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161. Tracking the Ups and Downs in Indonesia’s Economic Activity During COVID-19 Using Mobility Index: Evidence from Provinces in Java and Bali

Author:
Yose Rizal Damuri, Prabaning Tyas, Haryo Aswicahyono, Lionel Priyadi, Stella Kusumawardhani, and Ega Kurnia Yazid
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
A timely and reliable prediction of economic activities is crucial in policymaking, especially in the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, which requires real-time decisions. However, making frequent predictions is challenging due to the substantial delays in releasing aggregate economic data. This study aims to nowcast Indonesia’s economic activities during the COVID-19 pandemic using the novel high-frequency Facebook Mobility Index as a predictor. Employing mixed-frequency, mixed-data sampling, and benchmark least-squares models, we expanded the mobility index and used it to track the growth dynamics of the gross regional domestic product of provinces in Java and Bali and performed a bottom-up approach to estimate the aggregated economic growth of the provinces altogether. Our results suggested that the daily Facebook Mobility Index was a considerably reliable predictor for projecting economic activities on time. All models almost consistently produced reliable directional predictions. Notably, we found the mixed data sampling-autoregressive model to be slightly superior to the other models in terms of overall precision and directional predictive accuracy across observations.
Topic:
GDP, Economy, Mobility, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

162. Economic and Emission Impact of Australia–China Trade Disruption: Implication for Regional Economic Integration

Author:
Xunpeng Shi, Tsun Se Cheong, and Michael Zhou
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study examines the debates on supply chain resilience and the economic and emissions impact of supply chain rerouting using Australia and China trade as an example. The estimations demonstrate that, in both export and import cases, a trade embargo between Australia and China, despite being compensated by alternative supply chains, will cause gross domestic product loss and emissions increases for both countries. Moreover, even if all other countries gain from the markets left by China, many of them suffer from overall gross domestic product loss and emissions increase. The findings that ASEAN and China may also suffer from an Australia–China trade embargo, despite a gain in trade volume, suggests that no country should add fuel to the fire. The results suggest that countries need to defend rules-based trading regimes and continuously promote regional economic integration.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Economy, Global Value Chains, Carbon Emissions, and Economic Integration
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, and Southeast Asia

163. Policy Strategies to Strengthen the Travel and Tourism Sectors from the COVID-19 Pandemic Shocks: A Computable General Equilibrium Model for the Indonesian Economy

Author:
Irlan Adiyatma Rum
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The travel and tourism sectors have become the most vulnerable sectors to the COVID-19 pandemic. Studies have shown that most tourist-destination countries will experience economic shocks due to the pandemic. This study analyses the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic shock and the implications of policies taken by the government to strengthen the travel and tourism sectors. As the largest travel and tourism economy in ASEAN, this study uses Indonesia as a case study. It uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model using a detailed national input–output table for the creative sectors. The study develops baseline scenarios (low and lower-middle recovery), general policy scenarios (moderate and highly effective support) and specific policy scenarios for the travel and tourism sectors. Through changes in export demand, the impact of the pandemic depends on the existing conditions and policy interventions. The pandemic causes the nominal gross domestic product at the national level to decline by an interval of [–1.99%, –2.97%] and for tourism and travel sectors by [–6.81%, –10.38%] depending on the recovery period. If the recovery is low (all annual inbound tourism expenditure is removed), the Indonesian macroeconomy will be worse than under the lower-middle recovery, given the same government intervention. Thus, effectiveness becomes an important factor for creating a better impact. Adding capital stimulus into the tourism sector helps to further reduce output decline in the travel and tourism sectors, but it is not enough to help the economy recover from the pandemic. The best policy strategy is to make sure that the mitigation plan will be implemented effectively.
Topic:
Tourism, Economy, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Travel
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Asia

164. America’s Use of Coercive Economic Statecraft

Author:
Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, Paula J. Dobriansky, and Adam Szubin
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
U.S. policymakers will continue to intensively use a growing array of coercive economic tools, including tariffs, sanctions, trade controls, and investment restrictions. The growing use reflects a desire by policymakers to use coercive economic tools in support of a growing range of policy objectives. Diplomacy around these tools has long been challenging and can require hard choices. To use these tools effectively, policymakers should focus on articulating clear objectives and measuring effectiveness and costs. U.S.-China competition raises the stakes for getting the use of coercive economic statecraft right. Policymakers in the next presidential administration and Congress would be well-served to spend at least as much effort focusing on the positive tools of statecraft. These include domestic economic renewal, international finance and development incentives, and positive trade measures, among others.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

165. A New Arsenal for Competition: Coercive Economic Measures in the U.S.-China Relationship

Author:
Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and China have long used coercive economic measures to advance both economic and foreign policy objectives. In recent years, however, both countries have turned to coercive economic measures as mainstream instruments of foreign policy and national security policy, and increasingly have deployed coercive economic measures against each other. For the United States, China’s economic scale and global interconnections make it a fundamentally different type of target for coercive economic measures than the comparatively smaller and less sophisticated economies that have been primary targets of U.S. economic coercion in the past. The United States cannot simply isolate China from the global economy. Instead, it must adopt a more strategic focus on limiting Chinese actions in areas significant to U.S. national security and shoring up economic and technology arenas where the United States maintains lasting leverage. Over the past several years, the United States has deployed an array of coercive economic measures against China. The most prominent of these have been the tariffs on approximately two-thirds of U.S. imports from China. The tariffs remain largely in place despite implementation of the Phase One trade deal that the United States and China signed in January 2020. But the United States also has developed and deployed an increasingly sophisticated set of other coercive economic tools that will play a prominent role in U.S.-China relations over the years ahead, regardless of whether the United States and China fully implement the Phase One deal and reach a broader Phase Two trade agreement. Those other coercive economic tools include export controls, restrictions on U.S. imports to secure U.S. supply chains, heightened scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, sanctions, and stepped-up law enforcement measures against Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft and other Chinese activities in the United States. This expanding set of measures serves a broadening array of U.S. policy goals, including economic objectives, foreign policy goals, and the maintenance of America’s technological edge. The U.S. record of success in the use of these coercive economic measures has been mixed. While tariffs and other measures have succeeded in putting some macroeconomic pressure on China, they have not extracted fundamental concessions from Beijing. Targeted sanctions and law enforcement measures similarly have had economic impacts on some Chinese companies, but other Chinese companies have demonstrated an ability to weather U.S. economic coercion. To be effective in translating economic coercion into policy change by China, the United States needs to better integrate its coercive measures with each other and with other policies, better signal intentions and escalation, more rigorously assess impacts and costs, and galvanize allied support and coordinated action. For its part, China appears to recognize a balancing act between limiting economic ties with foreign partners in some domains and maintaining them in others. China has sought to distance certain Chinese economic sectors, particularly high-tech manufacturing, from the United States in some areas, investing heavily in domestic capacity development. In other areas where China must rely on foreign partners for technology, IP, or manufacturing, or where China does not appear to see a clear interest in severing trade, Beijing has sought to keep trade and investment flows moving in an unencumbered fashion. As for the United States, this is a dynamic policy environment.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

166. Forging an Alliance Innovation Base

Author:
Daniel Kliman, Ben Fitzgerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report presents a blueprint for a community of technology innovation and protection anchored by America and its allies. Unless the United States builds this community—an “alliance innovation base”—it will steadily lose ground in the contest with China to ascend the commanding technological heights of the 21st century. Given that technology will increasingly determine future military advantage, underpin economic prosperity, and function as a tool for promoting liberal and illiberal visions of domestic governance, the stakes could not be higher. To compete, China is leveraging its formidable scale—whether measured in terms of research and development (R&D) expenditures, data sets, scientists and engineers, venture capital, or the reach of its leading technology companies. The only way for the United States to tip the scale back in its favor is to deepen cooperation with allies. The global diffusion of innovation also places a premium on aligning U.S. and ally efforts to protect technology. Unless coordinated with allies, tougher U.S. investment screening and export control policies, for example, will feature major seams that Beijing can exploit. America’s current approach to allies on technology innovation and protection remains a work in progress. In recent years, animated by concerns about China, the United States has made a concerted effort to step up engagement with allies in both areas. Existing mechanisms for deepening innovation with allies include technology scouting programs, multilateral cooperative frameworks, rapid innovation initiatives, and bilateral projects. However, these mechanisms at times lack sufficient resourcing, move too slowly, or feature rigid constraints on participation. U.S. instruments for working with allies on technology protection also contain major points of weakness. Multilateral export control regimes, though inclusive, are ponderous. The extraterritorial reach of U.S. export control laws can generate unintended obstacles to technology collaboration with allies. Bilateral and minilateral consultations on protection lack positive incentives to motivate allies to incur immediate costs such as forgoing technology sector investments from China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

167. Total Competition: China’s Challenge in the South China Sea

Author:
Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s bid for ascendancy remains anchored in the South China Sea and surrounding Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deems it economically and militarily vital to dominate the resources and sea lines of communication of a body of water twice the size of Alaska. Achieving this goal requires tethering neighboring countries into Beijing’s ambit while making the existing ruleset more favorable to China and displacing the dominant power behind the existing regional order. Some may find comfort in describing the scenario underway as a return to a “China-centered” rather than “Sino-centric” region.1 However, an authoritarian China’s coercive attempts to wield hegemonic control of the South China Sea threatens the sovereignty of Southeast Asian states and international freedom of the seas, both of which are of fundamental national interest to the United States. Yet the South China Sea and Southeast remain the least defended and most bountiful region susceptible to Chinese predations and inducements. The CCP leadership is obsessed with the idea that outside forces intend to contain China’s development, foment internal unrest, and prevent it from retaking what it considers to be its rightful place center stage in regional and global affairs. In partial response to deep-seated insecurities and renewed great-power ambitions, Xi Jinping and the CCP are in the process of attempting to exercise control over the entire nine-dash line claim covering the vast majority of the South China Sea and to turn Southeast Asia into a latter-day tributary system. CCP propaganda casts China’s quest for control over maritime Asia as an inexorable outcome of China’s rise and America’s decline. Curiously, the only government speaking seriously about “stopping” China is Beijing, suggesting that its policies are influenced more by subjective internal fears than by objective external realities. China wants nothing to stop it from consolidating its maximalist historic claims, from denying the United States the ability to intervene in regional conflicts, and from dismantling America’s postwar alliance system.
Topic:
Leadership, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South China Sea

168. The Novel Coronavirus Outbreak and Its Political/Economic Impact on China (Continued)

Author:
Li Hao
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The author released a short paper in early March 2020 on China's reaction to the spread of novel coronavirus infections, but circumstances have since progressed to a new stage. A pandemic of historic proportions has broken out, and the spread of infections has been relentless even in the Western countries that initially looked upon China coolly. The numbers of infections and deaths in the US in particular have significantly surpassed those in China, making the US the most infected country in the world. At the same time, China continues to contain the spread of infections, and appears to be moving toward resuming economic activities. Nevertheless, there are numerous issues that still need to be addressed. This paper will briefly examine the novel coronavirus situation in China since March.
Topic:
Politics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

169. The American News Media’s Volatile Perspectives on China

Author:
Ted Galen Carpenter
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Cato Journal
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In the decades since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, wild swings have occurred in the way that American media outlets view that country. At most times, a herd mentality is evident, as a large percentage of news stories portray China in one particular fashion, although there always are some dissenters from the dominant narrative. The nature of that narrative sometimes shifts rapidly and dramatically, however. During some periods, the prevailing perspective has been extremely hostile, with nearly all accounts seeing the PRC as a monstrous oppressor domestically and an existential security threat to the United States. That was the case for more than two decades following the communist revolution, until Richard Nixon’s administration suddenly altered U.S. policy in 1971–1972, and Washington no longer treated the PRC as a rogue state.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Media, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

170. The Costs of Covid: Australia’s Economic Prospects in a Wounded World

Author:
John Edwards
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Despite Victoria’s second wave of infection, Australia’s economic recovery from the coronavirus is underway. The bitter aftermath includes high and rising unemployment, vastly increased government debt, and a markedly less congenial global economy. Though formidable, the fiscal challenge is well within Australia’s means, especially if the Reserve Bank remains willing to acquire and hold Australian government debt. It may need to do so anyway to suppress an unwelcome appreciation of the Australian dollar in a world where major central banks are committed to low long term interest rates. Australia’s increasing integration into the East Asia economic community offsets the drag from the major advanced economies, but the US–China quarrel and the dislocation of global trading and investment relationships it threatens heightens the tension between Australia’s economic and security choices.
Topic:
Debt, Economy, Fiscal Policy, Unemployment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America