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421. Guardians of the Belt and Road: The Internationalization of China's private security companies

Author:
Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Chinese private security companies are going global to protect the country's assets and citizens, in the sometimes unstable countries linked to Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. Following the build-up of infrastructure and investment projects along China’s extensive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), private security companies from China are also increasingly going global – to protect Chinese assets and the growing number of Chinese nationals living and working in countries along the BRI, in sometimes unstable regions. Out of the 5,000 registered Chinese private security companies, 20 provide international services, employing 3,200 security personnel in countries like Iraq, Sudan and Pakistan. The impact of this newly developing Chinese activity abroad is analyzed in this MERICS China Monitor. Chinese private security companies’ international activities pose a challenge to European interests as they are often largely unregulated and their security staff are often inexperienced in dealing with serious conflict situations and combat. EU policymakers, thus, are called upon to encourage and assist Beijing to pass laws regulating Chinese private security companies’ activities overseas.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, European Union, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Beijing, and Asia

422. Cooperation Between Kazakhstan and the United States in Military Professionalization Programs

Author:
Sebastian Engles
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. should remain committed to Central Asian security cooperation, but must carefully evaluate each program for merit and value added to U.S. security goals in the region. Military professionalization of the Kazakh armed forces will have the most significant impact towards accomplishing these goals and help Kazakhstan attain a more capable military. U.S. security cooperation efforts in assisting Kazakhstan to improve non-commissioned officer development serve as an excellent example of effective professionalization and a way to further our strategic relationships with non-NATO countries. Training programs that professionalize the Kazakh military can offer a cost-effective way for the United States to further a lasting partnership with Central Asia’s most stable country.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Imperialism, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

423. Between Giants: The Sino-Indian Cold War in the Indian Ocean

Author:
David Brewster
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean is growing and has the potential to profoundly impact the stability and security of the region. The Indian Ocean is becoming the scene of a sustained contest that in some ways resembles strategic competition during the Cold War. This will include pressure on Indian Ocean states to align themselves with one side or another within an increasingly unstable and complex strategic environment.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Political stability, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Indian Ocean

424. Turkey and the European Union: Conflicting Policies and Opportunities for Cohesion and Cooperation In Iraq and Syria

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, Susan Cersosimo, and Kamaran Palani
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
There are major security events, issues and trends within Iraq since 2003 and Syria since 2011, that have influenced and impacted Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. In this policy paper we deconstruct the causal mechanisms that act as the primary drivers impacting bilateral relations. We then compare and contrast Ankara’s and Brussels’ current security interests, priorities and perceptions toward security threats originating in this troubled neighbourhood. Finally, we classify opportunities as culminating in three possible discrete or combined security policy scenarios: conflict, cooperation and/or convergence and make recommendations to improve Turkey-EU relations. To address how Iraq’s and Syria’s security environment evolved to its current state and predict the subsequent outcomes and impacts on EU-Turkey relations, we look back and critically analyse Ankara’s and Brussels’ views on the following key events, issues and trends: security and political dynamics following the second term of al-Maliki, the withdrawal of the US forces in 2011, the 2011 Syrian revolution, the war against the Islamic state (IS), The Global Coalition against Daesh (GCD) backing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and aspirations for statehood in Iraq and autonomy in Syria, the enhanced influence of Iran in Iraq and the growth of IS with subsequent mass displacement of person across both Iraq and Syria. Iraq is now largely free of IS reign, yet is still threatened by terrorism, mass population displacement and weak governance, among other ills. In parallel, now that the Syrian civil war enters its seventh bloody year, generating large numbers of casualties and millions of displaced persons, Brussels and Ankara are strongly incented to converge and/or cooperate on security policies which mitigate the escalating humanitarian crisis and ease the path to a durable peace agreement. However, finding durable solutions to address high value, high impact problems stemming from Iraq and Syria requires identifying and mitigating the causes vs symptoms of these countries’ instability and insecurity affecting Ankara’s and Brussels’ own security interests, priorities and threat perceptions. Central security priorities for the EU in post-IS Iraq include stabilization, the return of internally displaced people and refugees and eliminating violent jihadist organizations and ideologies. While Turkey shares these objectives in principle, Ankara’s security interests concentrate primarily on neutralizing the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and its affiliates’ presence and influence. Since 2014, Ankara and Brussels have mostly bifurcated on how they perceive security threats in Syria. Turkey-EU leaders continue to disagree on the Kurd’s role in the Syrian war and how Turkey should control its borders to cut flows of foreign fighters into Syria. As the IS invaded parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, European states began providing PKK affiliated Kurdish groups in Syria with both intelligence and military support. Alternately, since the Kurdistan Region of Iraq held its referendum for independence on 25 September 2017, EU and Turkish leaders have mostly converged on how they perceive security threats in Iraq with both staunchly supporting the country’s territorial integrity, thus, both refused to recognize the referendum’s legitimacy. We consider the issue of terrorism as a highly relevant driver of EU and Turkish security policies, perceptions and priorities. Though we see both countries as highly concerned with this issue, they diverge on which organizations pose the greatest threat. Ankara places the PKK at the top of its terrorist list – both within its borders and across the region – while Brussels prioritizes neutralizing jihadi terrorist threats on its soil, thus, the probability of convergence and cooperation and positive impact on EU-Turkey relations is moderate for this issue. Moreover, the IS is not given the same degree of priority by the two sides in the neighbourhood, including Iraq and Syria. Unlike the EU, Turkey considers the threat posed by the IS equal to the one posed by the PKK, but not as strategic. Here, the two sides diverge. In sum, dissent between Brussels and Ankara is highly likely given the Turkish Armed Forces’ broad kinetic engagement in both Iraq and Syria which negatively impacts EU and US efforts to roll back terrorism, stabilise the region, deliver humanitarian aid and help displaced persons return to their homes. Thus, regardless of whether Baghdad and/or Damascus formally grant Ankara permission to launch assaults, the EU views these actions as bellicose destabilizers competing with its own interests, thus, degrades EU-Turkey relations. Ultimately, this study calls for the EU and Turkey to prioritize mending cracks and fissures in their relationship and focus on the gains to be made through rapprochement on security issues originating in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, the EU can use its tremendous mediating capacity as an honest broker to settle entrenched disputes between warring parties in Iraq and Syria and for Turkey restart the peace process at home. More than ever, both must develop a long-term strategic security framework to ensure that bilateral security interests, priorities and interventions do not derail current stabilisation and reconstruction procedures in Iraq and/or progress toward a durable peace in Syria.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria

425. PeSCo – Anything There for European Defence?

Author:
Sandro Knezović
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The European strategic landscape has changed dramatically over the course of the last decade. The post-Cold War mantra about the obsolescence of conventional threats in the wider European space proved to be short-sighted with developments at its eastern �lanks, while security dysfunctions in the MENA region and their immanent consequences for the safety of European citizens have loaded a heavy burden on compromise-building and decision-making in the �ield of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. Furthermore, the approach of the new US administration to European security and the strategic consequences of Brexit have changed the wider framework in which security of 'the Old Continent' is to be determined, hence stimulating European leaders to rethink European security in a strive for strategic autonomy of their own. The very ambitiously phrased EU Global Strategy that came out in June 2016, served as both catalyst and umbrella document for such an endeavour. However, in order to achieve measurable progress in responding to contemporary security challenges, it was clear that the EU needs to develop a structural way for member states to do jointly what they were not capable of doing at the national level. This is so especially in the environment in which China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are championing the defence spending, right after the US, while European states are signi�icantly trailing behind. The fact that the EU collectively is the second largest military investor and yet far from being among the dominant military powers only emphasises the burning issue of ef�iciency of military spending and the level of interoperability among member states’ armies. High-level fragmentation of the European defence market and the fact that defence industries are kept in national clusters is clearly contributing to that. The reality on the ground is obviously challenging traditional methods of co-operation that operate mainly in ‘national boxes’ and calling for a paradigm change in the wider policy context of CSDP. However, it remains to be seen to which extent will this new security environment actually be able to push the European defence policy context over the strict national boundaries.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

426. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral: Better at Deterrence than Diplomacy?

