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61. Intertwined Affairs: Reasons and Repercussions of Exempting Chabahar Port from US Sanctions

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Despite US determination on the strict application of its sanctions on Iran, it has granted a waiver for the development of Iran’s Chabahar port, in which both India and Afghanistan participate. In addition, it granted waivers for eight Iranian oil-importing countries from sanctions, temporarily, until they find other alternatives. The move, announced by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, on November 7, seems to be closely related to Washington’s assessment of its relations with Asian powers, particularly India and China, as well as the future of political and security arrangements in Afghanistan. However, this move could send mixed signals that might ultimately affect Iran’s stance on sanctions.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Oil, Sanctions, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, South Asia, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

62. Talks, Markets, and Recognition? Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

Author:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
North Korea has become a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of one’s views about the regime and its treatment of the country’s ordinary citizens, its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its illegal activities ranging from proliferation of WMD to currency counterfeiting, the international community has to accept that it is dealing with a nuclear North Korea. This means that stopping and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer a realistic goal, at least in the short term. Both in public and in private, the regime has clearly indicated that the program itself is not a bargaining tool. Rather, the Kim Jong-un regime considers a nuclear deterrent the best means to avoid the same fate as the Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein regimes: military strikes led or supported by the U.S., followed by the execution of their leaders at the hands of their former citizens. The debate has to now shift towards how to deal with a nuclear North Korea. Sanctions have clearly not worked. The current round of UN and bilateral sanctions implemented from July 2006 onwards has failed. Pyongyang had not even conducted a nuclear test when sanctions were first implemented. Today, it is believed to be in possession of dozens of nuclear devices.3 Isolation of the Kim Jong-un regime has not worked either. Two consecutive South Korean conservative governments led by Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye dismantled many of the cooperation mechanisms set up by their predecessors. The Barack Obama administration refused to countenance diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang unless it changed its behavior. Xi Jinping is yet to meet with Kim Jong-un, even though they sit less than two hours away from each other. In return for sanctions and isolation, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deterrence is a useful way to prevent a North Korean attack on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, few experts think that Pyongyang would strike first.4 Engagement thus seems to be the only viable option to deal with Pyongyang.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

63. International Collaboration Efforts to Denuclearize the Korean Peninsula

Author:
George Hutchinson
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The international community’s confrontation with North Korea reached crisis proportions in 2017, following Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches and its sixth nuclear test. In the wake of a series of high-level summits, tensions began to thaw in 2018. At the inter-Korean summit in Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un agreed to seek support from the international community to denuclearize. But the international community, led by the U.S. in concert with the United Nations Security Council, has already worked tirelessly over the past 26 years to coordinate efforts to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Successive U.S. administrations have worked through the cycle of confrontation, crisis, discussions and agreements with North Korea. Nonetheless, all these agreements have ultimately fallen apart, allowing North Korea to advance its nuclear program. This paper focuses on two key questions: How has the international community contributed toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and what is its role in facilitating the complete, verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program? Ultimately, the success of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula will be measured by whether North Korea completely dismantles its nuclear program. Fortunately, the international “tools” are on the table, but successfully denuclearizing North Korea will, in the end, be a matter of effectively enforcing existing international measures.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

64. North Korea's Strategy in 2018

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
What does North Korea seek at a time of unprecedented sanctions and pressure against it and suddenly developing opportunity, as South Korea and four great powers explore diplomatic overtures? This set of four chapters completed at the height of anticipation for summits in 2018 approaches Pyongyang’s strategy from diverse angles: public relations—how it is striving to shape images of itself, beginning by taking advantage of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics; diplomacy—how it is engaging one state after another to forge an ideal diplomatic environment for securing maximum concessions; economy— how it is coping with sanctions and preparing to realize byungjin by boosting the economic side while deriving credit from the military side; and military—how it continues to develop threat capacities and prepare for contingencies. There is a lot that is unknown about what is driving Kim Jong-un’s behavior with some accentuating the strength achieved by building his threat capacity and others emphasizing the weakness exposed by draconian sanctions. These chapters explore the drivers behind his moves through the lens of strategic objectives, recognizing that the North Korean leader sees a mix of opportunities. This volume covers well into the spring of 2018—including the New Year’s Day address by Kim Jong-un that opened the door to a public relations blitz, the delegations sent to South Korea to kick-start “smile diplomacy” against the backdrop of the Winter Olympic Games, the personal diplomacy by Kim with South Korean officials followed by his outreach to Donald Trump and then a hurried visit to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping, and finally the Panmunjom summit with Moon Jae-in in the last week of April. This whirlwind of public relations and diplomacy against diverse interpretations of their economic and military background captured the world’s attention. Yet, Kim’s strategic intentions largely remain a mystery. Does he expect to retain his missiles and nuclear weapons and be recognized as one of the nuclear powers on essentially equal footing with the world’s great military powers? Does he seek to cut a grand bargain, eliminating these threatening weapons in return for acceptance in the international community with guarantees of security and bountiful economic assistance? Is Kim Jong-un playing a multi-stage game with long-term objectives hidden as he capitalizes on differences among five countries to maneuver in ways still difficult to fathom? Much remains unknown, as we delve into his strategic choices.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Economy, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

65. The Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea’s Luxury Goods Imports

Author:
Hyung-gon Jeong and Hokyung Bang
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This paper aims to analyze the economic impacts of UN sanctions on North Korea’s banned luxury goods imports. The analysis is based on applying Difference-in-Differences Methods to the gravity model. The results show that North Korea’s luxury goods import patterns reflect the aforesaid model. The result of Difference-in-Differences shows that UN Resolutions 1695 and 1718 were ineffective in decreasing North Korea’s luxury goods imports. This paper also found that four countries, primarily China, accounted for 91.4% of North Korea’s luxury goods imports in 2007, and the share of North Korea’s luxury goods accounted for about 5.3% of North Korea’s overall imports.
Topic:
United Nations, Sanctions, and Imports
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

66. China and the Korean Peninsula: Arming Kim, Gutting Sanctions, Opposing THAAD

Author:
Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
China is playing a duplicitous game when it comes to North Korea. It proclaims it is enforcing Security Council resolutions when it is in fact not. The Chinese have overwhelming leverage over the North, but they will not use their power to disarm the Kim Family regime, at least in the absence of intense pressure from the United States. Beijing believes Pyongyang furthers important short-term Chinese objectives, and so views it as a weapon against Washington and others. Beijing’s attempts to punish Seoul over its decision to accept deployment of the THAAD missile defense system reveal true intentions.
Topic:
Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Weapons, Missile Defense, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

67. Japan, Chongryon, and Sanctions

Author:
James F. Durand
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
With nearly 900,000 long-term residents, Japan has one of the largest populations of overseas Koreans. Japan is unique in that it is the only country that further classifies its Korean residents by external political affiliation; i.e., those not adopting Japanese nationality are affiliated with the Korean Residents Union of Japan (Mindan) or the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), organizations that are linked to South and North Korea, respectively. The status of Korean residents in Japan, and both organizations supporting them, is a product of Japan’s complex relationship with the Korean Peninsula during the last century. American concerns about Japan’s Korean residents—both as an occupying power and a treaty ally—add another dimension to what should have been a domestic or bilateral issue between the Government of Japan, its Korean residents, and North or South Korea. Chongryon’s long-term financial, material, and technical support to Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs highlighted the differences between all governments. However, Pyongyang’s admission that it abducted Japanese citizens has brought about significant changes in the Japanese government’s policies toward North Korea and Chongryon. These include the suspension of ferry services between the two countries and limiting remittances to North Korea. As the Trump Administration considers tighter sanctions as part of its North Korean strategy, the history of the Japan’s relations with its proPyongyang residents provides a cautionary tale about the international community’s ability to use sanctions as a means to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile ambitions.
Topic:
Immigration, Sanctions, Weapons, Ethnicity, and Abductions
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

68. Getting Real on Sanctions Is Key to Pressuring North Korea

Author:
Melanie Hart and Renee Ding
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
As the Trump administration’s approach to North Korea appears to shift back and forth between saber rattling and hints of diplomacy—with leading administration officials at times sending contradictory signals—it is clear that the administration needs an overarching strategy for addressing the North Korean threat. That strategy must include a tough, smart, and carefully targeted sanctions offensive. However, given President Donald Trump’s fiery exchanges with Kim Jong Un, and the drumbeat of White House statements and media opinion pieces discussing potentially imminent military action, one can be forgiven for having the impression that the United States has already run its best sanction plays against North Korea. In reality, that effort has only just begun, and if the United States can stay the course, it has the potential to turn this crisis around. Chinese diplomats often claim that it is pointless for China to cut off its economic ties with North Korea because Kim Jong Un would rather let his people starve than give up his nuclear program.1 They give an impression that there is no middle ground: If China pushes North Korea economically, the regime will resist until it collapses, triggering a massive security crisis on the Korean Peninsula.2 There is an equal amount of hand-wringing on the U.S. side. American observers tend to view the past decade of apparently ineffective U.N. action as evidence that sanctions are a dead end and military action will eventually become inevitable. In truth, there is a middle road on sanctions and it runs in two directions: through China and through North Korea’s gateways to the international financial system. The reality is that North Korea is much more exposed than many observers recognize, and the United States has only just begun to target the regime’s biggest weak spots. Instead of blowing hot and cold with China and exchanging blustery rhetoric with North Korea—two approaches that give China maneuvering room to avoid action—the United States needs to double down on a strategy that deals an economic blow against North Korea on par with the blow that brought Iran to the negotiation table in 2013.3
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

69. A U.S. Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
James Walsh
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Despite a crowded news agenda, North Korea has managed to draw the attention of both political leaders and the public at large. Missile tests, an assassination employing VX nerve agent, and preparations for a nuclear test have drawn strong reaction from Washington to Kuala Lumpur. Each new controversy sends policymakers scrambling for a response and, more often than not, that response has been a call for new and tougher sanctions. And not surprisingly, each new call for sanctions resurrects the old question: do sanctions on North Korea have any impact?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

70. A South Korean Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
Kim Joong-ho
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
There is no way to hurt the regime of the DPRK without hurting its people; and there is no way to support the people of the DPRK without supporting its regime. Thus, discussing the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea demands hard labor in fact-finding and tremendous patience until the desired effects are witnessed. Sanctions are time and energy consuming. In order to curb North Korea’s enthusiasm for long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, the sanctions regime needs to be upgraded.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea