Number of results to display per page
Search Results
12. Sino-Russia Arctic Relations: The View from Singapore
- Author:
- Hema Nadarajah
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Dr. Hema Nadarajah, Program Manager for Southeast Asia at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, explains that states seeking to deepen their engagement in the Arctic, such as Singapore, may find themselves trying to balance tensions, especially in the wake of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region and US-China strategic competition.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and Arctic
13. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation
- Author:
- James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
14. Competing Values Will Shape US-China AI Race
- Author:
- Valerie Shen and Jim Kessler
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- President Biden’s AI executive order reflects a set of values recognizable to all Americans: Privacy, equal treatment and civil rights; free speech and expression; the rule of law; opportunity and free market capitalism; pluralism; and advancement of global leadership as the beacon of a free world. President Xi Jinping’s government has also issued AI regulations with values recognizable to China: Collectivism and obedience to authority; social harmony and homogeneity; market authoritarianism and rule of state; and digital world hegemony to restore China’s rightful place as the Middle Kingdom. The United States and China may share similar broad goals for “winning” AI along the lines of leading innovation and advancement, spurring broad-based economic growth and prosperity, achieving domestic social stability, and becoming the clear global influencer for the rest of the world—but they define those goals and seek to achieve those ends through very different values. Those values embedded in our respective AI policies and underlying technology carry high-stakes, long-term national and economic security implications as US and Chinese companies compete directly to become dominant in emerging global markets. They also share similar fears that reflect each country’s values. China worries that AI could cause social unrest if information to a sheltered population is too real and unfiltered. America fears that AI could cause social unrest if information Americans receive is too fake. And that massive disinformation and algorithms that rile the population could threaten our democratic system. Why do these value differences matter when it comes to the AI race? Below, we outline six contrasting values that we believe will be the most determinative in how the US-China AI competition plays out. We argue that understanding our different values-based approaches illuminates our respective advantages and disadvantages in this competition. It assesses who is currently set up to “win” across key metrics and determines how to lean into our democratic advantages or mitigate some practical disadvantages compared with the PRC, this will ultimately win the AI marathon.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
15. China, the West, and the Rest: Who is Enjoying the Shadow of Whom?
- Author:
- Jasper Roctus and Bart Dessein
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- On Tuesday, July 25, 2023, Beijing announced that seasoned diplomat Wang Yi would return to his function as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a post he had held for ten years (2013–2022). With this, he replaced his predecessor Qin Gang, a so-called ‘wolf warrior’ diplomat who was in office for only a few months. When former premier Li Keqiang (2013–2023) died of a heart attack on October 27, 2023, crowds of ordinary citizens laid chrysanthemum bouquets across the country, mourning for the more open and optimistic times that had characterized the era under Li’s patron, State President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Hu Jintao (r. 2002–2012). Minister of Defense Li Shangfu was, after an equally short stint in office, replaced by former People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral Dong Jun on December 29, 2023. In the case of Li Shangfu, who was sanctioned by the United States (US) over arms sales to Russia, his resignation was combined with a purge and crackdown on corruption within the rocket force of the PLA. Given the focus on the PLAN in Xi Jinping’s military reforms of the mid-2010s, this could be interpreted as an advantage point for the faction of China’s leader. This signal stands in contrast to the promotion of Hu Haifeng, the son of Hu Jintao, to vice minister of Civil Affairs on January 16, 2024. Keeping the much-speculated removal of Hu’s father during the 20th National Congress of the CCP of October 22, 2022 into mind, one might ask: Who enjoys whose sunlight to step out of the shadows?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
16. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition
- Author:
- Maximilian Hess
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia
17. Material world: How Europe can compete with China in the race for Africa’s critical minerals
- Author:
- Sarah Logan
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- In the last two decades, China has come to dominate global supply chains for critical raw materials and the green energy and other technologies they enable. This increases competition and economic risks for Europe. In an effort to build CRM supply chains insulated from China, the EU has signed strategic partnerships with several politically friendly countries around the world, including in Africa. However, the EU will only realise its de-risking ambitions if the European private sector invests in CRM supply chains in partner countries in Africa and elsewhere. Yet the incentives for European companies to enter mining and processing operations in these markets are too weak. The example of Namibia shows that the EU’s strategic partnership with the country has borne little fruit – and may even be benefitting Chinese firms at European expense. To address this, the EU must enhance support to European companies to invest in securing access to critical raw materials. This should include new financial incentives and measures to protect against China manipulating prices on international markets.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, Strategic Partnerships, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, Europe, Asia, and Namibia
18. Kubernetes: A Dilemma in the Geopolitical Tech Race
- Author:
- Sunny Cheung
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- US-sanctioned Huawei has significant influence in the Cloud Native Computing Foundation and its open-source platform Kubernetes, which underpins US military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets and nuclear infrastructure. The use of open-source technologies in critical systems raises concerns. Despite US efforts to mitigate risks, Kubernetes remains tempting to exploit for attackers. Open source fosters global innovation, from which the United States benefits. But this same openness also strengthens US competitors. The United States should therefore develop a clear framework to understand and mitigate the challenges posed by open source.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Huawei
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
19. The Problem with Power: Taiwan in the Era of Great Power Competition
- Author:
- Joey Ching Aracena
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- The United States and the PRC hold opposing positions on the “Taiwan Question.” The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act affirms U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense by providing weapons and services to promote Taiwan’s self-defense capability.” The Act also considers “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means...a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Conversely, the PRC emphasizes that Taiwan “reunification” is a strategic priority that “cannot be dragged on generation after generation.” At the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), PRC President Xi Jinping stated, “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification… but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” Despite the PRC’s coercive behavior and sharpened rhetoric, Taiwan refuses to accept “reunification” under the PRC’s proposed “One Country, Two Systems” model. Nevertheless, the United States and the PRC both discourage Taiwan’s independence. Both states understand that if Taiwan were to formally declare independence, it would compel both parties to respond, potentially escalating towards military conflict. By attempting to influence Taiwan’s behavior, both great powers implicitly recognize Taiwan’s role in making or breaking their respective strategies. In this way, Taiwan maintains a powerful point of leverage in the “Triangular Relationship,” as it could take actions that trigger future conflict between the United States and the PRC.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
20. Marine Corps and Space Force Integration for a More Lethal Joint Task Force to Counter China
- Author:
- Josh Bringhurst
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- The objective of this article is to highlight the unique capabilities of the Marine Corps and Space Force and how they can function as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF) operating within U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). More importantly, it aims to discuss the need to establish a Joint force structure and package that minimizes the risk should the United States need to quickly shift from competition to a crisis or, worse, conflict with China. Determining command relationships, allocated resources, and authorities as part of a JTF structure and package will be critical to quickly transition such a force in response to a crisis or engage the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in conflict.
- Topic:
- Space Force, Strategic Competition, Joint Operations, People's Liberation Army (PLA), US Marine Corps, and Great Powers
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific