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281. Montenegro: Which Way Next?

Publication Date:
11-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The removal of Slobodan Milošević's regime, with its poisonous influence on the entire Balkan region, raises hopes that a host of inter-connected problems may now stand a significantly better chance of being resolved, including the future status of Kosovo and of Montenegro, both notionally still a part of the Yugoslav federation.
Topic:
Security, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Balkans, and Montenegro

282. War Criminals in Bosnia's Republika Srpska: Who are the People in Your Neighbourhood?

Publication Date:
11-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Five years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, which brought an end to almost four years of bloody war in Bosnia, many of those believed to have carried out some of the war's worst atrocities remain at large. The continued presence in the municipalities of Republika Srpska (RS) of individuals suspected of war crimes—some indicated either publicly or secretly by the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—represents a significant obstacle to the return of ethnic minority refugees. It also undermines seriously Bosnia's chances for building central institutions, generating self-sustainable economic growth, and achieving the political transformation necessary to begin the process of integration with the rest of Europe. Moreover, the continued commitment of most war crimes suspects to the goal of a Greater Serbia, and their willingness to use violence to achieve it, could—in the long term—provoke renewed conflict in Bosnia and continued instability in the Balkans.
Topic:
Security, Ethnic Conflict, Human Rights, and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Bosnia, Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Balkans

283. Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica's Victory

Publication Date:
10-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
While the world watched in fascination as mass demonstrations in Belgrade toppled Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic from power, Kosovo—where Milosevic had committed some of his worst crimes—had an almost eerie air of normalcy. On the night Milosevic fell, cafés were full and the usual crowd of young people strolled along Pristina's central artery, Mother Theresa Street. But Pristina's surface in difference masked serious unease about events in Serbia and especially about the swelling international welcome for newly elected President Vojislav Kostunica. Kosovo Albania's political circles, opinion leaders, and public, which for long had a head-in-the-sand approach toward the rise of the democratic opposition in Belgrade, are only beginning to come to grips with the changed political landscape in the Balkans caused by Milosevic's fall.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, and Politics
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Balkans, and Albania

284. Blunder in the Balkans: The Clinton Administration's Bungled War against Serbia

Author:
Christopher Layne
Publication Date:
05-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The Clinton administration has made one miscalculation after another in dealing with the Kosovo crisis. U.S. officials and their NATO colleagues never understood the historical and emotional importance of Kosovo to the Serbia n people, believing instead that Belgrade's harsh repression of the ethnic Albanian secessionist movement in Kosovo merely reflected the will of President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia. The administration's foreign policy team mistakenly concluded that, under a threat of air strikes, the Yugoslav government would sign a dictate d peace accord (the Rambouillet agreement) to be implemented by a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Even if Milosevic initially refused to sign the Rambouillet agreement, administration leaders believed that Belgrade would relent after a brief “demonstration” bombing campaign. Those calculations proved to be disastrously wrong.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Balkans, and Albania

285. Independent Task Force Report: Reconstructing the Balkans

Author:
Charles A. Kupchan, Morton I. Abramowitz, and Albert Fishlow
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The last of the six Balkan Wars of the twentieth century is over. But it is by no means certain that a durable peace is at hand. After vast death, destruction, and savagery lasting almost a decade can the peoples of the former Yugoslavia live together again in peace? If so, the region will require sustained help and support from the West. The United States and its European partners are in the midst of mustering the necessary resources and political will. There are numerous uncertainties complicating efforts to proceed with the reconstruction of the area. Whatever the international community may proclaim, the borders of Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia could well change. The management of Kosovo's status and its relationship to Serbia is likely to produce serious tensions within the Alliance and between NATO and Russia. What politically will emerge from a beaten and traumatized Serbia no one can predict. Nor is it clear that Montenegro will remain as part of Yugoslavia, particularly if Milosevic continues to rule. An ethically fragile Macedonia has been badly weakened by the war and the inflow of three hundred thousand Kosovar deportees. Albania barely hangs together as a state. Neighboring Rumania and Bulgaria have avoided violence and begun to remake their societies, but they have suffered economically from the wars. The area of reconstruction is small and the population limited; the task at hand certainly is not of the dimensions of restoring post-war Europe. But the problems are daunting. Without security there will be no development. NATO forces will be needed indefinitely to keep the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. Much more must be done to promote political and economic reform in the region, requiring vision and planning. The states of the region will first need urgent help to stabilize their economies and manage enormous humanitarian problems. They must also be able to envisage a better future, one that holds out the prospect of bringing them into Europe's political and economic mainstream. Realizing that goal will require profound changes in their economies and institutions as well as in their relationships with each other. Faced with these challenges, Western countries and a host of international institutions have begun to address how to foster the broad reconstruction of the area. The EU-sponsored stability pact, adopted in Cologne in June, is the beginning attempt at a multifaceted, coordinated approach to the problem. The G-8 has agreed on a broad program of financial assistance, and the EU has pledged 1.5 billion dollars for aid to Kosovo alone. Numerous follow-up conferences are already planned. Much more work has to be done to give reality and coherence to such efforts. Balkan reconstruction will be a protracted undertaking. It will require extremely difficult commodities – a comprehensive approach and the will, resources, and mechanisms to implement the effort. It is mostly to such a long term approach that this preliminary working paper addresses itself. It does not deal with the immediate requirements of refugee return and humanitarian assistance nor the urgent repair of human and material infrastructure. The World Bank and the IMF in cooperation with many other international organizations and interested countries are coordinating the assessment of needs and costs and have issued preliminary reports. The purpose of this working paper is to provide a broad political approach and to highlight the three key components of a comprehensive, long-term strategy: building security, integrating the region into the European Union, and fostering economic and political reform. For the purposes of this paper, we consider the region to be Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, and Rumania. This is somewhat arbitrary and these states are at different stages of political and economic development. The problems of Rumania and Bulgaria are quite different than Serbia's and Kosovo's; Croatia is much further advanced than next door Serbia and Bosnia. They all have to be dealt with separately, and no single state should hold back the progress of others in entering Europe. But they also face a collective future and the region will enjoy a lasting peace only if all its states leave the past behind and move decidedly to join the wider community.
Topic:
NATO, Ethnic Conflict, International Cooperation, International Political Economy, and World Bank
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Bosnia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Balkans, Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia

286. Remarks: Prime Minister of Greece K. Simitis

Author:
K. Simitis
Publication Date:
04-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Thank you very much for the opportunity you have given me today to develop some thoughts as to the role of my country within our broader region, South-East Europe, and to do so before this distinguished body, the Council on Foreign Relations. Of course, I would never have imagined that my speech would be so timely, unfortunately, for reasons which have to do with the continuing crisis in Yugoslavia. The recent developments there, I fear, have confirmed in the minds of many observers of events around the world, those stereotypes which have prevailed for more than a century in the Balkans,—that it still the powder keg of Europe. Of course, no one can deny that the history of the Balkans is one of turbulence. It is appropriate to remind you, that the history of other European regions is also full of wars and other atrocities. Unfortunately, in some cases, far greater than those which took place and are taking place in the Balkans. I would also add, that the perturbed development of the Balkans has also been marked by long-term, economic and social under-development.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Balkans

287. Serbia—Opposition Division

Author:
Oxford Analytica
Publication Date:
10-1999
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxford Analytica
Abstract:
Daily demonstrations calling for Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to resign have, over recent weeks, been poorly attended. In part this reflects the opposition parties' failure to resolve their differences. This has led to growing scepticism in the West about the Serbian people's ability to bring about political change. In these circumstances, the international community may alter its policy towards the country. However, greater efforts to support the democratic opposition could prove counter-productive in the short-to-medium term due to anti-Western sentiment in the aftermath of the NATO air campaign. In the longer term the West will need to reconsider its policy towards the Balkans if it wants to play a constructive role in regional democratisation.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Democratization, and Politics
Political Geography:
Mongolia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

288. Beyond Kosovo: A Regional Approach to the Balkans

Author:
Roger Kirk, Jack M. Seymour Jr., John Lampe, and Louis Sell
Publication Date:
06-1999
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Basic Factors Underlying a Regional Settlement 1. Any overall settlement in the Balkans should be area-wide and coordinated among the entities directly involved, the neighboring states, the key nations of the outside community, and the relevant political and economic international institutions. 2. It will have to include political arrangements, international security guarantees, and substantial economic assistance as a basis for genuine peace and reconciliation. 3. It must embrace generally accepted international standards, including respect for human rights and rights for ethnic minorities; right of return for all area refugees; rule of law; effective media freedom; and free elections supervised or, where necessary, organized by the international community. 4. The settlement should promote and institutionalize political and economic cooperation, regional trade and/or formal ties among the participating states and entities of the former Yugoslavia, and neighboring states as feasible, including the free flow of goods, labor and capital. 5. International assistance in reconstruction, economic reform and development of economic ties among the peoples of the region and with the European Community must be massive. It should, however, be designed to promote democratic institutions, market reform, adherence to peace agreements, and respect for human rights. 6. Such assistance should target the private sector, encourage local initiatives, and help governments pursue effective economic reform policies. It should seek to curtail corruption and the maintenance of unprofitable state industries. It should avoid encouraging international dependency. The purpose should be to build societies and practices conducive to self-reliance, international cooperation, and outside investment. Positive and negative lessons can be drawn from experiences in Bosnia. 7. The support of the broad population of Serbia will be necessary if peaceful and economically viable regional arrangements are to last. The reconstruction process implied in these arrangements will itself be an incentive for the Serbs to opt away from destructive nationalist policies and join in the regional reconstruction process. 8. Neither lasting peace in the Balkans nor democracy in Serbia can be achieved as long as Slobodan Milosevic remains in power. He has been indicted by the Tribunal in The Hague for crimes against humanity and his removal from power is a prime NATO objective. There are increasing and encouraging signs of popular Serb desire to be rid of Milosevic, but it is not certain that he will depart in the near future. 9. A regional settlement may have to be negotiated indirectly with, or imposed upon, Milosevic as the ruler of Serbia. It should nevertheless be made clear that the West condemns Milosevic\'s actions, that Serbia cannot resume its rightful place in Europe as long as it is governed by indicted war criminals, and that the West will help the people of Serbia in their efforts to bring forth new, democratic, cosmopolitan leadership in their country. 10. The Kosovar Albanians cannot be expected to live under Serbian control again for the foreseeable future. Arrangements short of formal independence such as an international protectorate or trusteeship are possible, indeed likely, for a transitional period. A more permanent and self-sustaining arrangement is highly desirable if it can be achieved without creating more instability in the former Yugoslav space and the neighboring area. 11. A credible international military presence is needed to encourage the return of the remaining Albanian-Kosovars, the continued residence of Serb-Kosovars and to maintain peace and order within Kosovo and on its borders. Such a presence will also be a lasting part of any transitional arrangement. Any foreseeable regional settlement will similarly require a prolonged foreign military presence. This settlement should, however, lay the foundation for an end to that presence by, among other things, providing for supervised demilitarization of the states and entities involved, and a comprehensive regional arms control agreement. 12. A central objective of any regional settlement should be to promote conditions that will encourage a stable political and military environment, economic growth, and increasing self-reliance. These changes will permit an end to the foreign military, political, and economic presence in the region, though no date for that termination should be set.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Kosovo, and Balkans

289. Economic Strategy for South Eastern Europe

Publication Date:
11-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
The international community has produced a plethora of projects, proposals and initiatives for South Eastern Europe. In spite of this, the region still lacks a viable, result-oriented economic strategy, which understands and addresses the fundamental economic needs of the region. In response to this need the EastWest Institute, in close co-operation with the Business Advisory Council of the Southeast European Co-operative Initiative, launched a small Task Force on Economic Strategy for South Eastern Europe. The Task Force included fourteen leading business executives and economic experts from the region with first-hand knowledge of the economic and business environment on the ground. Over the course of a series of meetings, which analysed country and regional data and discussed various policy options, the Task Force produced this report. Its intention is to focus the attention of all those who want to help the Balkans, including their political leaders, on the real causes of conflict, poverty, and isolation in the region. Its recommendations offer guidelines for embarking on what we believe is the right path of reform and development. Very often the policies applied in the Balkans, both by the international community and the domestic politicians, reflect an agenda that was not internalised by the "subjects" of reform, i.e. the people living in the region. We believe that the focus of our report on developing the human capital of the region and creating employment opportunities in an integrated regional market will gather strong internal support for a more stable and prosperous Balkans.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Maryland

290. Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm

Publication Date:
08-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Just under a year ago a nervous Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic warned the world that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was preparing to trigger a new Balkan war by launching a campaign of violence against the tiny republic of Montenegro. Djukanovic was right about Milosevic's intent, but wrong about the target. In March of this year, the dictator struck against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and unleashed the barbarous Operation Horseshoe.
Topic:
Ethnic Conflict, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Balkans, Albania, and Montenegro