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1. A feminist analysis of Australia’s International Gender Equality Strategy

Author:
Australian Feminist Foreign Policy Coalition (AFFPC)
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:
AFFPC’s submission on the International Gender Equality Strategy centred around a call for Australia to take an explicitly feminist approach and made a series of recommendations for how such an approach could be brought to life through practical steps. In this Issues Paper, we have evaluated the extent to which the strategy has responded to our recommendations. Despite appearing to fail at the first hurdle—the strategy does not take an explicitly feminist approach nor even use the word feminist—there remains some promising signals. Of the 21 recommendations made by the AFFPC in our submission on how the strategy could take a feminist approach in practice, two have been mostly integrated, 8 integrated in part, and 11 not integrated in a meaningful way or at all. The most glaring gap is the lack of an explicit acknowledgement that gender equality requires equality and rights for gender diverse, trans, nonbinary and intersex people, with the strategy instead walking back from its 2016 recognition of the same and using the language “gender equality means equality for all people.” This is backed up by a default to binary language of “women and girls” or “men and boys” whenever specific gender identities are named, although there is a text box recognising LGBTQIA+ rights as a priority.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Feminism, LGBT+, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

2. Geopolitics in the Pacific Islands: Playing for advantage

Author:
Meg Keen and Alan Tidwell
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Pacific Islands Countries are leveraging geopolitical rivalries to maximise their development options. But unmanaged competition for influence among key development partners can compromise good governance and privilege geopolitical posturing over local priorities. Australia, the United States, and other traditional donors can capitalise on areas of strength, such as social inclusion and regional and multilateral initiatives. Joint efforts along these lines and the pooling of resources would scale up impact and set higher accountability standards. Despite the risk that higher standards will open gaps for non-traditional donors with less burdensome criteria, there is much long-term value in traditional development partners collaborating in a “race to the top” in meeting the region’s needs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Regional Cooperation, Foreign Aid, Geopolitics, and Donors
Political Geography:
China, Australia, Australia/Pacific, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

3. Deterring at a distance: The strategic logic of AUKUS

Author:
Luke Gosling
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
As China’s massive military build-up drives rising regional security anxieties, Australia is contributing to a more favourable balance of power through AUKUS. This technology-sharing agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States will see eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) in Australian service by the 2050s. SSNs are overwhelmingly in Australia’s interest because they strengthen the country’s ability to deter war by threatening painful consequences for aggression against Australia, its partners, and its interests. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review explicitly tasks the Australian Defence Force with a deterrence role against a significant military power — a relatively new mission. SSNs are optimal deterrence machines, able to accomplish the essential tasks laid out in the Review.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Deterrence, AUKUS, Regional Security, and Nuclear-Powered Submarines (SSNs)
Political Geography:
Australia/Pacific

4. Papua New Guinea’s fiscal decentralisation: A way forward

Author:
Maholopa Laveil
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Fiscal decentralisation in Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been a contentious topic for much of the country’s history. PNG has had several attempts at decentralising fiscal responsibilities, without much success in improving governance or service delivery. This is concerning, given sub-national funding has increased in the past decade. Governance has deteriorated over time as more responsibilities and funds are channelled to lower levels of government, including through unaccountable transfers to members of parliament (MPs) to use at their discretion. Government effectiveness and service delivery have suffered as a result, leading to poor development outcomes. This paper examines the weaknesses in the decentralisation process and how these mechanisms can be strengthened. Data collected from PNG government budget reports is analysed both for insights into the decentralisation of finances to provinces since 2007 and implications for service delivery and accountable governance. Where data are publicly available, the paper compares sub-national revenues and operational and capital spending across provinces, provides contrasts to global experiences, and relates the insights gained from field interviews of province and district administration staff in two provinces: East New Britain and New Ireland. The paper concludes with reflections on policy implications.
Topic:
Governance, Budget, Fiscal Policy, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Australia/Pacific and Papua New Guinea

5. Australia’s 2024 Independent Intelligence Review: opportunities and challenges: Views from The Strategist

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia has a recent history of intelligence community reform via independent intelligence reviews (IIRs) commissioned by government on a regular basis since 2004. The latest IIR is being undertaken by Dr Heather Smith and Mr Richard Maude. In the lead-up to the announcement of the 2024 IIR, and afterwards, ASPI’s The Strategist has served as a valuable forum for canvassing publicly the most significant issues and challenges to be addressed by the reviewers. This report draws together a selection of articles featured in The Strategist over the past year, with direct relevance to the review and its terms of reference. The articles cover topics from the broad to the specific but include: the review itself, including its scope and purpose the key capability challenge facing Australian intelligence—its future workforce the ‘how’ of intelligence now and into the future; more particularly, new tools such as intelligence diplomacy and offensive cyber operations the purposes for intelligence – from addressing global, existential risks to informing effective net assessment of Australia’s strategic circumstances. In the lead-up to the expected public release of the IIR’s findings later this year, this compilation provides valuable background to the review and to the fundamental challenges and opportunities facing Australian intelligence in the decade ahead.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and National Security
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

6. AUKUS Pillar 2 critical pathways: a road map to enabling international collaboration

Author:
George Henneke and Roland Stephens
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The AUKUS trilateral partnership presents Australia with an unprecedented opportunity to achieve national-security goals that have eluded it for decades. It could offer access to cutting-edge technologies. It can further integrate Australian, US and UK military forces, allowing more unified action to maintain deterrence against national and transnational actors who threaten the global rules-based order. Perhaps most importantly, AUKUS—in particular its Pillar.2 objectives—is an opportunity for Australia to pursue the long-sought industrial capacity necessary to defend its borders and its interests across a range of probable conflict scenarios.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Partnerships, Emerging Technology, Collaboration, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

7. Deterrence, escalation and strategic stability: rebuilding Australia’s muscle memory

Author:
Bec Shrimpton
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
To build an effective deterrence strategy, Australia needs urgently to improve its skills and understanding of deterrence, and raise the topic’s profile in our public and policy discussions. Despite having previously been a global thought leader on nuclear weapons and deterrence half a century ago, Australia today doesn’t have a strong grasp of the basics of modern deterrence. Knowledge of and literacy in deterrence are vital for adapting and applying such concepts to meet today’s extraordinarily complex, multidomain and multidimensional requirements. A lack of understanding of deterrence can critically undermine the ability to get strategy and policy right. The implications for Australia’s national interests are urgent and serious. The limited debate in Australia about what good deterrence strategy looks like and its key components can’t be advanced without better understanding of key terms and ideas that are fundamental to deterrence theory and practice. There are, of course, obvious limits to what Australia can achieve alone. Our ability to integrate and combine our military capabilities with those of the US and other critical partners is fundamental to our ability to achieve our security objectives, but some of our partners are working more closely together on building deterrence strategies. We have some catching up to do. This report explains what deterrence is and why it matters. It looks at Australian deterrence policy in practice and at deterrence efforts by some of our partners and allies and it highlights a number of gaps in Australia’s strategic and deterrence planning. The report makes a series of policy recommendations for government, and especially for the Department of Defence, to rebuild Australia’s position as a thought leader on deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, Strategic Stability, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

8. Nobody wins unless everybody wins: The Coles review into the sustainment of Australia’s Collins-class submarines

Author:
Andrew Davies
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In 2003, Australia became the proud owner of the last of six new-build Collins-class submarines. Less than a decade later, the fleet was in a poor state of repair, and at times only one or two of the boats were available to the Royal Australian Navy. This account by Andrew Davies explains how the situation was remediated by bringing in a team of highly experienced naval professionals to take an uncompromising look at the arrangements in place to manage a vital national defence asset. Despite a public perception that the submarines were inherently defective, the problems were in fact almost entirely due to dysfunctional and often rancorous organisational dynamics between the key players. In the space of just a few years, and with remarkably little required in the way of additional funding, the situation took a dramatic turn for the better. As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, Nobody wins unless everybody wins is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips and sustains its defence force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Defense Industry, and Submarines
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

9. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence budget brief 2024-2025

Author:
Bec Shrimpton
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia needs to spend more on defence—and it needs to do so immediately. The strategic imperative has been firmly established in the government’s own major defence documents. The Albanese government and the Coalition opposition agree that we are in the gravest geopolitical period in generations and this is only going to intensify. But as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s latest Cost of Defence report finds, the rhetorical urgency is not being matched by action in the form of defence investment. The May budget is the latest demonstration of this mismatch, lacking spending for swift increases in capabilities that the Australian Defence Force would need if our region were to deteriorate quickly. In particular, this year’s budget priorities are not directed towards strengthening the Australian Defence Force’s ability to fight in the next decade. This is not doom-mongering; the government has acknowledged that the warning time before any conflict, which had long been set at 10 years, has shrunk to effectively zero time. We have war in Ukraine and the Middle East, aggression and increasingly dangerous and unprofessional behaviour from China causing instability and confrontation in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, erosions of the rule of law and revisionist agendas from authoritarians. Instability is heightened by foreign interference, economic coercion and artificial intelligence-enabled dangers such as cyber attacks and disinformation. If war were to break out at any time in the next 10 years, our military would essentially fight with the force it has today. Based on current resourcing, nothing significant will change over the decade. Most of the major new capabilities in the government’s defence investment blueprint are two decades away from being fully fielded. That blueprint does contain some shorter-term enhancements, but these will not be fielded until the 2030s. The welcome $5.7 billion in new defence spending over the four-year forward estimates period is devoted to just three priorities: the AUKUS submarines, the next fleet of surface warships and investment in long-range strike, targeting and autonomous systems. But two thirds of this funding doesn’t arrive until 2027-28. The relatively impressive longer term plan leaves us vulnerable in the immediate period ahead. More money immediately is not a silver bullet, and ambition must be balanced with how much Defence can actually spend each year. But the nation’s security requires a two-pronged strategy of enhancing our existing force to meet threats within the decade while investing in long term capabilities. Other countries are furiously pursuing new capabilities that can be put into action quickly—such as creating masses of small drones and prototyping and developing new technologies. We talk about technology and asymmetric advantage—playing to your strengths and finding effective means to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses–yet we lack a credible pathway to bring them into operation to bolster the force we have today. Over the longer term, the picture starts gradually to improve. The $50 billion in additional spending over the next decade is an important commitment, even if far away. The plan for a complete recapitalisation of the surface combatant fleet will eventually give us the biggest and most capable navy Australia has had since World War Two. But, so far, we are failing to grasp the opportunity to link our traditional large platforms such as submarines and warships to more modern developments in warfare—drones and various small uncrewed and smart capabilities. AI, robotics, electronic warfare and space capabilities remain aspirational, without any pathway for inclusion and integration into a truly focused force capable of meaningful deterrence and warfighting. That is why it is so important to realise AUKUS Pillar II, which is dealing with these capabilities. It’s easy to criticise; harder to do. All governments are grappling with tight budgets amid competing demands and the unremitting expectations of voters and taxpayers. As a nation, we need to accept the need for higher defence spending. Hoping that conflict won’t come is not a viable strategy. If we are prepared for war, we have a better chance of deterring and hence averting it. Europe is living that lesson now, having put all hope in the judgment that global trade and economic entanglement would bring security. Now it is clear that military investment is imperative to deter war or best prepare nations for it. The government has a vital responsibility to speak plainly to the nation about the geopolitical risks and the possibility of conflict. We need to grasp the challenge that is in front of us today, not in three or five years’ time. Otherwise, we risk delivering on Macarthur’s famous two word warning: “The history of failure in war can almost always be summed up in two words: “Too late.” Too late in comprehending the deadly enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness. Too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance.” Why take the risk of only acting after a crisis and saying better late than never? The world in turmoil demands we act in real time to both deter crises and be best prepared for them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Budget, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

10. The ‘official’ histories of Australian and British intelligence: lessons learned and next steps

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Unclassified, official histories of ‘secret’ intelligence organisations, for public readership, seem a contradiction in terms. These ‘official’ works are commissioned by the agencies in question and directly informed by those agencies’ own records, thus distinguishing them from other, outsider historical accounts. But while such official intelligence histories are relatively new, sometimes controversial, and often challenging for historians and agencies alike, the experiences of the Australian and British intelligence communities suggest they’re a promising development for scholarship, maintaining public trust and informed public discourse, and more effective functioning of national security agencies. Furthermore, these histories remain an ongoing project for Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and National Security
Political Geography:
Britain, Australia, and Australia/Pacific