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1. The Future of Cyberwarfare in Northeast Asia

Author:
Minwoo Yun
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
A new phase of global geostrategic hegemonic conflict is intensifying. The theater of this emerging hegemonic struggle encompasses not only conventional physical realms-land, sea, air, and space-but also virtual realms of cyber and human cognition. Northeast Asia has emerged as the epicenter of this new round of global conflict. The victor in the geostrategic struggle within Northeast Asia is poised to exert a greater influence over the entire Eurasian theater of the New Cold War. In the Northeast Asian theater, the US, Japan, and South Korea stand against China, North Korea, and Russia. Cyberwarfare holds a pivotal role in this confrontation, as all parties possess advanced information technology, scientific capabilities, and cyberwarfare prowess. Consequently, in the context of Northeast Asia, cyberwarfare could be a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the geostrategic conflict, possibly more so than in any other region. This article explores the future of cyberwarfare in Northeast Asia. To accomplish this, it will delve into the geostrategic significance of Northeast Asia in the broader global hegemonic conflict, underscore the importance of cyberwarfare in future warfare, and ultimately examine the current state and prospective evolution of cyberwarfare in the Northeast Asian context.
Topic:
Security, Cybersecurity, Espionage, Influence, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

2. Perfect Spy: The Arc of Pham Xuan An’s Life from War to Peace

Author:
Larry Berman and Lien-Hang T. Nguyen
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
What goes on in the heart of a spy? Can a spy truly have friends? What makes a spy tick? How does a spy decide between loyalty to a secret mission and loyalty to friends and colleagues? During the war, Pham Xuan An was the dean of Vietnamese journalists, employed by Time magazine as a full-fledged correspondent. None of his colleagues knew that An was really Vietnamese communist agent X6, whose training began years before the arrival of American combat troops and ended on April 30, 1975. For over twenty years Pham Xuan An lived his cover, deceiving everyone about his real identity while providing indispensable intelligence to Hanoi. After the war, Pham Xuan An was promoted to the rank of Major General and given the title People’s Army Hero. Yet, Pham Xuan An also became a symbol for reconciliation between former enemies.
Topic:
War, History, Peace, and Espionage
Political Geography:
Asia and Vietnam

3. The Cross-Strait Intelligence Contest Continues Without Quarter

Author:
Peter Mattis and Zoë Moore
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last week, the Taiwan High Court found retired air force Colonel Liu Sheng-shu (劉聖恕) and five serving military officers guilty of espionage for China. The court sentenced Colonel Liu and two of his co-conspirators to approximately 20 years in prison, marking some of the harshest sentencing for espionage in recent years (Taipei Times, October 26). Liu’s spy ring is one of at least 11 rings Taiwanese authorities have broken up over the last two years. These Chinese spies targeted Taiwan’s military, civilian government, industry, and the overseas communities of Chinese minorities. In some cases they were able to operate for years. Although it is tempting to read these cases as simply more examples of Beijing’s relentless intelligence operations against Taiwan, these cases and the tradecraft employed suggest some positive developments—or the relative absence of dangerous trends—in the cross-strait intelligence contest. The cost in trust of Chinese intelligence operations, the requirements of deterrence, and the potential costs of a cross-strait conflict combine to suggest that a wider international effort to counter Chinese intelligence operations is warranted.
Topic:
Intelligence, Espionage, Regional Security, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. U.S.-China Technological “Decoupling”: A Strategy and Policy Framework

Author:
Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A partial “decoupling”2 of U.S. and Chinese technology ecosystems is well underway. Beijing plays an active role in this process, as do other governments and private actors around the world. But the U.S. government has been a primary driver in recent years with its increased use of technology restrictions: export controls, divestment orders, licensing denials, visa bans, sanctions, tariffs, and the like. There is bipartisan support for at least some bolstering of U.S. tech controls, particularly for so-called strategic technologies, where Chinese advancement or influence could most threaten America’s national security and economic interests. But what exactly are these strategic technologies, and how hard should the U.S. government push to control them? Where is the responsible stopping point—the line beyond which technology restrictions aimed at China do more harm than good to America? These are vexing questions with few, if any, clear answers. Yet the United States cannot afford simply to muddle through technological decoupling, one of the most consequential global trends of the early twenty-first century. The U.S. technology base—foundational to national well-being and power—is thoroughly enmeshed with China in a larger, globe-spanning technological web. Cutting many strands of this web to reweave them into new patterns will be daunting and dangerous. Without a clear strategy, the U.S. government risks doing too little or—more likely—too much to curb technological interdependence with China. In particular, Washington may accidentally set in motion a chaotic, runaway decoupling that it cannot predict or control. Sharper thinking and more informed debates are needed to develop a coherent, durable strategy. Today, disparate U.S. objectives are frequently lumped together into amorphous constructs like “technology competition.” Familiar terms like “supply chain security” often fail to clarify such basic matters as which U.S. interests must be secured and why. Important decisions are siloed within opaque forums (like the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [CFIUS]), narrow specialties (like export control law), or individual industries (like semiconductors), concealing the bigger picture. The traditional concerns of “tech policy” and “China policy” receive outsized attention, while second-order implications in other areas (such as climate policy) get short shrift. And as China discourse in the United States becomes more politically charged, arguments for preserving technology ties are increasingly muted or not voiced at all. This report aims to address these gaps and show how American leaders can navigate the vast, perilous, largely unmapped terrain of technological decoupling. First, it gives an overview of U.S. thinking and policy—describing how U.S. views on Chinese technology have evolved in recent years and explaining the many tools that Washington uses to curb U.S.- China technological interdependence. Second, it frames the major strategic choices facing U.S. leaders—summarizing three proposed strategies for technological decoupling and advocating a middle path that preserves and expands America’s options. Third, it translates this strategy into implementable policies and processes—proposing specific objectives for U.S. federal agencies and identifying the technology areas where government controls are (or are not) warranted. The report also highlights many domestic investments and other self-improvement measures that must go hand in hand with restrictive action.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Authoritarianism, Economy, Espionage, Military, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. On the Question of Chinese Espionage

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Throughout recorded history, nations have employed spies to support foreign policy goals and military operations. However, such clandestine activities seldom become the subject of foreign policy themselves, and intelligence and related activities are rarely subject to public review. Yet in the People’s Republic of China, a massive “whole-of-society” approach to economic espionage is creating a new paradigm for how nations conduct, view, and address intelligence func- tions. In fact, a key element in the United States-China trade war is Washington’s insistence that Beijing cease stealing American intellectual property and trade secrets. China denies the claim, but hundreds of recently prosecuted espionage cases prove otherwise. These espionage activities are changing the global balance of power, impacting U.S. and foreign economies, and providing challenges to domestic and national security, as well as foreign policy formulation. Domesti- cally, they threaten economic security, the protection of critical infrastructure, and intellectual property rights.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and Espionage
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

6. The PLA General Staff Department Third Department Second Bureau: An Organizational Overview of Unit 61398

Author:
Mark Stokes
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
In May 2014, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) announced indictments against five Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers on charges of cyber espionage directed against U.S. firms. According to the indictments, the five officers were assigned to the Third Office of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) Technical Reconnaissance Department (alternatively known as the Third Department) Second Bureau. While assigned personnel may well engage in cyber espionage, a survey of Second Bureau infrastructure indicates a much broader communications intelligence mission.
Topic:
Intelligence, Cybersecurity, and Espionage
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Countering Chinese Cyber Operations: Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Interests

Author:
Mark Stokes and L. C. Russell Hsiao
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Chinese cyber espionage poses an advanced persistent threat to U.S. national and economic security. Groups operating from PRC territory are believed to be waging a coordinated cyber espionage campaign targeting U.S. government, industrial, and think tank computer networks. A dozen of these groups have been identified and linked with the PLA, and others connected with universities and information security enterprises. The largest and most active of these groups may operate from Beijing and Shanghai.
Topic:
Government, Cybersecurity, Economy, and Espionage
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America