Search

Begin New Search Topic NATO Political Geography Baltic States

1. The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny

Author:
Adrian Popa and Cristian Barna
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Russia’s recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. While the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski’s ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

2. What next for NATO? Views from the North-East Flank on Alliance Adaptation

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Linas Kojala, Toms Rostoks, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO leaders have invited Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to present proposals at their next Summit for measures to reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role. To support his reflection process, the Secretary General has appointed a group of ten experts. Only one of these represents the 14 of 30 Allies who have joined NATO since 1999. In this policy paper we set out issues, concerns and expectations about NATO’s future adaptation from the perspective of the three Baltic states and Poland, based on a series of interviews with several senior officials and members of the expert community in each of the four states. While not identical, the views of our interviewees were close. They broadly agreed that while NATO faces a multitude of threats, Russia is by far the most serious. In response, NATO should prioritise—and enhance—its core task of collective defence. However, they recognised, it is essential for NATO to maintain a balance between the security interests of all Allies. They support the 360-degree approach and are ready to back and participate in efforts to deal with threats from other regions too. NATO should also retain its core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The Covid-19 pandemic suggests that NATO should re-calibrate the crisis management task to better reflect the need for collective support to the civilian authorities in large-scale efforts to deal with crises on Alliance territory. Our interviewees were generally cautious about otherwise expanding NATO’s roles and responsibilities, arguing that the Alliance should consider where it can add value, while avoiding overreach. They saw, for example, only a modest role for NATO in dealing with the challenge from China. They were, however, supportive of the Alliance developing further its global network of partnerships, both with states such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, and with other international organisations, notably the EU. NATO should also continue its cooperative security efforts with a focus on states in the immediate neighbourhood. And while further NATO enlargement is unlikely at present, the door should certainly remain open. Interviewees in all four states expressed concerns about the tensions within the Alliance and the lack of US leadership. While these tensions persist, it is probably unwise to consider drafting a new strategic concept. Nonetheless, the internal challenges might be eased if the Allies are prepared to use NATO to a greater extent as forum for consultation on a wide range of security issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Alliance, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States

3. Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States

Author:
Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the course of 2018-20, development of Fifth Generation (5G) communication networks has been increasingly influenced by the considerations of national security and geopolitics. The largest provider of 5G equipment, the Chinese mobile telecom giant Huawei, has come under fire from the U.S., Czechia, Poland, and other nations in recent years for attempted espionage, theft of intellectual property and other nefarious activities; in the past month, UK decided to ban Huawei technology from its networks. All this comes into sharp focus as the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Beijing reaches new heights. However, China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners and has worked to establish its economic, political, and cultural influence in various Member States. The EU and NATO have both released standards for member states must use when gauging the security of potential 5G networks. Yet, the EU in particular has not enacted a blanket ban or sweeping restrictions on the Chinese 5G equipment providers, leaving the tradeoffs between national security, technological progress and cost-efficiency to individual states. Although the Baltic states are well-versed in dealing with cybersecurity challenges, their road to 5G development is going to be complex. Whole-of-society awareness, political diligence, technical competence, regional cooperation, and resilience to Beijing’s influence operations are needed in forging a clear path to 5G that is aligned with their key geopolitical interest—maintaining their close strategic alliance with the United States. This brief aims to explore the geopolitical factors at play in determining the Baltic states’ 5G policy and regulations, with a particular focus on the EU, U.S., and China’s influence. It also provides a short of overview of the state of current 5G networks and regulations in the Baltic states while identifying challenges that the region will face in the coming years.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Resilience, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States

4. Strengthening NATO’s Cohesion Through Consultation

Author:
Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the first of a new series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation and their possible impacts in the Baltic region, Wojciech Lorenz of the Polish Institute of International Affairs examines how NATO’s mechanisms for consultation among Allies have evolved in response to shifts in the security environment, and offers suggestions as to how these mechanisms might be strengthened as a means of mitigating tensions in NATO today.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Social Cohesion
Political Geography:
Baltic States

5. Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region

Author:
Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO has revitalised its core business of deterrence and defence and adapted it to today’s political and geostrategic circumstances. In the Baltic region, the most visible expression of this effort has been the deployment of the enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Poland and the three Baltic states. These are, in turn, backed up by a readiness and reinforcement strategy, which NATO has also strengthened through the adoption of a number of measures agreed by the Allies. But deterrence is a complex matter that involves political, diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, information-related, and other aspects. In the Baltic region, the constraints of geography coupled with the proximity of the region to Russia pose particular challenges to NATO’s approach. The region remains a focus of tensions between Russia and the West and the three Baltic states are still NATO’s most vulnerable members. Moscow, meanwhile, pretends that it is particularly threatened in the Baltic region, where it regards the territory of the Baltic states as a potential bridgehead of American power projection and presents NATO’s deterrence measures as a deliberate, unprovoked and unjustified build-up of forces around its periphery. Two interdependent developments in the period since 2014 have pointed to a particular need to re-examine the credibility of NATO’s posture as it pertains to the Baltic region: first, Russia’s continued programme to achieve conventional military superiority in its western direction; and second, its recent deployment of new mobile, land-based, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles. The former has given Russia has a substantial numerical advantage in ground forces in the Baltic region which give Moscow the option of executing a rapid land-grab attack before NATO could react. The latter could be used to try to decouple Europe from the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US, paralysing NATO decision making and undermining the Allies’ resolve. Full and expeditious implementation of all decisions taken at Warsaw and Brussels to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is therefore imperative. In this policy paper, we recommend some steps that NATO should take in order to strengthen the deterrent effect of NATO forces and to ensure that timely reinforcement of its peripheries is feasible. In the light of a US Congressional request for a detailed assessment from the Pentagon on whether to expand US military presence in the Baltic states, we pay particular attention to the role of US forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Political stability, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Baltic States

6. Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War

Author:
Ben Hodges, Tony Lawrence, and Ray Wojcik
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s ability to efficiently move large and heavy armed forces into and across Europe is a key aspect of its deterrence and defence posture. In establishing the enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the three Baltic states, NATO leaders acknowledged that credible deterrence would also require these small multinational forces to be underpinned by a robust reinforcement strategy. In this report, we examine this key aspect of NATO’s defence and deterrence posture as it relates to the Baltic region. In a crisis, military movement in Europe is likely to be confronted by legal and procedural obstacles, by the limited capacity of infrastructure, and by issues related to coordination, command and control. The severity of these problems would vary according to the type of crisis. For an operation to restore Alliance territory following an armed attack, the sheer scale and breadth of NATO’s requirements for military movement would present a major challenge to Europe’s transport infrastructure, and to prioritisation and coordination efforts. NATO has had little practice in reinforcing Allies at scale since the end of the Cold War. A preventative deployment to respond to a potential crisis, meanwhile, would put a premium on speed of movement. In this case, legal and procedural obstacles may be more problematic as timescales for dealing with the bureaucracy would be similar to the timescales for the movement itself. NATO and the EU have cooperated widely to mitigate the legal and procedural challenges of moving armed forces across the European continent, but the processes in place remain numerous and complex. NATO and the EU have also collaborated on the harder task of ensuring that transport infrastructure is suited to military needs. Movement would be challenged by both physical constraints, such as weight limits on roads and bridges and traffic volume restrictions for rail transport, and procedural ones, such as the limitations of the contractual arrangements necessary to enable the use of civilian railway wagons and heavy equipment transporters for military purposes. Such constraints, while manageable in peacetime, may make it difficult to meet the armed forces’ requirements for large-scale movement during crisis. Furthermore, the Baltic region also lacks supporting logistics infrastructure, for example for receiving and staging (and sustaining for extended periods) forces that have arrived in the region. A third set of challenges arises from the need for coordination among the multiple agencies involved in the movement of armed forces. Even amongst movement specialists there is no clear picture of how these agencies would work together during crises or of how movements would be prioritised to serve the operational needs of the Joint Force Commander.
Topic:
NATO, War, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States

7. Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook

Author:
Elisabeth Kühn
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Amid the rollout of the February 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, security analysts have understandably focused much attention on its implications for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, intra-alliance ties with key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, and Washington’s icy relations with Moscow. But nuclear deterrence only partially addresses NATO members’ shared concerns about Russian behavior, especially in light of Moscow’s growing propensity to undermine the alliance with nonkinetic operations and other tactics that nuclear warheads cannot easily deter. The risk of escalation sparking a wider conflict—deliberately, inadvertently, or accidentally—between Russia and NATO is dangerously high. This is particularly the case in the Baltics, a region that would be difficult for NATO to defend because the military balance there very much favors Russia; moreover, Moscow could instigate unrest among the Russian minorities living there. To mitigate these risks and remain united, NATO members must complement deterrence with resilience and risk-reduction measures better tailored to addressing Russian behavior below the threshold of outright conventional and nuclear conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Baltic States