Author:
Sheila A. Smith
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Once more, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have confronted a crisis with North Korea. The pattern is now well established. First, there is a provocation—a missile test, a nuclear test, and even worse, the use of force. Next, the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia muster their forces, strengthen their trilateral policy coordination, and sanction the belligerent Pyongyang. The three nations advocate for the accompanying effort by the United Nations Security Council to condemn North Korea’s behavior. Setting aside their political differences, Seoul and Tokyo intensify their military cooperation and Washington calls for greater trilateral unity in confronting a shared security challenge. In 2017, policymakers in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo found themselves in a similar cycle but with the threat of war ever more real. The dramatic escalation of tensions between President Donald J. Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seemed to bring the region to the brink of a second Korean conflict. But today, just as dramatically, an accelerated series of high-level summits suggests that the Korean Peninsula could be on the brink of peace. President Moon Jae-in met with Kim at Panmunjom, and both Kim and Moon stepped across the line of demarcation at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. The two leaders have embraced a “new era of peace,” with the promise of ending the state of war on the peninsula. Trump has also said he is willing to meet Kim to discuss denuclearization. CIA director Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang on April 1 to test out that proposition, and as secretary of state, Pompeo had the lead in setting the stage for a meeting in Singapore. The Moon-Kim meeting set up the premise of a negotiated denuclearization process. Trump and Kim will define the contours of that path forward.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

427. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the Context of the Chinese Grand Strategy

Author:
Tommaso Rossotti
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Being the most populous country and the second biggest economy in the world, the People’s Republic of China is under every aspect one of the most important players in today’s international system. As every great power, China acts rationally in its foreign relations, and, doing so, it follows what has been labelled as a “Grand Strategy”. The aim of this paper is to analyse Chinese Grand Strategy in a practical perspective; in particular, it will be discussed how the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) fits in Beijing foreign policy and in its Grand Strategy. The paper moves from a working definition of Grand Strategy, to suddenly analyse how and if the different aims and goals of the SCO are aligned with China’s interests and long-term objectives.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China and Asia

428. Technical Note on a Timeline for North Korean Denuclearization

Author:
Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
On May 28, 2018, the New York Times reported on a technical roadmap for North Korean denuclearization written by Stanford University professor and scientist Siegfried S. Hecker and colleagues Robert L. Carlin and Elliot A. Serbin. While we greatly respect the work of Dr. Hecker and colleagues, we disagree on the up to 15-year timeline put forth for completing full denuclearization. Our assessments are based on verified dismantlement in other countries. If North Korea agrees to denuclearize and to cooperate fully, admittedly big “ifs,” then verified dismantlement of the key parts of its nuclear weapons program can happen in parallel and be accomplished in as little as about two years. Gaining assurance that North Korea is not hiding relatively small but significant amounts of plutonium, enriched uranium, or nuclear weapons will take longer than two years and will likely fall to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to handle as part of bringing North Korea into compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state. This whole process could take several more years, as the IAEA insists on accounting for even grams of nuclear explosive materials, as it should. Decommissioning operating reactors and plutonium separation plants will also take years longer.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

429. Shift of Power from West to East and Rise of China

Author:
Mushtaq Ahmed Abbasi, Ghulam Qumber, and Ahmed Saeed Minhas
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
This research paper is aimed at evaluating prevailing global scenario and the dynamics of shift of power from the West to the East. Efforts have been made to analyze the economic, political, and security trends to understand important aspects of the power transition process. Currently, there is an enough literature available, which proves the existing consensus among many experts that China is playing a central role in the process of shift of power from the West to the East. Therefore, while explaining this transition process, it is pertinent to focus on the leading role of China and its possible implications. So, this study further highlights the rising power of China covering an overall picture of China, particularly its economic development process, the political and cultural aspects, and the military modernization. Efforts have been made to give an analytical view that how the rise in economic power is gradually transforming itself into political, diplomatic, and military strength of China. Besides; this research effort also focuses on how China is adjusting its foreign policy posture in the regional and global affairs, which culminates or aims at adjusting itself to globalization process.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
China and Asia

430. Japan’s international peace operations in South Sudan

Author:
Daisuke Akimoto
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
After the independence of South Sudan from Sudan on 9 July 2011, the Japanese government decided to dispatch its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to South Sudan under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Despite the post-conflict military clashes in South Sudan, the Japanese government did not withdraw the SDF, but instead, the Abe administration assigned a new mission, the so-called ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ (‘rush and rescue’), to rescue staff of international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGO) in preparation for possible armed attacks during peacekeeping operations. The new mission can be regarded as Prime Minister Abe’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’ (proactive pacifism) in action, and the policy is congruous with the purpose of ‘human security’ and ‘protection of civilians’. This paper aims to investigate Japan’s contribution to peacekeeping operations in South Sudan and examine associated dilemmas facing the United Nations, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers in UNMISS – which need to be overcome for future international peace operations.
Topic:
Security, Humanitarian Aid, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa, Japan, Asia, and South Sudan