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111. The 2012 U.S. Presidential Election and Its Implication in East Asia

Author:
Young Kwon Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
After the extended and fierce campaign, Obama finally clinched the victory in the 2012 presidential election. By gaining more than 300 electoral-college votes, which are disproportionately huge given his popular vote margin of around two percent over Romney(50% vs. 48%), he can legitimately claim national mandate for the next four year, although conservatives will be reluctant to embrace that mandate. After making a history four years ago by becoming the first black president to occupy the White House, he made another history this year by recapturing the presidency amid the still evolving Great Recession with the high unemployment rate around 7.1%. Given this historic nature of Obama’s second term, this paper aims to show how Obama was able to maintain an exceptionally competitive campaign despite the extremely bad national economic conditions. From the widely accepted consensus that the outcome of the U.S. presidential election is largely determined by the economic conditions of the election year, Obama’s successful presidential campaign needs explanation in one way or another. Following that, the paper also attempts to predict what the post-election U.S. East Asia policy look like. Will the post-election U.S. policy be different from the mainline policy of the last four years? If not, what would be rationale of the policy consistency? This paper will address these questions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

112. A Path Never Taken: The Options for Kim Jong-un and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since Kim Jong-il’s health deteriorated in the summer of 2008, the question of his succession has drawn attention from all over the world. Finally, on September 28 2010, Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son, rapidly emerged with his guardianship group made up of the close personnel of the “dear leader” at the Third Meeting of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Representatives. The future direction of the succession process has generated tremendous interest from all over the world, because it is not only related to internal power transition in North Korea but also directly linked with the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The political and diplomatic decisions of Kim Jong-il’s successor will crucially affect his own future, as well that of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Inter-Korean relations, and the international order of Northeast Asia. Kim Jong-un was promoted to the rank of daechang, the equivalent of a four-star general, and appointed vice chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission, in essence holding the de facto post of second-in-command. He was named right after the four members of the politburo standing committee by North Korea's official news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and his picture was revealed to the public for the first time. This formulated that he became the successor to his father. All in all, he was named as general on the 27th, appointed vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission on the 28th, and his picture released on the 29th, which shows precisely the elaborated staging and even hastiness on the part of the North Korean regime. On October 10, Kim Jong-il effectively declared his heir apparent at home and abroad when he attended a massive military parade with Kim Jong-un, commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. This remarkable event was broadcasted live in North Korea with even foreign correspondents invited to attend. The succession process was a lot faster than expected, particularly when compared to Kim Jong-il, whose succession process only got off the ground six years after he was designated a member of the Politburo in 1974. It is premature to say which direction Kim Jong-un will go, but it cannot but be seen that his emergence puts more emphasis on ‘continuation’ rather than ‘severance’ or ‘transformation’ from the existing songun or military-first politics. Above all, it is noteworthy that Kim Jong-un took the position of vice chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission rather than positions within its Politburo or Secretariat. This is groundwork to make Kim Jong-un become the “royal” successor of the military-first politics system. Like his father, he will likely exercise the power to interpret the ruling ideology as the sole successor to the “bloodline of Mount Baekdu.” Holding onto the banner of military-first politics, Kim Jong-un will establish it as a “revolutionary” tradition that will form the basis of his succession. Secondly, it is also noticeable that Kim Jong-un’s guardianship group is filled with his father’s people. They were appointed to be heavyweights in the Party and military during the Meeting of Party Representatives. Kim Jong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui became a member of the Politburo, her husband Jang Song Thaek became an alternate member of the Politburo, member of the Central Military Commission, and a department director of the Party’s Central Committee, while Vice-Marshal Ri Yong Ho became a Standing Member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. It is hard to find anyone that could be considered as Kim Jong-un’s people, which is to be understood considering his age and inexperience. There is a dilemma for Kim Jong-un in that he cannot completely rely on the military-first politics. Currently, Kim has not even been officially designated as successor; that will only come when he assumes position as a Standing Member of the Politburo. Such a move can only be possible if he accumulates considerable achievements as he has nothing to his name so far. Presumably, this process needs to be completed before the 7th Party Congress in 2012, leaving Kim Jong-un with little time. Establishing North Korea as an ‘economically strong power,’ one of the three pillars of gangseongdaeguk or strong and prosperous country is something that has yet to be achieved. Pyongyang has already claimed to have achieved the other two pillars of a strong political power and a strong military power. However, as long as the military-first politics is sustained, it is almost impossible for North Korea to pursue the path to economic recovery by itself.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Leadership, Succession, and Transition
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

113. Post-2012 U.S. Leadership and U.S. Policy toward East Asia

Author:
Young Kwon Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
2012 the United States will hold another presidential election, and it will surely be a referendum on the first term of the Obama presidency. As usual, the election will attract the attention of the public and the pundits alike, both at home and abroad, particularly at a time when an increasing number of people will be interested in how the election’s outcome will affect U.S. foreign policy and, related to it, the Sino-American bipolar configuration in East Asia. Since the Cheonan incident in the West Sea in the spring of 2009, particularly, the evolution and interaction of the Sino-American relationship in East Asia has become the focus of speculation among policy analysts and practitioners. That said, the outcome of the 2012 U.S. presidential election raises several questions. Will the 2012 presidential election bring a new leadership team to the White House? And will the outcome, new leaders or not, affect the overall tone of U.S. strategy in East Asia? If not, what other factors should be considered in forecasting the future of East Asia? Although a definitive answer to these questions cannot be had when we are still two years away from the 2012 presidential election, addressing them, nevertheless, is an intriguing mental exercise. We can say immediately that it is unlikely that the outcome of the 2012 election will be the dominant factor determining the United States’ strategy in East Asia as of 2013. Because of the rising power of China and the ever-hardening bipolarized structure of power in the region, significant changes in post-2012 East Asia are more likely to be triggered by changes from within East Asia itself, rather than from the United States. An ambitious China, taking a more aggressive posture toward both its neighbors and the United States, could be a potentially destabilizing factor in the region. Internal changes in North Korea could also be regionally destabilizing. The United States’ East Asian policy would thus be somewhat reactive in its general tone, although not passive. The U.S. stance could be firm and even assertive, however, depending on the situation, just as it was recently in dealing with China’s bid for expansion toward the South China Sea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

114. North Korea at the Crossroads

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea is now at the crossroads. It needs to make a strategic decision on whether to defend its nuclear program and “military-first politics” against the pressure of increasing international sanctions or to denuclearize and pursue “economy-first politics.” Depending on which decision Kim Jong-il makes, his successor will face either the path of opportunity or the path of peril. Currently, Kim faces the challenge of ensuring a smooth transition of power to his successor. At the same time, he must negotiate with an international community that is trying to induce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program by simultaneously imposing sanctions on it while offering a comprehensive negotiation package. In this situation, the surrounding countries must construct an international environment that is favorable to convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and join the international community. Furthermore, the neighboring countries need to actively support and develop a clear formula for establishing a lasting peace framework on the Korean Peninsula. Since the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, Kim Jong-il has faithfully followed the will of his father, who stated that North Korea will denuclearize if and only if the United States withdraws its hostile policy and nuclear threat toward Pyongyang. Amidst the backdrop of its increasing international isolation in the post-Cold War era, the North Korean regime made the decision to develop nuclear weapons as to safeguard its survival. However, this decision brought it into sharp conflict with the United States, who strongly opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The United States could not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea that would destabilize the East Asian region. Subsequently, its strategic decision to pursue the nuclear military-first politics has led North Korea to become a “weak and vulnerable nation” rather than a “strong and prosperous nation,” enduring hardships along the “arduous march.” Compared to circumstances in 1994 and 2003, the current situation confronting Kim Jong-il is far more complex and difficult. Not only must he revive a shattered economy but he must also adroitly manage the sensitive process of leadership succession that is still ongoing. If Kim fails to take the initiative to give up his nuclear program and allows the nuclear military-first politics to dominate the succeeding regime, it will become even more difficult for North Korea to make the transition toward a non-nuclear economy-first politics. Given the fact that external pressure from the international community for denuclearization and internal pressure of attenuating stability will only continue to increase, the succeeding regime will be in a position where giving up the card that guarantees its survival is impossible. Moreover, it would be political suicide for the new regime to abandon the nuclear military-first politics. As the son of Kim Il-sung who is the embodiment of Chuche ideology, Kim Jong-il needs to make the critical decision to abandon North Korea’s nuclear program. There is no other method for resolving the tense situation without denuclearization. Nuclear weapons might be a shot of morphine to ease the pain temporarily, but it cannot be the remedy to cure a dying patient.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

115. Turkey's Crisis and Future

Author:
Doğu Ergil
Publication Date:
08-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The two trials that have been occupying the Turkish national agenda today are likely to be the milestones of Turkey’s ability to rid itself of an opaque regime shaped under bureaucratic tutelary. One of the trials concerned the closure of the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and has finally been concluded, with a narrow victory for the ruling party and democratic governance. The other is the Ergenekon case, which may unravel the illegal nationalist organization intent on overthrowing the government and bringing an isolationist dictatorial regime under the guise of national sovereignty. The attempt to close the AK Party—deemed the center of anti-secular activities threat- ening the state—began with a Constitutional Court verdict annulling a newly enacted law that lifted a headscarf ban at universities. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s reply was to accuse the Court of overriding Parliament and threatening national stabili- ty—its headscarf policy is part of democratic reforms to advance free speech and minor- ity rights and has the support of the EU, which Turkey seeks to join. This is true, how- ever much the party lost enthusiasm for liberalizing and democratizing Turkey’s system as part of its EU bid. In its late July decision, the judiciary narrowly allowed the AK Party to survive—and, with other political and civic organizations, to broaden the base of political participation and public discourse. This is all to the good, though the fact that the case was brought to begin with remain troubling. The question is whether or not Turkey will be able to expose its alternative history, bludgeoned by human rights violations, thousands of unsolved assassinations, restric- tions put on liberties, and military interventions in the political process and start a new age marked with liberal ideals.
Topic:
Governance, Authoritarianism, Leadership, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia