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271. China’s Nuclear Arms Race: How Beijing Is Challenging US Dominance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Elisabeth Suh and Leonie Reicheneder
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
China is building up its military capabilities. Not only is the country investing heavily in conventional arms, but it is also modernizing its nuclear weapons. To secure its nuclear deterrent, China is diversifying its delivery systems. The United States sees this as a challenge to its military superiority in the Indo-Pacific region. Washington and Beijing are both fueling a qualitative arms race by investing in new capabilities. This spiral poses risks to stability that affect Germany and Europe as well.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

272. The China Difference in the U.S.-South Korea Alliance

Author:
Tobias Harris, Haneul Lee, and Abigail Bard
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
It is important to understand why the United States and South Korea do not see eye to eye on how to confront challenges presented by China.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

273. Charting a Transatlantic Course to Address China

Author:
Julianne Smith, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Carisa Nietsche, and Ellison Laskowski
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Mounting competition between China and liberal democracies will shape the course of the 21st century. The gravity and scope of the challenges that China poses have permeated the transatlantic policy agenda and become a focal point in U.S.-Europe relations. Whereas China has long been a source of disagreement and even tension between the transatlantic partners, in the past two years views have converged. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) assertive actions—its “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, aggressive influence operations, human rights violations at home, and elimination of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong—have increased concerns in both the United States and Europe. There is now fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation on everything from reducing dependency on Chinese trade and investment to setting global norms and standards for the future. Yet, despite this convergence of views and interests, there is still no roadmap for how such cooperation should progress. This report outlines such an approach. It is based on the premise that the time is ripe for greater transatlantic cooperation on China. It also recognizes the comprehensive nature of the task at hand. Today’s controversies with China over trade, investment, technology, and global governance are all part of a larger competition between political systems and worldviews. The breadth of the challenge means that the United States and Europe must compete with China across multiple domains. This report lays out a roadmap for doing so, outlining concrete recommendations across the four sectors of technology, investment, trade, and global governance. By working together, the United States and Europe can pool the resources and leverage needed to push back against the CCP in these areas and develop preferred alternatives that advance strategic priorities for both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, the strategies outlined in this report will also serve a second purpose: re-energizing the ailing relationship between Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

274. Restoring Strategic Competence: How to Manage Northeast Asian Alliance Dilemmas amid a Nuclear North Korea

Author:
Van Jackson
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the foreseeable future, America’s Northeast Asian allies Japan and South Korea must live in the shadow of a nuclear North Korea, whose capabilities they cannot match. During the Obama and Trump administrations, North Korea dramatically expanded and improved its ability to hold Japanese, South Korean, and even U.S. territory at risk with its nuclear and missile arsenal.1 Despite high-profile summitry and promises to the contrary, there is no sign that this imbalance will be rectified, and its continuation exacerbates regional risks and ally insecurity.2 The mounting North Korea threat is compounded by poor timing—U.S. policy has proven exceptionally erratic, unreliable, and risk-prone in recent years. The very existence of Japan and South Korea depends on strategies built around a partnership with the United States that has become shaky, and on faith in the competence of U.S. statecraft—which both countries are starting to perceive as a risk rather than a source of security. Ally perceptions of U.S. strategic incompetence generate real costs and risks for the United States and Northeast Asian security. If the United States continues to squander its deepest relationships in Asia, the allies could become rivals with each other, increase risks of nuclear instability, play a spoiler role in U.S. regional strategy, withhold basing and access rights to U.S. forces operating in the region, and potentially take independent aggressive actions against North Korea that unintentionally escalate to war.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

275. A New Arsenal for Competition: Coercive Economic Measures in the U.S.-China Relationship

Author:
Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and China have long used coercive economic measures to advance both economic and foreign policy objectives. In recent years, however, both countries have turned to coercive economic measures as mainstream instruments of foreign policy and national security policy, and increasingly have deployed coercive economic measures against each other. For the United States, China’s economic scale and global interconnections make it a fundamentally different type of target for coercive economic measures than the comparatively smaller and less sophisticated economies that have been primary targets of U.S. economic coercion in the past. The United States cannot simply isolate China from the global economy. Instead, it must adopt a more strategic focus on limiting Chinese actions in areas significant to U.S. national security and shoring up economic and technology arenas where the United States maintains lasting leverage. Over the past several years, the United States has deployed an array of coercive economic measures against China. The most prominent of these have been the tariffs on approximately two-thirds of U.S. imports from China. The tariffs remain largely in place despite implementation of the Phase One trade deal that the United States and China signed in January 2020. But the United States also has developed and deployed an increasingly sophisticated set of other coercive economic tools that will play a prominent role in U.S.-China relations over the years ahead, regardless of whether the United States and China fully implement the Phase One deal and reach a broader Phase Two trade agreement. Those other coercive economic tools include export controls, restrictions on U.S. imports to secure U.S. supply chains, heightened scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, sanctions, and stepped-up law enforcement measures against Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft and other Chinese activities in the United States. This expanding set of measures serves a broadening array of U.S. policy goals, including economic objectives, foreign policy goals, and the maintenance of America’s technological edge. The U.S. record of success in the use of these coercive economic measures has been mixed. While tariffs and other measures have succeeded in putting some macroeconomic pressure on China, they have not extracted fundamental concessions from Beijing. Targeted sanctions and law enforcement measures similarly have had economic impacts on some Chinese companies, but other Chinese companies have demonstrated an ability to weather U.S. economic coercion. To be effective in translating economic coercion into policy change by China, the United States needs to better integrate its coercive measures with each other and with other policies, better signal intentions and escalation, more rigorously assess impacts and costs, and galvanize allied support and coordinated action. For its part, China appears to recognize a balancing act between limiting economic ties with foreign partners in some domains and maintaining them in others. China has sought to distance certain Chinese economic sectors, particularly high-tech manufacturing, from the United States in some areas, investing heavily in domestic capacity development. In other areas where China must rely on foreign partners for technology, IP, or manufacturing, or where China does not appear to see a clear interest in severing trade, Beijing has sought to keep trade and investment flows moving in an unencumbered fashion. As for the United States, this is a dynamic policy environment.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

276. Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, ​Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and China are locked in strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific—the most populous, dynamic, and consequential region in the world. At stake are competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the decades to come.1 The U.S. government aspires toward a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, defined by respect for sovereignty and the independence of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free and fair trade, adherence to international law, and greater transparency and good governance.2 For the United States, successful realization of this regional order would include strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships; a military able to operate throughout the region, consistent with international law; U.S. firms with access to leading markets, and benefiting from updated technology standards, investment rules, and trade agreements; U.S. participation in effective regional and international institutions; and the spread of democracy and individual freedoms in the context of an open information environment and vibrant civil society.3 By contrast, China is driving toward a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, core aspects of which would undermine vital U.S. interests.4 Key features of China-led order would include the People’s Liberation Army controlling the South and East China Seas; regional countries sufficiently coerced into acquiescing to China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; an economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor, with dominance over leading technologies, data, and standards; and Beijing with de facto rule over Taiwan and agenda-setting power over regional institutions. The order would be further characterized by weak civil society, a dearth of independent media, and the gradual spread of authoritarianism, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state. The net result would be a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.5 Ultimately, the competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific is a contest over which of these futures will come closer to fruition, even as neither is likely to attain in its entirety. In the two years since the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy aptly identified this competition over the regional order in Asia, the U.S. government has taken initial steps toward its goal of a free and open region. On balance, however, critical areas of U.S. policy remain inconsistent, uncoordinated, underresourced, and—to be blunt—uncompetitive and counterproductive to advancing U.S. values and interests. This independent assessment—mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—is intended to help close the considerable gap between the current administration’s stated aspirations for a free and open Indo-Pacific and the actual implementation of policies to advance that vision. Specifically, Congress called for “an assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the Indo-Pacific region that are necessary for the successful implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” with a particular focus on how to “support United States military requirements for forward defense, assured access, extensive forward basing, and alliance and partnership formation and strengthening in such region.”6 This report examines how the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense, can realize these outcomes. Although the focus of this assessment is on the Indo-Pacific, it is critical to underscore that the China challenge is a global phenomenon, and many of the actions recommended in this report should be taken to bolster U.S. competitiveness beyond the region. Consistent with the bipartisan mission of the Center for a New American Security, the report’s authors have collectively served on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Included herein are nearly a hundred specific and actionable policy recommendations across critical vectors of American competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Before turning to these recommendations, the remainder of this section describes six core principles that undergird the assessment and should form the foundations of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

277. India–China Unsettled Boundary & Territorial Dispute: Institutionalized Border Mechanisms since 39 Years, Sans Resolution

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The border dispute between India and China does not pertain to the definition of a boundary that can be marked physically on ground, and, on a military map, alone. It also takes on board vast tracts of disputed territorial frontiers. China continues to be in illegal physical occupation of large territorial land areas of India’s territory, starting with the entire Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh, approximately 38,000 sq kms, since the mid-1950s. In addition, India maintains that in 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded to China, 5,180 sq kms of Indian Territory in the Shaksgam Valley of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), north of the Siachen Glacier, under a bilateral boundary agreement that holds no legal validity. Besides, China also stake claim to about 96,000 sq kms of Indian Territory in north-eastern Arunachal Pradesh, which it terms as ‘Southern Tibet’. The statements regarding Arunachal Pradesh being “Chinese territory and part of southern Tibet” are a key instrument of the marked shift in China’s strategy and stance in the early 1980s when Beijing began signaling that the eastern sector was the larger part of the boundary dispute. China’s stated position is that reunification of Chinese territories is a ‘sacred duty’ of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China shares a 22,000 kms land border with 14 adjacent states. It has resolved territorial disputes with 12 of them, but still needs to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute with India. Beijing, for that matter, also challenges the total length of the Indo-China International Land Border, which runs 3,488 kms according to the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs. This was also acknowledged by Indian Prime Minster, Narendra Modi, while addressing the India-China Business Forum in Shanghai on May 16, 2015.
Topic:
Security, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

278. The American News Media’s Volatile Perspectives on China

Author:
Ted Galen Carpenter
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In the decades since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, wild swings have occurred in the way that American media outlets view that country. At most times, a herd mentality is evident, as a large percentage of news stories portray China in one particular fashion, although there always are some dissenters from the dominant narrative. The nature of that narrative sometimes shifts rapidly and dramatically, however. During some periods, the prevailing perspective has been extremely hostile, with nearly all accounts seeing the PRC as a monstrous oppressor domestically and an existential security threat to the United States. That was the case for more than two decades following the communist revolution, until Richard Nixon’s administration suddenly altered U.S. policy in 1971–1972, and Washington no longer treated the PRC as a rogue state.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Media, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

279. Managing US-China Rivalry in the Arctic: Small states can be players in great power competition

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Many fear that strategic competition between the US and China threatens longstanding regional cooperation and stability in the Arctic. But if they recognise their own political and economic significance and work collectively, the Nordic states and Canada can still play an instrumental role in steering the region’s future away from confrontation. Recommendations: Recognise how US–China strategic competition represents a false binary for policy choices in the Arctic. Understand how economic connectivity provides room for manoeuvre against big power pressure. Encourage participation of non-Arctic states with similar economic and political norms on natural resource and infrastructure development.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

280. The Avoidable War: The Case for Managed Strategic Competition (Collection of Speeches by the Hon. Kevin Rudd)

Author:
Kevin Rudd
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Throughout the recent 18 months of the U.S.-China trade war, which has landed in a “phase one” deal, and awaits the tackling of more difficult economic elements in phase two negotiations, there has been a slow and steady structural shift in the U.S.-China relationship as it continues to head in a more adversarial direction. Against the backdrop of this drift toward confrontation occurring in the absence of any common strategic understanding or high-level diplomatic mechanism to manage the mounting economic, security, and technological tensions into the future, Asia Society Policy Institute President the Hon. Kevin Rudd brings together a series of speeches delivered during 2019 in the collection, The Avoidable War: The Case for Managed Strategic Competition. This volume works to help make sense of where the U.S.-China relationship is heading in the current period of strategic competition, and follows on from Rudd’s 2018 collection, The Avoidable War: Reflections on U.S.-China Relations and the End of Strategic Engagement. In this new volume, Rudd focuses not only on the bilateral relationship, but also on China's domestic politics, economics, and its strategic vision. But on the bilateral relationship, Rudd writes that while there may be a truce of sorts on the trade front during 2020, that will not be the case across the rest of the economic, political, and security relationship. Challenges will continue in areas such as the future of 5G mobile telecommunications infrastructure, the Belt and Road Initiative, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, allegations of Chinese political influence and interference in foreign countries’ internal democratic processes, and China’s increasingly close strategic collaboration with Russia. Militarily, tensions will continue in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the wider Indo-Pacific, together with confrontations less visible to the public eye in espionage, cyber, and space. Against this backdrop, and the steady erosion of diplomatic and political capital in the overall relationship, Rudd asserts that the “2020s loom as a decade of living dangerously in the U.S.-China relationship.” The Avoidable War: The Case for Managed Strategic Competition includes six speeches from 2019 covering a range of critical challenges in the U.S.-China relationship, as well as a December 2019 conversation at the Harvard Kennedy School which begins to outline an approach to managing the growing tinderbox of tensions across the spectrum of the bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America