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41. US, Japan, and South Korea Coordination Key to Competing in Southeast Asia

Author:
Karl Friedhoff and Lea Chang
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
In picking fronts that offer the paths of least resistance, trilateral cooperation will maximize the presence of all three countries in ASEAN, maintaining balance in the region and making collective progress toward economic and development goals. Despite its size, economic dynamism, and geographic position, Southeast Asia has received comparatively little attention in US foreign policy. Even as American policy becomes more focused on China, the United States lacks a coordinated strategy to respond to and compete with China’s vast trade and investment in Southeast Asia. But most ASEAN countries are wary of China’s growing influence and would be open to US involvement as they look to diversify. To take advantage of this opportunity, the United States must supplement its focus on the South China Sea with diplomatic and financial efforts on land. These efforts should offer an alternative to China’s largesse but should not seek a direct competition in hard infrastructure or in terms of dollar amounts invested. Nor should the United States go it alone. Instead, it should seek to cooperate with its allies—Japan and South Korea in particular—to pursue their respective competitive advantages. These include identifying and investing in small- and medium-sized enterprises in ASEAN, developing human capital in the region, and conducting joint maritime cleanup activities in coordination with ASEAN countries. Creating coordinated activities with Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia should be the first step for the United States to roll back China’s influence in the region. But these efforts will need to be calibrated to ensure that they focus on the needs of countries in the region and not just engulf the region in the US-China competition.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

42. How China Regards its Future in the World

Author:
Marcos Caramuru and Philip Yang
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
China’s post-Covid plans regarding national investment and foreign policy are ambitious and its success depends on the ability to build trustworthy relations with its Asian neighbors and the great powers. The XXII China Analysis Group meeting gathered experts to discuss China’s positioning and the ways in which it could overcome challenges and aim for a positive bilateral agenda with the USA during the Biden administration.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

43. What Railway Deals Taught Chinese and Brazilians in the Amazon

Author:
Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Maiara Folly, and Maurício Santoro
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Chinese investments in Brazil have expanded and diversified considerably, especially ones involving infrastructure. Chinese investors have also diversified geographically. Increasingly, major Brazilian infrastructure projects are being planned or implemented with Chinese backing in environmentally sensitive regions such as the Amazon rain forest and the Cerrado, a large savanna region in Central-West Brazil. Chinese actors have become directly involved in such projects against a backdrop of sharpening debates about sustainability and other consequences of large-scale infrastructure projects. This is especially true in protected areas such as land populated by Indigenous groups and conservation units. A notable example is the Ferrogrão project, a major railway line designed to cross sections of the Amazon and Cerrado to deliver goods to Brazilian ports. This paper examines the diverse ways that Brazilian and Chinese actors have learned from each other as they negotiate the terms of these deals. It also explores how these learning processes have been conditioned by intense domestic political debates over these projects in Brazil. Official documents and secondary sources reveal that, rather than a set Chinese way of doing business or a stock Brazilian response, such projects entail dynamic institutional learning. Such learning is shaped not only by the particulars of the Ferrogrão project but also by Chinese actors’ broader engagement with Brazilian infrastructure projects over the past ten years.
Topic:
Environment, Infrastructure, Investment, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, South America, and Amazon Basin

44. Taiwan’s Opportunities in Emerging Industry Supply Chains

Author:
Evan A. Feigenbaum and Michael R. Nelson
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To some, the acute supply chain crisis that has followed in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic is a sign of poor planning, lack of resilience and surge capacity, and industry rigidity. Inflation is also having a major impact and will inevitably lead to some supply chain reconfiguration. But structural shifts matter too, including rising costs in mainland China—the world’s manufacturing’s powerhouse—and the overconcentration of freight in just ten companies that control 85 percent of global container capacity. Globalization has bequeathed a system that seemed efficient until it was tested by the multidimensional crises of the last two years. In industry after industry, C-suites are planning for a world of disruption. At a minimum, companies aim to build resilience and redundancy into their supply chains. But there is another factor—political risk—that is complicating planning, especially in technology-intensive industries. Specifically, the emergence of multidimensional strategic competition between Beijing and Washington has interrupted the flow of goods, capital, people, technology, and data. And these geopolitical disruptions look set to become a long-term structural trend. This is a sea change that will invariably bleed into many industries and rejigger supply chains. But amid the disruption, some economies will have fresh opportunities to attract investment, build out new industries, and diversify their growth drivers. Taiwan is one such economy that may stand to benefit from the supply chain rethink. This paper explores some ways that it could do so. But to seize opportunities in this dynamic environment, Taiwan needs policy changes and technology investments to better position its ecosystem of government, business, academia, research institutions, and labor to attract new supply chain opportunities, especially for the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the emerging economy of the twenty-first century. Two prior Carnegie Endowment studies of Taiwan’s economic competitiveness included specific recommendations that could comprise the foundation of an ecosystem that serves the public interest by bolstering Taiwan’s profile and role in more and more global supply chains. Most notably, these were Carnegie’s recommendations to position Taiwan’s economy as a trusted hub, trusted vendor, trusted tester, and trusted conduit for technology-intensive R&D and production. Taiwan’s public interest would benefit if such opportunities became a counterpoint to mainland China’s scale advantages. But Taiwan faces intense competition from other economies in Asia and Europe that also seek to capitalize on supply chain shifts, reaping the harvest from their investments while carving out specialized niches amid rising suspicion of mainland China-origin technology products and services. This study aims to help to refine competitive choices for Taiwan while highlighting unique comparative advantages that would make it an especially attractive place for new global investments. The paper digs deeply into two opportunities for Taiwan. The first involves dynamic changes in one of the high-tech industries that Taipei has made into a strategic priority—the life sciences, including biotechnology and precision medicine. Despite twenty years of concerted effort and some signal successes, especially with drug development and diagnostics, Taiwan has not captured a role or market share analogous to its multidecade build-out in semiconductors. For Taiwan, trust will be the crucial variable and competitive advantage. Taiwan could, for example, leverage its advantages with high-quality medical data to become a locus for clinical trials, while also leveraging other advantages for global supply chains in the drug discovery, advanced diagnostics, and personalized medicine markets. But to do so, it will need to make policy and regulatory changes and make some new strategic investments. The second chapter turns to whether Taiwan’s economy could be positioned as a leader in testing, validating, and deploying software, which would give Taiwan-based firms a larger role in the information technology services business where mainland China, India, and others have a larger profile. Elements of Taiwan’s ecosystem could potentially be positioned to use software engineering to ensure that business software and services produced by local companies and their international partners are more tested and more trusted than competing products on the market.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Investment, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Taiwan and Asia

45. How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid

Author:
Juliana González Jáuregui
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s modernization strategy integrates both domestic and foreign policy, especially through two complementary prongs—the so-called Going Global strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This push to internationalize China’s development strategy has ushered in a new era in Beijing’s relationships with countries and regions around the world. In Latin America, these policies have triggered a dynamic pattern of interactions between China and the region’s political economy. Being rich in fuels, energy, foodstuffs, and basic products, countries in Latin America have emerged as significant suppliers for China, but they also have become important destinations for Chinese-made industrial products, and, subsequently, Chinese investment and lending. For Latin American countries, China’s rise as an influential investor, lender, trader, and builder has created an array of new challenges and opportunities. While Beijing has harnessed its engagement in Latin America to support its own development, countries in the region have sought to direct some of China’s economic and financial resources to promote their own strategic sectors. Argentina illustrates this dynamic well, particularly in the energy sector. Argentinian government officials and business leaders have attracted Chinese investment and finance into renewables and other types of energy to promote Buenos Aires’s goals of taking a hybrid path to an energy transition. For its part, China has seized this opportunity to advance its own development goals and to participate in Argentina’s energy transition strategy. Though Argentina has not yet formally joined the BRI, Argentinian officials have reported publicly that Buenos Aires has already decided to endorse the initiative and is waiting for the right moment to do so.1 Argentina has been weighing the pros and cons of signing on to the BRI. On the one hand, signing on could enhance the presence of Chinese actors in the Argentinian renewables sector, as China seeks to intertwine its engagement in Latin America with the deployment of the Green BRI, the dimensions of the initiative that are framed in terms of environmental sustainability. More broadly, joining the BRI could attract new Chinese investment and finance in alternative energy and electricity transmission infrastructure, further contributing to Argentina’s goals for an energy transition. On the other hand, Argentina faces the challenge of designing and implementing a long-term national energy plan that complements its role in the BRI. This means devising an energy plan that, among broader objectives, seeks to help Argentina harness Chinese know-how on renewables and develop innovation and technological capacities of its own. In the meantime, Argentina’s lack of committed engagement with the BRI to date has not impeded the expansion of Chinese overseas investment and financing for renewables and other types of energy projects in the country. In a clear sign of political agency, the diplomatic outreach of key Argentinian national and provincial government officials, as well as corporate players’ push for local associations, has been central in the quest to increase Chinese engagement in Argentina’s solar and wind power sectors and in other alternative energy projects. These interactions have allowed Argentinian policymakers to help shape an adaptive partnership to strengthen the alignment between Chinese investments and Argentinian development objectives. Admittedly, this engagement has at times encountered resistance due to environmental and social risks in certain localities. Even so, these concerns are part of the learning process and set a tone for future cooperation on energy projects. Renewables and alternative energy will continue to be a magnet for global investment as countries around the world strive to address climate change. Thus, local tensions are pushing both Argentinian and Chinese actors to learn from the problematic impacts of some projects and do more to address local communities’ concerns jointly. Successful responses to such concerns would further enhance the basis of Argentina and China’s energy-focused adaptative partnership.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Economy, Business, Investment, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

46. How Can South Korea Teach, Lead, and Help in Asia’s Quest for Smart Cities?

Author:
Clara Gillispie
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As of 2021, virtually every country in Asia has announced some plan for standing up their own smart cities, with national- and/or city-level governments launching either pilot projects or official strategies to coordinate activities and investment across different stakeholder groups. In this context, South Korea could (and does) play a positive role in how countries across the region might be able to realize these plans. This includes through not only providing direct financial, technical, and development support, but also sharing its own lessons learned and practices in promoting sustainable, secure, and inclusive smart cities. Even so, both South Korean and Asian interests could benefit from greater attention to expanding South Korea-Asia engagements and cooperative mechanisms on digital development issues, as a means of better supporting and bolstering ongoing regional priorities.
Topic:
Development, Regional Cooperation, Digital Economy, Investment, and Smart Cities
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

47. Assessing South Korea's Role in Promoting ESG Investing in the Asia-Pacific

Author:
William Grimes and Yaechan Lee
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper assesses the potential for South Korea to be a regional leader in advancing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing, and supporting sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region. Many economies in the Asia-Pacific region are facing threats from climate change or other environmental limits to growth. Thus, the expansion of ESG investment and green infrastructure is a major regional challenge that must be addressed for sustainable growth. We argue that Korea can play a central role in overcoming this challenge based on the following conjectures. First, Korea’s developmental legacy has allowed it to reshape its financial market and investment habits to quickly expand its ESG market. This model is more relatable to developing economy governments than those offered by Western economies. Sharing Korea’s experience and know-how with the region’s developing economies can augment their ESG compliance capacities and make them a more attractive destination for sustainable infrastructure investments. Second, Korea’s significant presence in the region as a major creditor and exporter can induce ESG adherence from the private sector as Korean investors enhance their commitment to ESG principles. While questions remain about the sustainability of Korea’s ESG adherence due to the market’s heavy reliance on government agency finance and ad hoc pandemic response investments, the increasing global interest in the ESG market makes it likely that the Korean government will continue to incentivize adherence to ESG principles.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Investment, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

48. The World Bank in Asia: An assessment of COVID-19-related investments through a care lens. Care-responsive investments and development finance

Author:
Bist Joshi and Dharmistha Chauhan
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
International financial institutions (IFIs) have been playing a vital role in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and will play an equally important role in the recovery and ‘build back anew’ agenda. This is particularly true of the World Bank Group (WBG), given its high volumes of committed investments across sectors, especially in low-income and vulnerable countries. This report presents, through case studies, how care-responsive the World Bank’s COVID-19-related investments have been in four member countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal and the Philippines. It does so by using the Care Principles and Care-Responsiveness Barometer for IFIs to assess the nature of the WBG’s COVID-19 investments in these select countries, and by building evidence through a gender- and care-responsive budget review. The report demonstrates that the Bank has a foundation for care-inclusion upon which to build, and urges it to adopt a more comprehensive care-responsive approach to its operations in order to move towards rebuilding a more gender-just and equal future.
Topic:
World Bank, Finance, Investment, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Asia

49. What Does China’s Update of its Anti-Monopoly Law and New Regulations for the “Platform Economy” Mean for Business?

Author:
David Hoffman
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
The recently enacted revisions to China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, and its extensive provisions for regulating China’s “platform economy” – i.e., fintech and ecommerce platforms – are consequential for foreign investors in China, bearing both upside and downside risks. On the one hand, they reinforce the trend of increasing state intervention in China’s economy and commercial markets and raise concerns about a more confined and controlled play-space for the private sector in China, a cohort which includes foreign multinational companies and financial investors.
Topic:
Governance, Law, Economy, Business, Investment, Monopoly, Private Sector, and Commerce
Political Geography:
China and Asia

50. COVID-19 and Services Trade in ASEAN+6: Implications and Estimates from Structural Gravity

Author:
Anirudh Shingal
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Given the importance of services for economic activity in general and the salience of reducing service link costs for overcoming the economic and health challenges emanating from COVID-19, we examine the implications of the pandemic for services trade in the original group of ASEAN+6 countries that began negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement. Our analysis reveals that with the exception of the Philippines and Viet Nam for services exports, and Cambodia and India for services imports, up to half of total services trade for all other sample countries could be adversely affected by the pandemic. In the absence of bilateral services trade data for 2020, we proxy the impact of COVID-19 on services trade using bilateral data on announced greenfield investment in services sectors from fDi Markets. Structural gravity estimates suggest that a 1% increase in COVID-19-related deaths in the source country may have reduced ASEAN+6 bilateral greenfield investment by US$0.15 million in 2020 relative to the corresponding value in 2019.
Topic:
Investment, Services, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Asia and Southeast Asia