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1. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 2: The New Plan for Training Party Cadres

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 29, 2023, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a gathering of People’s Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic personnel in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. He instructed his audience to compose a “diplomatic iron army (外交铁军)” representing China’s interests. Notably, Xi emphasized the need for correct political thinking: asserting that they must “persist in our revolution (坚持自我革命),” “be steadfast in political conviction (政治信念坚定),” and “build a sturdy ideological line of defense (筑牢思想防线)” about themselves in the performance of their work (Yang Guang Wang, December 30, 2023). These comments are the latest example of an extensive series of efforts by the CCP leadership in late 2023 to reinforce ideological regimentation within the Party. On October 16, 2023, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a new document titled the National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2023-2027) [全国干部教育培训规划 (2023-2027年)] (hereafter “2023 Cadre Plan”), which laid out extensive new requirements for ideological study on the part of CCP officials (PRC Government, October 16, 2023). This move had been signaled at a CCP Politburo meeting at the end of August, which was reportedly convened to deliberate on new draft documents related to ideological training for Party members. The official coverage of the August meeting emphasized that forthcoming Party directives would further scrutinize “political judgment (政治判断力)”—signifying loyalty and obedience to the central Party leadership—and “strengthen political gatekeeping (加强政治把关)” for cadre reliability (PRC Government, August 31, 2023).
Topic:
Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2. The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century

Author:
Orhan Çifçi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
In his book, The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century, Bruce Dickson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, thoroughly scrutinizes China’s domestic political system and the inner structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dickson largely limits his primer to the post-Mao period, with each of the book’s sections answering specific research questions: “What Keeps the Party in Power?”, “How Are Leaders Chosen?”, “How Are Policies Made?”, “Does China Have a Civil Society?”, “Do Political Protests Threaten Political Stability?”, “Why Does the Party Fear Religion?”, “How Nationalistic Is China?” and “Will China Become Democratic?”. Each question he seeks answers to sheds light on the relationship between the CCP and Chinese society. Dickson argues that the CCP has exercised unopposed authority throughout the country since 1949 despite many elite conflicts, economic catastrophes and social unrests. Nevertheless, the party has not always resorted to repressive methods to stay in power. Rather, it is the author’s main argument that the main survival policy is the party’s ability to be responsive to the demands of Chinese people. For Dickson, the repression-responsiveness dichotomy is the core strategy that made it possible for the CCP to rule China as a single party for decades.
Topic:
Politics, History, Book Review, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3. China Maritime Report No. 40: Onboard Political Control - The Ship Political Commissar in Chinese Merchant Shipping

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.
Topic:
History, Political Parties, Shipping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. ‘Self-Revolution’ Suggests Stronger CCDI Mandate

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Xi Jinping addressed the perennial dilemma of corruption within the CCP, pronouncing “victory” in a decade of anti-corruption efforts but simultaneously warning that the situation remains “grim and complex.” In the short term, anti-corruption crackdowns are expected to continue, with Xi targeting sectors with concentrated power, capital-intensive industries, and resource-rich areas. The military, particularly the Strategic Support Force, might face increased scrutiny. The third plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the twentieth party congress took place on January 8, emphasizing “courage in [performing] self-revolution” as a distinctive character and advantage of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Topic:
Corruption, Political Parties, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

5. New Textbook Reveals Xi Jinping’s Doctrine of Han-centric Nation-Building

Author:
James Leibold
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Another cultural revolution is in full swing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This is not the purported class revolution Mao advocated in the past, but rather a wave of Han cultural and racial nationalism. Xi’s new approach to ethnic minority policy repudiates the Party’s past promise to allow minority nationalities to exercise political and cultural autonomy, becoming “masters of their own house.” Following more than ten years of incremental change, a new textbook from scholar-officials articulates the discourse, ideology, and policies associated with a new Han-centric narrative of China’s past and future. In this conception, the sovereignties and homelands of the Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongol, and other indigenous minorities are erased and replaced with a seamless teleology of the Han colonial and racial becoming.
Topic:
Education, Culture, Political Parties, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 1: The PRC’s New “Patriotic Education Law”

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On October 24, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee (全国人民代表大会常务委) officially codified the country’s existing initiatives for “patriotic education (PE; 爱国主义教育)” by promulgating the People’s Republic of China Patriotic Education Law (中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法). This mandates indoctrination in state-directed ideological content throughout all sectors of society (PRC Government, October 25). While CCP policy documents are always more important than formal PRC law, the Party-state does use formal laws passed by the National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会) to codify and emphasize Party policies. This law appears to be no exception. [1] The unveiling of the new Patriotic Education Law has been accompanied by a campaign of predictably laudatory coverage in PRC state media. For example, the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily ran a flowery editorial that quoted a professor from the China University of Political Science and Law as stating that “implementing the patriotic education law will enhance the daily practice of patriotic spirit” among the Chinese people. The editorial itself opined that the NPC had, “on the basis of the rule of law, promoted and guaranteed New Era patriotic education, inspiring the nation’s spirit, concentrating the people’s strength, advancing the building of a strong country [and] national revival with extremely significant and profound meaning” (People’s Daily, November 23). Such coverage has appeared alongside other official messaging emphasizing the need for enhanced focus on ideological instruction. For example, the mid-October issue of the CCP’s official journal Qiushi (求实) was a themed issue focused on ideology. It featured a lead article under Xi’s name titled “Open New Frontiers for the Sinicization and Modernization of Marxism.” It also included a list of articles on supporting themes, such as a Central Party School article titled “In the New Era and New Journey, Unceasingly Advance the Party’s Innovations in Theory” (Qiushi, October 16).
Topic:
Education, Law, Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7. Party Ties: Vietnam, Cuba and China’s Relations with Other Marxist-Leninist States

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last month, on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership (中越全面战略合作伙伴关系), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping met with Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Politburo Member and Head of the Central Committee Organization Commission Truong Thi Mai and asked her to convey his greetings to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], April 26). [1] The visit to Beijing by Mai, who has headed the VCP’s powerful organization commission since 2021 and was appointed to the Secretariat in March, occurred days after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Vietnam (NhanDan, April 15; VN Express, March 6). As the maritime dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea has intensified over the past fifteen years, Washington has deepened its ties with Hanoi based on overlapping geostrategic interests. Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s ability to achieve its goal of upgrading the U.S. relationship with Vietnam to a “strategic partnership” this year to mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.-Vietnam “comprehensive partnership” remains in question (Fulcrum.sg, April 20). Vietnam undoubtedly perceives the PRC’s drive to consolidate control over the South China Sea as its main geopolitical challenge. Moreover, Vietnam’s relationship with its larger northern neighbor is colored by mistrust derived from historical memories of Chinese occupation and a long legacy of conflict, including the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the subsequent series of border and naval clashes in the 1980s. However, the VCP, particularly the conservative faction, now views the U.S. as posing its primary ideological threat and is fearful that Washington aims to undermine its grip on power (Nikkei Asia, May 11, 2022). As two scholars at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences note in a recent analysis, Hanoi’s reluctance to upgrade ties with the U.S. stems not only from fear of angering China but also from concern with “Washington’s excessive focus on press freedom, religious freedom, and human rights as an internal intrusion and potential threat to Vietnam’s political security.” [2] Hence, Beijing is able to arrest Hanoi from drifting towards closer alignment with Washington by leveraging their shared Communist systems and mutual concerns about Western efforts to facilitate the “peaceful evolution” of communist states into liberal democracies. During his meeting with VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing last October, Xi spoke to both Party leaderships’ mutual concern with regime security. He stressed that each side “should stay committed to the socialist orientation” and called for increased party-party exchanges to facilitate “mutual learning in party governance and state administration, maintain high-level communication and strategic dialogue between the two militaries, achieve more outcomes in cooperation on law enforcement and security, and safeguard the political security and social stability of respective countries” (FMPRC, October 31). Party-to-party ties are a key element of the PRC’s relationships with the other three states with ruling Communist Parties: Vietnam, Cuba and Laos. [3] As with the CCP, the Vietnamese, Cuban and Laotian Communist Parties have each adapted and modified Marxist-Leninism to suit their national conditions, regional situations and elite political preferences. Despite their considerable differences, these states’ mutual Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations and systems foster shared interests, including maintaining regime security and “stability,” opposing perceived external attempts to define and impose Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, advancing a state-led model of economic development and promoting a more multipolar world.
Topic:
International Relations, Socialism/Marxism, Partnerships, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, and Cuba

8. Why Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election is Wide Open

Author:
Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Shortly after Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered the worst loss in its 37-year history, Nikkei Asia Review published an article entitled “Taiwan’s KMT has a mountain to climb for 2024 presidential race” that cautioned not to read too much into the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) success in the local elections last November (Nikkei Asia, November 29, 2022). The piece argued that voters still perceive the KMT as being too close to China, a liability in a national election focused on cross-Strait relations, and hamstrung by uncertainty about who should serve as its presidential candidate next year. Although the KMT confronts significant challenges heading into Taiwan’s 2024 elections, the difficulties the party faces should not be overestimated. Rather than a mountain, the KMT has a modest hill to climb. Over the past 22 years, Taiwan’s national politics have swung like a pendulum, favoring the DPP from 2000-2008, the KMT from 2008-2016 and the DPP again since 2016. Taiwanese voters, like their counterparts in other thriving democracies, sometimes vote for change even if they are not enamored with a particular candidate. Since Taiwan fully democratized in 1996, no political party has won three consecutive presidential terms, with DPP and KMT presidents alternating every eight years. President Tsai Ing-wen has avoided the kinds of issues, corruption scandals and major popular demonstrations against her policies that undid the presidencies of her predecessors, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, leading to opposition wins in the 2008 and 2016 presidential elections, respectively. Nevertheless, Tsai has been dramatically weakened by the DPP’s crushing defeat in the November 2022 local elections (Jamestown Foundation, November 29, 2022). She stepped down as DPP party chair after the elections as the party has taken a hit for its many pandemic missteps, a flagging economy and a contentious cross-Strait policy (United Daily News, November 27, 2022). The DPP’s likely candidate in the 2024 election, current Vice President Lai Ching-te, while personally popular, would represent continuity with Tsai’s policies (China Brief, March 3). Together, these factors will likely make the 2024 race the closest since 2004, when the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu eked out a victory against the KMT’s Lien Chan and James Soong of the People First Party (PFP) by a margin of just 0.22 percent (Taipei Times, March 21, 2004).
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

9. Taiwan’s Local Elections: Defeat of the Ruling DPP Amidst Negative Campaigns

Author:
Kai-Ping Huang
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Taiwan held “nine-in-one” local elections on November 26, 2022, and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) lost many seats amidst negative campaigns, while the KMT emerged as the winner of the election. However, Kai-Ping Huang, an Associate Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University, evaluates the biggest losers are voters who were not offered quality campaigns. Professor Huang defines the campaign’s major issues as Scandals of Plagiarism, Poor Quality of Infrastructure, Discredited Pandemic Control Performance and Economic Difficulties and Anti-China Campaign Backlash. In addition, she states that it is too early to say whether the KMT will have an advantage in the upcoming presidential election. The KMT must clarify its position on national identity. The Taipei voters don`t appreciate what the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) has done to the capital, and most voters do not believe that the TPP is a credible alternative to the two mainstream parties. Therefore, TPP needs to coordinate with the KMT to defeat the ruling DPP can be an option.
Topic:
Education, Elections, Democracy, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Taiwan and Asia

10. China’s 20th Party Congress Leadership Reshuffle: Stasis or Sweep?

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping successfully thwarted another “Twitter coup” in late September 2022, making clear he will remain China’s top leader for at least the next five years. But there is much less certainty about who else will make up the new leadership team at the 20th Party Congress that will assist Xi in guiding the country through its most challenging period in decades. There are virtually no hard rules in CCP politicking limiting the range of possible outcomes, and even the “norms” that are often cited as governing the process of choosing a new leadership lineup are, at best, loose conventions rather than predictable practices. Xi’s extreme centralization of power also means that China’s already deeply opaque political system is even more so, and more than two and a half years of COVID isolation for China has made it much more challenging to glean authoritative insights. Nevertheless, one still gets a very clear sense that the personnel arrangements for the party congress are largely in hand, and that Xi Jinping is firmly in command and very comfortable with them. If we accept that as the baseline, it is possible to deduce the most likely scenarios for personnel turnover at the apex of CCP power and decision-making, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). As with so many things in Xi Jinping’s unique political universe, it seems that the outcome will probably be one of two fairly binary, and perhaps nearly equally likely, possibilities. The first, a “stasis” scenario, would see very little change to the PBSC as Xi either strictly adheres to the convention, followed since 2002, that officials 68 or older must retire, or largely abides by it except for some PBSC incumbents, most probably Premier Li Keqiang, who may step down even though he is 67. In the second “sweep” scenario, Xi could adjust the age criteria downward or just outright ignore it, creating a lot more room for new entrants to the PBSC.
Topic:
Leadership, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia