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151. How Can an Inter-Korean Summit Contribute to the Denuclearization of North Korea?

Author:
Sung Bae Kim
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only a few months ago, a third inter-Korean summit and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks both seemed likely. With contacts for an inter-Korean summit under way since last year and the Chinese proposals for the Six-Party Talks having been warmly accepted by the United States and North Korea, the prospects were positive. The sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan on March 26, 2010, however, destroyed this optimism. A two-month multinational investigation, led by South Korea, uncovered clear evidence of North Korea’s involvement, and the South Korean government imposed strong and comprehensive sanctions against the North on May 24. The punishments included the suspension of inter-Korean trade, the resumption of psychological warfare operations, and strengthening naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. In response, North Korea announced that it would sever all inter-Korean relations and threatened war with the South. The whole situation on the Korean Peninsula has been deteriorating day by day, worsening already high tensions so that even military clashes seem potentially possible. The prospects for the Six-Party Talks are now also very negative. The Cheonan incident has proved to be a black hole absorbing all other critical issues. Kim Jong-il 's visit to China in May 2010 seemed to signal that the Six-Party Talks might be resumed, but this possibility could not appease Seoul’s fury over the sinking of the Cheonan. Diplomatic efforts for the resumption of the talks have been replaced with new moves to initiate additional sanctions against North Korea. Of course, the North Korean nuclear crisis, which is after all an urgent problem with both regional and global consequences, cannot be forever tied to the Cheonan incident. After a cooling-off period, diplomatic mediations to resume the Six-Party Talks can be restarted by China. But the concern at this time is that North Korea, in light of the Cheonan incident, might insist on excluding South Korea from the talks. Given the current situation, is there any possibility for an inter-Korean summit? A summit might, paradoxically, be the only means of exit from the crisis. Interestingly, in 1993, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis had broken out and military tensions were extremely high, a proposal for an inter-Korean summit was accepted. The meeting was only canceled because of Kim Il-sung's sudden death on July 8, 1994. Today, for inter-Korean relations to resume, a whole new framework is needed, given that all existing North-South agreements have been nullified. Such a rebuilt relationship can only be achieved through a third inter-Korean summit. Moreover, progress on the North Korean nuclear issue is impossible until the current state of North-South relations is improved. Were the Six-Party Talks to resume that occurs, they would end up at best as a diplomatic battle between the two Koreas. In the end, the only solution is an inter-Korean summit, which could achieve a breakthrough both in relations between North and South and on the nuclear issue at the same time.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Conference, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

152. Coping with the North Korean Survival Game: The Cheonan Incident and Its Aftermath

Author:
Seong-Ho Sheen
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
While on a routine patrol along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a South Korean Navy corvette, Cheonan was hit by an external explosion and rapidly sunk at 9:22pm on March 26, 2010. Of the one hundred and four South Korean crew members on board, forty six were found dead or remain missing (Cha 2010). After weeks of a scientific investigation supported by an international team of twenty four American, British, Australian, and Swedish experts, the South Korean government announced on May 20, that the ship was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean midget submarine. The South Korean government and the public are now weighing the various measures in how to respond to this major North Korean provocation. Experts, on the other hand, are trying to understand what might have been the cause of such a bold aggression by the North Korean regime. While some have suggested a combination of various reasons for the alleged attack, a prominent North Korean insider has argued that the Cheonan incident may have to do with the North Korean leadership succession issue. Cho Myung-chul, a former professor at Kim Il-sung University, has suggested that the Cheonan incident was the work of the emerging leadership surrounding the young and unknown Kim Jong-eun, the son of Kim Jong-il and possible future successor. The motivation then would be for Kim Jong-eun and his supporters to prove themselves to Kim Jong-il and North Korean people. Leadership succession in a dictatorship tends to create a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion for its governance and the state apparatus. There will be competition and rivalry among different groups and factions for survival and to take a lead in the power transition. In that process, hard liners tend to command a stronger voice. Given the mounting pressures of a deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation since the famine of 1995-98, sinking a South Korean warship could score an important political victory domestically, inducing the North Korean people to be proud of its regime and new leadership. At the same time, it could teach a lesson to the Lee Myung-bak government which has insisted on linking the nuclear issue with North-South exchanges. Indeed, North Korea issued a series of warnings to South Korea after criticizing the Lee administration for refusing to restart the Mount Kumkang Tours that had been canceled after a South Korean tourist had been shot by a North Korean guard on July 11, 2008. Pyongyang was further upset by alleged contingency planning for a sudden collapse of the regime and the hosting of military exercises with the United States. In particular, just a couple of weeks before the Cheonan incident, the Korean People’s Army issued a statement that it would no longer remain bound by the Korean War Armistice or the 1992 North-South Non-Aggression Agreement, therefore it “will legitimately exercise their force for self defense, unhindered, just as they had determined to do.” The worry now is that such provocations may eventually be aimed at the Obama administration which has hardened its position toward North Korea since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. While not completely excluding the possibility for bilateral dialogue, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must return to the multilateral Six-Party Talks by implementing its obligations under previous agreements. North Korean demands for nuclear arms control and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization has only strengthened Washington’s deep mistrust of Pyongyang’s true intentions. Considering that the Obama administration has adopted a policy of wait and see, or what it calls “strategic patience,” the North Korean leadership might have concluded that there is not much to gain from making a deal with Washington for now. Furthermore, President Obama’s designation of North Korea along with Iran as an outlier in his drive for a “World Without Nuclear Weapons” and a possible target of U.S. nuclear weapons in the recently published 2010 Nuclear Posture Review can only have made Pyongyang’s conviction even more pessimistic. The problem is that the sinking of the Cheonan may not be an isolated incident. North Korea may become more desperate and brazen as they face increasingly harsher measures from South Korea and the international community, particularly the United States. The race for completing succession by 2012 may further strengthen the voice of hardliners who wish to heighten tensions with South Korea and the United States. More importantly, the Cheonan incident could be a sign of increasing instability in North Korea. The regime there faces the critical question of Kim Jong-il’s health and the issue of succession amidst a deepening economic crisis and international isolation. The Cheonan incident not only presents the immediate challenge of crisis management but also poses a medium to long-term question about the regime’s future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

153. On the Rocks: Korea and Japan Divided over the Dokdo Issue

Author:
D. Bong Youngshik
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
No serious observer of postwar relations between South Korea and Japan doubts that there is a bilateral issue between the two nations that is more persistent and volatile than their feud over the sovereign status of the two minuscule islets of Dokdo. This commentary examines the history of disputes over Dokdo, and attempts to argue that the starting point for a solution lies in the pragmatic and prudent approach, not in assertive diplomacy based on nationalistic sentiments. Since the end of World War II, Dokdo has been under the effective administrative control of the South Korean government. The Japanese government has protested at various official levels since then, arguing that the islets, which it calls Takeshima, belong to Japan in accordance with historical evidence and international law. The diplomatic feud over the territory did not flare up during the Cold War, because both countries involved in the controversy made security cooperation against the communist threat in Northeast Asia their top priority. It was only after concerns over the external regional security environment were lifted with the end of the Cold War that Japan began to fortify its claims to Dokdo in a far more assertive and diversified manner. South Korea responded to this change by making periodic departures from its traditional line of defense of “quiet diplomacy”—that is, taking the view that because its sovereignty over the islets is indisputable and its control over them remains complete, South Korea has no strategic interests in aggressively and emotionally reacting to Japan’s escalatory territorial policy. To do so would only reinforce Japan’s claim that there does exist an unresolved territorial issue between the two countries and the sovereign status of Dokdo is undetermined, when in fact South Korea’s position is the opposite.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

154. Post-2012 U.S. Leadership and U.S. Policy toward East Asia

Author:
Young Kwon Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
2012 the United States will hold another presidential election, and it will surely be a referendum on the first term of the Obama presidency. As usual, the election will attract the attention of the public and the pundits alike, both at home and abroad, particularly at a time when an increasing number of people will be interested in how the election’s outcome will affect U.S. foreign policy and, related to it, the Sino-American bipolar configuration in East Asia. Since the Cheonan incident in the West Sea in the spring of 2009, particularly, the evolution and interaction of the Sino-American relationship in East Asia has become the focus of speculation among policy analysts and practitioners. That said, the outcome of the 2012 U.S. presidential election raises several questions. Will the 2012 presidential election bring a new leadership team to the White House? And will the outcome, new leaders or not, affect the overall tone of U.S. strategy in East Asia? If not, what other factors should be considered in forecasting the future of East Asia? Although a definitive answer to these questions cannot be had when we are still two years away from the 2012 presidential election, addressing them, nevertheless, is an intriguing mental exercise. We can say immediately that it is unlikely that the outcome of the 2012 election will be the dominant factor determining the United States’ strategy in East Asia as of 2013. Because of the rising power of China and the ever-hardening bipolarized structure of power in the region, significant changes in post-2012 East Asia are more likely to be triggered by changes from within East Asia itself, rather than from the United States. An ambitious China, taking a more aggressive posture toward both its neighbors and the United States, could be a potentially destabilizing factor in the region. Internal changes in North Korea could also be regionally destabilizing. The United States’ East Asian policy would thus be somewhat reactive in its general tone, although not passive. The U.S. stance could be firm and even assertive, however, depending on the situation, just as it was recently in dealing with China’s bid for expansion toward the South China Sea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

155. The Impact of North Korea’s Artillery Strike on Public Opinion in South Korea

Author:
Nae-Young Lee and Han-Wool Jeong
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On November 23, 2010, North Korea launched a deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island; a South Korean island situated 12km off the North Korean coastline. Although ROK Marines returned fire, two Marines and two civilians were killed in the attack by the North. There have been several incidents since the Armistice Agreement that brought an end to the Korean War was signed on July 27, 1953, but this has been the first time a military attack has killed civilians. The EAI/Han-Kook Research November Public Opinion Barometer, which was conducted after the North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island, reveals that 81.5% of respondents feel they are “concerned” about insecurity (34.9% “very concerned”+ 46.6% “slightly concerned”). This is the highest number since the survey first began in 2000.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Survey
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

156. A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident

Author:
Young-Sun Ha
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been stepping up efforts in its defense posture and international cooperation. In preparing against any further provocation from the North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on the island, strengthening defense and deterrence capabilities, and drastically increasing its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has also been taking up actions to reexamine the strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, demanding cooperation from China and Russia while maintaining the traditional trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak response to the shelling and preparing to prevent further provocations are undoubtedly important. However, reading the bigger picture and formulating key strategies for the future is a far more critical task. The Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November 2010 conducted two consecutive moves—revealing its uranium enrichment facilities and launching an artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. Understanding the situation of the whole East Asian region, while at the same time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and taking preemptive actions will be the main challenges ahead for Seoul. Firstly, it is important to understand the range of North Korea’s strategic options from aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula went through the Korean War in 1950 and following of the ceasefire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In spite of this global shift, North Korea has been frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the international strategic chessboard. For example, during the Cold War period North Korea provoked the South in a number of cases: Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheonan naval ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island ensued. At the same time, Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding for a peace agreement to this day. The possibility for limited warfare on the Korean Peninsula came dangerously close with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so than the last North Korean provocation, the sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use of this pendulum of peace and war in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. In spite of the dangers, merely worrying about the possibility of war is not going to help. Rather, we have to understand precisely why the North has raised the bar of aggression from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artillery attack on South Korean territory. It is likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the pendulum. A complex picture emerges when looking back on the recent comments made by top officials from North Korea, the United States, and China. Seoul and Washington have called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for active denuclearization and reengagement in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on the other hand has taken precisely the opposite measures. To read what the North Korean regime has in mind we have to think of the situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea must do more than just respond to North Korea’s actions. Instead it should focus on making strategically preemptive moves. For this, it is necessary to examine why the North Korean regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude and find measures to make the leadership pursue a survival strategy that does not include huddling around nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

157. Russian perceptions and policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin

Author:
Paradorn Rangsimaporn
Publication Date:
05-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Institution:
Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:
While the desire to counterbalance US unilateralism informed Russian perceptions and advocacy of multipolarity globally, the complex and fluid balance of power in a multipolar East Asia complicates Russian perceptions and policies of multipolarity regionally and counterbalancing US power became not the sole goal. Russia's aim in East Asia was to reassert its influence while ensuring a stable regional environment in order for Russia to restore itself as a great power. However, the relatively stabilizing US regional role, the rise of neighboring China, the prospects of Japanese remilitarization and strengthened US–Japanese military alliance, and the lack of a Northeast Asian security structure are factors that pose both challenges and opportunities for Russian policymakers in pursuing Russian interests and great-power aims. Such factors have served to make Russian perceptions and policy in East Asia somewhat contradictory. While Russia's great-power aspiration was relatively clear, the policies to achieve this remained vague and inconclusive.
Topic:
Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Asia

158. Evolving Military Responsibilities in the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:
Bruce Klingner
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The U.S.–South Korean security alliance has been indispensable in achieving Washington's strategic objectives and maintaining peace and stability in northeast Asia. A confluence of developments, however, is forcing changes in the alliance. These factors include a changing threat environment, an evolving U.S. military strategy, and South Korea's desire for greater autonomy as a result of its improving military and economic capabilities. It is important that the alliance begin the evolution from a singularly focused mission to a more robust values-based relationship that looks beyond the Korean Peninsula. Without substantial and sustained involvement by the senior political and military leadership, the alliance may not be sufficiently adapted to the new threat environment, including as a hedge against Chinese military modernization. The U.S. and South Korean administrations must also provide a clear strategic vision of the enduring need for the alliance and implement a robust public diplomacy program to prevent the erosion of public and legislative support. The plan to develop a U.S.–South Korean strategic alliance is a testament both to the successes of the long-standing military relationship and to the shared values of the two democracies.
Topic:
Economics and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, and South Korea

159. Arguing Afghanistan: what the detractors of NATO's mission get wrong

Author:
Patrick Keller
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Over the last few years, Afghanistan has become less stable and less secure. There were more than 2,000 civilian casualties in 2008 - more than in any other year since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001, and an increase by 40% in comparison to 2007. Coalition forces suffered 294 casualties in 2008, also the highest number so far. This is the direct consequence of a rise in Taliban and insurgent activity, mostly in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban

160. NATO and the new US "Af-Pak" Strategy

Author:
Christopher M. Schnaubelt
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Operations in Afghanistan pose a strategic challenge for NATO, not only because it is the largest and longest duration combat operation in the history of the Alliance, but also because of the fissures that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has exposed among NATO members. These difference include questions on how to characterize and approach the violence in Afghanistan and the relative military contributions by member states to the first and thus far only operation conducted by NATO under Article V. Allegations that some members have not been carrying their fair share of the burden have raised the specter of a "two-tier" alliance.
Topic:
NATO, International Security, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia