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31. ‘Deep roots’: agriculture, national security and nation-building in northern Australia

Author:
Saba Sinai
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report offers a multidisciplinary analysis of the various components that make up and influence the vast and complex agriculture industry network in northern Australia. It examines the economic and historical underpinnings of the agriculture industry we know today; the administration, direction and implementation of agricultural policy and funding across levels of government; the many and varied demographic and cultural characteristics of the northern Australian population; and the evolution of place-based physical and digital infrastructure. The role of infrastructure and infrastructure funding in northern Australia plays a key role in the report’s narrative, which outlines the implications for national security, economic prosperity, service delivery, social cohesion and policy implementation if prevailing arrangements aren’t reformed to a sufficient standard that addresses contemporary challenges. The report also examines biosecurity vulnerabilities, mitigation strategies for those vulnerabilities and their strategic and national security implications, and the long-term positioning of the north of Australia as critical for future growth, prosperity and security. The focus on opportunities presented by the north’s unique nature throughout the report culminates in a set of recommendations for policymakers to take a unified and big-picture approach across a daunting array of issues and disciplines.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Agriculture, National Security, and Nation-building
Political Geography:
Australia

32. Northern sovereign maritime sustainment

Author:
John Coyne and Gill Savage
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This special report explores the future of maritime sustainment in northern Australia through the lens of regional maintenance centres proposed under the Department of Defence’s Plan Galileo. Included in the report is consideration of the strategic environment and implications for the north, overview of the Australian Navy maritime sustainment, Plan Galileo, and discussion of US maritime sustainment model. Maritime sustainment in Australia’s north presents far-reaching opportunities and new challenges for the Department of Defence, industry and local governments. Traditional Defence and industry models used in Australia’s southern states have less utility in the north if they aren’t adapted to the region’s unique economic context. As such, a deeper understanding of industry capability in the north coupled with greater collaboration and partnering is needed to overcome those challenges and take advantage of the opportunities. In developing the report, the authors consulted a wide range of stakeholders. They included representatives from the Department of Defence, people representing the interests of the state, territory and local governments in northern Australia, port operators in Australia’s north, business organisations and the defence industry. The report highlights opportunities that could arise from improved collaboration between Defence, local governments, defence industry and SMEs. This report has again reinforced the need for the Australia government to articulate how it will utilise northern Australia’s strategic geography as a strength both now and in a future conflict if deterrence fails. The Australian Government needs to consider how to harness interests from different fields and identify points where the government may have to intervene with policies—and investments—that shape and enhance market forces. That’s a big shift from just thinking through how it ‘might’ take advantage of market forces and existing capacity and capability as circumstances change.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Sovereignty, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Australia and Asia-Pacific

33. Agenda for change 2022: Shaping a different future for our nation

Author:
Gill Savage, Peter Jennings, John Coyne, Malcolm Davis, and Robert Glasser
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In line with previous Agenda for Change publications from 2016 and 2019, this piece is being released in anticipation of a federal election as a guide for the next government within its first months and over the full term. Our 2022 agenda acknowledges that an economically prosperous and socially cohesive Australia is a secure and resilient Australia. ASPI’s Agenda for change 2019: strategic choices for the next government did, to a great extent, imagine a number of those challenges, including in Peter Jennings’ chapter on ‘The big strategic issues’. But a lot has changed since 2019. It was hard to imagine the dislocating impacts of the Black Summer fires, Covid-19 in 2020 and then the Delta and Omicron strains in 2021, trade coercion from an increasingly hostile China, or the increasingly uncertain security environment. Fast forward to today and that also applies to the policies and programs we need to position us in a more uncertain and increasingly dangerous world. Our Agenda for change 2022 acknowledges that what might have served us well in the past won’t serve us well in this world of disruption. In response, our authors propose a smaller number of big ideas to address the big challenges of today and the future. Under the themes of getting our house in order and Australia looking outward, Agenda for change 2022 focuses on addressing the strategic issues from 2021 and beyond.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, National Security, Cybersecurity, Economy, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia

34. The costs of discounted diplomacy

Author:
James Wise
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report outlines how and why Australia has under-appreciated diplomacy and under-invested in diplomatic capability—and why things should change. The prominence of deterrence, alliances and border controls in Australian security thinking has pushed diplomacy into the shadows. Over the last twenty years, Australian governments, sensibly, have invested massively in defence, intelligence and border control. Over the same period, though, the operating budget for DFAT’s foreign policy and diplomatic work, has been cut by 9 per cent. In a more contested and multipolar international environment, lightweight diplomacy reflects lightweight thinking. Australia will be safer, richer, better regarded and more self-respecting if our diplomatic influence is enlarged, not if it remains stunted. A properly funded DFAT can improve the government's understanding of the motivations, intentions and capabilities of others, and help the government to develop policies and coalitions that enable Australia to navigate risks and exploit opportunities. The report recommends that the government prepare a comprehensive capability assessment for DFAT, followed by a financial plan to match capability needs. The report will help analysts calculate whether governments are increasing or decreasing the critical operating budget for DFAT’s policy function—an important bellwether of their commitment to the role of diplomacy in Australia’s national security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Australia

35. Taking the low road: China's influence in Australian states and territories

Author:
John Fitzgerald
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In November 2020 a Chinese official passed a list of 14 grievances to Australian journalists, highlighting what Beijing regarded as missteps in the Australian government’s relations with China. A striking feature of the list is that many concern Australian Government attempts to limit Chinese engagement with the states and territories, or state-based institutions such as universities. Why did state and territory relations with China concern Canberra? This study explores the changing nature of China’s engagement with Australian states and territories, local governments, city councils, universities, research organisations and non-government organisations, all nested in Australian civil society. What emerges is the astonishing breadth and depth of China’s engagement, much of it the welcome outcome of Australia’s economic and people-to-people engagement with China over many decades. But it’s equally apparent that China has made covert attempts to influence some politicians and overt attempts to engage states, territories and key institutions in ways that challenge federal government prerogatives and have brought the two levels of government into sharp public dispute. Here we provide a detailed analysis of how China has worked to build its political influence and build dependence through trade and economic ties with each Australian state and territory. In addition, unique cross-cutting chapters review the impact of Chinese engagement with Australian universities and show how Beijing’s ‘United front’ organisation is designed to build influence. We assess the impact on Australian businesses and the constitutional challenges presented by Chinese engagement with the states and territories. The study methods and analytical approaches adopted in this book will be a model for similar research in many parts of the world. Understanding the nature of Chinese engagement with subnational jurisdictions is an important way for national governments to shape their security policies and to resist covert and, indeed, unwanted overt interference. This book provides original insights into the scale of the challenge and distils practical policy recommendations for governments at all levels to consider and adopt.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

36. VAMPIRE VAMPIRE VAMPIRE: The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile threat to Australian and allied naval operations

Author:
Sam Goldsmith
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report examines anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) possessed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is China’s armed forces, and the serious threat posed to Australian and allied naval forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA has spent over 20 years preparing to fight and win wars against technologically advanced adversaries, such as the United States and its allies. PLA preparations have included long-term investments in various capabilities that would be needed to facilitate and sustain ASCM strike operations, even whilst under heavy attack from technologically advanced powers. This report has recommended a series of upgrades to Australian Navy capability. In the short term, military-off-the-shelf upgrades might significantly enhance the survivability of existing surface ships. In the medium term, a mix of crewed and uncrewed assets could not only deepen fleet magazines but also underpin offensive naval and air defence operations. In the longer-term, a range of options could be acquired to help break the PLA’s kill-chain – this refers to disrupting the PLA’s ability to find, track and engage naval assets with ASCMs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Navy, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Australia

37. The Hunter frigate: an assessment

Author:
David Shackleton
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Powerful and survivable large surface combatants, in numbers commensurate with the expected threat and national budgetary limitations, remain central in the order of battle of any navy of a middle-power such as Australia, but they need to be fit for purpose. Australia’s government policy has acknowledged deteriorating geostrategic circumstances since 2009, culminating in its 2020 Strategic Update where we are not left in any doubt of the concern over China’s intentions and a stretched United States. The warships Australia acquires should be suitable for the circumstances it finds itself in. Doctrine describes how the fighting will be done; policy determines which fight to prepare for. This report explores the disconnect between doctrine and policy, which has led Australia to building a warship that is unsuited for its purposes. It offers better alternatives, and suggestions to prevent being in a similar situation in the future, including using AUKUS to form a relationship with the USN to participate in its forthcoming new large destroyer program.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Navy
Political Geography:
Australia

38. AUKUS Update #1: May 2022

Author:
Marcus Hellyer and Ben Stevens
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
On the 16th of September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the UK and the US announced the creation of a new trilateral security partnership called ‘AUKUS’—Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The three national leaders stated, ‘We will foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains. And in particular, we will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.’ At a time of rapidly increasing strategic uncertainty, when it’s increasingly clear that authoritarian regimes are willing to use military power to achieve their goals, it’s important to monitor the implementation of AUKUS so that governments and the public can assess whether it’s achieving the goal of accelerating the fielding of crucial military technologies. To track the implementation of AUKUS, ASPI will publish regular updates on progress. This is the first of those updates.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

39. Understanding the price of military equipment

Author:
Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Confusion reigns in discussions about the cost of the Department of Defence’s equipment projects. Whether we’re talking about media articles, parliamentary committee hearings, letters to the editor, duelling internet commentators or any other forms of discourse that address Defence acquisitions, the only thing that’s clear is that we’re almost always talking past each other when it comes to the cost of military equipment. Defence doesn’t help when it releases only a bare minimum of information. This sorry state of affairs reached its peak several years ago, when it turned out that when Defence said that the cost of the Attack-class submarine was $50 billion it really meant that the cost was somewhere around $90 billion. The situation gets even murkier when commentators compare the cost of military acquisition projects here in Australia with ones overseas. It’s very rare that we can make a direct, apples-to-apples comparison between local and overseas projects, and very often it’s more like apples-to-orangutans. Being completely unaware of the basis of the costs they’re comparing doesn’t stop some commentators from making strong claims about the rapacity of foreign arms companies or the competence of the Australian Defence Department. This report attempts to be a guide for the perplexed. It’s not a technical manual, but a plain-English discussion that unpacks the cost of Australian defence equipment projects. While it would be useful for those working in the field of defence and strategic studies to read the whole report, it can also be used a reference tool explaining key terms such as ‘constant’ and ‘out-turned’ dollars or different cost-estimation methodologies. It’s important up front to acknowledge that the cost of modern military equipment can be eye-wateringly high, and there’s always a ‘sticker shock’ when we compare the costs of military systems with the costs of their civilian counterparts. Those costs are driven by the constant quest for better capability that provides an advantage in a life-and-death business. That striving in turn drives rates of cost escalation that greatly outstrip inflation in the broader economy. No Western country has yet found a way out of that endless cost spiral, and Australia is certainly not an exception. Anyone discussing cost has to understand what’s included in the price. It’s here that comparisons of Australian and overseas projects are difficult. Australian defence project costs include all the elements needed to get a capability into service, which are known as the fundamental inputs to capability. They comprise much more than the military equipment itself and can include facilities, training systems, documentation, intellectual property, integration of the new equipment (such as a missile) onto existing systems (such as the aircraft that will launch it), science and technology programs, and so on. Elements other than the equipment aren’t trivial and can sometimes make up half of the total acquisition cost. Australian projects also include significant risk provisions, known as contingency. In contrast, most overseas programs don’t include all of those elements, so their cost can appear significantly smaller. In this report, I provide a hypothetical example that illustrates how the cost grows as we include these factors. If we start with available off-the-shelf equipment costing $1 billion and adjust for price escalation (including inflation and capability enhancements) and factor in all fundamental inputs to capability and contingency, we quickly get to a total acquisition cost of $3.5 billion. That’s before we include operating costs. The report also briefly examines a current, real-world example by comparing the cost of Australia’s Hunter-class frigate project with analogous international projects. While we attempt to make some assessments, the exercise confirms that comparisons are difficult when we don’t have visibility of what’s included in the price tag. We also attempt to debunk the popular and deeply held view that Defence projects frequently go over budget. Based on the public evidence, the opposite is in fact the case. Once the government considers a business case and gives Defence approval to enter into contracts to acquire a particular system with a set budget, the department rarely goes over budget. However, it must be said that, before that point, Defence’s estimates of the funding needed to acquire a capability can grow significantly as its understanding of its requirements and the possible solutions develops. It’s here that the infamous ‘blowouts’ generally occur, not after actual acquisition commences. Some commentators have suggested that focusing on the cost ignores the value those systems provide—why quibble over a few billion here or there when the security of the country is at stake? I’d argue that it’s difficult to assess value for money if you don’t understand how much money you’re paying. This study aims to help Australians understand how much they’re paying. It’s only then that we can make informed decisions about military spending.
Topic:
National Security, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Australia

40. Mitigating the risk of a China–India conflict

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
More than a year has passed since Chinese troops began to occupy previously Indian-controlled territory on their disputed border in Ladakh. The crisis has cooled and settled into a stalemate. This report warns that it could escalate again, and flare into a conflict with region-wide implications. The report assesses the risk of conflict by analysing its likelihood and consequences. A possible war would be costly for both India and China. But a possible war could also risk stirring Indian distrust of its new partners, especially in the Quad – Australia, Japan, and the United States. The report outlines some conditions under which a war would disrupt or dampen those developing partnerships. The report concludes by offering a framework for policymakers to shape India’s expectations and the strategic environment before and during a possible war.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China, India, Australia, and Asia-Pacific