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1. The Israeli ThreatL What is driving the renewed escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Ministry of Interior, Security Agency, and Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan announced in a joint statement on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, that nine individuals were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the government by force, assassinate prominent figures and senior Azerbaijani officials. The statement indicated that they had connections to Iranian intelligence agencies, and that the cell was composed of a person named Ruhollah Akhoundzadeh and his son Mursal, along with seven others working under his supervision. On his part, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, rejected the accusations in a statement on May 18, denying any official or unofficial relationship between these individuals and Iran. He affirmed that imprisoning individuals on the pretext of their connection to Iran is unacceptable.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Azerbaijan

2. Assessing the importance of new corridors in the South Caucasus in the context of the RussianUkrainian war

Author:
Murad Agayev
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:
This article analyzes the possibilities of a new corridor in the South Caucasus region in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The research is important because after the 44-day war, fertile conditions for new opportunities have emerged in the South Caucasus region. The RussianUkrainian war and the resulting damage to the transport sector, like other sectors, necessitated the creation and use of alternative routes. The questioning of the security of the Black Sea due to the war and the closing of the European space for Russia created a problem for the countries that used Russia and the Black Sea to reach Europe. These countries are already evaluating alternative opportunities to the corridors. One of these possibilities is the Middle Corridor project, which has seen an increase in the volume of transported cargo since its inception, except during the pandemic period. During the war, the shortest possible transport corridor from China to Europe will be provided after the financial investment in the infrastructure and the integration of the Zangezur Corridor into the Middle Corridor, and work on this process is currently being continued. The North-South Corridor, which has been discussed for a long time however has not gained much popularity, gained even more importance during the war, and the works related to the construction of the infrastructure of the corridor were accelerated.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

3. De-colonising the Azerbaijan-Armenian Conflict: Breaking the Knot of Security and Dependence

Author:
Leila Alieva
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The recent military operation in the Nagorno Karabakh area reflects a broader regional transformation. Its essence is in the second attempt (with the first one in Azerbaijan 30 years ago) of changing the security paradigm, this time in Armenia, leading to de-colonisation of relations in the region. The core of this change is liberation from the dependence on Russia’s almost two centuries old patronage, with Nagorno Karabakh conflict evolving as a tool of this dependence. With all the contradictions over the territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and difference in current political systems, the countries seem at last to arrive to the same conclusion of Russia and her control of the Karabakh elite being one of the obstacles to the peaceful relations, reforms and integration in the West. The power balance in the region, affected by such factors as Turkey’s greater involvement, distraction of the West, Russia’s increasing isolation, besides power change in Armenia, has also contributed to the “window of opportunity” for a change of paradigms. The role and influence of the EU and the US in this process, including in deterring potential military developments, will be dependent on the perception of them by the parties as non-partisan brokers, promotion of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as independent subjects of international relations and consistency in support of democracy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Mediation, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

4. Strategic Importance of the Ganja Gap in the New Security Scenario

Author:
Miguel Borja Bernabé-crespo and Alejandro Vallına Rodríguez
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:
The Ganja gap is the border space comprised between Azerbaijan and Georgia. This connection between these two countries represents a strategic zone due to the proximity of another axis of allies: Armenia and Russia, which are separated by the Ganja gap. Moreover, Ganja is the strategic path from Europe and the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, which also entails not only commercial and military transits but also the connection of the Turkic world between Türkiye and Central Asia. The complex relations of the actors surrounding the Ganja gap warn this space of a potential conflict: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership of Türkiye, its close relations to Azerbaijan, the aspirations of Georgia to become a member of this alliance, opposed to Russia’s intention to control its near abroad. Because of this, the control of this space represents a potential space of clash between military alliances. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the conception of the European Security scenario, leading Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to apply for European Union (EU) membership, being the former two official candidates, changing EU relations with Türkiye and creating some grey zones in the post-Soviet space. These grey zones are blurry spaces where peace is not guaranteed though there is no war situation – but could potentially evolve as such, as it happened in Ukraine in recent years. This contribution analyses the Ganja gap: its territory, and geopolitical context and discusses the new security scenario and the grey zone concept. It finally delivers some conclusions aiming to provide security by emphasising the strategic location of Ganja Gap and its implications for the whole region.
Topic:
Security, International Security, Conflict, and Gray Zone
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ganja Gap

5. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

6. The Sky is the Limit: The Azerbaijan-Israel-Türkiye Trio and the Greater Middle East

Author:
Rusif Huseynov
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, the director of Azerbaijan's Topchubashov Center, Rusif Huseynov writes on the existing and potential security and economic cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan, as well as the strategic link both countries share with Turkey.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Azerbaijan

7. Peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Who will economically win?

Author:
Emin Mammadov and Nigar Islamli
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:
Following the recent September escalations along the Azerbaijan and Armenian border, in a way towards achieving a sustainable peace deal and long-lasting security in the Caucasus, the quadrilateral meeting in pragmatic terms is deemed to play a significant role in this vein putting an end to hostilities. The President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia met in Prague on 6 October 2022 in the margins of the first European Political Community at the invitation of the President of the French Republic and the President of the European Council. Both sides reiterated their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which both recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty which will act as a legal basis for the work of the border delimitation commissions.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Sovereignty, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

8. Towards Sustainable Peace and Cooperation

Author:
Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:
Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:
The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Towards Sustainable Peace and Cooperation” is dedicated to the challenges and opportunities emerging in the South Caucasus region 2 years after the end of the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 with focus on security and political matters.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, International Law, Treaties and Agreements, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Landmines, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

9. Georgia After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The outcome of the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia significantly trans­formed the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, with im­plications for the wider Black Sea‑Caspian region. The unsettled political geography of the South Caucasus and the ethno‑political separatism fueled by external actors since the early 1990s left bleeding wounds on the bodies of the newly re‑emerged sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These conflicts have determined the trajectory of the geopolitical developments of the region for the last 30 years, including on the for­eign policy orientations of these new states. The conflicts in the South Caucasus were the primary challenge for transforming the strategic assets of this region into greater political and economic success. Three major conflict areas in the South Caucasus were former autonomous regions, created in the early Soviet period: Nagorno‑Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Tskhinvali region, what was called South Ossetia. (Briefly: the latter term was introduced by the Soviets in the 1920s as a name for the newly created autonomous area in Georgia, popu­lated by Ossetians alongside ethnic Georgians. The historic homeland of Ossetians is located to the north of the Greater Caucasus mountains. Following the Soviet tradition of planting ethno‑political time bombs, Ossetia proper—located in the Russian Federation—was named North Ossetia, while the Tskhinvali region of Georgia—with the Ossetian population at the time concentrated in the border areas with Russia—was named South Ossetia.) As of today, all three of these areas are self‑proclaimed indepen­dent states, are formally ruled by de facto governments, and saw fierce military confrontation in the early 1990s. In 2008, the Tskhinvali region became the battleground between Russian and Georgian forces. In 2020, Azerbaijan regained through a combination of military action and diplomatic brinksmanship all seven regions outside of Nagorno‑ Karabakh that had been occupied by Armenia, as well as one‑third of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh region. In the case of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, as of mid‑2021, these ter­ritories remain, in reality, governed by Russian occupational forces. The Russian military influence was in­serted into Karabakh after the war that ended on November 10th, 2020, with Russian peacekeepers playing an increasing role in the governance of the region. In terms of geopolitical orienta­tion, Armenia willingly allowed Russian troops onto its territory, seeing them as a security guar­antee and deterrent against Azer­baijan. Georgia aligned itself with the Western powers, determined to join NATO and the EU. The conflicts on Georgian territory are seen as punishment from Russia for Georgia’s pro‑Western focus. As a result, there has been a heavy Russian military presence in the separatist areas of Georgia since the Russian invasion to Georgia in 2008.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

10. From Struggle to Permanent Failure Why the Karabakh Attempt at Secession Failed

Author:
Azer Babayev
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
After 44 days of fighting, the Second Karabakh War came to an end on 10 November 2020 as a result of a Russian‑brokered ceasefire agree­ment. The most important questions here appear to be: what led to this dangerous military escalation, and what does it mean for the conflict, given that it seems to have now entered into a (new) political phase, again? In the declining Soviet Union, what was originally a status dispute over the autonomous Nagorno‑Karabakh region escalated into an international violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Following the end of a bloody war in 1994 (the First Karabakh War, 1992‑ 1994), a fragile situation around the conflict region took root: the “frozen conflict,” as it came to be known, lasted for nearly three decades and led to conditions of neither war nor peace. And during this period, it was feared that the longer the sides had to wait for a peace agreement to be reached, the more likely the conflict would re‑escalate and even­tually erupt again into a hot war. As it turned out, this is exactly what happened: an all‑out six‑week war erupted again unexpectedly between the conflict parties in late September 2020, and, as a result, the Armenian side more or less capitulated. But first things first: in the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan suffered a major defeat, ceding to Armenian forces not only the secessionist region itself but also seven surrounding territo­ries. These other lands were, as a whole, twice the size of Nagorno‑ Karabakh itself and contained five times the old oblast’s population, the entirety of which was expelled by the time an armistice was signed in 1994. And that is why during this war the UN Security Council re­sponded by passing four resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Arme­nian forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan. However, the UN res­olutions failed to have any effect. Since that time, no international protagonists felt a strong, compelling need to try to resolve the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. In addition, all in­ternational actors dismissed the idea of “power mediation.” Moreover, although Russia as a key international actor is directly involved in all the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, its involvement in the Nagorno‑Karabakh dispute has been rather indirect: in the Karabakh case, Moscow has been both a critical and a questionable actor. On the one hand, the Kremlin has taken a central position in me­diating a peaceful settlement to the conflict while, on the other hand, it has been delivering weapons to both sides. This last represents perhaps the most striking situation regarding the international dimension of the con­flict. Russia is militarily allied with Armenia and has a military presence in the country. It has provided secu­rity guarantees to Yerevan, primarily through their shared membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which neu­tralized to a certain extent the poten­tial effects of Russian arms being sold to financially strong Azerbaijan on a purely commercial basis.
Topic:
Security, War, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan