research and new interpretations which can add to, improve, and challenge the existing literature. This collection should provide academics, students, and policy makers with the research foundation to launch new inquiries into the field. Undergraduate students can use this collection as a substitute for extensive primary research, while graduate students and scholars can employ it as a ready jumping off point to undertake more thorough archival work.
Topic:
Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean