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Begin New Search Political Geography Australia Publication Year within 5 Years

221. Critical technologies and the Indo-Pacific: A new India-Australia partnership

Author:
Aakriti Bachhawat, Danielle Cave, Jocelinn Kang, Rajeswari Pillai, and Trisha Ray
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre and India’s Observer Research Foundation argues that as the India-Australia bilateral relationship continues to grow and evolve, both governments should invest in the construction of a new India–Australia partnership on technology. The foundation for such a partnership already exists, and further investment areas of complementary interests could stimulate regional momentum in a range of key critical and emerging technology areas including in 5G, Artificial Intelligence, quantum technologies, space technologies and in critical minerals. The report contains 14 policy recommendations that will help build this new technology partnership. This new report outlines what this new India-Australia technology partnership could look like. It examines the current state of the India–Australia relationship; provides an overview of current technology cooperation and where challenges and roadblocks lie; analyses each state’s competitive and complementary advantages in selected technology areas and highlights opportunities for further collaboration across the areas of 5G, Artificial Intelligence, Quantum technologies, Space technologies and in critical minerals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
India and Australia

222. Covid-19 Disinformation & Social Media Manipulation

Author:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Arange of actors are manipulating the information environment to exploit the COVID-19 crisis for strategic gain. ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre is tracking many of these state and non-state actors online, and will occasionally publish investigative, data-driven reporting that will focus on the use of disinformation, propaganda, extremist narratives and conspiracy theories by these actors. The bulk of ASPI’s data analysis uses our in-house Influence Tracker tool - a machine learning and data analytics capability that draws out insights from multi-language social media datasets. This new tool can ingest data in multiple languages and auto-translate, producing insights on topics, sentiment, shared content, influential accounts, metrics of impact and posting patterns.
Topic:
Social Media, Coronavirus, Pandemic, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

223. Cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums

Author:
Sarah O'Connor, Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, state actors have taken advantage of the digitisation of election systems, election administration and election campaigns to interfere in foreign elections and referendums. Their activity can be divided into two attack vectors. First, they’ve used various cyber operations, such as denial of service (DoS) attacks and phishing attacks, to disrupt voting infrastructure and target electronic and online voting, including vote tabulation. Second, they’ve used online information operations to exploit the digital presence of election campaigns, politicians, journalists and voters. Together, these two attack vectors (referred to collectively as ‘cyber-enabled foreign interference’ in this report because both are mediated through cyberspace) have been used to seek to influence voters and their turnout at elections, manipulate the information environment and diminish public trust in democratic processes. This research identified 41 elections and seven referendums between January 2010 and October 2020 where cyber-enabled foreign interference was reported, and it finds that there’s been a significant uptick in such activity since 2017. This data collection shows that Russia is the most prolific state actor engaging in online interference, followed by China, whose cyber-enabled foreign interference activity has increased significantly over the past two years. As well as these two dominant actors, Iran and North Korea have also tried to influence foreign elections in 2019 and 2020. All four states have sought to interfere in the 2020 US presidential elections using differing cyber-enabled foreign interference tactics. In many cases, these four actors use a combination of cyber operations and online information operations to reinforce their activities. There’s also often a clear geopolitical link between the interfering state and its target: these actors are targeting states they see as adversaries or useful to their geopolitical interests. Democratic societies are yet to develop clear thresholds for responding to cyber-enabled interference, particularly when it’s combined with other levers of state power or layered with a veil of plausible deniability. Even when they’re able to detect it, often with the help of social media platforms, research institutes and the media, most states are failing to effectively deter such activity. The principles inherent in democratic societies—openness, freedom of speech and the free flow of ideas—have made them particularly vulnerable to online interference.
Topic:
Elections, Referendum, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Global Focus

224. Submarines: Your questions answered

Author:
Peter Jennings and Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Prime Minister John Howard famously coined the term ‘barbeque stopper’ to refer to a political controversy so hot that it was likely to make backyard diners stop mid-shrimp-sizzle to debate the big issue of the day. If ever the specialist world of defence procurement has produced a national barbeque stopper, it would be over the question of Australia’s future submarine. Why are they so expensive? Why do we need 12 of them? Why build them here? Why not nuclear propulsion? Why a French design? Why not an American, German, Japanese or Swedish design? Aren’t submarines obsolete, to be replaced by drones? Won’t technology make the oceans transparent? There are many questions and few, if any, easily accessible, plain-English explanations. This ASPI study attempts to answer the many questions that Australians pose when it comes to the design, acquisition, cost, operational service and strategic implications of submarines. Our writing team includes a vice admiral and former Chief of Navy, two rear admirals—one a distinguished submariner who has served with the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy; the other, one of Australia’s leading naval historians. Other contributors include people steeped in strategy and capability development and with deep industry experience of defence production.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Submarines
Political Geography:
Australia

225. ‘Thinking big!’: Resetting Northern Australia’s national security posture

Author:
John Coyne
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report highlights the vast economic opportunities in northern Australia and how they can contribute to our national security. The author makes the case that, while defence spending is vital to northern economies and nation building, it’s focused more on the Defence organisation’s more narrowly conceived portfolio capital investments in defence establishments and facilities rather than on much-needed broader national security and economic decisions. Instead, there’s a need for the federal government and the Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australian governments to take a more holistic perspective on northern Australia’s critical economic and national security role. The cities of Townsville, Cairns, Darwin and Katherine are vital to our defence, but also to our financial and national security. They’re most definitely more than home bases for the ADF.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, Government, and National Security
Political Geography:
Australia and Asia-Pacific

226. ASPI/KAS The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on extremism dynamics: Towards national resilience

Author:
Katja Theodorakis and Leanne Close
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s (KAS) Regional Programme Australia and the Pacific held their annual Australia–Europe Counter Terrorism Dialogue in virtual form this year. This publication provides an overview of the issues discussed at the 5th Dialogue in Europe in 2019, and the two events held in Australia and virtually with European experts, in August and September. The annual ASPI–KAS Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, now in its sixth iteration, seeks to foster knowledge exchange on continuing and emerging forms of terrorism and violent extremism across the ideological spectrum, exploring how to proactively deal with an ever-evolving threat landscape. Keynote speakers were live-streamed from Europe joining a selected group of Australian experts and representatives of the European diplomatic corps. A tried and proven format, it brings together policymakers, representatives from relevant government institutions, academic experts and practitioners from Australia, Germany and other European countries for frank discussions. Security in our countries relies on peace, civility and collaboration within and beyond our own borders. The propagation of hate speech and disinformation is being creatively used by terrorists and conspiracy theorists, as is the current global pandemic. This report focuses on the theme of the 2020 dialogues - building national resilience, including consideration of the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the dynamics of violent extremism and terrorism.
Topic:
National Security, Counter-terrorism, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

227. Social Distancing: Australia’s Relations with China

Author:
Felix Chang
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Affronts to Australia by China’s top diplomat in Canberra and the Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times newspaper reached new heights in April 2020. What prompted their verbal barbs was the Australian government’s backing for an independent review into the origins and spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). While Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison may have regarded such a review as a way to avert future pandemics, Beijing saw it as support for finger-pointing at China. Whichever is the case, the affronts shone a light on how Beijing has come to view Australia and what it and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region might expect from China in the future. Still, China’s diplomatic and editorial barbs were surprising. China has long worked to move Australia closer into its orbit and away from that of the United States. And, by and large, those efforts had been paying off. Over the last decade, several Australian foreign policy analysts had come to believe that greater accommodation of China would be needed to ensure Australia’s future prosperity. Indeed, Canberra has already shown more sensitivity on issues, like Taiwan, which Beijing deemed strategic. But rather than being content with Australia’s gradual shift, China has undertaken actions that could undermine it, from cyber-espionage to political influence-buying in Australia. China’s most recent affronts are likely to deepen Australian concerns over what Chinese power means for the region.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

228. The Impact of COVID-19 on Vulnerable Mineral Supply Chains

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report will concentrate on select examples of the growing US vulnerability to global competitors due to shortages of key mineral resources in our domestic supply base. Dependence on China for raw materials and competition with its manufacturing firms is also a key focus. Shortages do not always indicate a problem because our close allies in mineral-rich countries like Australia and Canada can mitigate gaps in domestic supply. However, China’s growing control over many basic materials, and its history of using that control as leverage for its own economic and political goals, makes this a cause of concern for the continued strength of the US manufacturing economy.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, COVID-19, and Minerals
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Australia, North America, and United States of America

229. A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key US Allies and Security Partners—Second Edition

Author:
Gary J. Schmitt
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
With the United States facing two major revisionist powers, Russia and China, as well as additional security threats from North Korea, Iran, and jihadist terrorism, a critical advantage for the United States is its global network of alliances and strategic partners. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy states, “Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.” The advantage of having military allies and partners is enhanced by the core capacity of the American military having remained largely the same over the past decade, though the global security environment grew more complex and difficult during that time. In short, the United States needs allies and security partners. But the United States needs allies and partners that can pull their weight militarily if the country is going to be able to maintain a favorable balance of power in critical regions of the world. The second edition of A Hard Look at Hard Power provides an in-depth examination of the overall strategic perspective, defense plans, budgets, and capabilities of seven key European and Asian allies, three frontline strategic partners, and NATO.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Terrorism, Budget, Global Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, France, Poland, Germany, Australia, Sweden, and United States of America

230. Australia-China clashes in the COVID-19 era: Adjusting to a “new normal” in bilateral relations?

Author:
Thomas S. Wilkins
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The spread of the novel Corona Virus COVID-19 from the Chinese province of Hebei across the world has resulted in a global pandemic of catastrophic proportions. Certain countries have been affected more severely than others, and there have been glaring disparities in how national governments have responded to the outbreak. In addition to the global death toll of 400,000 (and counting), the industrial and financial disruption has been severe, with the Asian Development Bank estimating the loss to the global economy at between USD$ 5.8-8.8 trillion.1 To overcome the current crisis, and work toward a vaccine, global solidarity, including cooperation through multilateral organizations like the World Heath Organization (WHO), is desperately needed.
Topic:
Health, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific