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Begin New Search Topic Intellectual Property/Copyright Political Geography Asia

1. The Sources of China’s Innovativeness: Why China’s “Unstoppable” Innovation Powerhouse Might Falter

Author:
Tim Rühlig
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Western governments appear to fear that China is an ­innovation power­house on an almost unstoppable path to dominating ­future technologies. This is quite a turnaround. Only a few years ago, Western policies were crafted on the assumption that China was a copycat incapable of innovation. A focus on Intellectual Property theft as the Chinese “sin” that drove China’s technological development led many in the West to miss what I have identified as the “Five Virtues” that have made China the innovation powerhouse it is today. China’s future success is not ­in­evitable, however, but dependent on a delicate policy ecosystem.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2. Renew SBIR, Just Defend the Recipients against China

Author:
Charles Wessner and Sujai Shivakumar
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
An April 2021 internal report by the Department of Defense (DOD) found that companies funded by the DOD’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program are being targeted by state-sponsored Chinese firms. Based on an examination of a sampling of SBIR award recipients, the Pentagon study concluded that “nearly all cases show that China, not the U.S., is the ultimate beneficiary of DoD and other U.S. government research investments, some of which are significant in size.” The study’s authors cautioned that the study sample was small and that their methodologies warrant review, but their findings are clearly a matter of concern for U.S. policymakers. This justified concern, however, seems to have morphed into quite a different approach. Citing the Pentagon study’s findings, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), the senior Republican on the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee, said in June 2022 that he would not support reauthorizing the SBIR program “without reforms to strengthen research security and stop abusive behavior by bad actors lining their pockets with taxpayer dollars.” In a move unrelated to national security, Senator Paul and several other lawmakers are also seeking limits on the number of awards that can be made to individual SBIR companies. (There is no empirical basis for such a restriction, nor could it be effectively implemented, but the proposed measure emerges anew as SBIR comes up for reauthorization.) The risks, however, are real. The Wall Street Journal reported in July that SBIR and the related Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program face “an overhaul or outright extinction” if Congress does not renew their budgets and funding runs out at the end of September. The DOD has already canceled a round of SBIR award solicitations “because of uncertainty over the program’s future.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Business, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. U.S.-China Technological “Decoupling”: A Strategy and Policy Framework

Author:
Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A partial “decoupling”2 of U.S. and Chinese technology ecosystems is well underway. Beijing plays an active role in this process, as do other governments and private actors around the world. But the U.S. government has been a primary driver in recent years with its increased use of technology restrictions: export controls, divestment orders, licensing denials, visa bans, sanctions, tariffs, and the like. There is bipartisan support for at least some bolstering of U.S. tech controls, particularly for so-called strategic technologies, where Chinese advancement or influence could most threaten America’s national security and economic interests. But what exactly are these strategic technologies, and how hard should the U.S. government push to control them? Where is the responsible stopping point—the line beyond which technology restrictions aimed at China do more harm than good to America? These are vexing questions with few, if any, clear answers. Yet the United States cannot afford simply to muddle through technological decoupling, one of the most consequential global trends of the early twenty-first century. The U.S. technology base—foundational to national well-being and power—is thoroughly enmeshed with China in a larger, globe-spanning technological web. Cutting many strands of this web to reweave them into new patterns will be daunting and dangerous. Without a clear strategy, the U.S. government risks doing too little or—more likely—too much to curb technological interdependence with China. In particular, Washington may accidentally set in motion a chaotic, runaway decoupling that it cannot predict or control. Sharper thinking and more informed debates are needed to develop a coherent, durable strategy. Today, disparate U.S. objectives are frequently lumped together into amorphous constructs like “technology competition.” Familiar terms like “supply chain security” often fail to clarify such basic matters as which U.S. interests must be secured and why. Important decisions are siloed within opaque forums (like the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [CFIUS]), narrow specialties (like export control law), or individual industries (like semiconductors), concealing the bigger picture. The traditional concerns of “tech policy” and “China policy” receive outsized attention, while second-order implications in other areas (such as climate policy) get short shrift. And as China discourse in the United States becomes more politically charged, arguments for preserving technology ties are increasingly muted or not voiced at all. This report aims to address these gaps and show how American leaders can navigate the vast, perilous, largely unmapped terrain of technological decoupling. First, it gives an overview of U.S. thinking and policy—describing how U.S. views on Chinese technology have evolved in recent years and explaining the many tools that Washington uses to curb U.S.- China technological interdependence. Second, it frames the major strategic choices facing U.S. leaders—summarizing three proposed strategies for technological decoupling and advocating a middle path that preserves and expands America’s options. Third, it translates this strategy into implementable policies and processes—proposing specific objectives for U.S. federal agencies and identifying the technology areas where government controls are (or are not) warranted. The report also highlights many domestic investments and other self-improvement measures that must go hand in hand with restrictive action.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Authoritarianism, Economy, Espionage, Military, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. US-ROK Cooperation Can Improve IP Protection in Southeast Asia by a Strategic Focus on Online Counterfeiting

Author:
Seth Hays
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Mr. Seth Hays, Chief Representative, Asia-Pacific, at the International Trademark Association, explains that “both the US and ROK cooperate with ASEAN countries to improve IP protections, including on the issue of online counterfeits, most notably through their respective IP offices: the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Korean Intellectual Property Office.”
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Cooperation, and Counterfeiting
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

5. Proceed with Caution: Israeli Research Collaboration with China

Author:
Casey Babb
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
For Israel, warming relations with China has, in large part, been driven by pragmatic and enticing economic prospects, with policies focused on seizing the economic opportunity. For Xi and the Chinese Communist Party, the rationale for strengthening relations with Israel has been equally pragmatic, if of a different nature. China has long sought access to Israel’s vaunted innovation and technology sector – one of the most advanced in the world. For these reasons, China-Israel relations have accelerated dramatically, in areas ranging from trade in goods, to investment deals, to diplomatic relations, and beyond. However, over the last few years, and partly in response to mounting US pressure on Israel to reconsider its relations with China, there has been a noticeable cooling of economic activity between the two countries. That being said, if Israel wants to solidify its relationship with the US while limiting the gateways China could conceivably use to access or acquire the country’s technology and innovation in certain dual-use domains, it must also ensure the country’s research, intellectual property, and expert knowledge in these areas is sufficiently protected.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

6. Does China Really Dominate Global Innovation? The Impact of China’s Subsidized Patent Application System

Author:
Jonathan Putnam, Hieu Luu, and Ngoc Ngo
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, China’s economy has grown impressively, while its patented innovations have grown at an even higher rate. But this patent application trend should not simply be accepted at face value. The Chinese government has subsidized patent applications as part of its overall domestic industrial policy agenda, which underlies China’s claim to have “won” the global innovation race, especially in next-generation technologies like 5G or AI. Our study shows that high rates of patenting do not necessarily mean dominance, or even leadership, among the world’s innovation economies. China’s recent announcement that it plans to end subsidies for patent applications by 2025 perhaps acknowledges that its policy is no longer necessary or desirable. In any case, uncritical reports of China’s innovation dominance, overall or in prominent high-tech sectors, should be viewed skeptically, especially by policymakers.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, Law, Economy, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7. Does Change in Intellectual Property Rights Induce Demand for Skilled Workers? Evidence from India

Author:
Pavel Chakraborthy and Prachi Gupta
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Do incentives to innovate create demand for skilled workers more than proportionately? We study the question using the implementation of the Patent (Amendment) Act in India in 2002 to comply with the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement. We find, first, stronger intellectual property protection has a sharper impact on demand for skilled workers for high patentable industries. Demand for skilled workers increased by 0.5%–2.9% for industries that are more patentable. The average compensation for skilled workers went up by 10% in high patentable industries but decreased for unskilled workers by about 2%. Second, the increase in wage inequality can partly be attributed to the increase in wages rather than incentives. Third, the increase in demand for skilled workers is due to both the increase in intensive margin (or price) and extensive margin (number). Fourth, the aggregate effect is completely driven by industries producing intermediate goods and big plants. Finally, the reforms led to a significant reallocation of resources between industries. The high patentable industries invested more in technology adoption, started to produce more product varieties at higher quality, and filed for more product patent claims. Broadly, we demonstrate that stronger intellectual property protection leads to higher wage inequality between industries.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Intellectual Property/Copyright, and Skilled Labor
Political Geography:
India and Asia

8. An International Intellectual Property and Digital Trade Strategy for Canada

Author:
Jeremy de Beer
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
To remain competitive on a global scale, Canada needs to enhance its domestic intellectual property (IP) and digital trade strategies with an international approach that can respond to constantly changing global economic conditions. Although Canada launched its Intellectual Property Strategy in 2018 — focusing on IP awareness, strategic tools and legislation — its data initiative, known as the Digital Charter, remains a work in progress. Both policies would benefit from an outward-looking, interconnected, international strategic vision. As a member of various international trade agreements, Canada has framed its IP laws to align with these agreements and its trade partners. Canada should expand its trade relationships with Africa before other countries, such as China, take advantage of the continent’s rapidly growing economies and trade opportunities. Building strategic alliances with the right global partners, combined with the use of hard and soft laws to promote Canadian interests, will help Canada strengthen its international IP and digital trade strategy.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Digital Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and North America

9. Emerging Technologies and Managing the Risk of Tech Transfer to China

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
There are deep interconnections between the U.S. and Chinese economies, and China has built its technology base on what it has acquired from the West. China’s government and some Chinese companies will use any means, legal or illegal, to acquire technology. The United States’ relationship with China cannot continue unchanged, but given the interconnections, change must be managed carefully. New restrictions are needed, but counterintuitively, these should be shaped by recognizing that being open makes the United States stronger than being closed. The best approach is an incremental and flexible approach to technology transfer centered on the need to avoid harm to the U.S economy. This report outlines the policy tools that the United States can use to mitigate risk while maintaining the openness that is a hallmark of the U.S. economy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Conflict, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. The Security Dimension of a China Free Trade Agreement: Balancing Benefits and Risk

Author:
Gordon Houlden
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
In 2017, Canada engaged in several rounds of exploratory discussions for a potential free trade agreement (FTA) with the People’s Republic of China. It seemed probable that this exploratory phase would be followed by the opening of formal rounds of negotiations, to be announced during Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit to China in December 2017. An FTA appeared to be a priority for Trudeau since his government came into office in 2015 (Global Affairs Canada, 2017a; Lu, 2017; PMO, 2017); however, such negotiations were put on hold indefinitely, ostensibly due to irreconcilable differences on gender and labour issues. Despite this setback, it is likely that the Canadian government will continue to explore this option in the coming years, particularly with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in jeopardy. While there are many potential benefits of a Canada-China free trade agreement (CCFTA), there are also significant national security implications that will deserve particular attention. The security dimension will be the focus of this paper. Prospective CCFTA negotiations with China would be both complex and time consuming, in part due to the wide divergences between the Canadian and Chinese economies, as well as differences between Canadian and Chinese administrative and legal systems. Negotiations could therefore take several years to conclude, and might not be finished until well after the 2019 federal election. It took a full decade to sign and ratify the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), although it appears that the most difficult portion of the negotiations was wrapped up in the final two years. It is unlikely that a CCFTA will move as slowly as the Australian FTA did, in part because of the established Australian precedent and because of China’s increasing familiarity with FTA negotiations that involve advanced economies. For this reason, Canada would benefit from approaching a CCFTA after Australia, but before many other Western countries. Chinese and Canadian negotiators will be consumed with elaborating the principles of each side’s responsive FTA approaches, as well as the myriad of details involving thousands of products and services that a CCFTA’s provisions would affect. Canadian negotiators will seek a high-quality FTA that covers a large percentage of our export and import products with China, as well as an agreement that covers all key sectors and industries. There is also likely to be a Canadian focus on addressing China’s use of non-tariff barriers to trade which currently inhibit Canadian firms from taking full advantage of the massive China market. Such measures include the Chinese Ministry of Health’s 2013 changes to food safety standards which required all imported food products to list detailed nutritional components in Chinese. Procedural barriers such as this represent a significant hurdle for Canadian firms, and cause uncertainty among international exporters that want to break into the Chinese domestic market. In theory, the centralized Chinese economy lacks the regional complexity of the Canadian federal state, characterized by sub-national units, but in reality, China’s provinces and municipalities can, and often do, impose barriers to foreign imports, often to protect market share for local substantive industries. To date, China has FTAs with only a handful of developed countries. Australia, Korea, Switzerland, Iceland, Singapore and New Zealand currently have bilateral FTAs with China, and several others, such as Norway and Israel, are in FTA negotiations. China is also floating ideas for FTAs with developing countries, including India. China is far more trade-dependent than the United States, although by comparison China is not nearly as trade-dependent as Canada is.1 The balance of trade is currently in China’s favour: China exports US$46 billion to Canada, versus the US$16 billion that it imports from Canada (MIT, 2016a). However, it is important to note that China’s exports to Canada account for only 2.2 per cent of China’s total merchandise exports (MIT, 2016b).
Topic:
Security, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, and United States of America