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82. EU Sanctions Against Russia: Europe brings a hard edge to its economic power
- Author:
- Kristi Raik, Juha Jokela, and Niklas Helwig
- Publication Date:
- 10-2014
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- The EU has responded to the Ukraine crisis with a set of political and economic sanctions against Russia which constitute a qualitatively new step in the EU sanctions policy. The EU sanctions against Russia are exceptional and have strategic importance due to a combination of three factors: big power rivalry, the context of a major European crisis with global ramifications, and the costs of the sanctions for the EU itself. The EU has managed to maintain its fragile unity and has applied its collective diplomatic and economic weight in very difficult circumstances. The sanctions have not provided an alternative to diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis - on the contrary, hardening sanctions have been used as a way to put pressure on Russia to seriously engage in diplomacy. The impact of the sanctions on daily developments in Ukraine has been limited and uncertain, but the sanctions have imposed a long-term cost on Russia for violating key international norms. The policy process of Russia sanctions has exposed problems of leadership and coordination. The latest reform of the EU foreign policy machinery has streamlined the preparation of sanctions, but the current system still lacks the necessary resources to match the growing importance of the EU sanctions policy.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Power Politics, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
83. The Tenth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum
- Author:
- Walter H. Shorenstein
- Publication Date:
- 06-2013
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
- Abstract:
- Meeting after North Korea had raised tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the spring, participants in the Tenth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum focused on the implications for the Korean Peninsula of leadership changes in North and South Korea and especially China. Participants also focused on regional dynamics, including increased confrontation between China and Japan and various, sometimes conflicting, efforts to increase regional economic integration in Northeast Asia.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bilateral Relations, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- United States, Japan, China, Israel, and Asia
84. How Verbal Threats to Close Oil Transit Chokepoints Lead to Military Conflict
- Author:
- John Bowlus
- Publication Date:
- 01-2012
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
- Abstract:
- On December 26, 2011, in response to US, European, and potential Asian sanctions on Iranian oil exports, the government in Tehran issued a threat to “cut off the Strait of Hormuz.” The US Defense Department responded that any blockade of the strait would be met with force. On first read, it is easy to dismiss such saber rattling as another chapter in the new Cold War in the Middle East between Iran and its allies – including Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah – and the US, Israel, and the Sunni Gulf States, mostly notably Saudi Arabia. Iran has since backed away from its threat, but the event still carries importance because it is unclear how both the US and Iran will continue to respond, particularly as the diplomatic and economic pressures grow more acute while Iran's controversial nuclear program advances. Could such a verbal threat by Iran to cut off the Strait of Hormuzignite a military conflagration in the region? The relationship between military conflict and oil supply disruptions is well established; however, policymakers and analysts tend to focus on the incidents in which military conflict causes disruptions in oil supplies and sharp increases in prices. The first and most obvious example of this dynamic was the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The subsequent oil embargo by the Arab members of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) against the United States and the Netherlands for their support of Israel caused prices to soar as oil-consuming nations endured supply shortages. The Iranian Revolution from 1978 to 1979 was another event that curtailed Western nations' access to oil and caused prices to spike. When thinking about the relationship between military conflict and oil supply disruptions, however, policymakers and analysts should also recognize that the competition over oil – and even verbal threats to disrupt oil supplies by closing oil transit chokepoints – have either led directly to military conflict or have provided a useful cover under which countries have initiated military conflict. By examining past episodes when countries issued threats to close oil transit chokepoints, this Policy Brief helps illuminate the dangers associated with the current crisis over the Strait of Hormuz.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Arabia
85. Iran Turns to China, Barter to Survive Sanctions
- Author:
- Barbara Slavin
- Publication Date:
- 09-2011
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Sanctions and China's growing economic clout have altered Iran's trading patterns in ways that are reducing Iran's access to hard currency but may also be insulating the Iranian government and political elite from further US unilateral pressures.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia
86. Lessons from the Cheonan Incident and South Korea’s Response
- Author:
- EAI Security Net
- Publication Date:
- 05-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Since the tragic sinking of the ROK Navy corvette, the Cheonan, on March 26 2010, there has been an unprecedented level of unconfirmed suspicion, speculation, and criticism over the incident. Not only has this focused on the cause of the sinking but also on the Lee Myung-bak administration’s handling of the incident and its response in the immediate aftermath. The major challenge ahead is to build a domestic consensus on how to perceive and characterize the Cheonan incident and muster global support to punish North Korea. Pyongyang’s sinking of the South Korean warship has raised fundamental questions in the five most critical areas of the state; the military, diplomacy, economy, politics, and intelligence. Rather than narrowly focusing on one single area within which to muster a response, the Lee administration needs to take a comprehensive approach across all five areas and prevent further provocations from threatening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
- Topic:
- Security, Intelligence, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
87. Moving From a North Korean Nuclear Problem to the Problem of North Korea
- Author:
- Chaesung Chun
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- North Korea, in conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, is repeating its earlier pattern of nuclear diplomacy: raising the level of military tensions by launching a long-range rocket and performing a nuclear test, and then searching for the most favorable position once negotiations resume. This vicious circle, composed of North Korea's brinkmanship and other countries’ multilateral sanctions will continue without any prospect of solving the North Korean nuclear problem in the near future. The so-called action-to-action paradigm cannot succeed, because the most fundamental principles of North Korea and the countries conflict with each other. Japan, South Korea, and the United States hope that a "stick and carrot" approach will elicit concessions from North Korea during the process of negotiations, but North Korea will not take steps toward giving up its nuclear program, unless its leaders feel sure that they are being given reliable, material guarantees for the survival of their entire regime, system, and state. Because their nuclear program is their ultimate bargaining chip, “sticks and carrots” focusing only on specific issues of the negotiations will be fall far short of solving the problems of North Korea as a whole. Sixteen years have passed since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. The Geneva System, based on the Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea in Geneva in 1994, lasted for eight years (from October 1994 to October 2002), but failed to manage the problems of nuclear proliferation and the normalization of relations. The success or failure of the new system of Six-Party Talks is yet to be seen, but as of now in 2009, negotiations based on the approach of the George W. Bush administration and, more specifically, the February 13 agreement of 2007 seem to be in a stalemate. The North Korean problem is older than the North Korean nuclear problem. From the perspective of North Korea, the latter is its desired solution to the following questions: How will North Korea survive in the post-Cold War world, in which most socialist countries are no longer socialist? What kind of regime and system can North Korea sustain in this environment? How will North Korea compete with South Korea and resist absorption by the South? North Korea developed a nuclear program and pursued militaristic diplomacy as the most plausible shortcuts to solve the problems indicated by these questions. For countries outside of North Korea, diplomacy has failed to solve either the North Korean nuclear problem or the more general North Korean problem. The Six-Party Talks that have been held by South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russian Federation, and North Korea are stalled at the last phase of the second stage of what is termed “disablement,” and participants are now struggling to find a way to get into the third stage of the agreement of February 13. Reaching the issue of North Korea’s declaration and verification of its nuclear program is critical, because it will demonstrate a genuine intention to begin the process of giving up its program. Yet North Korea is desperately trying to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Obama administration by first launching a long-range rocket and then by testing a nuclear weapon for the second time, reversing the achievements of the disablement stage and rejecting the Six-Party Talks altogether. North Korea desires to strike a comprehensive deal with the Obama administration through bilateral talks, and seeks a variety of political, economic, and diplomatic rewards such as a peace treaty, diplomatic normalization, economic assistance, the lifting of international economic sanctions, and possibly light-water reactors. The five countries in the Six-Party Talks except North Korea have tried to evade facing up to the North Korean problem, because it is difficult to know how best to influence the future orientation of the North Korean regime, system, and diplomatic position. The structure of the Six-Party talks has also been narrowly focused on the problem of the nuclear program, leaving broader questions aside. The Northeast Asian international order, which is based on a strict and competitive balance of power, will be gravely influenced by the future orientation of North Korea, and therefore it is appropriate for the five countries most affected to deal with the North Korean problem directly. But by focusing so narrowly on the North Korean nuclear issues, these countries have maintained only minimal agreement on how to manage the nuclear problems that are involved, sometimes showing strategic and tactical differences on various specifics. In spite of the five countries’ agreement on the Six-Party presidential statement criticizing North Korea's rocket launch on April 9, they have had a hard time finding common ground to deal with future North Korean problems. The United States has been determined to impose economic sanctions on North Korean firms by using a specifically targeted list, as well as to punish North Korea diplomatically by refusing to give serious and close attention to the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea and Japan have maintained a policy of neglecting North Korea for different reasons. The two countries seem to continue minimal interactions with North Korea even if the North fails to meet the conditions suggested by these countries. China and Russia do not want to take the initiative either to punish or to side with North Korea, and only reluctantly facilitate cooperation among the other countries.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
88. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`
- Author:
- EAI Security Net
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America