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81. Defence projects and the economy

Author:
Rob Bourke
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report examines what the national economy stands to gain from nearly $100 billion of planned investment in new defence capital equipment including submarines, frigates and military vehicles. The report emphasises that although the general public has been informed about some of the economic benefits of those projects, it has limited access to reliable information on most of their economic costs. Nor has the public been fully informed of how much of what goes into the projects will be produced in Australia. The picture emerging from information available publicly contrasts with the image of vessel and vehicle projects as a major source of ‘jobs and growth’. At best, the projects appear to have a small positive impact on economic activity. That’s due to the substantial economic costs involved. Author Rob Bourke said that ‘for such large projects whose economic benefits have been portrayed as being far above their economic costs, it’s surprising how little supporting evidence has been made available to Australian taxpayers. With the economic upside of projects touted widely but the economic downside largely hidden from public view, it’s difficult to assess the merits of investments of national significance. Government messaging suggests that projects add much more to the economy than they take away. The evidence available publicly paints a different picture: Australia potentially paying a lot to protect a little. Vessel and vehicle acquisitions might now be difficult to alter. Nonetheless, the lessons in transparency that they provide are important to consider for future investments by Defence, especially with calls for its budget to move well above the current target of 2% of GDP.’
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Investment
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

82. Strong and free? The future security of Australia's north

Author:
John Coyne
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report argues that ‘there is a need to reconceptualize Northern Australia, as a single scalable Defence and National Security ecosystem’. This ecosystem should be developed to ‘deliver integrated support to current and future ADF and National Security operations’. The strategic importance of Australia’s north to Australia’s defence has long been recognized by government and policy makers. Despite strategic policy commitments to Northern Australia, there is a growing body of evidence indicating that the gap is widening between strategic policy and Defence’s actual activities and presence in the north. This could well be symptomatic of a gap in Australia’s northern development policies. It is likely that with the significantly reduced warning times of future conflict the North of Australia will increasingly become either Australia’s Forward Operating (FOB) base, or its lily pad to another forward location within the pacific or the first or second island chain. The northern Australian industry base needs to be enhanced to be able to provide a permanent and scalable civilianized replenishment and depot repair capacity for Defence capabilities deployed across the various physical nodes of FOB North. If the Northern Australian industry base is not scalable then the ADF may not be able to optimally configure to undertake Defence of Australia tasks, nor short notification joint expeditionary operations within our regional neighbourhood. To succeed, the FOB North concept must be fully integrated with Australia’s broader national security strategy. ADF and National security activities ought to be integrally linked and mutually supporting. The FOB North concept will provide policy makers the foundation for thinking of the North as a facilitator of engagement with the region. FOB North will also make the North of Australia a vehicle for defence with the region, rather than defence from the region. The development of FOB North needs to be part of, and supported by, Australia sovereign nation building efforts. FOB North as both a sovereign defence and national security concept is an integral part of building national resilience in Northern Australia and as such should not be simply planned and delivered through a defence white paper (DWP). This kind of ambitious national approach will involve Defence working with a diverse array of stakeholders and partners. It will also allow Defence to make a significant and lasting contribution to its most basic strategic interest; a secure, resilient Australia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

83. The Australian Defence Force and contested space

Author:
Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This new Strategy report looks at war on the high frontier of outer space, and what the implications such a development might have for the ADF. It highlights that space is not a sanctuary from geopolitical rivalries. The report notes that Australia is heavily dependent on the space environment, both for its national prosperity and societal well-being, and for its defence and national security, and the report examines Australia’s current approach to use of space for Defence. The report then examines emerging counterspace threats. China and Russia are moving towards deploying a suite of ‘counterspace capabilities’ to deny access to essential space systems used by the US and its allies, including Australia, prior to, or at the outset of a military conflict. These include direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that physically destroy satellites in orbit after being launched from Earth’s surface; they are testing technologies that could be applied towards a co-orbital ASAT system designed to attack satellites from space; and have a range of ‘soft-kill’ ground-based technologies to disrupt, damage, and disable – but not destroy - satellites. Author Malcolm Davis notes that, 'China is developing the ability to rapidly attack US and allied (including Australian) critical space infrastructure prior to or at the outset of a future military conflict, in what amounts to the risk of a ‘space Pearl Harbor’ that would be designed to leave the US and its allies ‘deaf, dumb and blind.’ Such an outcome would severely erode the ADF’s ability to undertake information-led joint, integrated and coalition operations.' The report highlights the risks posed by ‘soft-kill’ systems described above. These don’t generate space debris, and thus have greater operational utility and anonymity, and they raise the threat of ‘grey zones in orbit. The report also examines efforts towards legal and arms control measures to constrain space weaponization and explores how these can contribute to reduce the prospect of warfare in space. The report finally makes a number of recommendations on how Defence should respond to this challenge to maintain freedom of action in space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Space, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

84. The Marawi crisis—urban conflict and information operations

Author:
Charles Knight and Katja Theodorakis
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The seizure of Marawi in the southern Philippines by militants linked to Islamic State (IS) and the response to it by Philippine authorities provides useful insights to Australian and other policymakers, with relevance for force structure, concepts of operations and the breadth of activity required to deal effectively with the consequences of an urban seizure. One overall insight is that the increasing urbanisation of global populations, combined with proliferating information technologies, means there’s a need to be prepared both for military operations in urban environments and for a widening of what policy/decision-makers consider to be ‘the battlefield’ to include the narrative space. The siege showed the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for an urban fight: the AFP took five months to recover the city, leaving it in ruins and sustaining a notable number of casualties. This will obviously provide a set of lessons and insights to the Philippine military and authorities, but it also can allow other governments and militaries to assess their own readiness to deal with urban operations, either as assisting partners or in their own territories. This seems especially relevant to considering capability options for supporting allies facing comparable challenges, which could reduce military and civilian casualties in future operations. The insurgents’ seizure of Marawi was accompanied by a systematic IS propaganda campaign (online and offline) aimed at projecting an image of triumph and strength. The AFP engaged in active counter-messaging to undermine militants’ narratives, encompassing the online space as well as more traditional methods of messaging, such as leaflet drops, banners, and radio and loudspeaker broadcasts. In the tactical sphere, this was aimed at avoiding civilian casualties as well as stemming further recruitment by and popular support for the insurgents. In the longer term, the overarching goal was to morally denounce the militants and undercut their support bases. Considering the centrality of ideology and information operations (IOs) in the future operating environment, the Marawi crisis offers an instructive case when preparing for the challenges of an evolving threat landscape. This report therefore examines both the capability aspects of kinetic hard power and the lessons from soft-power IOs, and how they intertwine in the urban environment.
Topic:
National Security, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Philippines, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

85. Safeguarding Australia's Security Interests Through Closer Pacific Ties

Author:
Greg Colton
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Greater Australian engagement in the Pacific Islands region is needed if Canberra wants to ensure regional stability and underpin Australia’s national security. Inconsistent engagement by Australia, the United States, France and New Zealand in the Pacific Islands region has created space that non-traditional powers have exploited to engage with sovereign Pacific Island states. There is an increasing risk of geostrategic competition in the region, particularly with the growing influence of China and the economic leverage it holds over some indebted Pacific Island nations. The Australian Government should pursue a deliberate strategy of forging stronger links with its traditional partners in the region, and more equitable partnerships with its Pacific Island neighbours, if it is to underpin regional stability and strengthen Australia’s national security.
Topic:
International Relations, National Security, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, France, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

86. The Philippines' Continued Success Against Extremists

Author:
Peter Chalk
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The extremist environment in the Philippines continues to improve. The main organizations that have traditionally been at the forefront of national security concern are either exhibiting a continued readiness to engage in negotiations with the government in Manila or are variously suffering from battlefield losses, criminalization or reductions in popular support. Although there has been an increase in kidnappings by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), this is actually a sign of the group's weakness and declining capabilities. Moreover, the United States and Australia remain committed to underwriting assistance packages to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), both of which continue to make steady advances in the struggle against violent extremism.
Topic:
Government and National Security
Political Geography:
United States, Philippines, and Australia