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911. Black Sea Defense Ministers Forum (Event Summary)

Author:
Victor Bannykh, Victor Gaiciuc, Armen Kirakossian, and David Tevzadze
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
On May 2, the Black Sea Security Program held a public forum at the Kennedy School of Government that featured leading representatives from the governments of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. This panel was moderated by Graham Allison, chair of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Moldova, Eastern Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Georgia

912. The Prospects for Peace in Chechnya (Event summary)

Author:
Ilias Akhmadov
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Observers of the situation in Chechnya know that the "prospects for peace" that Akhmadov's title refers to are virtually nil, as Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chechen rebel leaders continue to lock horns on how to end the hostilities that broke out in war over two years ago. Akhmadov devoted considerable time in his discussion to the problems confronting Chechnya since the development of a Bush-Putin alliance to combat "Islamic fundamentalism." He also challenged Putin's insistence that the conflicts in Chechnya are domestic and therefore not subject to international monitoring or mediation. Akhmadov opened his talk with the assertion that the destruction he had discussed at the Davis Center in January 2000 had grown more serious, with levels of physical devastation and civilian casualties on the rise and the world community more supportive than ever of armed Russian intervention. To illustrate his point that the Russian Federation is unfairly using the international war on terror to justify actions in Chechnya, Akhmadov said that two days after FBI agents found diskettes containing flying instructions which had belonged to the terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the US, Russian FSB agents reported finding similar diskettes belonging to Chechen terrorists in the woods near a pilot-training school. Akhmadov considered the presence of such a school in those woods unlikely. He added that a high casualty rate among Chechen civilians is now officially connected to the search for members of Al Qaeda. Akhmadov reminded the audience of a speech made by Putin on September 24, 2001, in which the Russian president expressed support for the United States' war on terror and urged Chechen rebels to disarm and abandon their separatist fight. Akhmadov's response to that speech was that disarmament could not be a condition for starting peace talks. As for the November meeting between Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's envoy to Chechnya, and Akhmed Zakayev, a prominent representative of Chechnya's rebels, Akhmadov said it "left no room for illusions about their relations, or about the Russian government's position on Chechnya." The talk ended when Zakayev refused to comply with Kazanstev's request that the rebels disarm. Akhmadov addressed allegations of ties between the rebels and Osama bin Laden in the question-and-answer session, restricting himself during his talk to criticism of what he considers unwarranted BBC and CNN reports about the "thousands of Chechens fighting in Afghanistan." While Akhmadov allowed for the possibility that a few Chechens could be fighting for the Taliban, he stressed the unlikelihood that Chechens played a critical role in Taliban efforts and reported that nobody yet had been able to provide any "concrete facts to verify that Chechens are fighting for the Taliban." Putin's affirmations that Chechnya belongs to Russia apparently strike Akhmadov as oxymoronic, as indicated by his remark that "the Russian Federation wants to integrate the territory of Chechnya but not the people." To convey the extent of destruction wrought by the Chechen-Russian conflicts, Akhmadov cited data culled by Russians showing that before the first war in 1994, there were 1 million Chechens; 100,000 people were killed between 1994-6; that casualty figure has been greatly exceeded during the fighting that started in 1999. In addition, 400,000 Chechens have emigrated or become displaced persons. Akhmadov pointedly remarked that "we don't count as refugees, because that only happens during a war . . . What is happening in Chechnya is, according to Russia, 'a small, minor anti-terrorist operation.'"Finally, Akhmadov stated that impartial monitoring groups were needed to observe the conflict. He also asserted that a one-on-one dialogue with Russians was not a realistic solution and that intermediaries were needed to promote discussion between Russian and Chechen leaders. Following his prepared talk, Akhmadov replied to questions from the audience about issues including Chechen rebel fighting in Abkhazia, hostage-taking, and Russian bombing of civilian and industrial areas. In response to a question about Maskhadov's ability to rebuild the war-torn region, Akhmadov said that "neither Maskhadov nor any other Chechen can do anything with Chechnya's meager resources." He also said that the international community should aid Chechnya in future attempts to rebuild the war-torn republic and that visiting Ground Zero in New York had given him the "feeling that I had seen that [kind of devastation] somewhere before, only on a larger scale." Finally, Akhmadov answered an audience member's question about Russian and Chechen military strategy by saying that it was hard forhim to believe that "someone is sitting at a map plotting points . . . We're [Russians and Chechens] just killing each other . . . Russians see us, they kill us, and vice versa. It's a snowball effect."
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

913. Assessing Russian Democracy (Event Summary)

Author:
Grigory Yavlinsky
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Mr Yavlinsky began by thanking the Belfer Center for the invitation and said that the main topic of his talk will be to explore the progress of Russian Democratization. According to Mr. Yavlinsky, the process of democratization involves not only creating some set of democratic procedures, like free elections or free press. It is necessary to look behind the formal democratic institutions to ask what people applying and using them have in mind. Only after analyzing such motivations is it possible to understand how essentially democratic and legitimate institutions produce results contrary to their nature. The value of freedom of speech is nonexistent, if people have nothing to say, the freedom of action is needless if people are only willing to march in military ranks. Hence democracy can only work if the society enacting it has some basic democratic values, education, beliefs or moral principles. The democratic institutions and procedures per se are merely tools, able to transform these ideas and beliefs into reality. That is why the benefits of mere democratic procedures are so limited. It is for this reason that the economic base of any democracy is one of its crucial elements, providing for independent individuals as its basic members. In Mr. Yavlinsky's opinion, these facts represent the main challenge for Russian democracy. Russia's small and middle business enterprises are important for its democracy. Mr. Yavlinsky called them a "conditio sine qua non" for any democratic society. Only if the economy of the country can ensure the independent economic behavior of its citizens and only if these citizens have a certain level of democratic education and democratic values, only in this case the democratic procedures can work for the common benefit. From Yavlinsky's point of view the main challenge for the Russian reforms is that the country has to perform an acrobatic act, similar to riding a bicycle, where it must accomplish two operations simultaneously: the Russians have to engage in actions preparing democracy and at the same time practice this democracy with no reference to any previous historic democratic record. After presenting these general thoughts Mr. Yavlinsky moved on to a deeper analysis of the present Russian situation. He assumed that the present political elite consists of people coming from the Soviet administrative system and still thinking in Soviet categories. To achieve their goals they use a democratic cover "quasi democracy," a somewhat modernized version of the famous "Potemkin villages." Just like Stalin's constitution, which was considered to be one the most progressive democratic constitutions, the present formally democratic institutions in Russia do not constitute real democracy. Yavlinsky described the present state of political life in Russia as a controlled or managed democracy. This is a state where the democratic tools are used to achieve any result desirable for the leader of the country. The most recent example of this type of manipulation was a recent proposal drawn up by the parties close to the Russian president. According to this proposal, elections should only be considered valid if voter participation was at least 50 percent and only if one of the candidates was able to achieve more then 50 percent of the votes. In the opinion of Mr. Yavlinsky such a regulation would easily lead to an election deadlock, which would benefit the president. Mr. Yavlinsky underscored the difference between this type of controlled democracy and a totalitarian rule. While the latter destroys all the democratic institutions directly and openly, the main strategy of controlled democracy is not to destroy, but to adjust the institutions to serve the goals of the ruling elite. If any adjustment of institutions is impossible, the government prefers to replace the people controlling these institutions (like replacing the owners of the free TV stations) or substitute these institutions with new, more easily manageable organizations (as happened in the case of the Media Union, which was created to weaken the influence of the Union of Journalists). Speculating on the future of the Russian democracy, Yavlinsky stressed the special and very important role of bureaucracy in implementing this new "vertical of power." However as any bureaucracy, it will lead to more corruption. In order to keep the corruption under control, the government will have to use intense enforcement mechanisms, which might go as far as creating a police state. Of the three core democratic elements — free press, free elections, and an independent judiciary — Mr. Yavlinsky specifically spoke about the press. Yavlinsky said that the situation with the press in today's Russia is certainly not comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union. Everyone can read anything in the press, even the most incredible and slanderous information about most prominent political figures. Restricted is any systematic explanation or critical analysis of the political events. For example, state television stations have a list of people who are not to be shown on the air. The same is true for the list of forbidden topics. Certainly there still are a some newspapers who still cover critical topics (e.g. Obschaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta). However, they unfold their activities in a kind of a glass box, their presence is not really essential, and is only useful for the government in order to demonstrate to foreign observers that free press exists. As a result of such media control, the Russian population is subject to the management and manipulation of human choice. According to Mr. Yavlinsky this ability to manipulate and control is actually one of the main results of the last 10 years: it is not hard to manipulate the choice of the Russian public. Just like one could convince it to vote for Yeltsin or vote for a totally unknown newcomer Putin, you can always manipulate the public opinion. In the question and answer section Yavlinsky addressed various issues. In speaking about the best way western countries could assist Russia on its way towards democracy, Yavlinsky rejected any form of financial credits or subsidies. He is convinced that the help must be conducted in a smart way and this means in the first place the west should give up any policy of double standards towards Russia and address Russia as an honest and valuable ally. Regarding Putin's intentions, Yavlinsky mentioned two of them: the intention to make Russia a strong state and to protect his own power. The question is not whether these goals are good or bad, but rather which instruments Putin is prepared to use to implement those goals.
Topic:
Security and Human Rights
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

914. Weapons of Mass Destruction in India and Pakistan

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
India continues its nuclear weapons development program, for which its underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a significant milestone. The acquisition of foreign equipment will benefit New Delhi in its efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons. During this reporting period, India continued to obtain foreign assistance for its civilian nuclear power program, primarily from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, India, and Asia

915. American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House

Author:
Bruce Riedel
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for the Advanced Study of India
Abstract:
July 4th, 1999 was probably the most unusual July 4th in American diplomatic history, certainly among the most eventful. President Clinton engaged in one of the most sensitive diplomatic high wire acts of any administration, successfully persuading Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull back Pakistani backed fighters from a confrontation with India that could threaten to escalate into a nuclear war between the world's two newest nuclear powers. The events of that 4th accelerated the road to a fundamental reconciliation between the world's two largest democracies, India and the United States, but also set the scene for another in the series of military coups that have marred Pakistani democracy. As the President's Special Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs at the National Security Council I had the honor of a unique seat at the table and the privilege of being a key adviser for the day's events.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, America, South Asia, India, and Asia

916. The Federal Option for Afghanistan

Author:
Henry E. Hale
Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
The future security and stability of Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus–all struggling to deal with the simultaneous forces of terrorism, crime, narcotics, poverty, and disease–require a successful political and economic transformation in Afghanistan. A federal system was rejected in favor of aunitary state structure for Afghanistan, but the government of Hamid Karzai has faced great difficulty extending central authority much beyond Kabul. New questions about state-building there and elsewhere in the region should compel policymakers to reconsider federalism among a range of options for how best to organize this complex and diverse society. Although critics charge that a federal solution to state organization enhances social cleavages and fosters instability, federalism could be aviable and effective option if constructed to minimize the power and influence of the demographically dominant group.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Caucasus, Asia, and Kabul

917. Transatlantic Energy Security and the Caspian Basin: Moving Towards a Common Agenda

Author:
Adam N. Stulberg and Hendrik Cosijn
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
Once considered an impediment to stable development and a catalyst for a new “Great Game,” Caspian energy may play a stabilizing role in world markets and geopolitics after all. With the West's growing dependence on hydrocarbon imports, growing tensions in the Middle East, and Moscow's emergence as a major player in 21st century energy politics, the Caspian region is poised to become a focal point for cooperation between the United States, Europe, and Russia. Policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Moscow share a common interest in preventing the Caspian Basin from lapsing into another Persian Gulf, where windfalls in oil revenues have fueled instability and extremism. They also recognize that efforts to extract and export Caspian energy must advance regional development and stability. Thus far, however, shared interests have not yielded real transatlantic partnership on Caspian energy issues. Different strategic orientations and preferred approaches for unlocking Caspian energy threaten to mar prospects for broadening and deepening transatlantic cooperation in the region. To date, the U.S., Europe, and Russia have pursued parochial interests in the Caspian Basin without much regard for each other. The time is ripe for American, European, and Russian policymakers to take stock of the burgeoning confluence of interests, mount a concerted effort to prevent backsliding, and cement a common agenda by forging a trilateral dialogue on Caspian energy issue.
Topic:
Security and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Washington, Asia, and Moscow

918. The United States, Europe, and Russia: Toward a Global Energy Security Policy

Author:
David L. Goldwyn
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
Together, the United States, Europe, and Russia can help to diversify the global energy supply by creating a Global Strategic Petroleum Reserve (GSPR) filled largely with oil from Russia and other states in the Caspian Basin. Such a move would mitigate U.S. and European dependence on Middle East oil and help to stabilize world oil prices. Other important beneficiaries of a GSPR would be the Asia-Pacific economies outside the OECD that currently lack strategic reserves. A GSPR offering access to China and other Asian economies would help anchor these states in an important, positive-sum arrangement that highlights shared energy security interests with Russia and the West. If managed responsibly, creating the GSPR will not antagonize OPEC countries, which themselves benefit from stable energy markets. Moreover, developing the GSPR will encourage the reform and modernization of Russian and other transition countries' energy economies and give real substance to collaboration on energy issues between Russia, the EU, and the U.S. If coupled with close collaboration on Caspian energy development, the creation of a GSPR would make U.S. and EU energy ties with Russia and its neighbors sources of substantial, long-term strength.
Topic:
Security and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

919. Russia's Southern Regions: Threats and Opportunities

Author:
Robert Orttung
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
Instability in Russia's southern regions poses a threat to the continuation of the country's overall political and economic reform, and to regional stability in Central Eurasia. These regions, which already possess Russia's most fragile local economics, face a variety of problems emanating from the weak and failing states to their immediate south. Most visibly, there is the threat of terrorism, an increasing flow of illegal narcotics from producers in Afghanistan, an influx of contraband goods that wipe out Russian jobs, and illegal immigration. With few resources and extensive corruption among key officials, Russia's southern regions are poorly equipped to deal with these problems. Developing mutually beneficial trade links between Russia's southern regions and its neighbors in Central Asia, China, and Mongolia can mitigate instability and economic stagnation in this region, help to rebuild regional economies, generate income, and better enable governments to provide security and basic human services to their people. The West can support these developments as well as help combat organized crime, target corruption, and improve border security.
Topic:
Security, Economics, International Cooperation, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, China, Europe, Mongolia, and Asia

920. China's Rise and the U.S. Army: Leaning Forward

Author:
Russell D. Howard and Albert Willner
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
The United States led war on terrorism has already had a major impact on developing state relationships in Asia. The coalition of convenience that emerged in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has engendered a change in strategic thinking, perceptions, and influence. A significant shift in any of these three areas could have dramatic implications. For the United States, what is required is not only a reassessment of the new realities but also a strategy to take advantage of new opportunities and cope with potential threats. Perhaps nowhere is this need more apparent, or possible responses more fraught with risk, than in determining the impact of such strategic shifts on the U.S.-China relationship, particularly in the security realm.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia