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11. East Vs. West: A New Cold War?

Author:
Richard Sakwa
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Cold War has returned to dominate international politics. Expectations that the end of the Cold War in 1989 would lead to a more inclusive and comprehensive peace seems to be practically failed, and instead, by 2014, the centenary of the start of the First World War, Europe was once again wracked by conflict. On the one side, the U.S.-led Political West shaped by the Cold War remained the main protagonist. In contrast, on the other hand, a much-weakened Russia took the place of the former Soviet Union, now accompanied by a China intent on restoring its status as a great power. The article examines why a new cold war emerges again, and analyses how such a ‘Cold War II’ differs from the original.
Topic:
Cold War, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. The Role of Democracy Discourse in the Emerging "New Cold War"

Author:
Emre Demir and Sirma Altun
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
In the first three decades after China initiated reform and opening-up policies in 1978, its relations with the United States (U.S.) improved steadily. However, in the post-2007/2008 global financial crisis period, both countries’ attitudes toward each other began to change. Particularly since the Trump administration, as the U.S. started to define China as its main competitor, their bilateral relations deteriorated further. As a result, scholars, diplomats, and politicians worldwide began to talk about the emergence of a new Cold War between China and the U.S., encompassing economic, ideological, military, and political aspects. The ideological aspect of this emerging “new Cold War” revolves around the discourse of democracy.
Topic:
Cold War, Hegemony, Democracy, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. China's response to the US tech war: The closing of detours

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the US-China rivalry, no battle is currently more fierce than the one over technology, with both countries ramping up efforts to pursue global technological leadership. The tech war has intensified under President Joe Biden, with the US’s strangling of China’s technological bottleneck getting tighter and tighter. The US’s stated aims are protecting its national security and foreign policy interests and preventing sensitive technologies with military applications from being acquired by China. Some analysts point to Beijing’s Made in China 2025 as the trigger of the tech war because that is China’s plan to upgrade manufacturing and seek the top positions in global value chains. The US is pursuing a strategy to outcompete and outmanoeuvre China, as is stated in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy in October 2022: “this decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our [the US’s] competition with the PRC”. Especially in the sector of semiconductors or chips, where the West controls China’s access to the most advanced technology, US restrictions and its ability to bring its allies into line have been destructive to China’s development. On 21 May 2023, Beijing’s ban of American chipmaker Micron from critical information infrastructure in China signals a first direct retaliation from Beijing. China has also realised that some of its hitherto measures—turning to alternative sources of import, utilising policy loopholes, and sufficing with lower-level technology—are just detours. They are not long-term solutions; nor can they be the foundation of China’s national security. The US restrictions have forced China to adopt new measures to accelerate domestic innovation with more focus on basic research and market forces. How the tech war will play out has important implications for Western countries and global supply chains. This policy brief will focus on China’s responses to the US-waged tech war, specifically: What have been China’s domestic measures to respond to the tech restrictions from the US, and what is China’s potential for technological breakthrough? What have been China’s international responses, and what are China’s options for retaliation?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. Xi Moderates to US and Others Amid Continued Competition

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Southeast Asia was the center of international attention in November as regional and global leaders gathered at the G20 conference in Indonesia, which took place between the annual ASEAN-hosted summit meetings in Cambodia and the yearly APEC leaders meeting in Thailand. Acute China-US rivalry loomed large in media and other forecasts, warning of a clash of US-Chinese leaders with negative implications feared in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The positive outcome of the Biden-Xi summit at the G20 conference and related actions eased tensions, which was welcomed, particularly in Southeast Asia, but the implications for the US and allies’ competition with China remain to be seen. Tensions over disputes in the South China Sea continued unabated. President Xi Jinping made his first trip to a major international gathering at the G20 conference followed by the APEC meeting after more than two years of self-imposed isolation in line with his government’s strict COVID-19 restrictions. His visit occurred against the background of China’s unprecedented military show of force in response to US advances in relations with Taiwan, strident criticism of US efforts to increase influence in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and remarkable warnings about China’s determination to resist adverse international threats in his landmark report to the 20thCommunist Party Congress in October validating his third term as party leader. Representing the United States at the ASEAN and G20 summits, President Joseph Biden gave no ground on Taiwan or other sensitive issues, increased US support for the island government, signed two massive bills calling for over half a trillion dollars of spending to compete with China on high technology and climate change, and imposed strict export controls on advanced computer chip technology to undermine China’s high technology ambitions. Because of protocol and scheduling, Xi and Biden overlapped only at the G20 meeting, making the Xi-Biden summit meeting on the sidelines of that conference a focus of attention. As discussed in the US-China chapter of this edition of Comparative Connections, Xi adopted a more moderate approach in dealing with the United States. He notably ended China’s past insistence that the United States change its policies toward China before China would agree to the Biden government’s longstanding request to work with China to set guardrails to manage US-China rivalry in ways that would avoid military conflict. The Chinese leader’s new approach was accompanied by public diplomacy efforts that were remarkable because they were starkly contrary to Chinese diplomacy throughout 2022. Chinese representatives and commentary endeavored to persuade audiences in Southeast Asia and elsewhere that Xi’s report and recent strident Chinese commentary and provocative actions did not represent China’s intentions. They corrected such “misperceptions” and advised that Chinese intentions were moderate, accommodating, and positive, focused on constructive outreach for cooperation in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. In addition to the United States, targets for this call to improve ties included US allies and partners heretofore strongly criticized by China for their policies in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, notably Japan and Australia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

15. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes: Discontinuities Between Land and Sea

Author:
Benjamin Jebb
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
When does China use force to settle territorial disputes? This paper leverages data from the Correlates of War project and Stanford’s Mapping Interstate Territorial Conflict repository to demonstrate that China takes different approaches to settling terrestrial and sea-based disputes. While China has tacitly accepted the territorial status quo and generally used force only after a rival challenged extant terrestrial boundaries, it has initiated revisions to the territorial status quo in the maritime domain. This paper contends that China takes different approaches to its terrestrial disagreements and maritime disputes due to the Chinese Communist Party’s internal risk calculus. While land-based disputes can stoke unmanageable levels of escalation, factors specific to the maritime domain are more likely to keep militarized incidents contained.
Topic:
Security, Territorial Disputes, Maritime, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China and Asia

17. Finding Firmer Ground: The Role of High Technology in U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Sara Hsu, Ja Ian Chong, Rorry Daniels, Hargisl Shirley Martey, and John Lee
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
The latest installment in the Finding Firmer Ground report series examines how technological advancements have increased distrust and uncertainty in U.S.-China relations. From big data to semiconductors, the multiauthor report looks into the geopolitical implications of technological development and what strategies, if any, policymakers in the United States and China can take to mitigate tensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. Immaterial Competition: Rethinking the Roles of Economics and Technology in the US-China Rivalry

Author:
Arthur Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-China rivalry is likely to be the fulcrum around which international affairs are structured in the twenty-first century, akin to the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. This rivalry, like its predecessor, emerges from divergent geopolitical interests and imperatives. While the Chinese Communist Party’s aims are many, various, and subject to change, they include its continued control of the Chinese State; economic and technological modernization and leadership; internal order; complete union with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms; certain territorial concessions from its neighbors; and the disestablishment of security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific that it views as threatening and trammeling. The latter three are in direct conflict with US interests and imperatives in the Indo-Pacific: prohibiting China’s unilateral modification of the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies and partners; and maintaining its military partnerships and presence in the region. These antithetical interests animate a larger struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and serve as the terms on which this contest will be decided. Explanations of the rivalry as an ideological contest or a competition born from competing economic interests are less compelling by comparison. The United States and China are motivated to an extent by ideological imperatives, but these do not appear to propel or serve as the central stakes for the rivalry as much as they affect each’s disposition toward the other. Long-standing trade, investment, and commercial disputes and competition, meanwhile, are not so substantial that they motivate the rivalry. While these issues are impactful to niche communities and conspicuous to national policymakers, they are not particularly consequential for national prosperity. The logic of competition, trade, and globalization, in fact, suggests that the US-China commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, notwithstanding each’s concerns with the other’s economic statecraft and market-leading firms. In their geopolitical rivalry, there are a few key forces or contests of interest: path dependence, regime continuity, prudent strategy, third-party alignments, and the balance of military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Each affects the United States’ and China’s ability to achieve their ends and shapes their rivalry. Economic and technological statecraft, by contrast, is largely peripheral to these ends as it does not effectively advance political objectives relevant to territory, borders, security architectures, and national defense. That is not to suggest that economic and technological factors are irrelevant, however; they shape, constrain, and advantage the United States and China across their rivalry’s key forces and contests of interests. Particularly noteworthy are economic and technological factors’ impact on the military balance. Tradition and intuition hold that nations with bigger and more advanced economies are better postured to resource, procure, and manufacture military equipment and can therefore generate greater military power. In the case of the US-China military competition, however, total military power is less relevant than the specific military balance in the Indo-Pacific, in which the distribution and strength of forces in the theater, the capability and reliability of key materiel inputs of outsized importance, and the operational concepts and tactics with which each’s military fights are more important. Total military power—and in particular greater military equipment—matters on the margin, of course, if only because the party with the greater mass and quality of materiel will be able to retain more forces in the Indo-Pacific, maintain more of these key materiel inputs, and develop novel operational concepts and tactics tailored to their superior materiel. Neither the United States’ nor China’s total economic production, public balance sheet, high-technology commercial firms, and scientific production are likely to provide a decisive or lasting advantage on this count. Each country’s economy can support substantially greater military spending, limiting the extent to which one can derive an advantage from the other’s more binding constraints. The capacity and maturity of each country’s defense industrial base is of greater relevance, but these are flexible quotients that investment can improve. This elasticity of defense production suggests that microeconomic endowments may be binding in the short run but variable in the longer run, meaning that policy choices—rather than existing economic endowments—constrain military production. Technological endowments, informing each country’s capacity for broad innovation, are of similarly bounded importance because military technology is somewhat narrow and other factors, such as military procurement processes and inflexibility in concepts of operation, limit the extent to which superior technology translates into military advantage. The fundamental result of this argument is that the concerns that propel the emerging US-China economic and technological competition are ultimately not all that relevant to the matters at the core to their rivalry and to the instruments of national power most relevant to these issues. The US should therefore be wary of policies ostensibly demanded by economic and technological competition and may find its interests better served by limiting its rivalry with China to military competition driven by its core geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. US-China geoeconomic rivalry intensifies: A risk or an opportunity for European companies?

Author:
Jana Titievskaia
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
As the US and China balance between the pursuit of strategic security interests and ambitions to attain economic growth, novel sources of risk are emerging for globally active businesses, ranging from sanctions to export controls. The Biden presidency will offer only moderate respite from the escalation of this geoeconomic rivalry, even as US-China trade recovers in the aftermath of the pandemic. In the face of US-China rivalry, the EU and its member states have opted for the third way of “open strategic autonomy”, including a range of trade instruments that will allow the EU to support the competitiveness of its companies more effectively. European companies need to closely monitor their risk exposure in various transmission channels and stay attuned to unexpected opportunities that can materialise in the form of market entry possibilities and the development of new niches.
Topic:
Hegemony, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. Russia’s connectivity strategies in Eurasia: Politics over economy

Author:
Kristiina Silvan and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Russia has been attempting to strengthen connectivity within Eurasia since the early 2000s as a part of its policy to “pivot to the East”. Yet due to limited resources and political will, the tangible effects of its connectivity strategy have remained limited. The Russian Far East would greatly benefit from an improved connectivity infrastructure, given its proximity to Asian markets and the abundance of natural resources in the region. However, the attempts to accelerate regional socio-economic development by strengthening the region’s connectivity have failed to make a difference. In post-Soviet Central Asia, Russia adopted a passive approach to connectivity in the 1990s and 2000s, which meant focusing on maintaining and protecting the links inherited from the Soviet Union. It was only the pressure of external actors – both China and the West – that prompted Moscow to take a more active stance in the region in the 2010s. The launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative pushed Russia to promote its own grand vision of trans-continental connectivity, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, designed to reaffirm Moscow’s great-power status and its equal standing with China. While it lacks economic and administrative foundations and its implementation is highly implausible, it has fulfilled a symbolic role as Russia’s grand connectivity project for Eurasia.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Rivalry, and Resource Allocation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia