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71. Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook

Author:
Elisabeth Kühn
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Amid the rollout of the February 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, security analysts have understandably focused much attention on its implications for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, intra-alliance ties with key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, and Washington’s icy relations with Moscow. But nuclear deterrence only partially addresses NATO members’ shared concerns about Russian behavior, especially in light of Moscow’s growing propensity to undermine the alliance with nonkinetic operations and other tactics that nuclear warheads cannot easily deter. The risk of escalation sparking a wider conflict—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—between Russia and NATO is dangerously high. This is particularly the case in the Baltics, a region that would be difficult for NATO to defend because the military balance there very much favors Russia; moreover, Moscow could instigate unrest among the Russian minorities living there. To mitigate these risks and remain united, NATO members must complement deterrence with resilience and risk-reduction measures better tailored to addressing Russian behavior below the threshold of outright conventional and nuclear conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Baltic States

72. Security policy of the Baltic states and its determining factors

Author:
Sławomir Piotrowski
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The history of the nations living in today’s Baltic States is marked by fighting against stronger neighbours: Russia, Poland, Sweden, Denmark and the German settlers in their territories. Unlike Lithuanians, Estonians and Latvians failed to create their own statehood before the 20 th century. The Lithuanians created their own state, a powerful one, which then became a part of an even wider state organism – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a result, the security policy of Lithuania was identical to that of the First Republic of Poland. Although there were tribes living within the area of current Estonia and Latvia for many centuries up to the outbreak of World War I, the lands of Latvia and Estonia had been changing owners and had been under the rule of almost all neighbouring countries. As a result of the positive outcome of the First World War, but also thanks to their efforts, the Baltic States regained independence in order to lose it after only 20 years, as a consequence of another war. After restoring independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States realised that even acting together they were unable to defend themselves against a potential aggressor. As a result, they decided to follow in the footsteps of other countries of the former Eastern Bloc (e.g. Poland and Slovakia) and to integrate with Western European structures such as NATO and the EU. Following NATO inclusion, the security strategies of the Baltic States have been revised in line with the changes in their surrounding geopolitical environment.
Topic:
Security, History, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Baltic States

73. A New Era of EU-NATO Cooperation: How to Make the Best of a Marriage of Necessity

Author:
Kristi Raik and Pauli Järvenpää
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The challenges confronting both the European Union and NATO today are severe and complex: e.g. terrorism, refugee and migration crisis, hybrid and cyber threats, and a Russia willing to break international law and other treaties and agreements, thus undermining the post-World War II international order. This report argues that the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, based on shared values and interests, has become more critical than ever. Hence, the report seeks to identify and analyse the most crucial and promising areas of cooperation between the EU and NATO. It is divided into three parts. The first examines the short history of EU-NATO cooperation on defence and security from 1998 up to the present day. The second part focuses on two areas of cooperation: hybrid threats and strengthening defence capabilities. The third part offers conclusions and recommendations, stressing that for EU and NATO member states there is no “business as usual“. The two areas highlighted in the report, countering hybrid threats and developing European defence capabilities, offer avenues for new and much-needed cooperation. The member states should understand that developing these capabilities is not beyond their reach, should they decide to act together.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Europe and Baltic States

74. Brexit and Baltic Sea Security

Author:
Riina Kaljurand, Tony Lawrence, Pauli Järvenpää, and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The result of the UK’s June 2016 referendum on continued membership of the EU was unexpected and its consequences may be wide-ranging and grave. This report considers the impact of the UK’s exit from the European Union (‘Brexit’) on the security of Estonia, the Baltic Sea region and Europe more widely. Its focus is hard security – military security and defence. The UK is a defence and security actor of considerable prominence, able to contribute significant military capability to the organisations and operations in which it participates. It is, however, sceptical about the place of the EU in defence matters and has achieved a certain level of infamy for its perseverance in obstructing the further development of an EU defence dimension. One immediate consequence of the Brexit referendum result was a burst of ideas for further EU defence integration, which has led to an agreement on the first steps for implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. Not all member states, however, are enthusiastic for these ideas. Interviews conducted for this report with officials and researchers in the Baltic Sea states of Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and also in the UK found that interviewees believed that their countries shared with the UK approaches to security that would be harder to pursue after Brexit without the active support of the UK itself, and were largely sceptical about the need for further defence integration in the EU. In general, though, interviewees felt that the character of the European security environment post-Brexit is very difficult to forecast and the many factors that will contribute to shaping it are highly uncertain, complex, and intertwined. In these circumstances, scenario planning methodologies offer perhaps the best means of thinking about the future and informing policy decisions. The report thus identifies a range of possible post-Brexit scenarios as a vehicle for testing policies and identifying those likely to result in maximum benefit and minimum cost.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

75. Strengthening the Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Defence Committee of the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) commissioned ICDS to conduct a study on the strategic balance in the Baltic Sea region with aim to contribute, in the run up to the Warsaw Summit, to the discussion on the optimum Alliance military posture in the region. Assumptions: Russia follows an increasingly aggressive anti-Western policy of revisionism and has become a direct and open threat to NATO. It is implementing an ambitious military modernisation programme and has demonstrated a tendency to use force against weaker neighbours. NATO´s overall superiority vis-à-vis Russia is not reflected equally in the Baltic Sea region, especially by taking into account geography and force postures. The Alliance military power is not sufficiently available in the region. Russia will strive to avoid a full-scale war with NATO, but it could be tempted, nevertheless, while being guided by misperceptions, to provoke and exploit a “local conflict” to test and undermine the Alliance. Key findings: Credible NATO deterrence in the eastern flank of the Alliance requires an optimum balance between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Present NATO defence posture in the Baltic Sea region is inadequate for the effective deterrence by denial. Notable capability gaps exist as regards air and missile defence and naval presence. Russia has the ability to impose an A2/AD “bubble” over the Baltic states and large parts of the Baltic Sea. The major concentration of Russian forces in the areas surrounding Baltic states clearly exceeds defensive needs. Many of these units are offensive in their nature. Russia is frequently exercising military actions against Baltic states and their separation from the rest of the Alliance In military terms Belarus is an extension of Russian armed forces and performs an important geopolitical role, especially with regard to the “Suwalki gap”. The most likely worst scenario is not a “hybrid crisis” or limited incursion, but the separation and possible conquest of the Baltic states by conventional military means. Conclusions and recommendations The Russian threat has to be clearly acknowledged, treated as a strategic long-term challenge and taken fully into account in NATO’s defence planning and future posture in the Baltic Sea area. Effective deterrence requires a clearly increased presence of Allied forces in the region. NATO’s forward defence has to move from a symbolic to a meaningful presence. The Alliance’s forward presence must balance two key aspects: military effectiveness and multinationality. Military effectiveness requires the forces to be combat ready. The United States should exercise leadership by providing the framework and certain key capabilities, which would then be complemented by contributions from other Allies. In terms of manoeuvre formations, the baseline consideration should be brigade-sized units. A continuous presence of two brigades would be necessary, in addition to the indigenous forces of the Baltic countries. An increased presence of air assets, including transition from Air Policing mission to Air Defence, and maintenance of a robust naval presence in the Baltic Sea, is required. The Baltic countries will need to allocate additional resources for the Host Nation Support, including the development of necessary infrastructure. Alongside the strengthening of the forward presence component, the Alliance needs to refine capabilities for the deployment of reinforcements and follow-on forces, and for the neutralization of Russia´s A2/AD capabilities. The Allies should demonstrate their ability, in collective defence exercises, to rapidly move large numbers of troops to the Baltic region.
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

76. Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap

Author:
Wesley K. Clark, Juri Luik, Egon Ramms, and Richard Shirreff
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report was prepared as an input to the forthcoming NATO’s Warsaw Summit by three former NATO commanders with considerable experience of Allied strategy, operations and capabilities: a former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a former Deputy SACEUR and a former Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum. Political experience and context are provided by a former ambassador to NATO.
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

77. Consolidation of Ukrainian Society: Challenges, Opportunities, Pathways

Author:
Valeriya Klymenko
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
This issue of the journal summarises findings of the second stage of the Razumkov Centre’s Project “Formation of a Common Ukrainian Identity under New Conditions: Features, Prospects and Challenges”. Studies undertaken as part of the first project stage helped to identify the shifts that took place in various aspects of national identity between 2005 and 2015, including those brought about by the Revolution of Dignity and provoked by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. These studies paint a fairly detailed portrait of identities of Ukrainian citizens, including cross-regional differences and specifics attributable to citizens belonging to various social groups.1 Certain important issues remain insufficiently explored, particularly the hierarchy of various types of identity, the correlation between civil, national and ethnic components of identity, how citizens in different regions perceive one another, public assessment of the significance of cross-regional differences for the country’s future, etc. Since the previous public opinion survey, notable changes have taken place at the state and society levels as well as in the international political landscape. These changes have affected the public mood. They mainly have to do with falling living standards, a declining level of trust in government institutions, political parties and individual politicians, active attempts of the aggressor state to destabilise situation in Ukraine, lack of progress in resolving the Donbas conflict and returning Crimea, a somewhat decreased level of attention to Ukraine from the international community coupled with Russia’s growing influence on political processes in certain Western countries, the conflicting positions of some EU countries on Ukraine’s European future, certain aspects of Ukraine’s relations with the EU as well as Russia’s role in the ongoing armed conflict. With these factors in mind, the Razumkov Centre has outlined the following key research objectives for the second stage of the project: • Obtain a more detailed picture of how citizens understand specific aspects of identity (particularly civil and socio-cultural identity); • Assess the intensity and nature of the impact these socio-political and international trends have on various identity aspects of citizens, primarily the civil aspect; • Study how citizens in different regions of Ukraine perceive one another, explore the specifics of this perception and the existing beliefs and stereotypes; • Identify the specifics of the viewpoints that residents in different regions have on factors contributing to the division or consolidation of society, and assess their potential impact; • Learn about the attitudes of citizens to possible political approaches and specific efforts in “sensitive” areas, particularly those concerning language, cultural and national policies, and their impact on national unity; • Analyse the experience of specific post-Soviet and post-socialist countries of Europe in matters of shaping and preserving national identity. Formulated in this way, objectives are aligned with overriding goal of the second project stage: to devise effective and theoretically sound political tools adapted to the existing social reality (i.e., the substance of public policy and methods for implementing it) intended for shaping a common national identity among Ukrainian citizens, which would accelerate the process of consolidation of Ukrainian society, help achieve mutual understanding and support national unity.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Citizenship, Identity, and Society
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Baltic States

78. Instigations of Separatism in the Baltic States

Author:
Mindaugas Kuklys and Raul Carstocea
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)
Abstract:
This Issue Brief deals with some recent attempts to instigate and foment separatism in certain regions of all three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Although these attempts would appear at first glance to be spontaneous, we argue that certain recurring elements and links between them seem to indicate that they are rather coordinated actions showing a certain level of organization. In turn, these recent cases have direct bearing on the relationship between minorities and majorities in the Baltic states after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the increasingly strong promotion of the Eurasian Union initiated by Russia. Despite the differences between Estonia and Latvia on the one hand – which have large Russian-speaking minorities continuing to face integration challenges – and Lithuania – with a relatively small and well-integrated Russian minority –, these recent calls for separatism are manifest in all three countries under consideration.
Topic:
Minorities, Ethnicity, Discrimination, Separatism, and Identity
Political Geography:
Europe and Baltic States

79. Cooperation and Conflict in the Arctic: A Road Map for Estonia

Author:
Metthew Bryza, Kalev Stoicescu, and Natalja Jegorova
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The strategic value of the Arctic region is increasing as sea ice diminishes and previously inaccessible regions become open for exploration and exploitation. The Arctic has the potential to provide various natural riches and economic benefits—such as minerals, hydrocarbons, fisheries, and shorter shipping routes—alongside opportunities to strengthen international cooperation. However, the wealth of the region brings with it a potential threat to international stability. The mix of countries and international organizations with growing interests in the Arctic represent a diverse subset of the international community, stretching from Europe to the Far East. Furthermore, it brings a new dimension of confrontation to historical adversaries. For instance, four of five Arctic Ocean littoral states are members of NATO—and the fifth is Russia.
Topic:
NATO, Climate Change, International Cooperation, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic States

80. Connecting the Baltic States to Europe’s Gas Market

Author:
Emmet Tuohy and Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
More than two decades after the end of the Soviet occupation, and eight years after they joined NATO and the European Union, the Baltic republics remain disintegrated from the rest of Europe in one crucial way: their natural gas infrastructure isolates them into “energy islands.” But, for the first time in their histories, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania now have a chance to secure their energy independence by connecting their natural gas systems with those of their European allies and evolving them into market-based trading systems. This will require the Baltic republics to work with their EU Allies to develop physical and regulatory infrastructure required for liquid trading hubs and spot-market pricing of natural gas to emerge in the Baltic region. By achieving these objectives, these three small countries on the EU’s periphery will help the EU achieve two key strategic goals: to establish a single European energy market; and to complete the full integration of the EU’s easternmost member states into a Europe that is whole and free.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Energy Policy, Markets, and Gas
Political Geography:
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States