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2. Elections that will shape the EU more than ever befor
- Author:
- Augustin Palokaj
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
- Abstract:
- European elections this year, to take place on 23-26 May, are considered to be one of the most important in the history of the European Union. This might sound exaggerated or at least something that has been heard before. But there are many reasons why this time things are different. The EU is at the crossroads, performance, record low unemployment and fewer member states find themselves in economic difficulties or excessive deficit. Trust in the EU and support for membership is increasing among citizens in most member states. However, the general picture remains mixed and any flaw is widely exploited by with mixed picture on the state of the union: divided more than ever on core issues such as common values, solidarity, migration, free movement and the rule of law. On the positive side, however, there is a pretty good economic eurosceptic forces. Many challenges will have to be addressed urgently, starting immediately after the European elections. The results, which will most probably confirm a decline in support for traditional mainstream parties, will affect the election of a new President of the European Commission, a new President of the European Council and other key figures in EU institutions. This time it will not be easy, since many national leaders have questioned the automatic respect for the principle of “Spitzenkandidat” (the lead candidate put forward by the political group able to create a majority in the European Parliament, that becomes the President of the European Commission) and will try to return this power to elect the Commission’s President to the heads of states and governments, with the Parliament expected to rubber-stamp their choice. The Parliament could fight back and this may create a politically motivated power struggle between two major EU institutions.
- Topic:
- Regional Cooperation, Elections, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Brussels
3. Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: An early assessment of PESCO implementation
- Author:
- Yvonni-Stefania Efstathiou, Connor Hannigan, and Lucie béraud-Sudreau
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Between March and November 2018, the 25 participating member states launched 34 projects, with the core aim of addressing the EU’s capability shortfalls. In May 2019, a call for a third round of project proposals will be launched. The IISS undertook an early assessment of how PESCO projects are carried out, to assess whether the momentum on the ground has continued since the projects were announced at the political level. A strong pace of implementation would require detailed timelines, deadlines and financial plans, as well as clear links with EU capability requirements. Questionnaires were sent to the projects’ country leads, and were complemented by interviews and secondary-source research. We looked at various dimensions of implementation: timelines, financial commitments, stakeholder involvement and the projects’ relation to strategic autonomy. The results are mixed. While some projects are off to a strong start, there are common challenges for all
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Military Spending
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eastern Europe, Brussels, Central Europe, and Western Europe
4. European security in crisis: what to expect if the US withdraws from NATO
- Author:
- Lianna Fix, Bastain Giegerich, and Theresa Kirch
- Publication Date:
- 09-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Recent developments in transatlantic relations have reignited the debate about the need for Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Yet, efforts by European leaders to substantiate the general commitment to 'take their fate into their own hands' are so far lacking sufficient progress. Against this backdrop, the Körber Policy Game brought together a high-level group of senior experts and government officials from France, Germany, Poland, the UK and the US to address a fictional scenario that involves a US withdrawal from NATO, followed by multiple crises in Europe. How will Europeans organise their security and defence if the US withdraws from NATO? To what extent will future European security be based on mutual solidarity, ad-hoc coalitions or a bilateralisation of relations with the US? Which interests would the respective European governments regard as vital and non-negotiable? What role would the US play in European security after the withdrawal? The Körber Policy Game is based on the idea of projecting current foreign and security policy trends into a future scenario – seeking to develop a deeper understanding of the interests and priorities of different actors as well as possible policy options. The starting point is a short to medium-term scenario. Participants are part of country teams and assume the role of advisers to their respective governments.
- Topic:
- NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Brussels
5. Opportunities for Defense-Industrial Collaboration after Brexit
- Author:
- Douglas Barrie
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU’s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combat- aircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and sub- system levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Brexit, Maritime, and Space
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, France, London, Germany, and Brussels
6. UK Participation in the EDA and the new EU defense package in the context of Brexit
- Author:
- Lucie béraud-Sudreau
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- To continue United Kingdom participation in European Union defence cooperation: The UK, the European Commission and EU member states should strive to avoid near-term decisions that would shut out the UK from future participation in EU defence policies. Pursue agreement on the nature of a ‘third-state’ position as applied to the UK, ensuring the goals of Brussels and London are met. Identify ways for London to show its commitment to supporting the EU’s defence ambitions, signalling clearly a change from previous opposition. Brussels and London need to agree the key preconditions that will under- pin any deal over the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The UK should aim to ensure a single point of entry through the European Defence Agency for defence cooperation with the EU, in the absence of a Commission directorate-general for security and defence. Reach agreement on an overarching financial contribution covering access to the EDA, the EDF and PESCO, while London also commits to contributing funding to specific projects it wishes to take part in.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels
7. The UK’s potential role in enabling EU–NATO cooperation after Brexit
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The United Kingdom, having expressed interest in a strong EU–UK security partnership and having indicated that, if anything, its commitment to NATO will be even stronger after Brexit, has an opportunity to be a leader and facilitator in the context of EU–NATO cooperation in meeting emerging threats. Several of the priority areas and action items defined by these two organisations, following a declaration to enhance their cooperation at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, play to the UK’s strengths: To increase the level of cooperation between the EU and NATO, and in order to implement the cooperation agenda, the UK should invest both financially and in terms of personnel, via voluntary national contributions to NATO. The UK taking on a leadership role in the area of inter-organisational cooperation would signal to EU partners that stronger support for NATO is not intended to weaken EU initiatives; it is an opportunity to stress the complementary nature of EU and NATO capabilities. Given its limited resources, the UK could, in effect, use engagement in EU–NATO cooperation to hedge its bets on both organisations. Stronger support for NATO can directly benefit the EU’s security and defence initiatives, while making sure that cooperation results in added value in both multinational frameworks, rather than fostering institutional competition.
- Topic:
- NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United States, United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels
8. Europe`s migration crisis: threats to Schengen
- Author:
- Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
- Publication Date:
- 03-2016
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Fundación Alternativas
- Abstract:
- 2015 has been the year of refugees. Acording to ACNUR, around 1.006.768 migrants have arrived to the European Union running from war and poverty crossing the Mediterranean Sea. More than 850.000 asylum seekers arrived in Greece crossing the Egean Sea, standing for the 84,5% of the people who arrived in Europe in irregular conditions, while the number using the Italian route went slightly down from 170.000 in 2014 to 152.700 in 2015. Member states and EU institutions have a duty to respond to this situation under international law and agreed on an European Agenda on Migration that stated the “immediate imperative is a duty to protect those in need” adopting a substantial package of new measures: Setting out a common approach to managing Europe's external borders, migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development of a common Asylum and immigration policy withing the Schengen Area. Under this agreement, an Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) has been set up for the period 2014-20, with a total of EUR 3.1 billion for the seven years. As part of this strategy, the European Commission, in its attempts to push forward an EU agenda, has proposed to establish a European Border and Coast Guard to ensure a strong and shared management of the external borders. In this line, Frontex recently accepted a Greek request to deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) increasing the number of officers and technical equipment, such as boats and patrol cars, allowing to identify and register more migrants as soon after they arrive. In addition to 448 officers offered by Member States under thise mechanism, Frontex deploys 16 vessels and more than 260 officers assisting in new arrivals, as well as border surveillance officers, and document experts. However, and due to the lack of political commitment, after this serie of so-far unsuccessful attempts to address the stream of migrants and refugees the EU has opted to push the problem out of its borders following in Greece the model implemented in the West African migration route. According to EU data, the fact is incontestable: through subsidizing third countries to block the route to keeping migrants out of EU borders; express readmission agreements, reinforcing border control, guards and fences whilst dismantling camps at third countries soil; irregular immigration to Spain by sea decreased to very low levels. However, as in tthe Spanish case, this is not only illegal under international law. Human Right Watchdog organizations report gross and systematic violations of human rights since those measures may represent "an unjustified militarization of the border" and "an outsourcing of the control of external borders of the EU to a country that does not respect human rights". Following this strategy, in March 2016, the EU sealed an agreement with Turkey, temporary home to more than 2 million Syrians, to stop commuting to Greece. In return, Turkey will double the 3,000 million euros of aid approved by the European Union in exchange for their commitment to 6,000 million € to “improve border control and to cooperate in the fight against traffickers. Besides allowing the express devolution of irregular migrants and refugees to Turkey, the deal will cap the number of Syrian refugees resettled from Turkey at 72.000. Far from the 850.000 that arrived last year and even far from the 160.000 agreed last year. Undoubtedly, the agreement represents the last attempt to save Schengen after the continous EU failure to set up a common response to the crisis. The EU Parliament -which action is very limited due to the lack of compentencesis officially discussing the agreement in addition to the future of the Schengen zone; the rights of refugees under international law; and racism and violence suffered by these incomers. Many MEPs have expressed grave reservations about the deal, questioning whether the agreement with Turkey violated international conventions.
- Topic:
- Migration, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Asylum, and Schengen
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Brussels
9. A new step towards a common European defense
- Author:
- José Enrique de Ayala Marín
- Publication Date:
- 04-2016
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Fundación Alternativas
- Abstract:
- EU security has reached a critical point unparalleled since the end of the cold war. The threat of Jihadism, instability in Eastern Europe, failing states and human trafficking are problems it must deal with at a moment at which the United States is seeking to play a lesser role in European defence. Although as many as 34 civilian and military operations have been conducted during the 16 years in which the CSDP has been active, this instrument is far from being sufficient to meet the EU's security requirements. Of the various areas in which the CSDP must now be strengthened – which range from strategy definition and the development of common capacities to financing and force structure – the most important is Command and Control, a point that has been resolved at the political-strategic level but remains pending at the military-strategic level due to the lack of a permanent European operational headquarters (OHQ) that obliges the Union to negotiate specific agreements in every instance that one is required. None of the three current options for establishing an OHQ satisfies the availability, rapid response and capacity requirements for conducting CSDP operations. The use of NATO assets contemplated in the Berlin Plus agreement has for all intents and purposes been blocked by the diplomatic deadlock between Cyprus and Turkey, the response provided by national OHQs (which are not exclusively devoted to EU defence) is slow, and the capacity of the EU Centre of Operations is severely limited. This problem can only be resolved by creating a permanent, joint, combined, modular and sustainable European Operational Headquarters (EOHQ) with the planning, command, control and coordination capacities needed to guarantee that a 6 military commander can carry out his responsibilities in close coordination with the commander of civilian operations and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. An EOHQ would give the CSDP the visibility and rapid response capability it must have to work effectively in an increasingly unstable environment in which heightened security measures are essential and the launch of new operations is inevitable. Its establishment would have a multiplier effect in that it would lead to other initiatives that would pave the way for the expansion of the CSDP – a crucial step towards the common European defence envisioned in EU Treaties that should be a key EU objective. Promoting the creation of this structure and participating in its realisation should be one of the priorities of those Member States, including Spain, that are in favour of strengthening the CSDP as part of a process of political convergence, and consider such a measure to be the most appropriate, urgent and effective action to afford European citizens a higher level of security and a collective contribution towards the achievement of the paramount goal of peace.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Violent Extremism, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Spain, and Brussels
10. Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU's Role
- Publication Date:
- 03-2006
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Instability in the South Caucasus is a threat to European Union (EU) security. Geographic proximity, energy resources, pipelines and the challenges of international crime and trafficking make stability in the region a clear EU interest. Yet, the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have the potential to ignite into full-fledged wars in Europe's neighbourhood. To guarantee its own security, the EU should become more engaged in efforts to resolve the three disputes. It can do so by strengthening the conflict resolution dimension of the instruments it applies. As the EU is unlikely to offer membership to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan even in the medium term, it must identify innovative means to impose conditionality on its aid and demonstrate influence. This is a challenge that Brussels has only begun to address.
- Topic:
- Security and Regional Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- America, Europe, Azerbaijan, Georgia, South Caucasus, and Brussels