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1. North Korea is Winning the Information War

Author:
Jonathan Corrado, Chelsie Alexandre, and Alexander Tufto
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The outside world has been presented with two contradictory images of North Korea’s younger generation. In the outside media, youth are portrayed as rebellious and radical, ignoring the Kim regime’s increasingly harsh crackdowns on foreign media and trends, and instead toting the latest South Korean fashion trends and adopting South Korean lingo. Meanwhile, state propaganda pushes the narrative that North Korean youth are extremely devoted to Kim Jong Un and the regime. Both conceptions of North Korea’s younger generation fail to acknowledge a more complex reality. Kim Jong Un understands the importance of winning over the younger generation to ensure his regime’s survival. Since coming into power, Kim has increased the severity of punishments for importing, distributing, and consuming foreign media. This strangled information environment amplifies the efficacy of a youth loyalty campaign designed to bear hug the younger generation. As a consequence, when compared with older cohorts, North Korean youth have a more favorable view of the regime, juche ideology, and Kim Jong Un himself. In short, the campaign is working. A reinvigorated foreign media distribution strategy is needed to break the impasse and win the battle over hearts and minds. Despite the dangers, North Koreans remain highly interested in foreign media. Research shows that those who consume tend to feel more fondly about South Korea and view the North Korean regime critically. Foreign media provides a powerful basis to cross check regime propaganda and can even lay the foundation for a shared understanding of concepts like human rights and civil society. A reinvigorated strategy should focus on content curation and innovative dissemination methods to maximize utility and minimize blowback for end users in North Korea.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Media, Propaganda, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

2. Kursk Incursion Draws Delayed Response From Beijing

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Official media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has finally begun to comment on the Ukrainian operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast, which began on August 6. It gives Ukraine low odds of success, emphasizes Russia’s strength and successes elsewhere in the conflict, and has started amplifying Russian propaganda about US involvement and potential Ukrainian attacks on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. For the two weeks after Ukrainian forces invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6, PRC state media either ignored the developments or provided minimal reporting, mostly recycling statements from Russian officials and media. The PRC’s muted coverage follows a pattern of delayed responses to surprising events and volatile situations, also seen at the outbreak of the war and during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. This can be taken as evidence that authoritarian systems are not necessarily capable of responding quickly to developments, especially when decision making is highly centralized.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

3. On the Propaganda and Supply Fronts of the Russia-Ukraine War: North Korean Soldiers, Workers, and Munitions in the Donbas?

Author:
Avram Agov
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the past summer, there were reports about the possibility of North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) providing 100,000 volunteers to fight with the Russian army in Ukraine as well as construction workers to help reconstruct war-torn areas in the Donbas. These reports, based on Russian sources, became fodder in the propaganda war in Ukraine and resonated in international media and the academic community. Western sources reported possible supply of North Korean munitions to the Russian army. This paper will critically assess the three reports in the context of wartime dynamics and in the wider international context. The feasibility of sending North Korean troops, munitions, and workers to Russia will be viewed in light of the latest wartime developments in both Ukraine and Russia, including the retreat of the Russian army in some of the occupied areas, Russian partial mobilization and the annexation of four Ukrainian regions. The international context of evaluation includes the recent history of Russia-North Korea security and economic relations. The essay will argue that sending North Korean soldiers to Ukraine is out of the question, though the dispatch of North Korean workers has some degree of probability. The likeliest possibility is Russian procurement of North Korean munitions.
Topic:
Propaganda, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

4. Countering United Front Work: Taiwan’s Political Warfare System

Author:
Mariah Thornton
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This strategic update introduces the challenges posed by China’s united front work, which has significantly expanded due to unprecedented institutional elevation and support under Xi Jinping. Mariah argues that Taiwan—a country that has effectively resisted China’s united front activities for several decades—can serve as an instructive case for other democratic countries in institutionalising counter-interference operations. The briefing initially explores the origins of Taiwan’s political warfare system, its evolution from the martial law era to democratisation in the 1990s, and how this history informs the institution’s modern structure and operations. The information presented in this report was compiled during a period of fieldwork in Taiwan from late September to early November 2022, in which she interviewed dozens of political warfare officers as well as Taiwanese defence and security experts–a majority of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. In the conclusion, Mariah offers broad policy recommendations based on these findings that may be applicable to other countries experiencing united front work activities and or seeking to institutionalise counter-interference operations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

5. How Chinese Propaganda Works

Author:
Grigol Julukhidze
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
China is becoming an ever more powerful player in the international political arena. Once a regional power, it now represents the main rival to US global dominance. Over the last few years, Beijing has actively started to apply “propagandistic methods” in order to increase its importance and demonize actual or potential foes. From this point of view, the visibility of the Chinese propaganda model is not as high in Georgia as, for example, the Russian. The main task of the below-presented expert opinion is to illustrate and analyze one of the most powerful machines of disinformation in the world and answer the question, “How does Chinese propaganda work?”
Topic:
Propaganda, Disinformation, and International Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Georgia

6. Time to Leave China’s “16+1” Influence Trap

Author:
Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Last week Estonia and Latvia followed Lithuania and quit what used to be known as 16+1, as the Czech Republic and other participating countries become increasingly vocal in their scepticism of the initiative. The 16+1 format, officially known as Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (中国—中东欧 国家合作, Zhongguo-Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), was launched in 2012 as a China-centric initiative incorporating 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In 2019, Greece—which is heavily indebted to China—joined, and the platform was briefly renamed 17+1. While it is officially described as an economic cooperation platform, its real achievements and the PRC’s approach to it show that trade and investment were never its true focus. Rather, the PRC used it as a propaganda and influence tool, wasting CEE diplomatic capacity on activities that only benefited Beijing. The lack of benefits and abundance of risks have recently led several CEE countries to reassess their participation in the 16+1 format. The time has come for the rest of the participating countries to join their Baltic neighbours and ditch this PRC influence vehicle.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Soft Power, Propaganda, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Estonia

7. Frontier influencers: the new face of China’s propaganda

Author:
Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores how the Chinese party-state’s globally focused propaganda and disinformation capabilities are evolving and increasing in sophistication. Concerningly, this emerging approach by the Chinese party-state to influence international discourse on China, including obfuscating its record of human rights violations, is largely flying under the radar of US social media platforms and western policymakers. In the broader context of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to censor speech, promote disinformation and seed the internet with its preferred narratives, we focus on a small but increasingly popular set of YouTube accounts that feature mainly female China-based ethnic-minority influencers from the troubled frontier regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, hereafter referred to as ‘frontier influencers’ or ‘frontier accounts’. Despite being blocked in China, YouTube is seen by the CCP as a key battlefield in its ideological contestation with the outside world, and YouTube’s use in foreign-facing propaganda efforts has intensified in recent years. Originally deployed on domestic video-sharing platforms to meet an internal propaganda need, frontier-influencer content has since been redirected towards global audiences on YouTube as part of the CCP’s evolving efforts to counter criticisms of China’s human rights problems and burnish the country’s image. Alongside party-state media and foreign vloggers, these carefully vetted domestic vloggers are increasingly seen as another key part of Beijing’s external propaganda arsenal. Their use of a more personal style of communication and softer presentation is expected to be more convincing than traditional party-state media content, which is often inclined towards the more rigid and didactic. For the CCP, frontier influencers represent, in the words of one Chinese propaganda expert, ‘guerrillas or militia’ fighting on the flanks in ‘the international arena of public opinion’, while party-state media or the ‘regular army’ ‘charge, kill and advance on the frontlines’. The frontier accounts we examine in this report were predominantly created in 2020–21 and feature content that closely hews to CCP narratives, but their less polished presentation has a more authentic feel that conveys a false sense of legitimacy and transparency about China’s frontier regions that party-state media struggle to achieve. For viewers, the video content appears to be the creation of the individual influencers, but is in fact what’s referred to in China as ‘professional user generated content’, or content that’s produced with the help of special influencer-management agencies known as multi-channel networks (MCNs). For the mostly young and female Uyghur, Tibetan and other ethnic-minority influencers we examine in this report, having such an active presence on a Western social media platform is highly unusual, and ordinarily would be fraught with danger. But, as we reveal, frontier influencers are carefully vetted and considered politically reliable. The content they create is tightly circumscribed via self-censorship and oversight from their MCNs and domestic video platforms before being published on YouTube. In one key case study, we show how frontier influencers’ content was directly commissioned by the Chinese party-state. Because YouTube is blocked in China, individual influencers based in the country aren’t able to receive advertising revenue through the platform’s Partner Program, which isn’t available there. But, through their arrangements with YouTube, MCNs have been able to monetise content for frontier influencers, as well as for hundreds of other China-based influencers on the platform. Given that many of the MCNs have publicly committed to promote CCP propaganda, this arrangement results in a troubling situation in which MCNs are able to monetise their activities, including the promotion of disinformation, via their access to YouTube’s platform. The use of professionally supported frontier influencers also appears to be aimed at ensuring that state-backed content ranks well in search results because search-engine algorithms tend to prioritise fresh content and channels that post regularly. From the CCP’s perspective, the continuous flooding of content by party-state media, foreign influencers and professionally supported frontier influencers onto YouTube is aimed at outperforming other more critical but stale content. This new phenomenon reflects a continued willingness, identified in previous ASPI ICPC reports,1 by the Chinese party-state to experiment in its approach to shaping online political discourse, particularly on those topics that have the potential to disrupt its strategic objectives. By targeting online audiences on YouTube through intermediary accounts managed by MCNs, the CCP can hide its affiliation with those influencers and create the appearance of ‘independent’ and ‘authoritative’ voices supporting its narratives, including disinformation that it’s seeking to propagate globally. This report (on page 42) makes a series of policy recommendations, including that social media platforms shouldn’t allow MCNs who are conducting propaganda and disinformation work on behalf of the Chinese party-state to monetise their activities or be recognised by the platforms as, for example, official partners or award winners. This report also recommends that social media platforms broaden their practice of labelling the accounts of state media, agencies and officials to include state-linked influencers from the People’s Republic of China.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Social Media, Propaganda, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8. Assessing the impact of CCP information operations related to Xinjiang

Author:
Albert Zhang and Tilla Hoja
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using technology to enforce transnational digital repression and influence unwitting audiences beyond China’s territory. This includes using increasingly sophisticated online tactics to deny, distract from and deter revelations or claims of human rights abuses, including the arbitrary detention, mass sterilisation and cultural degradation of minorities in Xinjiang. Instead of improving its treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities, the CCP is responding to critiques of its current actions against human rights by coordinating its state propaganda apparatus, security agencies and public relations industry to silence and shape Xinjiang narratives at home and abroad. Central to the CCP’s efforts is the exploitation of US-based social media and content platforms. CCP online public diplomacy is bolstered by covert and coercive campaigns that impose costs and seek to constrain international entities—be they states, corporations or individuals—from offering evidence-based critiques of the party-state’s record on human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and other sensitive issues. This asymmetric access to US-based social media platforms allows the CCP to continue testing online tactics, measuring responses and improving its influence and interference capabilities, in both overt and covert ways, across a spectrum of topics. The impact of these operations isn’t widely understood, and the international community has failed to adequately respond to the global challenges posed by the CCP’s rapidly evolving propaganda and disinformation operations. This report seeks to increase awareness about this problem based on publicly available information.
Topic:
Human Rights, Propaganda, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Uyghurs, and Information
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

9. No Better Way to Promote Human Rights and Peace on the Korean Peninsula? Propaganda Leaflet Dropping and the South Korean Government’s Leafleting Ban

Author:
Youngsoo Yu
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Anti-North Korea leaflets that are flown across the inter-Korean border to North Korea have consistently been a topic of controversy. While South Korean activists deem the practice crucial for promoting human rights in North Korea, North Korea has vocally criticized the act in fear that the leaflets could delegitimize its regime. Following a series of psychological warfare acts of propaganda leaflet dropping, the South Korean National Assembly passed a bill prohibiting the act of sending anti-North Korea leaflets. This was done in hopes of alleviating rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula and inducing North Korea into opening up for more dialogue and contact among the two Koreas. However, Youngsoo Yu, professor at the University of North Korean Studies, provides commentary critical of the government’s decision, claiming that the government has not only acted against the principles and values shared by the international community, but was also mistaken in prioritizing political purposes over the defense of human rights. Additionally, South Korea has not taken the appropriate measures to improve human rights conditions in North Korea. Moving forward, he claims that it is crucial for South Korea to work together with the international community and revamp its strategies to promote greater engagement with the hermit kingdom.
Topic:
Human Rights, Borders, Propaganda, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

10. The Futility of North Korean Propagandistic News

Author:
Sandip Kumar Mishra
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Propaganda, among other tools, is a widely used means by the North Korean government to bolster the basis of its regime. The use of distorted news through inaccurate publications is one way in which propagandistic information is circulated within not only North Korea, but also in foreign countries online. In this commentary, Dr. Sandip Mishra, Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, argues that the old way of propaganda negatively impacts North Korea’s reputation. To illustrate, Rodong Sinmun has disseminated inaccurate information on North Korea’s international reputation and its diplomatic relations with other countries; this has not been taken seriously by other countries. Notably, he argues that North Korea’s claims on its relations with India have been found to be based on inaccurate or nonexistent facts. The author emphasizes that North Korea must realize that they need to stop producing propagandistic news and focus on their political and economic reforms.
Topic:
News Analysis, Propaganda, Fake News, and Reputation
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea