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1. Nobody wins unless everybody wins: The Coles review into the sustainment of Australia’s Collins-class submarines

Author:
Andrew Davies
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In 2003, Australia became the proud owner of the last of six new-build Collins-class submarines. Less than a decade later, the fleet was in a poor state of repair, and at times only one or two of the boats were available to the Royal Australian Navy. This account by Andrew Davies explains how the situation was remediated by bringing in a team of highly experienced naval professionals to take an uncompromising look at the arrangements in place to manage a vital national defence asset. Despite a public perception that the submarines were inherently defective, the problems were in fact almost entirely due to dysfunctional and often rancorous organisational dynamics between the key players. In the space of just a few years, and with remarkably little required in the way of additional funding, the situation took a dramatic turn for the better. As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, Nobody wins unless everybody wins is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips and sustains its defence force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Defense Industry, and Submarines
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

2. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence budget brief 2024-2025

Author:
Bec Shrimpton
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia needs to spend more on defence—and it needs to do so immediately. The strategic imperative has been firmly established in the government’s own major defence documents. The Albanese government and the Coalition opposition agree that we are in the gravest geopolitical period in generations and this is only going to intensify. But as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s latest Cost of Defence report finds, the rhetorical urgency is not being matched by action in the form of defence investment. The May budget is the latest demonstration of this mismatch, lacking spending for swift increases in capabilities that the Australian Defence Force would need if our region were to deteriorate quickly. In particular, this year’s budget priorities are not directed towards strengthening the Australian Defence Force’s ability to fight in the next decade. This is not doom-mongering; the government has acknowledged that the warning time before any conflict, which had long been set at 10 years, has shrunk to effectively zero time. We have war in Ukraine and the Middle East, aggression and increasingly dangerous and unprofessional behaviour from China causing instability and confrontation in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, erosions of the rule of law and revisionist agendas from authoritarians. Instability is heightened by foreign interference, economic coercion and artificial intelligence-enabled dangers such as cyber attacks and disinformation. If war were to break out at any time in the next 10 years, our military would essentially fight with the force it has today. Based on current resourcing, nothing significant will change over the decade. Most of the major new capabilities in the government’s defence investment blueprint are two decades away from being fully fielded. That blueprint does contain some shorter-term enhancements, but these will not be fielded until the 2030s. The welcome $5.7 billion in new defence spending over the four-year forward estimates period is devoted to just three priorities: the AUKUS submarines, the next fleet of surface warships and investment in long-range strike, targeting and autonomous systems. But two thirds of this funding doesn’t arrive until 2027-28. The relatively impressive longer term plan leaves us vulnerable in the immediate period ahead. More money immediately is not a silver bullet, and ambition must be balanced with how much Defence can actually spend each year. But the nation’s security requires a two-pronged strategy of enhancing our existing force to meet threats within the decade while investing in long term capabilities. Other countries are furiously pursuing new capabilities that can be put into action quickly—such as creating masses of small drones and prototyping and developing new technologies. We talk about technology and asymmetric advantage—playing to your strengths and finding effective means to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses–yet we lack a credible pathway to bring them into operation to bolster the force we have today. Over the longer term, the picture starts gradually to improve. The $50 billion in additional spending over the next decade is an important commitment, even if far away. The plan for a complete recapitalisation of the surface combatant fleet will eventually give us the biggest and most capable navy Australia has had since World War Two. But, so far, we are failing to grasp the opportunity to link our traditional large platforms such as submarines and warships to more modern developments in warfare—drones and various small uncrewed and smart capabilities. AI, robotics, electronic warfare and space capabilities remain aspirational, without any pathway for inclusion and integration into a truly focused force capable of meaningful deterrence and warfighting. That is why it is so important to realise AUKUS Pillar II, which is dealing with these capabilities. It’s easy to criticise; harder to do. All governments are grappling with tight budgets amid competing demands and the unremitting expectations of voters and taxpayers. As a nation, we need to accept the need for higher defence spending. Hoping that conflict won’t come is not a viable strategy. If we are prepared for war, we have a better chance of deterring and hence averting it. Europe is living that lesson now, having put all hope in the judgment that global trade and economic entanglement would bring security. Now it is clear that military investment is imperative to deter war or best prepare nations for it. The government has a vital responsibility to speak plainly to the nation about the geopolitical risks and the possibility of conflict. We need to grasp the challenge that is in front of us today, not in three or five years’ time. Otherwise, we risk delivering on Macarthur’s famous two word warning: “The history of failure in war can almost always be summed up in two words: “Too late.” Too late in comprehending the deadly enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness. Too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance.” Why take the risk of only acting after a crisis and saying better late than never? The world in turmoil demands we act in real time to both deter crises and be best prepared for them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Budget, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

3. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9

Author:
John Coyne and Henry Campbell
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include; 1. Defence in the North, 2. Developing Northern Australia, 3. Northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific 4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities, 5. Space, Food Security and Climate Trends As in previous editions, Volume 9 contains a range of expert opinions across these varied topics. Volume 9 also features a foreword by the Hon. Eva Lawler, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Lawler calls readers attention to the relevance of northern Australia in light of the National Defence Strategy and updated Integrated Investment Program as well as Australia’s economic ambitions, stating “the strategies in this volume can inform our efforts to unlock northern Australia’s full potential and build a stronger, more resilient nation.” The 36 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers facilitating development, prosperity and security of northern Australia. These policy solutions tackle both the challenges and opportunities present in the north, and reflect the potential of the north to increasingly contribute to Australia’s national security and economic prosperity.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Climate Change, National Security, Food Security, Space, Defense Industry, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific

4. Deciding the future: the Australian Army and the infantry fighting vehicle

Author:
Albert Palazzo
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The aim of this report is to inform government decision-makers and the public on the ability of Project LAND 400 Phase 3—the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) acquisition—to meet the needs of Australia. I examine a number of factors that provide context for the government’s upcoming decision, whenever that may take place. Those include how IFVs fit into the Australian strategic environment, the ease with which the ADF can deploy them, their vulnerability to threats, and the ongoing utility of armour in the light of lessons unfolding from the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian War. To set the information into a useful context, this report explains the nature of contemporary land warfare and speculates how the Australian Army is likely to fight in a future conflict. To further assist those making the IFV decision, this report offers a number of scenarios that outline potential operations that the government may direct the ADF to undertake. It also identifies current gaps in ADF capability that will need remediation if the IFV is to achieve its potential, as well as the other opportunities that might not be taken up because of the focus on this investment. The report’s analysis results in some key questions for decision-makers to consider as they decide on the infantry fighting vehicle acquisition: Does the government believe that its IFV investment will deliver an appropriate balance of protection, lethality and mobility (both tactical and operational)? Does the government agree with the requirement for an infantry vehicle with STANAG 4569 Level 6 force protection and equipped with an active protection system? Is the government confident that the number of the IFVs obtained will generate a deployable and sustainable force that represents a sufficient return on the investment? Does the government accept that the IFV options under consideration will enable the ADF to offset existing gaps in capability and allow it to conduct operations in a contested maritime environment, including sea and airlift, long-range fires and logistics? Is the government confident that the Army’s combined arms system is deployable in contested environments, particularly in a maritime scenario? Does the government believe that the IFV will provide utility in the range of contingencies that the government envisages the ADF will need to meet? Does the government agree that the IFV will contribute to the requirement that the ADF be able to shape, deter and respond to threats as mandated in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU)?
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, United Nations, Economy, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Australia, and United States of America

5. Agenda for change 2022: Shaping a different future for our nation

Author:
Gill Savage, Peter Jennings, John Coyne, Malcolm Davis, and Robert Glasser
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In line with previous Agenda for Change publications from 2016 and 2019, this piece is being released in anticipation of a federal election as a guide for the next government within its first months and over the full term. Our 2022 agenda acknowledges that an economically prosperous and socially cohesive Australia is a secure and resilient Australia. ASPI’s Agenda for change 2019: strategic choices for the next government did, to a great extent, imagine a number of those challenges, including in Peter Jennings’ chapter on ‘The big strategic issues’. But a lot has changed since 2019. It was hard to imagine the dislocating impacts of the Black Summer fires, Covid-19 in 2020 and then the Delta and Omicron strains in 2021, trade coercion from an increasingly hostile China, or the increasingly uncertain security environment. Fast forward to today and that also applies to the policies and programs we need to position us in a more uncertain and increasingly dangerous world. Our Agenda for change 2022 acknowledges that what might have served us well in the past won’t serve us well in this world of disruption. In response, our authors propose a smaller number of big ideas to address the big challenges of today and the future. Under the themes of getting our house in order and Australia looking outward, Agenda for change 2022 focuses on addressing the strategic issues from 2021 and beyond.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, National Security, Cybersecurity, Economy, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia

6. Cracking the missile matrix

Author:
Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Last year’s war between Azerbaijan and Armenia was short, sharp and decisive. By effectively employing precision guided weapons, the former rapidly forced the latter to capitulate and accede to its political demands. The conflict confirmed the centrality of guided weapons to modern war fighting and showed how small states can now master the technologies and techniques needed to use them. Last year also witnessed the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and the supply-chain crisis it triggered. That provoked much soul-searching from governments and companies about how to manage the risks presented by modern just-in-time supply chains that span the globe. When we take those two events together, it’s clear that the ADF will not only need many kinds of guided weapons across the spectrum of conflict, but also need to guarantee their availability in times of crisis when supply chains will be under pressure and threat. That will be difficult, since Australia currently manufactures virtually no guided weapons. The Australian Government is also aware of both needs. Its 2020 Defence Strategic Update plans on investing tens of billions of dollars in guided weapons over the next two decades. It also directs Defence to explore the potential for new sovereign guided weapons production capability to mitigate supply risks. It appears that exploration has determined that the potential can be turned into reality: on 31 March, the government announced that it was ‘accelerating’ the development of a sovereign guided weapon manufacturing capability. This report examines two fundamental questions. First, would the manufacture of guided weapons in Australia enhance ADF capability and provide greater self-reliance? Second, is it viable to manufacture guided weapons in Australia? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. The report also presents some key considerations about how the industry should be established.
Topic:
Security, Government, Weapons, Investment, Defense Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Australia

7. The Bushmaster: From concept to combat

Author:
Brendan Nicholson
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This account of the Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle by Brendan Nicholson is the classic story of the ugly duckling—an ‘armoured Winnebago’—transformed swan-like into the vital lifesaver for Australian and Dutch troops on combat operations in Afghanistan. It was never designed to play that role. Based on South African and Rhodesian experiments with landmine-blast-deflecting V-shaped hulls, the Bushmaster was first conceived as a lightly armoured truck. In 1980s ‘Defence of Australia’ planning, the Bushmaster would move troops around the vastness of northern Australia pursuing ‘thugs in thongs’ bent on harassing locals. As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, The Bushmaster: From concept to combat is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips its defence force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

8. Sticking to our guns: A troubled past produces a superb weapon

Author:
Chis Masters
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Chris Masters delivers a cracking read about the ‘funny plastic weapon’ that replaced the Vietnam-era L1A1 assault rifle in the 1980s, the successors to which remain the ADF’s primary personal weapon. And what a history it is. Chris skilfully weaves the political, design, industrial, economic and battlefield factors that have driven decision-making about the weapon earlier known as the Steyr AUG, F88 and Austeyr and now known as the EF88. As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, Sticking to our guns is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips the ADF. Chris Masters is one of Australia’s best-known and most influential investigative journalists. He holds the record as the longest serving reporter on the country’s longest running current affairs program, Four Corners. Over 25 years he made a series of nation-shaping reports, among them ‘The Moonlight State’, which helped trigger Queensland’s Fitzgerald inquiry into police corruption. Chris has received multiple awards for his work, including the premier Gold Walkley for his international exposé of the sinking of the Greenpeace boat Rainbow Warrior. He is the author of five best-selling books, including Uncommon soldier: the story of the making of today’s diggers (2013) and No front line: Australian special forces at war in Afghanistan (2017).
Topic:
National Security, Armed Forces, Weapons, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

9. Embracing Indigenous culture in military organizations: the experience of Māori in the New Zealand military

Author:
Grazia Scoppio
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This article builds on a 2007 research on Indigenous peoples in the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) which identified best practices from New Zealand that Canada could draw upon to enhance participation of Indigenous peoples within the Canadian Armed Forces. Using organizational culture theory as a conceptual framework, this article further investigates the main approaches and practices that have enabled a positive partnership with Māori and the successful inclusion of Māori culture in the NZDF. Specifically, the paper investigates the mechanisms used by the NZDF and the internal and external environments of the organization supporting the participation of Indigenous groups in the New Zealand military. The discussion explores ways in which Indigenous practices and customs can be incorporated into other military systems and protocols. The paper concludes that, among military organizations, the NZDF is a leader in transforming the organizational culture by enabling the organization to embrace Indigenous culture and empowering Indigenous members within their ranks.
Topic:
Culture, Military Affairs, Indigenous, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Canada, Australia, North America, and New Zealand

10. Subnational Experiences in the Defense Industry Promotion Policies: The Case of Rio Grande Do Sul

Author:
Christiano Cruz Ambrosias
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
This article has as its main objective to present initiatives of the Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul for the promotion of the defense industry of Rio Grande do Sul in recent years. Subnational entities have an important role to play in strengthening the national defense industry and, through the formulation and implementation of well-defined public policies, are able to act as facilitators and catalysts for national initiatives at the local level. This article seeks to bring examples that demonstrate the various public policies that can be implemented by subnational entities in developed countries (Australia, Canada and France) and developing countries (South Africa, India and Mexico), comparing them with what has been done in the Brazilian case.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nationalism, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Canada, India, France, South Africa, Australia, and Mexico