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81. A Tale of Two Villages: Kinship Netwoks and Political Preference Change in Rural India

Author:
Neelanjan Sircar
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for the Advanced Study of India
Abstract:
This paper develops a theory on how voters form and change political preferences in democratic de- veloping world contexts. In the developing world, where state institutions are often weak, voters tend to be more focused on the competence and capacity of parties and candidates to deliver benefits. Such information may be difficult to ascertain, so voters must glean information from how candidates con- duct themselves during the electoral campaign. Voters use kinship networks to develop more accurate preferences by collectively reasoning through newly available information on candidates. In order to demonstrate these claims, this study analyzes data collected on political preferences and kinship net- works in two villages just before and after the campaign period during the 2011 Assembly election in the Indian state of West Bengal. The paper finds very strong kinship network effects on changes in issue preferences and vote choice over the course of the campaign and explains the results through qualitative work and a series of network autoregressive statistical models. In sum, this paper demonstrates how vot- ers develop independent preferences and implement political change, even in low information contexts with weak human capital.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, and Networks
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Asia, and West Bengal

82. How Will Bihar Shake Out?

Author:
Neelanjan Sircar, Bhanu Joshi, and Ashish Ranjan
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
The exit polls are out in Bihar, and we are none the wiser. It is seemingly a photo finish between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the Janata Dal United [JD(U)]-Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)-Congress Grand Alliance. The Bihar election is ending as it began, full of theatre and intrigue. We can only guess how it ends. We were making our way to East Champaran; we didn’t realise Narendra Modi’s rally would be in Gopalganj district that day. The rally was over, but traffic had stopped moving 2 km from the rally site; we would be stuck at the same spot for the next few hours. Nowhere else to go, we got out of the car and started chatting with rally-goers. An exuberant BJP supporter exclaimed, “We have 8-10 lakh people today!” This was clearly an overestimate, but the crowd was bigger than we had seen elsewhere. We stopped in at a roadside stand where 4-5 men were being served their thalis and asked from where they had come to attend the rally. “Dewaria,” responded one man (Dewaria is in Uttar Pradesh (UP), not Bihar). He went on, “None of us are from Bihar. People are coming from Gorakhpur, Kushinagar, Allahabad. The Party gives us enough money to eat lunch as well.” The Muslim shopkeeper who was cooking for them, the only person there who would actually be voting in Bihar, was clearly supporting the Grand Alliance, but he was happy for the extra money generated from the rally. The real reason for the traffic bottleneck then became clear. The road had narrowed to a single lane. While we headed further into Bihar, bus after bus, each with a “UP” license plate, was headed the other way. We analysts often mistakenly use rallies to gauge the hawa for a party. But, ultimately, rallies are about theatre and spectacle, while elections are won on the strength of the ground-level campaign. Privately, a section of BJP workers have been telling us that they can now see the NDA losing in this election, not something we heard in the first couple of weeks of the campaign. In our previous piece, using available data, we argued that the NDA would have to do very well in the third and fourth phases of this five-phase election if it is to win, something that even BJP leaders have now said publicly. Given that the NDA was well ahead in 2014, the NDA might still pull off this victory. It is clear, however, that the Grand Alliance has run a stronger ground campaign than the NDA, and that the campaign has had a major impact on changing voters’ minds. The NDA now seems unlikely to get near the 172 assembly constituency (AC) segments it won in 2014. In the remainder of this piece, we assess the structure of the Grand Alliance, how it shaped the campaign, as well as how the campaigns, for both NDA and the Grand Alliance, conducted themselves during this election.
Topic:
Government, Politics, and Elections
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Asia

83. Mapping Bangladesh's Political Crisis

Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
On 5 January, the first anniversary of the deeply contested 2014 elections, the most violent in Bangladesh's history, clashes between government and opposition groups led to several deaths and scores injured. The confrontation marks a new phase of the deadlock between the ruling Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) opposition, which have swapped time in government with metronomic consistency since independence. Having boycotted the 2014 poll, the BNP appears bent on ousting the government via street power. With daily violence at the pre-election level, the political crisis is fast approaching the point of no return and could gravely destabilise Bangladesh unless the sides move urgently to reduce tensions. Moreover, tribunals set up to adjudicate crimes perpetrated at the moment of Bangladesh's bloody birth threaten division more than reconciliation. Both parties would be best served by changing course: the AL government by respecting the democratic right to dissent (recalling its time in opposition); the BNP by reviving its political fortunes through compromise with the ruling party, rather than violent street politics. With the two largest mainstream parties unwilling to work toward a new political compact that respects the rights of both opposition and victor to govern within the rule of law, extremists and criminal networks could exploit the resulting political void. Violent Islamist factions are already reviving, threatening the secular, democratic order. While jihadi forces see both parties as the main hurdle to the establishment of an Islamic order, the AL and the BNP perceive each other as the main adversary. The AL and its leader, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid, emphasise that the absence from parliament of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and her BNP make them political non-entities. Yet, concerned about a comeback, the government is at-tempting to forcibly neutralise the political opposition and stifle dissent, including by bringing corruption and other criminal cases against party leaders, among whom are Zia and her son and heir apparent, Tarique Rahman; heavy-handed use of police and paramilitary forces; and legislation and policies that undermine fundamental constitutional rights. The BNP, which has not accepted any responsibility for the election-related vio-lence in 2014 that left hundreds dead (and saw hundreds of Hindu homes and shops vandalised), is again attempting to oust the government by force, in alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami, which is alleged to have committed some of the worst abuses during that period. The party retains its core supporters and seems to have successfully mobilised its activists on the streets. Yet, its sole demand – for a fresh election under a neutral caretaker – is too narrow to generate the public support it needs to over-come the disadvantage of being out of parliament, and its political capital is fading fast as it again resorts to violence. The deep animosity and mistrust between leaders and parties were not inevitable. Despite a turbulent history, they earlier cooperated to end direct or indirect military rule and strengthen democracy, most recently during the 2007-2008 tenure of the military-backed caretaker government (CTG), when the high command tried to re-move both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia from politics. Rather than building on that cooperation, the two leaders have resorted to non-democratic methods to undermine each other. In power, both have used centralised authority, a politicised judiciary and predatory law enforcement agencies against legitimate opposition. Underpinning the current crisis is the failure to agree on basic standards for multi-party democratic functioning. While the BNP claims to be the guardian of Bangladeshi nationalism, the AL has attempted to depict itself as the sole author and custodian of Bangladesh's liberation. The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established by the AL in March 2010 to prosecute individuals accused of committing atrocities during the 1971 liberation war, should be assessed in this context. While the quest to bring perpetrators to account is justifiable, the ICTs are not simply, or even primarily, a legal tool, but rather are widely perceived as a political one, primarily for use against the government's Islamist opposition. In short, the governing AL is seen to be using the nation's founding tragedy for self-serving political gains. The AL needs to realise that the BNP's marginalisation from mainstream politics could encourage anti-government activism to find more radical avenues, all the more so in light of its own increasingly authoritarian bent. Equally, the BNP would do well to abandon its alliances of convenience with violent Islamist groups and seek to revive agreement on a set of basic standards for multiparty democracy. A protracted and violent political crisis would leave Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia the ultimate losers, particularly if a major breakdown of law and order were to encourage the military to intervene; though there is as yet no sign of that, history suggests it is an eventuality not to be dismissed. The opportunities for political reconciliation are fast diminishing, as political battle lines become ever more entrenched. Both parties should restrain their violent activist base and take practical steps to reduce political tensions: the AL government should commit to a non-repressive response to political dis-sent, rein in and ensure accountability for abuses committed by law enforcement entities, reverse measures that curb civil liberties and assertively protect minority communities against attack and dispossession of properties and businesses; the AL should invite the BNP, at lower levels of seniority if needed, to negotiations aimed at reviving the democratic rules of the game, including electoral reform. It should also hold mayoral elections in Dhaka, a long-overdue constitutional requirement that would provide opportunities to begin that dialogue; and the BNP should commit to non-violent political opposition; refrain from an alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami that is enhancing the Islamist opposition's street power with little political return for the BNP; and instead demonstrate willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations with the AL to end a crisis that is undermining economic growth and threatening to subvert the political order.
Topic:
Democratization, Political Activism, and Elections
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and Asia

84. Back in the Same Orbit and Back on Earth

Author:
Satu Limaye
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Given the drift and depths to which the US-India relationship has succumbed throughout much of 2013 and the early part of 2014, visits by the two heads of government in the span of a few months constituted something of a return to the same orbit, symbolized by the fact that the two countries’ Mars orbiters (Mangalyaan and Maven) had entered the planet’s orbit within a couple of days of each other. Prime Minister Modi visited Washington in late September 2014, just four months after taking office. President Obama followed up with an important visit to India in January 2015 as the “Chief Guest” for India’s Republic Day, the first US president to be accorded this honor. But as always with US-India relations, positive symbols are suffused with caution. In the event, there were no major run-ins during the period of US-India relations covered by this article. Though, there were few major breakthroughs either. The relationship did recover very soon after the resounding election victory of Narendra Modi following India’s national elections in May 2014. The pace at which high-level US-India ties were reestablished under a Modi administration was something of a surprise given the unusual situation of his being barred from traveling to the US due to allegations about his role in the communal riots between Hindus and Muslims in the Indian state of Gujarat that he once led as chief minister. The improbable dilemma of the US government banning an official visit by a democratically elected leader, who had not been convicted of illegal acts by his own country or any international body, was finessed by simply removing the ban and issuing a message of warm welcome by President Obama himself. Prime Minister Modi thus visited Washington in late September 2014, just four months after taking office and on the back of an appearance at the annual UN General Assembly meeting in New York. President Obama followed up with an important visit to India in January 2015 as the “Chief Guest” for India’s Republic Day, the first US president to be accorded this honor. Obama also became the first US president to visit India twice while in office. Another first was the appointment in December 2014 of a US ambassador to India of Indian origin, Richard Rahul Verma. Given the drift and depths to which the bilateral relationship has succumbed throughout much of 2013 and the early part of 2014, the two heads of government visits constituted something of a return to the same orbit, symbolized by the fact that the Indian Space Research Organization’s (ISRO) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) respective Mars orbiters (Mangalyaan and Maven) had entered the planet’s orbit within a couple of days of each other. Indeed, PM Modi alluded to the connection at a joint media conference with President Obama in September saying “I’m happy that we are meeting here just a few days after the Indian and the U.S. missions reached Mars around the same time. So after the India-U.S. summit on Mars, we are meeting here on Earth. This happy coincidence captures the potential of our relationship.” But as always with US-India relations, positive symbols are suffused with caution. While also noting the “pleasant coincidence” of the two orbiters proximate trip to Mars, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Frank Rose suggested to an Indian audience in March 2015 that the time might be right for a “Space Situational Awareness” information sharing agreement, implying to listeners the need to avoid accidental collisions. In the event, there were no major run-ins during the period of US-India relations covered by this article. Though, as will become clear, there were few major breakthroughs either.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Elections
Political Geography:
India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

85. KMT Disarray Shapes Campaign

Author:
David G. Brown and Kevin Scott
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Kuomintang (KMT) Party’s mismanagement of the selection of its presidential candidate has left the party in disarray and increased the prospect that Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ing-wen will win the presidency along with a majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY) elections. Faced with the prospect of DPP victories, Beijing has sent mixed messages to Taiwan, while voicing its confidence in preserving the accomplishments of the peaceful development policy for the long-term. Against this background, the Ma administration and Beijing have struggled to keep cross-strait relations moving forward.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Elections, Leadership, Partisanship, and Campaigning
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

86. Money and Elections in the Maldives

Author:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:
The International Foundation for Electoral System’s (IFES) in close cooperation with national experts from Commerce, Development and Environment Consulting, conducted a nation-wide survey to measure the prevalence of vote buying in the Maldives during the March 2014 parliamentary elections. This is the first systematic study of its kind conducted in the Maldives and it provides statistical data on vote buying, campaign finance and other election-related issues. It reveals that 37% of the voters have personally witnessed attempts at vote buying. In addition, the Maldivian public is highly cynical of the way in which political parties and candidates spend their campaign funds. At the same time there is very strong public support for campaign finance reforms and, in particular, for combating vote buying. The methodology and sample were designed to be nationally representative with a +/- 3 percent margin of error. The report will be shared with the government, the parliament, the Election Commission, civil society, political parties and others. IFES is currently providing technical support to the Electoral Reform Working Group to formulate amendments to electoral legislation, and remains committed to supporting Maldivian institutions in improving the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Finance, Voting, and Campaign Finance
Political Geography:
South Asia, Asia, and Maldives

87. Popular Mandate and the Coming-of-Age of Social Media’s Presence in Indonesia Politics Post-Reformasi

Author:
Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The itinerant rise of the professionalised class of political pollsters, consultancies and statistic-analytical institutes in the Indonesian electoral scene has, in recent months, been accompanied by an analogous rise of a proto opinion-mining, sentiment-tracking industry in cyber-space, facilitated by an increasingly mediated environment. While newer forms of online media platforms have yet to replace traditional mass-media, the felt effects of individual aggrandisement and vicarious political marketing derived from these platforms proved to be very effective. This paper explores aspects of new media and its nascent influence upon Indonesian politics in the race to 2014. It examines how a more participatory post-Reformasi climate had joined forces with various aspects of new media, providing the electorate with greater leverage over their choice of candidates following the precipitous rise of populist media doyens like Joko Widodo. This paper concludes that aspects of new media are steadily gaining currency as a legitimate mainstream indicator of candidature electability even as voters‟ allegiance gradually shifts away from party to personality in Indonesia.
Topic:
Mass Media, Elections, Democracy, and Populism
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Asia

88. DPJ’s Broken Promise and the End of the Anti-Koizumi Era in Japan

Author:
Junghwan Lee
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The Democratic Party of Japan (hereafter DPJ) has ruled Japan since 2009 but is now at risk with Ozawa Ichiro’s departure from the DPJ only after three years. On July 2, 2012, Ozawa, former DPJ president and influential figure in DPJ intraparty dynamics, announced his departure from the DPJ with 49 fellow Diet members. He and his fellows have criticized the DPJ’s election manifesto and fundamental identity as being broken with Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko’s effort to raise the consumption tax. A split of Ozawa’s group from the DPJ seemed inescapable when Ozawa and 56 fellows voted against a bill for a consumption tax hike in the Lower House on June 26, 2012. Noda’s continued support for the consumption tax hike and Ozawa’s reactive choice to break away have increased political uncertainty in Japan. Japan may undergo Diet dissolution and a general election this fall due to the divided DPJ. How can we understand the DPJ’s endogenous collapse and what will be the impact of this political upheaval on Japan’s political future? I argue that DPJ solidarity did not have a strong foundation beyond an anti-Koizumi framework and that there was no intraparty consensus on some DPJ leaders’ new policy agenda, which is not related to the anti-Koizumi framework. When Koizumi Junichiro aggressively enhanced neoliberal structural reforms in the early 2000s, DPJ politicians were at first perplexed because Koizumi’s key agendas were well matched with their “small government” orientation. However, they soon found a solution for the anti-Koizumi framework with a doctrine for “more universal welfare without a tax hike” under the leadership of Ozawa. The DPJ’s differentiation from Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter LDP) was successful in the 2007 Upper House election and the 2009 Lower House election. However, Kan Naoto and Noda have tried to deviate from an Ozawa-led manifesto of no tax hike since 2010 because they found that a stable universal welfare system demands sound fiscal conditions and that a consumption tax increase is the only way of relieving the huge fiscal deficit problem. When the anti-Koizumi was exhausted as a core driving force of DPJ solidarity, the DPJ had become stuck in diverging policy orientations between fiscal soundness and no tax hike—and finally split. The divided DPJ symbolizes the end of the anti-Koizumi era in Japanese politics. Koizumi’s structural reform has dominated the discourse of Japanese politics in the last decade. However, the end of the anti-Koizumi era never means the rise of new discourse of Japanese politics. Since the DPJ and the LDP lost their differences on policy orientations, the stable two-party competition structure is dwindling in Japan. The more crucial point is that Japanese political leaders do not have new visions for Japan’s future political economic model beyond Koizumi’s structural reform and the anti-Koizumi framework’s emphasis on welfare.
Topic:
Reform, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Welfare
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

89. The 2012 U.S. Presidential Election and Its Implication in East Asia

Author:
Young Kwon Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
After the extended and fierce campaign, Obama finally clinched the victory in the 2012 presidential election. By gaining more than 300 electoral-college votes, which are disproportionately huge given his popular vote margin of around two percent over Romney(50% vs. 48%), he can legitimately claim national mandate for the next four year, although conservatives will be reluctant to embrace that mandate. After making a history four years ago by becoming the first black president to occupy the White House, he made another history this year by recapturing the presidency amid the still evolving Great Recession with the high unemployment rate around 7.1%. Given this historic nature of Obama’s second term, this paper aims to show how Obama was able to maintain an exceptionally competitive campaign despite the extremely bad national economic conditions. From the widely accepted consensus that the outcome of the U.S. presidential election is largely determined by the economic conditions of the election year, Obama’s successful presidential campaign needs explanation in one way or another. Following that, the paper also attempts to predict what the post-election U.S. East Asia policy look like. Will the post-election U.S. policy be different from the mainline policy of the last four years? If not, what would be rationale of the policy consistency? This paper will address these questions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

90. Japan under the DPJ: Changes in Foreign and Defense Policies

Author:
Sook-Jong Lee and Young-June Park
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On August 31, 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) landslide victory in the country’s national election brought fifty-four years of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) political dominance to an end. The DPJ won 308 of the 480 seats in the Lower House. Combined with 118 of the 237 seats in the Upper House that it won in July 2007, for the first time, the DPJ now controls both houses. By contrast, the LDP performed miserably. It managed to hold onto only 119 of the original 304 seats that it had held in the Lower House. Since its founding in 1955, the LDP had only lost power very briefly for a ten-month period between 1993 and 1994 when a non-LDP coalition came to power. The DPJ’s rise to power has been remarkable. The party was formed in 1996 during the run-up to the Lower House election of that year. The formation of the DPJ was in opposition to the LDP’s long dominance of Japanese politics and the policies of the reformist parties such as the Social Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party. The DPJ emerged as the third largest party behind the LDP and the now defunct New Frontier Party. By merging with members who had seceded from other opposition parties, such as the New Frontier Party, it would soon come to be a major challenger as it became the second largest party with the 1998 Upper House elections. However, its political influence waned and was only strengthened again through its merger with the Liberal Party, then led by the powerful Ichiro Ozawa in September 2003. This merger would also considerably boost its low public approval rating. However, it still trailed behind the LDP with a comparatively lower approval rating and a smaller number of parliamentary seats. In spite of these initial disadvantages, the DPJ’s victory was mainly due to a public backlash against the neoliberal reforms initiated during the 2001-2006 Koizumi administration and the inefficiencies of the short-lived cabinets of Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, and Taro Aso. With this election victory, analysts widely expect that there will be considerable changes in Japan’s domestic and foreign policies under the DPJ. On its domestic agenda, the DPJ is likely to increase its political control over the bureaucracy and to strengthen the social safety net by providing farming subsidies and cash allowances for child-rearing families. In its foreign policy, the DPJ is expected to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance but pursue a more independent stance than that of the LDP. At the same time, the DPJ will place greater emphasis on improving its relations with other Asian countries. This will also mean that South Korea-Japan relations will be improved as the DPJ addresses from a different perspective the controversial historical issues that have strained relations between the two countries. In general, there will not be significant changes to Japan’s foreign policy while substantial reforms will be focused on domestic political issues. Based on an analysis of the DPJ’s foreign and security policy, this commentary examines the prospects for South Korea-Japan relations as well as changes to Japan’s foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia